What Mary’s Aboutness Is About

The aim of this paper is to reinforce anti-physicalism by extending the “hard problem” to a specific kind of intentional states. For reaching this target, I investigate the mental content of the new intentional states of Jackson’s Mary. I proceed in the following way: I start analyzing the knowledge argument, which highlights the “hard problem” tied to phenomenal consciousness. In a second step, I investigate a powerful physicalist reply to this argument: the phenomenal concept strategy. In a third step, I propose a constitutional account of phenomenal concepts that captures the Mary scenario adequately, but implies anti-physicalist referents. In a last step, I point at the ramifications constitutional phenomenal concepts have on the constitution of Mary’s new intentional states. Therefore, by focusing the attention on phenomenal concepts, the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness will be carried over to the alleged “easy problem” of intentional states as well.     

Expressing One’s Mind

Remarks such as ‘I am in pain’ and ‘I think that it’s raining’ are puzzling, since they seem to literally describe oneself as being in pain or having a particular thought, but their conditions of use tend to coincide with unequivocal expressions of pain or of that thought. This led Wittgenstein, among others, to treat such remarks as expressing, rather than as reporting, one’s mental states. Though such expressivism is widely recognized as untenable, Bar-On has recently advanced a neo-expressivist view, on which such remarks exhibit characteristics of both expressions of mental states and reports of those states. I argue against any attempt to see such remarks as both reporting and expressing the same mental states, and that a correct account rests on distinguishing the truth conditions of such remarks from their conditions of use.     

The Pepsi Putnam Challenge

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Cohn Adam’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be hannless.     

Some arguments against intentionalism

Recently, many have argued that phenomenal content supervenes on representational content; i.e. that the phenomenal character of an experience is wholly determined (metaphysically, not causally) by the representational content of that experience. This paper it identifies many counter-examples to intentionalism. Further, this paper shows that, if intentionalism were correct, that would require that an untenable form of representational atomism also be correct. Our argument works both against the idea that phenomenal content supervenes on “conceptual” content and also against the idea that it supervenes on “non-conceptual” content. It is also shown that the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual content has been wrongly conceived as distinction between different kinds of information: in fact, it is a distinction between ways of packaging information that is, in itself, neither conceptual or non-conceptual.     

The sweet mystery of compatibilism

Any satisfactory account of freedom must capture, or at least permit, the mysteriousness of freedom—a “sweet” mystery involving a certain kind of ignorance rather than a “sour” mystery of unintelligibility, incoherence, or unjustifiedness. I argue that compatibilism can capture the sweet mystery of freedom. I argue first that an action is free if and only if a certain “rationality constraint” is satisfied, and that nothing in standard libertarian accounts of freedom entails its satisfaction. Satisfaction of this constraint is consistent with the universal causal predetermination of action (UCP). If UCP is true and the rationality constraint satisfied, there’s a sense in which our actions are explanatorily (though not necessarily causally) overdetermined. While it seems plausible (given UCP) that our actions are so overdetermined, it seems utterly mysterious why they should be so overdetermined. Compatibilism’s capacity to accommodate this mystery is a mark in its favor.     

Moral coherence,moral worth and explanations of moral motivation

Moral internalism and moral externalism compete over the best explanation of the link between judgment and relevant motivation but, it is argued, they differ at best only verbally. The internalist rational-conceptual nature of the link’ as accounted by M. Smith in The Moral Problem is contrasted to the externalist, also rational, link that requires in addition support from the agent’s psychological-dispositional profile; the internalist link, however, is found to depend crucially on a, similarly to the externalist, psychologically ‘loaded’ profile. It is also argued that the differentiation of the two competing explanations is insufficient partly because they both fail to consider crucial quantitative parameters of the judgment-motivation link. Such parameters become very important particularly in the light of Smith’s claim that this link is grounded on the observable “striking fact” where changes in the set of one’s moral beliefs systematically bring about changes in one’s moral behavior. Examples of algorithms measuring moral coherence and moral worth are provided to serve as evidence for what it comes down to, vis-à-vis the alleged fact, only a verbal dispute between the two camps. Finally, the ‘misfiring’ of these explanations is understood in connection to the irreducibility of concepts such as ‘moral worth’, and/or, ‘moral sensitivity’.     

