基于微分博弈的生鲜农产品三级供应链温度控制投入研究

针对生鲜农产品三级供应链温度控制投入的最优动态决策与协调问题,考虑供应链供应商、零售商和第三方物流服务商三方温度控制投入对生鲜农产品新鲜度的共同影响,分别构建集中式和批发价分散式决策下微分博弈模型,并比较两种决策情形下最优温度控制投入水平和供应链的各成员及整体利润。利用“互为成本分担-带固定补贴契约”对供应链进行协调,并结合数值算例,对不同决策情形下影响参数进行了敏感性分析和协调机制效果分析。研究表明：协调机制下“互为成本分担-带固定补贴契约”与批发价分散决策相比,协调机制下“互为成本分担-带固定补贴契约”供应链供应商、零售商和第三方物流服务商能够得到帕累托改善。     

预付款融资下基于改进收益共享与回购联合契约的双渠道供应链协调研究

随机需求下,考虑了制造商存在资金约束的双渠道供应链在采用预付款融资时,如何实现供应链协调的问题。在制造商为主方的Stackelberg博弈下,研究了制造商和零售商分散决策时的最优库存决策问题,并通过设计改进收益共享与回购联合契约使得供应链达到协调。在此基础上,讨论了供应链的帕累托改进区间。最后,通过算例验证了联合契约对双渠道供应链协调及帕累托改进的有效性,并分析了契约参数和融资参数对供应链的影响。     

二级供应链上不完美互补产品的定价决策

建立一个由两个制造商和一个零售商组成供应链模型,以求解制造商和零售商的最优定价决策,其中两个制造商向零售商批发的产品是不完美互补的,且零售商采取混合捆绑策略销售这两种产品。考虑三种情形下的决策:(1)完全非合作博弈;(2)局部合作博弈;(3)合作博弈。通过比较前两种情形下的决策,利用Nash协商模型求解得到消除水平和垂直供应链冲突的最优定价决策。与完全非合作博弈决策相比,局部合作博弈决策对制造商是有利的,在一定的条件下也可以实现对零售商收益的帕累托改进;而合作博弈决策在任何情况下都要明显地优于完全非合作博弈决策以及局部合作博弈决策,同时合作博弈决策下的最优产品需求量相比局部合作博弈决策下的最优产品需求量提高了一倍。最后,通过数值试验验证了文章所得结论。     

价格和服务双因素影响的供应链协调决策模型研究

以单个制造商和存在竞争的两个零售商组成的供应链结构模型为研究对象,建立价格和服务两个重要因素影响的市场需求函数,研究供应链协调决策模型。以销售价格、服务质量和制造商批发价格作为三个决策变量,分析集中决策和分散决策两种情景的最优策略,研究收益共享、服务成本分担、收益共享成本分担等三种不同契约的供应链协调问题,并使用数值仿真方法,分析了相关参数变化对系统协调的影响。仿真结果表明:收益共享契约和成本分担契约需满足一定条件才能达到供应链协调,但其效果不一定实现帕累托最优;收益共享和成本分担契约可实现供应链协调,但收入共享系数需在合理区间取值;改进的收益共享成本分担契约能够避免共享系数的盲区,更加有效地达到供应链协调,保持供应链良好运行。     

双向碳减排成本分担下资金约束供应链契约协调研究

国家“双碳”目标对供应链协同减排提出新要求.文章考虑由单一供应商和单一受资金约束制造商构成的低碳供应链,双方通过“双向碳减排成本分担”机制进行协同减排,制造商通过竞争性银行信贷市场获取生产、碳减排及购买不足碳配额所需的运营资金.在求解供应商、制造商、银行在内的参与方博弈均衡策略基础上,探究了以“双向碳减排成本分担合约”为基础的资金约束型低碳供应链多契约协调问题.研究发现:批发价格、双向碳减排成本分担、收入分享契约的组合可实现低碳供应链协调和帕累托优化,而当考虑碳交易市场情形时,还需额外引入碳交易成本分担契约类型.相关研究结果可为“双碳”目标下企业的集成运营、碳减排和融资决策,及供应链主体间协同减排等提供理论指导.     

考虑政府参与方式的供应链低碳商誉微分博弈模型

低碳经济背景下,考虑到政府参与方式的不同,借助微分博弈研究供应链中长期合作(上游制造商减排和下游零售商宣传)提高供应链低碳商誉的动态博弈问题。分别构建了无政府补贴的分散式决策模型、有政府补贴的分散式决策模型、有政府补贴的集中式决策模型和政府干预下的双向成本分担契约模型,并进行求解分析。研究表明,后三种情况,供应链低碳商誉、制造商和零售商的努力程度具有相同的水平,且都高于无政府补贴时的情况;政府干预下的双向成本分担契约,政府无需提供补贴,也能达到有补贴时的效果;政府和作为供应链中博弈地位较高的制造商都更倾向于采取政府干预下的双向成本分担契约方式,而作为供应链中博弈地位较低的零售商更愿意接受有政府补贴的分散式决策方式;政府在选择参与方式时,应充分考虑供应链中企业边际利润的对比情况。最后,通过算例对模型进行了数值分析。     

