共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Michael McDermott 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(4):333-335
In this note I discuss what seems to be a new kind of counterexample to Lewis’s account of counterfactuals. A coin is to be
tossed twice. I bet on ‘Two heads’, and I win. Common sense says that (1) is false. But Lewis’s theory says that it is true.
(1) If at least one head had come up, I would have won.
相似文献
Michael McDermottEmail: |
2.
Julia Tanner 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(4):337-347
The fact that humans have a special relationship to each other insofar as they belong in the same species is often taken to
be a morally relevant difference between humans and other animals, one which justifies a greater moral status for all humans, regardless of their individual capacities. I give some reasons why this kind of relationship is not an appropriate
ground for differential treatment of humans and nonhumans. I then argue that even if relationships do matter morally species
membership cannot justify a difference in moral status. This has important implications because it removes one barrier to
giving animals greater moral status.
相似文献
Julia TannerEmail: |
3.
In this paper, we defend and extend a (simple) mathematical model of akrasia.
相似文献
Joseph S. FuldaEmail: |
4.
Anomaly detection in a mobile communication network 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Alec Pawling Nitesh V. Chawla Greg Madey 《Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory》2007,13(4):407-422
Mobile communication networks produce massive amounts of data which may be useful in identifying the location of an emergency
situation and the area it affects. We propose a one pass clustering algorithm for quickly identifying anomalous data points.
We evaluate this algorithm’s ability to detect outliers in a data set and describe how such an algorithm may be used as a
component of an emergency response management system.
相似文献
Greg MadeyEmail: |
5.
6.
Kelly Becker 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(1):17-31
Timothy Williamson has provided damaging counterexamples to Robert Nozick’s sensitivity principle. The examples are based
on Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments, and they show how knowledge requires a margin for error that appears to be incompatible
with sensitivity. I explain how Nozick can rescue sensitivity from Williamson’s counterexamples by appeal to a specific conception
of the methods by which an agent forms a belief. I also defend the proposed conception of methods against Williamson’s criticisms.
相似文献
Kelly BeckerEmail: |
7.
Pavel Materna 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(1):69-90
If concepts are explicated as abstract procedures, then we can easily show that each empirical concept is a not an effective
procedure. Some, but not all empirical concepts are shown to be of a special kind: they cannot in principle guarantee that
the object they identify satisfies the intended conditions.
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Pavel MaternaEmail: |
8.
Javier Kalhat 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(2):161-176
In this paper I argue against Armstrong’s recent truthmaking account of possibility. I show that the truthmaking account presupposes
modality in a number of different ways, and consequently that it is incapable of underwriting a genuine reduction of modality.
I also argue that Armstrong’s account faces serious difficulties irrespective of the question of reduction; in particular,
I argue that his Entailment and Possibility Principles are both false.
相似文献
Javier KalhatEmail: |
9.
Wayne A. Davis 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(3):207-231
According to Peacocke, concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which are specified in terms of conditions
in which certain propositions containing those concepts are believed. In support, Peacocke tries to explain what it is for
a thought to have a structure and what it is for a belief to have a propositional content. I show that the possession condition
theory cannot answer such fundamental questions. Peacocke’s theory founders because concepts are metaphysically fundamental.
They individuate the propositions and thoughts containing them, which in turn individuate the propositional attitudes that
are relations to those propositions or thoughts.
相似文献
Wayne A. DavisEmail: |
10.
Nic Damnjanovic 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(2):113-126
In several publications Graeme Forbes has developed and defended one of the strongest arguments for essentialism about biological
origins. I attempt to show that there are deep, as yet unrecognized, problems with this argument. The problems with Forbes’s
argument suggest that a range of other arguments for various forms of origin essentialism are also likely to be flawed, and
that we should abandon the seemingly plausible general metaphysical thesis that concrete entities that share all intrinsic
properties are identical.
相似文献
Nic DamnjanovicEmail: |
11.
Nikolaj Nottelman 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(2):105-124
In this paper I discuss the claim that believing at will is ‘conceptually impossible’ or, to use a formulation encountered
in the debate, “that nothing could be a belief and be willed directly”. I argue that such a claim is only plausible if directed
against the claim that believing itself is an action-type. However, in the debate, the claim has been univocally directed
against the position that forming a belief is an action-type. I argue that the many arguments offered in favor of the ‘conceptual impossibility’ of performing
such actions fail without exception. If we are to argue against doxastic voluntarism we are better off by resorting to more
modest means.
相似文献
Nikolaj NottelmanEmail: |
12.
Steffen Borge 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(2):149-154
In this paper I argue against a criticism by Matthew Weiner to Grice’s thesis that cancellability is a necessary condition
for conversational implicature. I argue that the purported counterexamples fail because the supposed failed cancellation in
the cases Weiner presents is not meant as a cancellation but as a reinforcement of the implicature. I moreover point out that
there are special situations in which the supposed cancellation may really work as a cancellation.
相似文献
Steffen BorgeEmail: |
13.
Nenad Miscevic 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(3):239-266
A strong, strictly virtue-based, and at the same time truth-centered framework for virtue epistemology (VE) is proposed that bases VE upon a clearly motivating
epistemic virtue, inquisitiveness or curiosity in a very wide sense, characterizes the purely executive capacities-virtues
as a means for the truth-goal set by the former, and, finally, situates the remaining, partly motivating and partly executive
virtues in relation to this central stock of virtues. Character-trait epistemic virtues are presented as hybrids, partly moral,
partly purely epistemic. In order to make the approach virtue-based, it is argued that the central virtue (inquisitiveness or curiosity) is responsible for the value of truth: truth is valuable
to cognizers because they are inquisitive, and most other virtues are a means for satisfying inquisitiveness. On can usefully
combine this virtue-based account of the motivation for acquiring knowledge with a Sosa-style analysis of the concept “knowledge”,
which brings to the forefront virtues-capacities, in order to obtain a full-blooded, “strong” VE.