Black the libertarian

The most serious challenge to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) comes in the form of a dilemma: either the counterexample presupposes determinism, in which case it begs the question; or it does not presuppose determinism, in which case it fails to deliver on its promise to eliminate all alternatives that might plausibly be thought to satisfy PAP. I respond to this challenge with a counterexample in whichconsidering an alternative course of action is anecessary condition fordeciding to act otherwise, and the agent does not in fact consider the alternative. I call this a “buffer case,” because the morally relevant alternative is “buffered” by the requirement that the agent first consider the alternative. Suppose further that the agent’s considering an alternative action—entering the buffer zone—is what would trigger the counterfactual intervener. Then it would appear that PAP-relevant alternatives are out of reach. I defend this counterexample to PAP against three objections: that considering an alternative isitself a morally relevant alternative; that buffer cases can be shown to containother alternatives that arguably satisfy PAP; and that even if the agent’spresent access to PAP-relevant alternatives were eliminated, PAP could still be satisfied in virtue ofearlier alternatives. I conclude that alternative possibilities are a normal symptom, but not an essential constituent, of moral agency.     

Contextualism on a pragmatic,not a skeptical,footing

Contextualism is supposed to explain why the following argument for skepticism seems plausible: (1) I don’t know that I am not a bodiless brain-in-a-vat (BIV); (2) If I know I have hands, then I know I am not a bodiless BIV; (3) Therefore, I do not know I have hands. Keith DeRose claims that (1) and (2) are “initially plausible.” I claim that (1) is initially plausible only because of an implicit argument that stands behind it; it is not intuitively plausible. The argument DeRose offers is based on the requirement of sensitivity, that is, on the idea that if you know something then you would not believe it if it were false. I criticize the sensitivity requirement thereby undercutting its support for (1) and the skeptical data that contextualism is meant to explain. While skepticism is not a plausible ground for contextualism, I argue that certain pragmatic considerations are. It’s plausible to think that to know something more evidence is required when more is at stake. The best way to handle skepticism is to criticize the arguments for it. We should not adopt contextualism as a means of accommodating skepticism even if there are other pragmatic reasons for being a contextualist about knowledge.     

Reflective Luck and Belief Ownership

A belief is reflectively lucky if it is a matter of luck that the belief is true, given what a subject is aware of on reflection alone. Various epistemologists have argued that any adequate theory of knowledge should eliminate reflective luck, but doing so has proven difficult. This article distinguishes between two kinds of reflective luck arguments in the literature: local arguments and global arguments. It argues that local arguments are best interpreted as demanding, not that one be reflectively aware of the reliability of the sources of one’s beliefs, but that one’s beliefs be attributable to one as one’s own. The article then argues that global arguments make illegitimate demands, because they require that we be ultimately answerable for our beliefs. In the end, the article argues that epistemologists should shift their focus away from reflective luck and toward the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to cognitive agents.     

Monadic theory of order and topology, 1

We deal with the monadic theory of linearly ordered sets and topological spaces, disprove two of Shelah’s conjectures and prove some more results. In particular, if the Continuum Hypothesis holds, then there exist monadic formulae expressing the predicates “X is countable” and “X is meager” in the real line and in Cantor’s Discontinuum.     

