网络视频媒体独播节目提供模式与广告定价模式研究

通过构建网络视频媒体独播节目的最优决策模型,分析了独播节目的节目提供模式与嵌入式广告定价模式问题.研究得到当嵌入式广告采用CPM定价模式时:若嵌入式广告价格价较低,网络视频媒体应同时提供收费模式与免费模式的视频节目;若嵌入式广告价格较高,网络视频媒体应只提供收费模式的视频节目.当嵌入式广告采用CPC定价模式时:若嵌入式广告价格价较低,网络视频媒体应同时提供收费模式与免费模式的视频节目.两种定价模式下嵌入式广告价格的相对大小决定了网络视频媒体的节目提供模式.     

考虑炒作效应的网络视频平台商业模式选择

随着网络视频产业迅猛发展,越来越多的视频节目依赖炒作宣传吸引关注度获取丰厚的商业收益。本文考虑时间因素和炒作因素,基于用户需求不确定性建立连续时间型收益模型。应用哈密顿方法求解非线性优化问题,得到了炒作效应影响下的视频用户支付意愿变化规律,网络视频商业模式的动态演化趋势,并确立了最优的视频节目定价和营销炒作策略。研究结果表明,选择收费模式用户人数随着炒作时间的增加而增加,而选择免费模式用户人数随着炒作时间的增加而减少;随着炒作效应的提高,混合型免费—收费模式会逐渐演化为单一收费模式,且视频平台利润呈现倒“U”型变化趋势。研究结论揭示了营销炒作对视频定价、用户支付意愿和收视行为的影响,为视频平台更好的了解用户需求,制定商业策略提供决策依据。     

两阶段免费增值商业模式中的定价优化与时序研究

免费增值商业模式在信息产品和服务当中被广泛采用。针对企业首先推出免费产品再推出付费产品以充分利用两种产品推出的时间差来提升消费者学习效应、降低消费者使用成本的情形,本文首先建立两阶段模型,求解给定系统参数情况下的付费版产品最优定价问题并给出解析解,然后通过与企业应用单阶段免费增值模式时的利润进行比较,解析地得到企业选择两阶段模式可获得较高利润的条件,最后在数值计算基础上讨论了学习效应强度对企业利润的影响,和优化学习效应强度以拓展两阶段模式适用范围的问题。本文的研究成果为拟采用免费增值商业模式的企业提供了关于产品最优定价和模式选择的决策支持。     

考虑云安全风险的个人云存储服务最优定价策略

针对现有个人云存储服务纷纷关闭的现象,如何根据不同市场时期和云用户特征,制定合理的定价策略已成为个人云存储服务商面临的挑战性问题。本文在考虑云安全风险,云用户感知价值及弹性成本对个人云存储服务定价的影响,建立了基于云安全风险的两阶段定价模型,给出了免费试用时长确定下的最优决策及免费试用时长不确定下的最优免费试用时长及最优价格。借助数值分析,进一步研究了云安全风险系数,云用户感知价值,云安全运营成本系数对最优免费时长,最优利润的影响,结果表明,当云安全风险系数适中时,个人云存储供应商(PCSP)采取两阶段定价策略。另外,最优利润随着云安全风险系数,免费试用时长,单位安全运营成本的增加先增加后减少。     

考虑地位效应时炫耀性虚拟商品的最优定价与普及版本化

考虑地位效应的影响,针对炫耀性虚拟商品,决策最优定价和普及版本化。建立了单标准版策略、双版本免费普及策略和双版本销售策略等三种模型,求解得到企业在对应策略下对单版本或双版本的炫耀性虚拟商品的最优定价,在此基础上分析得到地位效应对虚拟商品价格、企业利润和最优普及版本化策略的影响。研究发现地位效应是导致标准版炫耀性虚拟商品价格和企业利润提升的因素;当存在地位效应时,双版本销售策略是炫耀性虚拟商品的最优普及版本化策略;但双版本销售策略相比于单标准版策略的优势在一定条件下因网络外部性增强而削弱。     

基于网络外部性下双边平台延伸服务最优定价

在考虑交叉网络外部性的前提下,探讨平台提供延伸服务对平台定价策略的影响,结论表明,提供延伸服务可以增加平台利润,而具体的定价策略又分为两种情形,第一:在双边平台形成初期,用户规模较小,平台采取不对称定价,标准取决于延伸服务的互补强度:如果互补强度较小时,平台对卖方采取免费策略,如果互补强度较大时,平台则直接对卖方采取高价策略,此时平台利润最高;第二:当双边平台逐渐成熟之后,用户达到一定规模,平台直接对双边用户采取较高定价,此时平台利润最高.     

