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1.
This article reconsiders the double-slit experiment from the nonrealist or, in terms of this article, “reality-without-realism” (RWR) perspective, grounded in the combination of three forms of quantum discontinuity: (1) “Heisenberg discontinuity”, defined by the impossibility of a representation or even conception of how quantum phenomena come about, even though quantum theory (such as quantum mechanics or quantum field theory) predicts the data in question strictly in accord with what is observed in quantum experiments); (2) “Bohr discontinuity”, defined, under the assumption of Heisenberg discontinuity, by the view that quantum phenomena and the data observed therein are described by classical and not quantum theory, even though classical physics cannot predict them; and (3) “Dirac discontinuity” (not considered by Dirac himself, but suggested by his equation), according to which the concept of a quantum object, such as a photon or electron, is an idealization only applicable at the time of observation and not to something that exists independently in nature. Dirac discontinuity is of particular importance for the article’s foundational argument and its analysis of the double-slit experiment.  相似文献   

2.
This article reconsiders the concept of physical reality in quantum theory and the concept of quantum measurement, following Bohr, whose analysis of quantum measurement led him to his concept of a (quantum) “phenomenon,” referring to “the observations obtained under the specified circumstances,” in the interaction between quantum objects and measuring instruments. This situation makes the terms “observation” and “measurement,” as conventionally understood, inapplicable. These terms are remnants of classical physics or still earlier history, from which classical physics inherited it. As defined here, a quantum measurement does not measure any preexisting property of the ultimate constitution of the reality responsible for quantum phenomena. An act of measurement establishes a quantum phenomenon by an interaction between the instrument and the quantum object or in the present view the ultimate constitution of the reality responsible for quantum phenomena and, at the time of measurement, also quantum objects. In the view advanced in this article, in contrast to that of Bohr, quantum objects, such as electrons or photons, are assumed to exist only at the time of measurement and not independently, a view that redefines the concept of quantum object as well. This redefinition becomes especially important in high-energy quantum regimes and quantum field theory and allows this article to define a new concept of quantum field. The article also considers, now following Bohr, the quantum measurement as the entanglement between quantum objects and measurement instruments. The argument of the article is grounded in the concept “reality without realism” (RWR), as underlying quantum measurement thus understood, and the view, the RWR view, of quantum theory defined by this concept. The RWR view places a stratum of physical reality thus designated, here the reality ultimately responsible for quantum phenomena, beyond representation or knowledge, or even conception, and defines the corresponding set of interpretations quantum mechanics or quantum field theory, such as the one assumed in this article, in which, again, not only quantum phenomena but also quantum objects are (idealizations) defined by measurement. As such, the article also offers a broadly conceived response to J. Bell’s argument “against ‘measurement’”.  相似文献   

3.
This article considers a partly philosophical question: What are the ontological and epistemological reasons for using quantum-like models or theories (models and theories based on the mathematical formalism of quantum theory) vs. classical-like ones (based on the mathematics of classical physics), in considering human thinking and decision making? This question is only partly philosophical because it also concerns the scientific understanding of the phenomena considered by the theories that use mathematical models of either type, just as in physics itself, where this question also arises as a physical question. This is because this question is in effect: What are the physical reasons for using, even if not requiring, these types of theories in considering quantum phenomena, which these theories predict fully in accord with the experiment? This is clearly also a physical, rather than only philosophical, question and so is, accordingly, the question of whether one needs classical-like or quantum-like theories or both (just as in physics we use both classical and quantum theories) in considering human thinking in psychology and related fields, such as decision science. It comes as no surprise that many of these reasons are parallel to those that are responsible for the use of QM and QFT in the case of quantum phenomena. Still, the corresponding situations should be understood and justified in terms of the phenomena considered, phenomena defined by human thinking, because there are important differences between these phenomena and quantum phenomena, which this article aims to address. In order to do so, this article will first consider quantum phenomena and quantum theory, before turning to human thinking and decision making, in addressing which it will also discuss two recent quantum-like approaches to human thinking, that by M. G. D’Ariano and F. Faggin and that by A. Khrennikov. Both approaches are ontological in the sense of offering representations, different in character in each approach, of human thinking by the formalism of quantum theory. Whether such a representation, as opposed to only predicting the outcomes of relevant experiments, is possible either in quantum theory or in quantum-like theories of human thinking is one of the questions addressed in this article. The philosophical position adopted in it is that it may not be possible to make this assumption, which, however, is not the same as saying that it is impossible. I designate this view as the reality-without-realism, RWR, view and in considering strictly mental processes as the ideality-without-idealism, IWI, view, in the second case in part following, but also moving beyond, I. Kant’s philosophy.  相似文献   