Righting the early history of computing,or how sausage was made

The short answer to the question just posed seems to be, “Not much.” Since I have given “the long answer” elsewhere,¹² I can summarize it here. Berg could see no point in writing Bromley. What could he write to someone he believed guilty of plagiarism? What could such a letter accomplish? He did, however, write to New York University Press; to all the universities involved, and to the Works’ English publisher (Pickering and Chatto), who said they passed the letter on to Campbell-Kelly (30 June 1990); to a great many professional societies in Australia, England, and the United States; to a great many governmental agencies and some politicians in those countries; to some publications, both academic and popular; to the Pope and several cardinals; and to a miscellany of other individuals. Generally, those in the best position to do something—for example, the three universities involved —did not even answer Berg’s letter. Others often did answer, but their answer was generally that they were in no position to do anything. That was how matters stood when I published my first article on “the Berg Affair”.₁₂ Its publication finally roused those best positioned to answer. Late in 1993, Galler, Bromley, and Campbell-Kelly wrote letters to the editor of Accountability in Research criticizing me for not getting their side of the story before I published Berg’s. Campbell-Kelly threatened the journal’s publisher with a lawsuit if I (or it) did not retract. The three also provided some insight into what their explanation of events might be. Bromley, though listed prominently in ads for the Works, claimed to have had only a small part, merely advising Campbell-Kelly on selection and arrangement of the papers printed in Volumes 2 and 3. Campbell-Kelly confirmed that Bromley took no part in the detailed editing or in the provision of documents. That work was performed by one C.J.D. (“Jim”) Roberts, a “London-based independent scholar” who was “editorial consultant to the Works” (and, apparently, worked directly under Campbell-Kelly). Roberts seems to deserve more public credit than he has so far received. According to Campbell-Kelly, it was Roberts who, making a systematic search for unknown holdings of Babbage, turned up the original of the letter to Quetelet by writing the Royal Library (one “tiny triumph” among many). Campbell-Kelly also claimed that neither he nor Roberts knew of Berg’s prior discovery.     

The Geometry of Standard Deontic Logic

Whereas geometrical oppositions (logical squares and hexagons) have been so far investigated in many fields of modal logic (both abstract and applied), the oppositional geometrical side of “deontic logic” (the logic of “obligatory”, “forbidden”, “permitted”, . . .) has rather been neglected. Besides the classical “deontic square” (the deontic counterpart of Aristotle’s “logical square”), some interesting attempts have nevertheless been made to deepen the geometrical investigation of the deontic oppositions: Kalinowski (La logique des normes, PUF, Paris, 1972) has proposed a “deontic hexagon” as being the geometrical representation of standard deontic logic, whereas Joerden (jointly with Hruschka, in Archiv für Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie 73:1, 1987), McNamara (Mind 105:419, 1996) and Wessels (Die gute Samariterin. Zur Struktur der Supererogation, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2002) have proposed some new “deontic polygons” for dealing with conservative extensions of standard deontic logic internalising the concept of “supererogation”. Since 2004 a new formal science of the geometrical oppositions inside logic has appeared, that is “n-opposition theory”, or “NOT”, which relies on the notion of “logical bi-simplex of dimension m” (m = n − 1). This theory has received a complete mathematical foundation in 2008, and since then several extensions. In this paper, by using it, we show that in standard deontic logic there are in fact many more oppositional deontic figures than Kalinowski’s unique “hexagon of norms” (more ones, and more complex ones, geometrically speaking: “deontic squares”, “deontic hexagons”, “deontic cubes”, . . ., “deontic tetraicosahedra”, . . .): the real geometry of the oppositions between deontic modalities is composed by the aforementioned structures (squares, hexagons, cubes, . . ., tetraicosahedra and hyper-tetraicosahedra), whose complete mathematical closure happens in fact to be a “deontic 5-dimensional hyper-tetraicosahedron” (an oppositional very regular solid).      

Recollections of Fred Almgren

While visiting Princeton for the 1997–98 year I have had the privilege of using Fred’s office and helping Jean to go through his papers. It has been moving to see the magnitude of Fred’s helpful correspondence with students and colleagues, some of which Jean and I returned to them with an invitation to contribute short recollections. This article gives some selections from their responses. For more recollections see Mackenzie’s article on “Fred Almgren: Lover of Mathematics, Family, and Life’s Adventures” (Notices AMS 44, 1997, 1102–1106) and the memorial issue ofExperimental Mathematics (Vol. 6, 1997, 1–12).     