具广告影响的再制造闭环供应链的决策与协调

再制造品的出现会对单位利润较高的新产品产生蚕食,因此需要对新产品进行广告投入而制定合适的广告策略.在考虑普通消费者和绿色消费者偏好的基础上,进一步考虑了新产品广告投入对再制造闭环供应链(Closed-Loop Supply Chain,CLSC)的影响.基于消费者效用理论和博弈论方法,构建了再制造CLSC决策模型,对比研究了不同情况下的最优定价和广告策略,阐明了广告效应对再制造CLSC决策和利润的影响,并提出了改进的两部收费制契约.通过算例分析得到:广告不改变再制造CLSC定价策略的选择规律,无论是否有广告投入,零售商和制造商均倾向于其自身主导,第三方回收商倾向于制造商主导,但从经济效益和环境效益方面来说,制造商主导模式更优,并且改进的两部收费制契约能够实现再制造CLSC的有效协调.     

考虑衍生需求和粉丝效应的视频服务供应链质量努力策略研究

视频服务作为“互联网+”时代下的新型文化产业模式,日益受到人们的关注。本文构建一个视频服务平台和一个视频服务提供商组成的视频服务供应链,视频服务提供商通过视频服务平台向用户提供基础服务和两阶段衍生服务。考虑视频服务供应链成员的四种行为因素对服务需求的影响,并分别建立平台定价模式和提供商定价模式下服务供应链成员的利润函数,运用博弈理论,优化求解得到两种模式下服务供应链成员最优的质量努力策略和利润。最后,通过数值仿真,探讨了粉丝效应和收益分成比例与最优质量努力策略和最优利润的相关性,并得出相关结论,给出管理启示。     

基于质量分级的生鲜农产品供应链的定价与保鲜策略研究

为了有效降低生鲜农产品损耗,保障流通与销售过程中生鲜农产品的品质及安全,解决消费者对生鲜农产品品质及其新鲜度的高追求与生鲜农产品冷链物流成本过高导致保鲜投入不足之间的矛盾,文中以价格和新鲜度为市场需求的主要影响因素,分别在产销地均不分级、销地分级和产地分级三种质量分级模式下,构建了供应商和零售商的利润函数,采用stackelberg博弈求解得到各自的最优定价策略和最优保鲜策略.对不同质量分级模式下的定价策略和保鲜策略进行对比分析显示,产地分级模式下的定价策略有利于增加市场需求及市场主体的利润;产地分级模式下的保鲜策略在控制损耗的效果和控制保鲜的成本上都优于其他模式.     

维修中心参与回收时闭环供应链的定价决策及回收模式选择

维修中心参与回收是闭环供应链研究面临的新情境。本文将维修中心可以免费获得零部件的情形考虑进来,分别给出了回收商单回收渠道模式、回收商与第三方维修中心双回收渠道模式,在此基础上深入研究了两种模式下闭环供应链的定价决策及回收模式选择问题。结果表明：两种模式下,官方维修中心免费获得零部件数量的增加都会对制造商利润产生积极影响,但不会对其回购价产生影响;双回收渠道模式下,第三方维修中心免费获得零部件数量的增加会使制造商的回购价降低,使其利润增加。从有偿回收产品总数量最大化的角度来看,当第三方维修中心免费获得零部件的数量较低且两种渠道之间的竞争程度较高时,应该选择双回收渠道模式。从制造商利润最大化的角度来看,模式选取决策与两种模式下官方维修中心免费获得零部件数量的相对大小有关。     

A joint dynamic pricing and advertising model of perishable products

Advertising and dynamic pricing play key roles in maximizing profit of a firm. In this paper a joint dynamic pricing and advertising problem for perishable products is investigated, where the time-varying demand rate is decreasing in sales price and increasing in goodwill. A dynamic optimization model is proposed to maximize total profit by setting a joint pricing and advertising policy under the constraint of a limited advertising capacity. By solving the dynamic optimization problem on the basis of Pontryagin’s maximum principle, the analytical solutions of the optimal joint dynamic pricing and advertising policy are obtained. Additionally, to highlight the advantage of the joint dynamic strategy, the case of the optimal advertising with static pricing policy is considered. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the validness of the theoretical results, and some managerial implications for the pricing and advertising of the perishable products are provided.     

