中国式分权下地方政府环境规制执行研究——以排污收费为例

在中国式分权的制度背景下,以排污收费为例,对地方政府环境规制执行问题进行研究。通过建立地方政府与企业的动态博弈模型,刻画了环境规制的约束性本质特征。以此为基础,通过对政府规制利益集团理论Peltzman模型进行修正和拓展,构建了地方政府的环境规制执行均衡模型,阐述了环境规制执行均衡的形成机制。基于环境规制执行均衡模型,分析了制度因素、环境规制政策标准、治污成本和污染削减技术对地方政府环境规制执行的影响。研究结果表明,地方政府通过调节环境规制执行强度实现自身效用的最大化,从而达到环境规制执行的均衡状态。中央政府制定的更为严格的环境规制政策标准尽管在理论上能够提高企业的治污投入,但却有可能对地方政府的环境规制执行产生负面影响。降低企业治污成本能够促进地方政府严格执行环境规制,而污染削减技术创新则会在不同条件下对地方政府的环境规制执行产生不同的影响。     

Optimal pollution control,irreversibilities, and the value of future information

This paper focuses on the issue of optimal pollution control when either pollution itself is irreversible or when some characteristic of the environmental resource is irreversibly destroyed in the course of growing pollution. It is shown that exhausting the assimilative capacity through too heavy pollution is never optimal unless the rate of social time preference is sufficiently high. The paper also investigates the case that decisions about irreversible developments have to be made under uncertainty today when the decision maker faces the prospect of better information about the irreversible damage at some future point in time. A non-negative quasi-option value is shown to exist as in the Arrow-Fisher-Henry model that relates to natural resource deletion by projects of industrial development.     

A variational inequality formulation of the environmental pollution control problem

In this paper we develop the time-dependent pollution control problem in which different countries aim to determine the optimal investment allocation in environmental projects and the tolerable pollutant emissions, so as to maximize their welfare. We provide the equilibrium conditions governing the model and derive the evolutionary variational inequality formulation. The existence of solutions is investigated and a numerical example is also presented.     

On optimal solution of an inverse air pollution problem: Theory and numerical approach

A three-dimensional dispersion air pollution model with point sources is considered in a limited region. The adjoint model and the duality principle are used to pose a variational short-term control problem with the aim of determining optimal emission rates of the sources. The existence and uniqueness of the optimal control problem solution are proved. A numerical scheme using a process of orthogonal projections is given for approximating the optimal solution. The computing efficiency of the scheme is shown. Numerical results obtained in the case of a single point source demonstrate the method’s ability.     

Optimal pricing in a diffusion model with concave price-dependent market potential

Using optimal control theory, a diffusion model of new product acceptance is studied. We consider a profit-maximizing firm faced with the problem of determining its optimal pricing policy under the assumption that the total market potential is a concave decreasing function of price. For an infinite planning horizon it is shown by phase portrait analysis that the optimal price is steadily increasing and converging to a saddle point equilibrium.     

污染产业转移下府际间合作治理大气污染的演化博弈分析

大气污染具有跨区域性,府际间合作治理是大气污染防治的必由之路,合作治理中存在“搭治污便车”的困境。由于府际间大气污染治理博弈的具有长期性和动态性,由此建立了多人两策略的演化博弈模型。分别研究,无约束机制和有约束机制两种情况下地方政府演化稳定策略及其影响因素。考虑到政府间污染产业转移,建立了污染产业转移政府对承接方政府治污补偿机制下的演化博弈模型,分别研究无约束和有约束两种情形下(补偿,治理)策略成为演化稳定均衡状态的条件。研究表明:府际间的合作治理策略选择不会受到外部效应的影响,大气污染治理成本、治理时污染物减排量、不治理时污染物排放增加量、中央政府对治理的奖励和对不治理的惩罚力度是影响地方政府决策的重要因素。将大气质量作为政绩考核的重要指标,提高其权重系数,可有效促使地方政府策略向参与合作治理演化。无约束下自主选择时,最优策略(补偿,治理)不会成为稳定均衡策略,引入中央政府约束后,当经济惩罚在一定范围内,(补偿,治理)成为稳定均衡策略。     

Controlling pollution and environmental absorption capacity

This pollution accumulation model shows that the environmental absorption capacity is impacted by economic activity. The resulting optimal control problem has two inter-related state variables: the stock of pollution and the absorption capacity of the environment. The stock of pollution decreases with environmental absorption capacity and increases with the rate of current emissions, which is controlled by a production level as well as an emissions reduction effort. However, the environmental absorption capacity is positively affected by an absorption development effort, and negatively impacted by the stock of pollution. Under specific conditions, it is shown that an optimal path, which can be either monotonic or following transient oscillations, leads to a (nontrivial) saddle-point characterized by a positive environmental absorption capacity.     