4.
Quantum information theorists have created axiomatic reconstructions of quantum mechanics (QM) that are very successful at identifying precisely what distinguishes quantum probability theory from classical and more general probability theories in terms of information-theoretic principles. Herein, we show how one such principle, Information Invariance and Continuity, at the foundation of those axiomatic reconstructions, maps to “no preferred reference frame” (NPRF, aka “the relativity principle”) as it pertains to the invariant measurement of Planck’s constant h for Stern-Gerlach (SG) spin measurements. This is in exact analogy to the relativity principle as it pertains to the invariant measurement of the speed of light c at the foundation of special relativity (SR). Essentially, quantum information theorists have extended Einstein’s use of NPRF from the boost invariance of measurements of c to include the SO(3) invariance of measurements of h between different reference frames of mutually complementary spin measurements via the principle of Information Invariance and Continuity. Consequently, the “mystery” of the Bell states is understood to result from conservation per Information Invariance and Continuity between different reference frames of mutually complementary qubit measurements, and this maps to conservation per NPRF in spacetime. If one falsely conflates the relativity principle with the classical theory of SR, then it may seem impossible that the relativity principle resides at the foundation of non-relativisitic QM. In fact, there is nothing inherently classical or quantum about NPRF. Thus, the axiomatic reconstructions of QM have succeeded in producing a principle account of QM that reveals as much about Nature as the postulates of SR.  相似文献   

5.
We discuss the problems of quantum theory (QT) complicating its merging with general relativity (GR). QT is treated as a general theory of micro-phenomena—a bunch of models. Quantum mechanics (QM) and quantum field theory (QFT) are the most widely known (but, e.g., Bohmian mechanics is also a part of QT). The basic problems of QM and QFT are considered in interrelation. For QM, we stress its nonrelativistic character and the presence of spooky action at a distance. For QFT, we highlight the old problem of infinities. And this is the main point of the paper: it is meaningless to try to unify QFT so heavily suffering of infinities with GR. We also highlight difficulties of the QFT-treatment of entanglement. We compare the QFT and QM based measurement theories by presenting both theoretical and experimental viewpoints. Then we discuss two basic mathematical constraints of both QM and QFT, namely, the use of real (and, hence, complex) numbers and the Hilbert state space. We briefly present non-archimedean and non-hilbertian approaches to QT and their consequences. Finally, we claim that, in spite of the Bell theorem, it is still possible to treat quantum phenomena on the basis of a classical-like causal theory. We present a random field model generating the QM and QFT formalisms. This emergence viewpoint can serve as the basis for unification of novel QT (may be totally different from presently powerful QM and QFT) and GR. (It may happen that the latter would also be revolutionary modified.)  相似文献   

