The Tempered Aspirations solution for bargaining problems with a reference point

Gupta and Livne (1988) modified Nash’s (1950) original bargaining problem through the introduction of a reference point restricted to lie in the bargaining set. Additionally, they characterized a solution concept for this augmented bargaining problem. We propose and axiomatically characterize a new solution concept for bargaining problems with a reference point: the Tempered Aspirations solution. In Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), aspirations are given by the so called ideal or utopia point. In our setting, however, the salience of the reference point mutes or tempers the negotiators’ aspirations. Thus, our solution is defined to be the maximal feasible point on the line segment joining the modified aspirations and disagreement vectors. The Tempered Aspirations solution can be understood as a “dual” version of the Gupta-Livne solution or, alternatively, as a version of Chun and Thomson’s (1992) Proportional solution in which the claims point is endogenous. We also conduct an extensive axiomatic analysis comparing the Gupta-Livne to our Tempered Aspirations solution.     

A superadditive solution for cephoidal bargaining problems

We present a bargaining solution defined on a class of polytopes in called “cephoids”. The solution generalizes the superadditive solution exhibited by Maschler and Perles for two dimensions. It is superadditive on a subclass of cephoids.      

A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems

We investigate a two-person random proposer bargaining game with a deadline. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as the number of bargaining periods goes to infinity while the deadline is kept fixed. This limit is close to the discrete Raiffa solution when the time horizon is very short. If the deadline goes to infinity the limit outcome converges to the time preference Nash solution. Regarding this limit as a bargaining solution under deadline, we provide an axiomatic characterization.     

Disagreement point axioms and the egalitarian bargaining solution

We provide new characterizations of the egalitarian bargaining solution on the class of strictly comprehensive n-person bargaining problems. The main axioms used in all of our results are Nash’s IIA and disagreement point monotonicity—an axiom which requires a player’s payoff to strictly increase in his disagreement payoff. For n = 2 these axioms, together with other standard requirements, uniquely characterize the egalitarian solution. For n > 2 we provide two extensions of our 2-person result, each of which is obtained by imposing an additional axiom on the solution. Dropping the axiom of anonymity, strengthening disagreement point monotonicity by requiring player i’s payoff to be a strictly decreasing function of the disagreement payoff of every other player j ≠ i, and adding a “weak convexity” axiom regarding changes of the disagreement point, we obtain a characterization of the class of weighted egalitarian solutions. This “weak convexity” axiom requires that a movement of the disagreement point in the direction of the solution point should not change the solution point. We also discuss the so-called “transfer paradox” and relate it to this axiom.     

The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion

We consider bargaining problems under the assumption that players are loss averse, i.e., experience disutility from obtaining an outcome lower than some reference point. We follow the approach of Shalev (2002) by imposing the self-supporting condition on an outcome: an outcome z in a bargaining problem is self-supporting under a given bargaining solution, whenever transforming the problem using outcome z as a reference point, yields a transformed problem in which the solution is z.We show that n-player bargaining problems have a unique self-supporting outcome under the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. For all possible loss aversion coefficients we determine the bargaining solutions that give exactly these outcomes, and characterize them by the standard axioms of Scale Invariance, Individual Monotonicity, and Strong Individual Rationality, and a new axiom called Proportional Concession Invariance (PCI). A bargaining solution satisfies PCI if moving the utopia point in the direction of the solution outcome does not change this outcome.     

The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game

The feasible set in a Nash bargaining game is a set in the utility space of the players. As such, its points often represent expectations on uncertain events. If this is the case, the feasible set changes in time as uncertainties resolve. Thus, if time for reaching agreement is not fixed in advance, one has to take into account options for delaying an agreement. This paper studies such games and develops a solution concept which has the property that its followers will always prefer to reach an immediate agreement, rather than wait until a new feasible set arises.     

Iterated egalitarian compromise solution to bargaining problems and midpoint domination

We introduce a new solution for two-person bargaining problems: the iterated egalitarian compromise solution. It is defined by using two prominent bargaining solutions, the egalitarian solution (Kalai, 1977) and the equal-loss solution (Chun, 1988), in an iterative fashion. While neither of these two solutions satisfy midpoint domination – an appealing normative property – we show that the iterated egalitarian compromise solution does so.     

Two-player bargaining problems with unilateral pre-donation

This paper characterizes conditions for two-player bargaining problems and bargaining rules under which unilateral pre-donation always yields Pareto utility gains. The paper also computes the optimal pre-donation of each player under the class of proportional bargaining rules.     

The numerical solution of unstable two point boundary value problems

A number of workers have tried to solve, numerically, unstable two point boundary value problems. Multiple Shooting and Continuation Methods have been used very successfully for these problems, but each has weaknesses; for particularly unstable problems their success may be partial. In this paper we develop an algorithm that attempts to solve these problems in a routine manner.The algorithm uses a combination of Multiple Shooting and Range Extension in such a way that the advantages of both are maintained while the effects of their disadvantages are reduced considerably. The success of the algorithm is demonstrated on some particularly unstable problems.     