Coordination of cooperative advertising in a two-level supply chain when manufacturer offers discount

We studied the coordination of cooperative advertisement in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain when the manufacturer offers price deductions to customers. With a price sensitive market, the expected demand with cooperative advertising and price deduction is demonstrated. When the manufacturer is a leader, we obtained the optimal national brand name investment, local advertisement and associated manufacturer’s allowance with any given price deduction. When the manufacturer offers more price deduction to customers, the retailer will increase local advertisement if the manufacturer provides the same portion of the local advertising allowance. We obtained the necessary and sufficient condition for the price deduction to ensure an increase of manufacturer’s profit, and a search procedure for determining such an optimal price deduction is provided as well. When the manufacturer and retailer are partners, we obtained the optimal national brand name investment and local advertisement. For any given price deduction, the total profit for the supply chain with cooperative scheme is always higher than that with the non-cooperative scheme. When price elasticity of demand is larger than one, the resulting closed form optimal price deduction with partnership is also obtained. To increase profits for both parties in a supply chain, we recommend that coordination in local and national cooperative advertising with a partnership relationship between manufacturer and retailer is the best solution. The bargaining results show how to share the profit gain between the manufacturer and the retailer, and determine the associated pricing and advertising policies for both parties.     

Channel Coordination with Cooperative Advertising Considering Effect of Advertising on Willingness to Pay

In this paper, cooperative advertising in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain is studied. Advertising can enhance willingness to pay (WTP) of customers. This trade-off between the benefits of increasing WTP of customers and the advertising expenditure is a key to understanding the retailers optimal advertising decision. On the other hand, it is interesting to understand in which condition supporting the retailer for his advertising expenditure is beneficial for the manufacturer. In this study, in order to capture pricing and advertising strategies of the channel member, three non-cooperative games including Nash, Stackelberg retailer and Stackelberg manufacturer game-theoretic models are established. In spite of the related studies which restrict price in order to prevent negative demand, the proposed model allows channel members to increase their prices by enhancing WTP of customers. In this study, contrary to similar additive form demand functions applied in the co-op ad literature which limits their studies for cases that profit function is concave with respect to variables, optimal prices and advertising strategies are obtained for all the solution space. Surprisingly for the very high values of the advertising effect coefficient, a finite optimal advertising expenditure is achieved.     

规模不经济下基于一致定价和促销努力的双渠道供应链协调策略

在制造商存在规模不经济环境下,分别针对集中决策模式和分散决策模式,建立了基于一致定价和促销努力的双渠道供应链协调策略模型,分析了规模不经济和服务负溢出效应对供应链运营决策的影响,得到了集中和分散决策下各企业最优运作策略和收益。研究指出,规模不经济的双渠道供应链在分散决策批发价契约下无法实现供应链协调;而分散决策网络渠道收益共享契约能够实现双渠道总收益等于集中决策模式下供应链收益,但无法保证各主体始终获得高于批发价合同下的收益;进一步,设计了带有固定补偿的网络渠道收益共享契约,通过对固定补偿值的有效设计,不仅可以保证双渠道总收益等于集中决策模式下供应链收益,且可以始终保证各主体收益不低于分散决策批发价契约下其所得收益,从而实现各主体利益双赢以及供应链的有效协调。     

Signaling Quality: Dynamic Price-Advertising Model

This paper extends the existing quality-signaling literature by investigating the roles of price and advertising levels as quality indicators in a dynamic framework. Considering perceived quality as a form of goodwill, we modify the well-known Nerlove-Arrow dynamic model to include price effects. In our model, price is used both as a monetary constraint and as a signal of quality, while advertising spending is used only as a signaling device, and thus purely as a dissipative expense. Utilizing optimal control, we determine optimal decision rules for a firm regarding both price and advertising over time as functions of perceived quality. The results indicate that, when prices act as monetary constraints and are reduced to increase demand, the firm should use the signaling role of advertising by increasing spending to accelerate perceived quality increases. In cases when the value of the perceived quality goes up together with the increase in the perceived quality by more than the demand, in percentage terms, the firm should increase the price (use its signaling role). At steady-state, we find that the level of optimal profit margin relative to price decreases with the elasticity of demand with respect to the brand price. However, higher elasticity of demand with respect to the firm’s perceived quality and/or a higher impact of price (advertising) lead/leads to a higher optimal profit margin (advertising spending) relative to price (revenue).     