6.
Core quantum postulates including the superposition principle and the unitarity of evolutions are natural and strikingly simple. I show that—when supplemented with a limited version of predictability (captured in the textbook accounts by the repeatability postulate)—these core postulates can account for all the symptoms of classicality. In particular, both objective classical reality and elusive information about reality arise, via quantum Darwinism, from the quantum substrate. This approach shares with the Relative State Interpretation of Everett the view that collapse of the wavepacket reflects perception of the state of the rest of the Universe relative to the state of observer’s records. However, our “let quantum be quantum” approach poses questions absent in Bohr’s Copenhagen Interpretation that relied on the preexisting classical domain. Thus, one is now forced to seek preferred, predictable, hence effectively classical but ultimately quantum states that allow observers keep reliable records. Without such (i) preferred basis relative states are simply “too relative”, and the ensuing basis ambiguity makes it difficult to identify events (e.g., measurement outcomes). Moreover, universal validity of quantum theory raises the issue of (ii) the origin of Born’s rule, pk=|ψk|2, relating probabilities and amplitudes (that is simply postulated in textbooks). Last not least, even preferred pointer states (defined by einselectionenvironment—induced superselection)—are still quantum. Therefore, unlike classical states that exist objectively, quantum states of an individual system cannot be found out by an initially ignorant observer through direct measurement without being disrupted. So, to complete the ‘quantum theory of the classical’ one must identify (iii) quantum origin of objective existence and explain how the information about objectively existing states can appear to be essentially inconsequential for them (as it does for states in Newtonian physics) and yet matter in other settings (e.g., thermodynamics). I show how the mathematical structure of quantum theory supplemented by the only uncontroversial measurement postulate (that demands immediate repeatability—hence, predictability) leads to preferred states. These (i) pointer states correspond to measurement outcomes. Their stability is a prerequisite for objective existence of effectively classical states and for events such as quantum jumps. Events at hand, one can now enquire about their probability—the probability of a pointer state (or of a measurement record). I show that the symmetry of entangled states—(ii) entanglement—assisted invariance or envariance—implies Born’s rule. Envariance also accounts for the loss of phase coherence between pointer states. Thus, decoherence can be traced to symmetries of entanglement and understood without its usual tool—reduced density matrices. A simple and manifestly noncircular derivation of pk=|ψk|2 follows. Monitoring of the system by its environment in course of decoherence typically leaves behind multiple copies of its pointer states in the environment. Only pointer states can survive decoherence and can spawn such plentiful information-theoretic progeny. This (iii) quantum Darwinism allows observers to use environment as a witness—to find out pointer states indirectly, leaving systems of interest untouched. Quantum Darwinism shows how epistemic and ontic (coexisting in epiontic quantum state) separate into robust objective existence of pointer states and detached information about them, giving rise to extantons—composite objects with system of interest in the core and multiple records of its pointer states in the halo comprising of environment subsystems (e.g., photons) which disseminates that information throughout the Universe.  相似文献   

7.
A common understanding of quantum mechanics (QM) among students and practical users is often plagued by a number of “myths”, that is, widely accepted claims on which there is not really a general consensus among experts in foundations of QM. These myths include wave-particle duality, time-energy uncertainty relation, fundamental randomness, the absence of measurement-independent reality, locality of QM, nonlocality of QM, the existence of well-defined relativistic QM, the claims that quantum field theory (QFT) solves the problems of relativistic QM or that QFT is a theory of particles, as well as myths on black-hole entropy. The fact is that the existence of various theoretical and interpretational ambiguities underlying these myths does not yet allow us to accept them as proven facts. I review the main arguments and counterarguments lying behind these myths and conclude that QM is still a not-yet-completely-understood theory open to further fundamental research.  相似文献   

8.
9.
Nonobjectivity of physical properties enters physics with the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM), and a number of paradoxes of this theory follow from it. It seems, however, based on sound physical arguments (double slit experiment, Heisenberg's principle, Bell–Kochen–Specker theorem, etc.), so that most physicists think that avoiding it is impossible. We discuss these arguments here and show that they can be criticized from a physical viewpoint. Our criticism proves that nonobjectivity must be considered an epistemological choice rather than an unavoidable feature of QM, so that an objective interpretation of QM is not a priori impossible, which justifies our attempt at providing it in some previous papers. This interpretation is based on a classical language in which the language of the standard interpretation (Quantum Logic) is embedded as a subset of statements that are directly testable according to QM.  相似文献   

10.
There exist several phenomena breaking the classical probability laws. The systems related to such phenomena are context-dependent, so that they are adaptive to other systems. In this paper, we present a new mathematical formalism to compute the joint probability distribution for two event-systems by using concepts of the adaptive dynamics and quantum information theory, e.g., quantum channels and liftings. In physics the basic example of the context-dependent phenomena is the famous double-slit experiment. Recently similar examples have been found in biological and psychological sciences. Our approach is an extension of traditional quantum probability theory, and it is general enough to describe aforementioned contextual phenomena outside of quantum physics.  相似文献   