The ordered field property and a finite algorithm for the Nash bargaining solution

This note proves that the two person Nash bargaining theory with polyhedral bargaining regions needs only an ordered field (which always includes the rational number field) as its scalar field. The existence of the Nash bargaining solution is the main part of this result and the axiomatic characterization can be proved in the standard way with slight modifications. We prove the existence by giving a finite algorithm to calculate the Nash solution for a polyhedral bargaining problem, whose speed is of orderBm(m-1) (m is the number of extreme points andB is determined by the extreme points).     

Asymptotic solution of two-scale problems of wave propagation with a point of local degeneracy

Wave propagation is considered in media where the scale of variations in one co-ordinare is much larger than in the other. Local degeneration of waves is investigated and transformation coefficients are found. An example of wave propagation in a thin, symmetric plate is considered.Translated from Zapiski Nauchnykh Seminarov Leningradskogo Otdeleniya Matematicheskogo Instituta im. V. A. Steklova, Vol. 89, pp. 275–285, 1979.In conclusion, the author thanks I. A. Molotkov for his constant attention to the work and for critical remarks.     

Shock wave solution for a class of nonlocal nonlinear singularly perturbed boundary value problems with turning point

The nonlocal nonlinear boundary value problem with turning point is considered. Leading the stretched variables the formal asymptotic solution of the original problem is constructed. And by using the theory of differential inequalities the existence and uniformly validity of solution for the original boundary value problems are proved. The contribution of this paper is that, the asymptotic behavior of solution is studied by using a simple and special method.     

An equitable solution for multicriteria bargaining games

In this paper we study bargaining models where the agents consider several criteria to evaluate the results of the negotiation process. We propose a new solution concept for multicriteria bargaining games based on the distance to a utopian minimum level vector. This solution is a particular case of the class of the generalized leximin solutions and can be characterized as the solution of a finite sequence of minimax programming problems.     

Limiting accuracy of segregated solution methods for nonsymmetric saddle point problems

Nonsymmetric saddle point problems arise in a wide variety of applications in computational science and engineering. The aim of this paper is to discuss the numerical behavior of several nonsymmetric iterative methods applied for solving the saddle point systems via the Schur complement reduction or the null-space projection approach. Krylov subspace methods often produce the iterates which fluctuate rather strongly. Here we address the question whether large intermediate approximate solutions reduce the final accuracy of these two-level (inner–outer) iteration algorithms. We extend our previous analysis obtained for symmetric saddle point problems and distinguish between three mathematically equivalent back-substitution schemes which lead to a different numerical behavior when applied in finite precision arithmetic. Theoretical results are then illustrated on a simple model example.     

Existence and uniqueness of solution for quasi-equilibrium problems and fixed point problems on complete metric spaces with applications

In this paper, we presented new and important existence theorems of solution for quasi-equilibrium problems, and we show the uniqueness of its solution which is also a fixed point of some mapping. We also show that this unique solution can be obtained by Picard’s iteration method. We also get new minimax theorem, and existence theorems for common solution of fixed point and optimization problem on complete metric spaces. Our results are different from any existence theorems for quasi-equilibrium problems and minimax theorems in the literatures.     

Reference point approximation method for the solution of bicriterial nonlinear optimization problems

This paper presents a reference point approximation algorithm which can be used for the interactive solution of bicriterial nonlinear optimization problems with inequality and equality constraints. The advantage of this method is that the decision maker may choose arbitrary reference points in the criteria space. Moreover, a special tunneling technique is given for the computation of global solutions of certain subproblems. Finally, the proposed method is applied to a mathematical example and a problem in mechanical engineering.     

The generalized Nash bargaining solution and Incentive Compatible Mechanisms

In this paper I analyze whether the generalized Nash solution which has been defined by Harsanyi and Selten for bargaining problems with incomplete information can be characterized in the mechanism framework introduced by Myerson.I show that the solution is uniquely determined by a set of axioms in the case of independently distributed types. It can be seen that the axioms given by Harsanyi and Selten cannot be used if the types are not independently distributed.     

A note on nonzero-sum differential games with bargaining solution

The extension of Nash's bargaining solution to differential games is discussed. It is shown that a closed-loop solution verifies very stringent necessary conditions and that an open-loop solution can present serious weakness from a normative point of view.This research has been supported by the Canada Council (S73-0935) and the Ministère de l'Education du Québec (DGES).     

A new iterative algorithm of solution for equilibrium problems, variational inequalities and fixed point problems in a Hilbert space

In this paper, we introduce a new iterative method for finding a common element of the set of solutions of an equilibrium problem, the set of solutions of the variational inequality for β-inverse-strongly monotone mappings and the set of fixed points of nonexpansive mappings in a Hilbert space. We show that the sequence converges strongly to a common element of the above three sets under some parameters controlling conditions. As applications, at the end of paper we utilize our results to study some convergence problem for finding the zeros of maximal monotone operators. Our results are generalizations and extensions of the results of Yao and Liou (Fixed Point Theory Appl. Article ID 384629, 10 p., 2008), Yao et al. (J. Nonlinear Convex Anal. 9(2):239–248, 2008) and Su and Li (Appl. Math. Comput. 181(1):332–341, 2006) and some recent results.