相似文献
Nenad MiscevicEmail: |
14.
Christopher Buford 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(3):197-209
Lynne Rudder Baker’s Constitution View of human persons has come under much recent scrutiny. Baker argues that each human person is constituted by, but not identical
to, a human animal. Much of the critical discussion of Baker’s Constitution View has focused upon this aspect of her account.
Less has been said about the positive diachronic account of personal identity offered by Baker. Baker argues that it is sameness of what she labels ‘first-person perspective’
that is essential to understanding personal identity over time. Baker claims that her account avoids the commitment to indeterminacy of personal identity entailed by the psychological
account. Further, the psychological account, but not her account, is plagued by what Baker labels the ‘duplication problem’.
In the end, I argue that neither of these considerations forces us to renounce the psychological account and adopt Baker’s
favored account.
相似文献
Christopher BufordEmail: |
15.
Warren Shrader 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(3):257-271
This paper is an investigation into the nature of physicalism as well as to the possibility of formulating physicalism as
a supervenience thesis. First, I review the motivation for finding a supervenience thesis that characterizes physicalism.
Second, I briefly survey the types of supervenience theses that have been proposed as necessary (or, in some cases, as necessary
and sufficient) for physicalism. Third, I analyze the recent supervenience thesis proposed by Frank Jackson and expounded
upon by Gene Witmer. Jackson claims the supervenience thesis is both necessary and sufficient for physicalism; Witmer has
proposed a different interpretation of one of the Jackson’s key notions and has suggested an amended supervenience thesis
that is, if not sufficient, at least necessary for physicalism. However, I will argue that neither Jackson’s nor Witmer’s
supervenience theses as stated are necessary for physicalism.
相似文献
Warren ShraderEmail: |
16.
Christina Conroy 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(4):367-372
In his “Space, supervenience and substantivalism”, Le Poidevin proposes a substantivalism in which space is discrete, implying
that there are unmediated spatial relations between neighboring primitive points. This proposition is motivated by his concern
that relationism suffers from an explanatory lacuna and that substantivalism gives rise to a vicious regress. Le Poidevin
implicitly requires that the relationist be committed to the “only x and y” principle regarding spatial relations. It is not obvious that the relationist is committed to this principle in such a context.
An additional motivation for Le Poidevin's argument, that space should be considered to be discrete, is that he believes that
substantivalists are committed to a vicious regress. I show that the regress is in fact not of the vicious variety. These
two main arguments show that Le Poidevin's suggestion that we drop the density postulate for space is unnecessary.
相似文献
Christina ConroyEmail: |
17.
Aristophanes Koutoungos 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(2):125-145
A quantitative interpretation is given of the (in)coherence that moral agents experience as a tension between their ordered moral judgments over n physically incompatible actions, and the competitive ordering of motivating intensities (or, desires). Then a model describing
one’s tendency to reduce the experienced in-coherence is constructed. In this model, moral sensitivity (S) and desire attachment (e) function as primitives that motivate from opposing perspectives the reduction of incoherence. Two distinct sub-processes
of this reduction are therefore initiated by (S) and (e) co-ordinated (more or less efficiently) by the agent’s degree of rationality (R) characteristic of her capacity to handle such internal tensions. This process ends when a new equilibrium between what motivates and what resists (further) reduction has been reached. A macro-equilibrium is described involving
(R) constrained by weakness-of-will (W
w
). A reinterpretation of the Aristotelian characters (enkratês, akratês, etc.) and an exegesis of Hume’s ‘Calm Passions’ follow
as applications.
相似文献
Aristophanes KoutoungosEmail: |
18.
Charlie Pelling 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(3):169-182
According to the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception, we possess concepts for all the objects, properties,
and relations which feature in our experiences. Richard Heck has recently argued that the phenomenon of illusory experience
provides us with conclusive reasons to reject this view. In this paper, I examine Heck’s argument, I explain why I think that
Bill Brewer’s conceptualist response to it is ineffective, and I then outline an alternative conceptualist response which
I myself endorse. My argument turns on the fact that both Heck, in constructing his objection to conceptualism, and Brewer,
in responding to it, miss a crucial distinction between perceptual demonstrative concepts of objects, on the one hand, and
perceptual demonstrative concepts of properties, on the other.
相似文献
Charlie PellingEmail: |
19.
James A. Kitts Paul T. Trowbridge 《Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory》2007,13(4):333-353
This paper considers a formal model of cultural transmission in organizations, examining the interplay of structured social
influence and organizational demography. A set of focused and fine-grained computational experiments elucidates this model’s
assumptions, facilitates deeper explanations for some of its behavior, and explores the robustness and scope conditions of
previously published conclusions. In doing so, this investigation highlights several important issues in the design and evaluation
of computational experiments.
相似文献
Paul T. TrowbridgeEmail: |
20.
Laetitia Bueno-Ravel Ghislaine Gueudet 《International Journal of Computers for Mathematical Learning》2009,14(1):1-20
The study we present here concerns the consequences of integrating online resources into the teaching of mathematics. We focus
on the interaction between teachers and specific online resources they draw on: e-exercise bases. We propose a theoretical
approach to study the associated phenomena, combining instrumental and anthropological perspectives. For given didactical
tasks, we observe teachers’ instrumental geneses, and the didactical techniques they develop. We exemplify our approach with
the analysis of a case study of trigonometry in grade 9.
相似文献
Ghislaine GueudetEmail: |