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This paper is our attempt, on the basis of physical theory, to bring more clarification on the question “What is life?” formulated in the well-known book of Schrödinger in 1944. According to Schrödinger, the main distinguishing feature of a biosystem’s functioning is the ability to preserve its order structure or, in mathematical terms, to prevent increasing of entropy. However, Schrödinger’s analysis shows that the classical theory is not able to adequately describe the order-stability in a biosystem. Schrödinger also appealed to the ambiguous notion of negative entropy. We apply quantum theory. As is well-known, behaviour of the quantum von Neumann entropy crucially differs from behaviour of classical entropy. We consider a complex biosystem S composed of many subsystems, say proteins, cells, or neural networks in the brain, that is, S=(Si). We study the following problem: whether the compound system S can maintain “global order” in the situation of an increase of local disorder and if S can preserve the low entropy while other Si increase their entropies (may be essentially). We show that the entropy of a system as a whole can be constant, while the entropies of its parts rising. For classical systems, this is impossible, because the entropy of S cannot be less than the entropy of its subsystem Si. And if a subsystems’s entropy increases, then a system’s entropy should also increase, by at least the same amount. However, within the quantum information theory, the answer is positive. The significant role is played by the entanglement of a subsystems’ states. In the absence of entanglement, the increasing of local disorder implies an increasing disorder in the compound system S (as in the classical regime). In this note, we proceed within a quantum-like approach to mathematical modeling of information processing by biosystems—respecting the quantum laws need not be based on genuine quantum physical processes in biosystems. Recently, such modeling found numerous applications in molecular biology, genetics, evolution theory, cognition, psychology and decision making. The quantum-like model of order stability can be applied not only in biology, but also in social science and artificial intelligence.  相似文献   

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15.
We study the deviations from the exponential decay law, both in quantum field theory (QFT) and quantum mechanics (QM), for an unstable particle which can decay in (at least) two decay channels. After a review of general properties of non-exponential decay in QFT and QM, we evaluate in both cases the decay probability that the unstable particle decays in a given channel in the time interval between t and t+dt. An important quantity is the ratio of the probability of decay into the first and the second channel: this ratio is constant in the Breit-Wigner limit (in which the decay law is exponential) and equals the quantity Γ 1/Γ 2, where Γ 1 and Γ 2 are the respective tree-level decay widths. However, in the full treatment (both for QFT and QM) it is an oscillating function around the mean value Γ 1/Γ 2 and the deviations from this mean value can be sizable. Technically, we study the decay properties in QFT in the context of a superrenormalizable Lagrangian with scalar particles and in QM in the context of Lee Hamiltonians, which deliver formally analogous expressions to the QFT case.  相似文献   

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18.
A long-standing tradition, largely present in both the physical and the philosophical literature, regards the advent of (special) relativity—with its block-universe picture—as the failure of any indeterministic program in physics. On the contrary, in this paper, we note that upholding reasonable principles of finiteness of information hints at a picture of the physical world that should be both relativistic and indeterministic. We thus rebut the block-universe picture by assuming that fundamental indeterminacy itself should also be regarded as a relative property when considered in a relativistic scenario. We discuss the consequence that this view may have when correlated randomness is introduced, both in the classical case and in the quantum one.  相似文献   

19.
We present a critique of the many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics, based on different “pictures” that describe the time evolution of an isolated quantum system. Without an externally imposed frame to restrict these possible pictures, the theory cannot yield non-trivial interpretational statements. This is analogous to Goodman’s famous “grue-bleen” problem of language and induction. Using a general framework applicable to many kinds of dynamical theories, we try to identify the kind of additional structure (if any) required for the meaningful interpretation of a theory. We find that the “grue-bleen” problem is not restricted to quantum mechanics, but also affects other theories including classical Hamiltonian mechanics. For all such theories, absent external frame information, an isolated system has no interpretation.  相似文献   

20.
Quantum candies (qandies) represent a type of pedagogical simple model that describes many concepts from quantum information processing (QIP) intuitively without the need to understand or make use of superpositions and without the need of using complex algebra. One of the topics in quantum cryptography that has gained research attention in recent years is quantum digital signatures (QDS), which involve protocols to securely sign classical bits using quantum methods. In this paper, we show how the “qandy model” can be used to describe three QDS protocols in order to provide an important and potentially practical example of the power of “superpositionless” quantum information processing for individuals without background knowledge in the field.  相似文献   

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