四方主体参与下的环境规制演化博弈分析

环境污染问题严重阻碍了我国经济和社会的发展,我国当下的环境治理逐步形成多主体治理模式。本文将环境治理中的四个主要相关主体“中央政府-地方政府-企业-公众”置于统一框架下,建立了四方演化博弈模型,并利用数值仿真模拟参数变化对博弈系统不同主体稳定策略的影响,得到以下结论:(1)四方演化博弈系统的16个纯策略均衡点中,共有8个条件稳定点,其余8个均衡点在任何条件下都不稳定。其中8个条件稳定点代表着我国环境治理中各利益相关主体可能呈现的策略均衡,策略集中某策略的相对净收益决定了相关主体的策略选择。(2)通过数值仿真分析发现,增大中央政府对地方政府消极执行的处罚、增大中央政府转移支付和增大中央政府对地方政府消极执行的追加处罚不仅能够提升地方政府的环保执法力度,而且可以提高企业减排积极性。提高环境规制标准、增大对企业非法排污的处罚,对地方政府、企业和公众的策略选择都会产生影响,可以使系统更快向“中央政府不严格监管、地方政府积极执行、企业合法排污、公众不举报”的理想稳定状态演化,但提高环境规制标准的效果会略优于加大对企业处罚。地方政府增大企业治污补贴短期内可有利于实现经济的可持续发展,但过高的企业治污补贴将不利于博弈系统达到理想稳定状态,是一种非长效的环境治理模式。提高公众举报奖励可以促使企业合法排污,并在一定程度上加快实现博弈系统的理想稳定状态。最后,分别从中央政府、地方政府和公众角度提出了环境治理的相关建议。     

Optimal production control problem taking into account environmental pollution

We consider a simplified production control model taking into account environmental pollution. We obtain constructive conditions under which each optimal control is Lebesgue equivalent to an optimal bang-bang control.     

Infinite Dimensional Duality Theory Applied to Investment Strategies in Environmental Policy

In this paper, we develop an infinite dimensional Lagrangian duality framework for modeling and analyzing the evolutionary pollution control problem. Specifically, we examine the situation in which different countries aim at determining the optimal investment allocation in environmental projects and the tolerable pollutant emissions, so as to maximize their welfare. We state the equilibrium conditions underlying the model, and provide an equivalent formulation in terms of an evolutionary variational inequality. Moreover, by means of infinite dimensional duality tools, we prove the existence of Lagrange multipliers that play a fundamental role in order to describe countries’ decision-making processes.     

Necessary and Sufficient Optimality Conditions for Regular–Singular Stochastic Differential Games with Asymmetric Information

We consider a class of regular–singular stochastic differential games arising in the optimal investment and dividend problem of an insurer under model uncertainty. The information available to the two players is asymmetric partial information and the control variable of each player consists of two components: regular control and singular control. We establish the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for the saddle point of the zero-sum game. Then, as an application, these conditions are applied to an optimal investment and dividend problem of an insurer under model uncertainty. Furthermore, we generalize our results to the nonzero-sum regular–singular game with asymmetric information, and then the Nash equilibrium point is characterized.     

消费-投资增长模型

本文考虑代表性个体既是消费者,又是投资者,假设收益是不确定的,服从一个随机过程,利用随机优化理论和动力系统,给出消费一投资增长模型．分析均衡点的稳定性,并讨论利率、消费税、收入所得税、市场收益的波动率等参数对它们的影响。     

A dynamical model of echinococcosis with optimal control and cost-effectiveness

A dynamical model of echinococcosis transmission with optimal control strategies is first presented. The basic reproduction number of the model is determined and employed to study the global stability of the disease-free and endemic equilibrium points. The optimal control problem is formulated and solved analytically. Numerical simulations show that optimal control strategies could effectively reduce the transmission of echinococcosis. The cost-effectiveness analysis suggests that a combination of health education, anthelmintic treatment, and home slaughter inspection could provide the best cost-effective strategy to control the transmission of echinococcosis. Furthermore, it finds that anthelmintic treatment and environmental disinfection may shorten the time of eliminating the disease. The results may be helpful for prevention and control of echinococcosis in Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, China and other areas of echinococcosis.     

An extension of the Antoci-Dei-Galeotti evolutionary model for environment protection through financial instruments

This work moves from a recent paper by Antoci et al. (2009) [1] where a dynamic model is proposed to describe an innovative method for improving environmental quality based on the exchange of financial activities, promoted by a Public Administration, between firms and tourists in a given region. We extend their analysis in two directions: we first perform a global analysis of the basins of attraction to check the stability extents of the coexisting stable attractors of the model, and we show that some undesirable and sub-optimal stable equilibria always exist, whose basins may be quite intermingled with those of the optimal equilibrium; then we introduce a structural change of the model by assuming that the Public Administration, besides its action as an intermediary between visitors and polluting firms, also performs a direct action for the pollution control. We show how the cost of this direct action of the Public Administration can be balanced by proper taxes and we prove that undesired equilibria can be ruled out by a suitable balance of financial instruments and direct actions of Public Administration for environmental remediation.     