碳限额与交易机制下受资金约束的供应链优化

在碳限额与交易机制下,研究零售商受资金约束的供应链优化问题。构建了制造商占优的两级供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,通过引入减排成本分担机制,分别给出了分散决策和集中决策的最优解。通过收益共享契约,实现了供应链协调和供应链成员利润的帕累托改善。通过算例分析了不同减排成本分担系数、碳交易价格对供应链利润和订购量、碳减排决策的影响,为供应链各成员开展减排合作提供了理论依据。研究结果表明,供应链成员的合作不仅可以提高供应链总绩效,而且有利于为消费者提供更多、更绿色的产品;碳价格的提高,促使供应链更加努力减排,从而提高了供应链总利润。     

考虑大数据营销和风险规避的绿色供应链决策与协调

通过建立考虑大数据营销及零售商风险规避的博弈模型,对绿色供应链定价、产品绿色度及利润进行比较分析。研究发现：无论集中决策、双方风险中性分散决策还是仅零售商风险规避分散决策,考虑大数据营销时的供应链整体期望利润和产品绿色度较高,且大数据营销效率因子对产品绿色度的增加有正向作用;双方风险中性分散决策下,一定条件下,两部定价契约能够有效协调供应链整体利润,实现帕累托改进;仅零售商风险规避分散决策下,零售商的风险规避行为会降低其对大数据营销的投入,一定条件下,两部定价契约也能够实现供应链整体期望利润的帕累托改进。     

随机需求下双渠道供应链的改进回购契约协调

考虑市场需求是非线性随机的且受零售商努力影响的一般情形,建立由一个制造商与一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,研究设计协调双渠道供应链的引入努力成本分担系数的改进回购契约,结果表明,只要引入努力成本分担系数的改进回购契约参数取值恰当,双渠道供应链就能够实现协调.研究结论具有一定的理论与现实指导意义.     

需求预测更新条件下两阶段电子商务供应链契约协调

研究了一类在贝叶斯需求预测更新情形下,生命周期中采用B2C与C2B两阶段进行产品销售的供应链模型,研究发现无法使用单一契约来协调供应链。在此基础上,设计了具有供应商价格折扣契约与零售商承诺订购契约的两阶段供应链契约协调机制,证明了两阶段协调机制能够实现供应链的帕累托改进。算例分析表明了两阶段契约协调机制的有效性,并发现能够实现供应链完美协调的契约参数不一定在帕累托集合内,供应链不一定能够达到完美协调;且由于零售商与供应商的最优契约参数不同,需要通过零售商与供应商之间的谈判达到纳什均衡。     

Supply chain coordination through integration of innovation effort and advertising support

This study integrates firms’ innovation and advertising decisions in a two-echelon supply chain, where a monopoly manufacturer sells products to ultimate consumers through an autonomous retailer. Considering that both innovation and advertising contribute to the product demand, we first investigate the optimal equilibriums of channel members under two different game structures: the non-cooperative and cooperative. In the non-cooperative structure, the manufacturer controls the innovation effort and wholesale price while the retailer controls the advertising rate and retail pricing. In the cooperative structure, the manufacturer agrees to share part of retailer’s advertising expenditure. We find that both the optimal operation and marketing decisions are sensitive to effects of innovation and advertising on demand as well as the manufacturer’s cost reduction coefficient due to innovation. Further, we find that the manufacturer always prefers cooperation. Meanwhile, only when the firms’ investments significantly contribute to the market mechanism, does the retailer have incentive to implement a cooperative program. In addition, we further propose a new two-way subsidy policy to coordinate channel members’ business functions.     

A game theoretic approach to coordinate pricing and vertical co-op advertising in manufacturer-retailer supply chains

Vertical cooperative (co-op) advertising is a marketing strategy in which the retailer runs local advertising and the manufacturer pays for a portion of its entire costs. This paper considers vertical co-op advertising along with pricing decisions in a supply chain; this consists of one manufacturer and one retailer where demand is influenced by both price and advertisement. Four game-theoretic models are established in order to study the effect of supply chain power balance on the optimal decisions of supply chain members. Comparisons and insights are developed. These embrace three non-cooperative games including Nash, Stackelberg-manufacturer and Stackelberg-retailer, and one cooperative game. In the latter case, both the manufacturer and the retailer reach the highest profit level; subsequently, the feasibility of bargaining game is discussed in a bid to determine a scheme to share the extra joint profit.     

Coordination of cooperative advertising in a two-level supply chain when manufacturer offers discount

We studied the coordination of cooperative advertisement in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain when the manufacturer offers price deductions to customers. With a price sensitive market, the expected demand with cooperative advertising and price deduction is demonstrated. When the manufacturer is a leader, we obtained the optimal national brand name investment, local advertisement and associated manufacturer’s allowance with any given price deduction. When the manufacturer offers more price deduction to customers, the retailer will increase local advertisement if the manufacturer provides the same portion of the local advertising allowance. We obtained the necessary and sufficient condition for the price deduction to ensure an increase of manufacturer’s profit, and a search procedure for determining such an optimal price deduction is provided as well. When the manufacturer and retailer are partners, we obtained the optimal national brand name investment and local advertisement. For any given price deduction, the total profit for the supply chain with cooperative scheme is always higher than that with the non-cooperative scheme. When price elasticity of demand is larger than one, the resulting closed form optimal price deduction with partnership is also obtained. To increase profits for both parties in a supply chain, we recommend that coordination in local and national cooperative advertising with a partnership relationship between manufacturer and retailer is the best solution. The bargaining results show how to share the profit gain between the manufacturer and the retailer, and determine the associated pricing and advertising policies for both parties.     