Vertical cooperative advertising and pricing decisions in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain: A game-theoretic approach

Manufacturers can increase the advertising expenditures of their retailers by bearing a fraction of the occurring costs within the framework of a vertical cooperative advertising program. We expand the existing research which deals with advertising and pricing decisions in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain contemporaneously. By means of game theory, four different relationships between the channel members are considered: Firstly, three non-cooperative games with either symmetrical distribution of power or asymmetrical distribution with one player being the leader in each case, and one cooperative game where both players tend to maximize the total profit. The latter is complemented by a bargaining model, which proposes a fair split of profit on the basis of the players’ risk attitude and bargaining power. Our main findings are as follows: (a) In contrast to previous analyses, we do not limit the ratio between manufacturer’s and retailer’s margin, which provides more general insights into the effects of the underlying distribution of power within the channel. (b) The highest total profit is gained when both players cooperate. This behavior puts also the customers in a better position, as it produces the lowest retail price as well as the highest advertising expenditures compared to the other configurations.     

The effect of supply uncertainty in price-setting newsvendor models

We consider a price-setting newsvendor model in which a firm needs to make joint inventory and pricing decisions before the selling season. The supply process is uncertain such that the received quantity is the product of the order quantity and a random yield rate. Two cost structures are investigated, the in-house production case in which the firm pays for the input quantity and the procurement case in which the firm pays for the quantity received only. Our objective is to investigate the effect of yield randomness on optimal decisions and expected profit. By using the theory of stochastic comparisons, we find that under both cost structures, a less variable yield rate leads to a lower optimal price and a higher expected profit. Moreover, we show that in the in-house production case, a stochastically larger yield rate also results in a lower optimal price and a higher profit, but this is not true in the procurement case. Examples show that the effect of supply uncertainty on optimal order quantity is not universal.     

A game theoretic approach to coordinate pricing and vertical co-op advertising in manufacturer-retailer supply chains

Vertical cooperative (co-op) advertising is a marketing strategy in which the retailer runs local advertising and the manufacturer pays for a portion of its entire costs. This paper considers vertical co-op advertising along with pricing decisions in a supply chain; this consists of one manufacturer and one retailer where demand is influenced by both price and advertisement. Four game-theoretic models are established in order to study the effect of supply chain power balance on the optimal decisions of supply chain members. Comparisons and insights are developed. These embrace three non-cooperative games including Nash, Stackelberg-manufacturer and Stackelberg-retailer, and one cooperative game. In the latter case, both the manufacturer and the retailer reach the highest profit level; subsequently, the feasibility of bargaining game is discussed in a bid to determine a scheme to share the extra joint profit.     

考虑乘客取消订单的网约车平台定价策略

针对乘运市场供需不匹配的情况,考虑乘客在网约车平台预约订单后的取消行为,以平台利润最大化为目标,首先建立乘客选择模型计算乘客取消订单概率,再分别构建市场供过于求和供不应求状态下的利润模型,求解平台最优定价。研究表明:制定适当的违约规则可以有效减少乘客取消订单的概率,提高平台利润;最优定价随着服务质量的提高而增加,在打车非高峰期,平台可以通过提高服务质量来增加平台利润;非高峰期平台最优定价随着出租车费用的增加而减少,而高峰期定价策略受出租车费用影响较小。     

需求对时间和价格敏感产品的最优动态定价与订购策略

探讨了需求对时间和价格敏感产品的最优动态定价和订购策略,建立了使零售商利润最大化的库存模型.然后对模型的性质进行了分析,给出了一个寻找最优价格调整次数的算法和数值例子,得到一些有意义的管理经验.