Longevity,pollution and growth

We analyze the interplay between longevity, pollution and growth. We develop an OLG model where longevity, pollution and growth are endogenous. The authorities may provide two types of public services, public health and environmental maintenance, that participate to extend agents’ life expectancy and to sustain growth in the long term. We show that global dynamics might be featured by a high growth rate equilibrium, associated with longer life expectancy and an environmental poverty trap. We examine changes in public policies: increasing public intervention on health or environmental maintenance display opposite effects on global dynamics, i.e. on the size of the trap and on the level of the stable balanced growth path. On the contrary, each type of public policy induces a negative leverage on the long-run rate of growth.     

POLLUTION, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, TAXES AND STOCHASTIC GROWTH

This paper studies a stochastic endogenous growth model with pollution. It introduces government expenditure and exogenous pollution abatement technology to eliminate pollution and proves that under appropriate equilibrium conditions the main economic indexes （including economic growth rate, the optimal government expenditure rate） in the centrally planned economy and decentralized economy can be expressed by the parameters of the model uniquely. The optimal tax policy is analyzed ,and the optimal pollution is derived.     

Economic and environmental impacts of pollution control in a system of environment and economic interdependence

The importance of the rate of change of the pollution stock in determining the damage to the environment has been an issue of increasing concern in the literature. This paper uses a three-sector (economy, population and environment), non-linear, discrete time, calibrated model to examine pollution control. The model explicitly links economic growth to the health of the environment. The stock of natural resources is affected by the rate of pollution flows, through their impact on the regenerative capacity of the natural resource stock. This can shed useful insights into pollution control strategies, particularly in developing countries where environmental resources are crucial for production in many sectors of the economy. Simulation exercises suggested that, under plausible assumptions, it is possible to reverse undesirable transient dynamics through pollution control expenditure, but this is dependent upon the strategies used for control. The best strategy is to spend money fostering the development of production technologies that reduce pollution rather than spending money dealing with the effects of the pollution flow into the environment.     

Computation of viability kernels: a case study of by-catch fisheries

Traditional means of studying environmental economics and management problems consist of optimal control and dynamic game models that are solved for optimal or equilibrium strategies. Notwithstanding the possibility of multiple equilibria, the models’ users—managers or planners—will usually be provided with a single optimal or equilibrium strategy no matter how reliable, or unreliable, the underlying models and their parameters are. In this paper we follow an alternative approach to policy making that is based on viability theory. It establishes “satisficing” (in the sense of Simon), or viable, policies that keep the dynamic system in a constraint set and are, generically, multiple and amenable to each manager’s own prioritisation. Moreover, they can depend on fewer parameters than the optimal or equilibrium strategies and hence be more robust. For the determination of these (viable) policies, computation of “viability kernels” is crucial. We introduce a MATLAB application, under the name of VIKAASA, which allows us to compute approximations to viability kernels. We discuss two algorithms implemented in VIKAASA. One approximates the viability kernel by the locus of state space positions for which solutions to an auxiliary cost-minimising optimal control problem can be found. The lack of any solution implies the infinite value function and indicates an evolution which leaves the constraint set in finite time, therefore defining the point from which the evolution originates as belonging to the kernel’s complement. The other algorithm accepts a point as viable if the system’s dynamics can be stabilised from this point. We comment on the pros and cons of each algorithm. We apply viability theory and the VIKAASA software to a problem of by-catch fisheries exploited by one or two fleets and provide rules concerning the proportion of fish biomass and the fishing effort that a sustainable fishery’s exploitation should follow.     

Two-person game with nash equilibrium in optimal control problems

A two-person game with a Nash equilibrium is formulated for optimal control problems with a free right end and a linear differential system. The game is reduced to the calculation of a fixed point of an extremal mapping, which in turn is reduced to a variational inequality with linear constraints generated by systems of linear differential controllable processes. An extra-gradient iterative method is proposed for calculating the Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game. The convergence of the method is proved.     

World dynamics: An optimization study of the pollution subsystem

In a simplified version of the pollution subsystem of Forrester's world dynamics model, it is proposed to choose the capital investment policy for maximizing the integral of the quality of life. The optimization is carried out by using Green's theorem and the maximum principle. The optimal control is characterized by a combination of bang-bang and singular control, with the singular are forming a turnpike, corresponding to a global equilibrium policy.