Cooperative Advertising in a Marketing Channel

This paper examines dynamic advertising and promotion strategies in a marketing channel where the retailer promotes the manufacturer product and the manufacturer spends on advertising to build a stock of goodwill. We assume that sales depend on goodwill and promotion activities and that there are decreasing marginal returns to goodwill. Two scenarios are studied. First, the manufacturer and retailer determine noncooperatively their respective strategies. Second, the game is played à la Stackelberg with the manufacturer as the leader who supports partially the cost of the promotion activities of the retailer. In both cases, stationary Markovian strategies are characterized. These scenarios are examined also in the absence of decreasing marginal effect of goodwill on sales. The results show that, whether or not the goodwill stock has a decreasing marginal effect on sales, the cooperative advertising program is a coordinating mechanism in the marketing channel, i.e., both players receive higher payoffs.     

Vendor Management Inventory with consignment contracts and the benefits of cooperative advertising

Most of the cooperative advertising literature has focused on studying the effects of such programs considering marketing variables. This paper integrates production and inventory management with pricing and advertising considerations to assess the effects of cooperative advertising programs in bilateral monopolies. We consider a supply chain where a Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) along with a consignment contract is implemented to coordinate the chain. We develop and solve a differential model for two games. The first one is a benchmark scenario where no cooperative advertising is offered, while the manufacturer offers the cooperative program in the second game. The main results show that cooperative advertising programs, usually considered as successful marketing initiatives, can be very difficult to implement in a supply chain undertaking a VMI policy with a consignment contract, in which operations and marketing interface is taken into account. A cooperative program mainly hurts the manufacturer’s profits, and can be profit-Pareto-improving only in a few cases. Although the retailer is generally willing to receive a support from the manufacturer, she can opt for a non-cooperative program when the largest part of the supply chain profits goes to the manufacturer. We developed several special cases to strengthen our findings.     

考虑互惠偏好的闭环供应链系统合作机制研究

将互惠偏好引入到闭环供应链系统合作机制中,研究了由一个制造商,一个零售商和一个再制造商组成的三层闭环供应链,运用Stackelberg博弈理论分析了闭环供应链整体及各成员的最优决策问题,并对5种情形(决策模式)下的均衡结果进行比较分析.研究发现在考虑互惠偏好行为下,分散决策模式和局部联盟决策模式下的系统利润低于集中决策模式下的收益;新产品和再制造产品的销售量(零售价格)与制造商对零售商的互惠偏好系数呈正(负)相关,与零售商对制造商的互惠偏好系数呈负(正)相关;5种决策模式的供应链系统利润与制造商对零售商的互惠偏好系数呈正相关,与零售商对制造商的互惠偏好系数呈负相关.     

基于流程创新的供应链激励合同研究

针对由一个零售商两个制造商组成的竞争供应链,建立了零售商处于领导地位的Stackelberg博弈模型。分析了收益分享合同和成本分担合同下流程创新效率和竞争强度对流程创新水平和供应链成员利润的影响,并探讨了最优激励合同类型。研究发现,流程创新效率的降低会使得制造商流程创新水平和供应链成员利润降低;竞争强度的增大会使得制造商流程创新水平和供应链成员利润增加。此外,在流程创新效率较高和竞争强度较低时零售商提供收益分享合同有利,在流程创新效率较低和竞争强度较高时零售商提供成本分担合同有利。     

不确定情况下逆向供应链的协作与定价策略研究

基于单一制造商和单一零售商构成的逆向供应链系统,应用博弈理论和模糊理论对逆向供应链的协作与定价策略进行了研究.针对回收产品价格的不确定性,将回收价格看作是三角模糊数,采用Chen与H sieh提出的梯级平均综合表示法确定模糊回收价格的解模糊值,由此,建立非合作博弈模型和合作博弈模型,并给出均衡条件下制造商和零售商各自的回收价格策略.最后,举例说明了该方法的有效性.     

风险中性零售商的合作广告策略与订货模型

考虑了由一个制造商与一个零售商构成的单期二阶段供应链是否进行合作广告的博弈问题.面对市场需求的不确定性,零售商从制造商处订购报童类型产品销售给消费者,零售商具有风险中性的行为特征.通过不合作广告与合作广告两种情形,制造商与零售商进Stackelberg主从博弈,得到了均衡解,比较后发现,合作广告下的最优解及利润总是优于不合作广告下的最优解和利润,告诉了上下游企业采用合作广告的广告策略.最后,通过数值算例,给出了需求敏感系数对最优决策的影响,同时也论证了有关结论.