In Defense of Epistemic Circularity

In this paper I defend epistemic circularity by arguing that the “No Self-Support” principle (NSS) is false. This principle, ultimately due to Fumerton (1995), states that one cannot acquire a justified belief in the reliability of a source of belief by trusting that very source. I argue that NSS has the skeptical consequence that the trustworthiness of all of our sources ultimately depends upon the trustworthiness of certain fundamental sources – sources that we cannot justifiably believe to be reliable. This is a problem, I claim, because if the trustworthiness of all of our sources depends upon sources that we should not believe to be reliable, then a reflective individual should not trust any of his sources at all. The hidden cost of rejecting epistemic circularity is thus the unacceptable skeptical thesis that reflective individuals like you and I have no justified beliefs whatsoever.     

Disagreement point axioms and the egalitarian bargaining solution

We provide new characterizations of the egalitarian bargaining solution on the class of strictly comprehensive n-person bargaining problems. The main axioms used in all of our results are Nash’s IIA and disagreement point monotonicity—an axiom which requires a player’s payoff to strictly increase in his disagreement payoff. For n = 2 these axioms, together with other standard requirements, uniquely characterize the egalitarian solution. For n > 2 we provide two extensions of our 2-person result, each of which is obtained by imposing an additional axiom on the solution. Dropping the axiom of anonymity, strengthening disagreement point monotonicity by requiring player i’s payoff to be a strictly decreasing function of the disagreement payoff of every other player j ≠ i, and adding a “weak convexity” axiom regarding changes of the disagreement point, we obtain a characterization of the class of weighted egalitarian solutions. This “weak convexity” axiom requires that a movement of the disagreement point in the direction of the solution point should not change the solution point. We also discuss the so-called “transfer paradox” and relate it to this axiom.     

Iterated forcing and normal ideals onω 1

We prove that suitable iteration does not collapse ℵ₁ [and does not add reals], i.e., that in such iteration, certain sealing of maximal antichains of stationary subsets ofω ₁ is allowed. As an application, e.g., we prove from supercompact hypotheses, mainly, the consistency of: ZFC + GCH + “for some stationary setS ⊆ω ₁, {ie345-1}(ω ₁)/(D ω ₁ +S) is the Levy algebra” (i.e., the complete Boolean Algebra corresponding to the Levy collapse Levy (ℵ₀,<ℵ₂) (and we can add “a variant of PFA”) and the consistency of the same, with “Ulam property” replacing “Levy algebra”). The paper assumes no specialized knowledge (if you agree to believe in the semi-properness iteration theorem and RCS iteration). This research was partially supported by the NSF. This paper was largely written during the author’s visit at Cal Tech around the end of April 1985. The author would like to thank M. Foreman, A. Kekris and H. Woodin for their hospitality.     

Cantor set and interpolation

In 1998, Y. Benyamini published interesting results concerning interpolation of sequences using continuous functions ℝ → ℝ. In particular, he proved that there exists a continuous function ℝ → ℝ which in some sense “interpolates” all sequences (x _n ) _n∈ℤ ∈ [0, 1]^ℤ “simultaneously.” In 2005, M.R. Naulin and C. Uzcátegui unified and generalized Benyamini’s results. In this paper, the case of topological spaces X and Y with an Abelian group acting on X is considered. A similar problem of “simultaneous interpolation” of all “generalized sequences” using continuous mappings X → Y is posed. Further generalizations of Naulin-Uncátegui theorems, in particular, multidimensional analogues of Benyamini’s results are obtained.     

Is Believing at Will ‘Conceptually Impossible’?

In this paper I discuss the claim that believing at will is ‘conceptually impossible’ or, to use a formulation encountered in the debate, “that nothing could be a belief and be willed directly”. I argue that such a claim is only plausible if directed against the claim that believing itself is an action-type. However, in the debate, the claim has been univocally directed against the position that forming a belief is an action-type. I argue that the many arguments offered in favor of the ‘conceptual impossibility’ of performing such actions fail without exception. If we are to argue against doxastic voluntarism we are better off by resorting to more modest means.