离散时间单位连结人寿保险合同的局部风险最小对冲策略

单位连结人寿保险合同是保险利益依赖于某特定股票的价格的保险合同。当保险公司发行这样的保险合同后，保险公司将面临金融和被保险人死亡率两类风险。因此这样的保险合同相当对不完全金融市场上的或有索取权，不能利用自我融资交易策略复制出。本提出利用不完全市场的局部风险最小对冲方法对冲保险的风险，我们在离散时间的框架下给出了局部风险最小对冲策略。     

离散时间单位连结人寿保险合同的局部风险最小对冲策略

单位连结人寿保险合同是保险利益依赖于某特定股票的价格的保险合同 .当保险公司发行这样的保险合同后 ,保险公司将面临金融和被保险人死亡率两类风险 .因此这样的保险合同相当于不完全金融市场上的或有索取权 ,不能利用自我融资交易策略复制出 .本文提出利用不完全市场的局部风险最小对冲方法对冲保险者的风险 .我们在离散时间的框架下给出了局部风险最小对冲策略 .     

Random yield supply chain with a yield dependent secondary market

This paper considers a simple supply chain with one supplier and one retailer where the supplier’s production is subject to random yield and the retailer faces uncertain demand. There exists a secondary market for acquiring or disposing products by the supplier. We study both the centralized and decentralized systems. In the decentralized system, a no risk sharing contract and a risk sharing minimum commitment contract are analyzed. The supply chain with the risk sharing contract is further analyzed with a constant secondary market price and a yield dependent secondary market price. We present both the supplier’s and the retailer’s optimal strategies and provide insights for managers when making decisions under random yield risk and demand uncertainty. We find that the secondary market generally has a positive impact on supply chain performance and the actual effect of random yield risk on the supply chain performance depends on cost parameters and supply chain contract settings. Under certain conditions, reducing yield randomness may weaken the double marginalization effect and improve the chain performance. From the numerical study, we also show that there exists an optimal commitment level for the supply chain.     

Contract design and supply chain coordination in the electricity industry

In this article we propose a model of the supply chain in electricity markets with multiple generators and retailers and considering several market structures. We analyze how market design interacts with the different types of contract and market structure to affect the coordination between the different firms and the performance of the supply chain as a whole. We compare the implications on supply chain coordination and on the players’ profitability of two different market structures: a pool based market vs. bilateral contracts, taking into consideration the relationship between futures and spot markets. Furthermore, we analyze the use of contracts for differences and two-part-tariffs as tools for supply chain coordination. We have concluded that there are multiple equilibria in the supply chain contracts and structure and that the two-part tariff is the best contract to reduce double marginalization and increase efficiency in the management of the supply chain.     

Contract and product quality in platform selling

More and more e-tailers (platforms) are allowing manufacturers direct access to customers. Two common contracts are offered by platforms to manufacturers: the revenue sharing contract where a platform appropriates a portion of the manufacturer’s revenue, and the fixed fee contract where a platform charges a fixed rent for each sale. Using an analytical model, this paper studies the interrelationship between a platform’s contract choice and a manufacturer’s product quality decision. We find that if product quality is exogenously given, the platform will always adopt the revenue sharing contract. If the manufacturer endogenously decides the quality, however, the platform’s contract choice may be changed. This is because the revenue sharing contract, compared to fixed fee, leads to a lower selling price of the manufacturer, whereas the fixed fee contract can motivate a higher quality than does revenue sharing. As a result, a large (small) market heterogeneity induces the platform to adopt the revenue sharing (fixed fee) contract. We also extend the model to several directions, finding that longer product line, manufacturer competition, lower marginal production cost, and higher platform cost all tend to induce the platform to put forward a fixed fee contract; while if quality decision is less flexible than contract decision, the platform is more ready to embrace revenue sharing. Besides, when there are two platforms competing for the same market, they should differentiate their contract choices so as to mitigate competition.     

Stochastic models for bidding strategies on oligopoly electricity market

In this paper we consider the forward/futures contracts and Asian-type call options for power delivery as important components of the bidding strategies of the players’ profits on the electricity market. We show how these derivatives can affect their profit. We use linear asymmetric supply function equilibrium (SFE) and Cournot models to develop firms’ optimal bidding strategies by including forward/futures contracts and Asian-type options. We extend the methodology proposed by Niu et al. (IEEE Trans Power Syst 20(4):1859–1867, 2005), where only forward contracts for power delivery were considered in the SFE model.     

The efficiency of financial futures markets: Tests of prediction accuracy

The prices of financial futures contracts can be interpreted as forecasts of the spot rates, which will apply at the final delivery date of that contract. Financial futures contracts have been traded daily since the early 1980s and provide a substantial bank of data to test the forecasting efficiency of such contracts. Tests are carried out to examine whether the interest rates implied by the futures price for eurodollar and short sterling contracts are cointegrated with the final settlement price over forecasting horizons of 1, 2 and 3 months. Similar analysis is carried out for the yen/dollar exchange rate futures contract. The paper then examines the forecasting performance of the three contracts over the forecasting horizons of 1, 2 and 3 months and in particular whether the forecasts implied by the futures contract provide better predictions than the naı̈ve no-change (i.e. random walk), a vector error correction model (VECM) or an ARIMA model.An examination of the relative efficiency of the markets for the three markets over the three time horizons is carried out and finally trading strategies are simulated to see whether excess profits can be achieved. In fact the results suggest that both profits and losses would be attracted.     

Coordinating a three-stage supply chain with competing manufacturers

It is common for multiple manufacturers to compete in one common market. This paper considers a three-stage supply chain consisting of two competing manufacturers, one distributor, and one retailer. The two manufacturers’ products are substitutable with each other, and both manufacturers sell their products through the common distributor and the common retailer. In this supply chain, three contract mechanisms are discussed. The first one is wholesale-price (WP) contracts. The second one is pairwise revenue-sharing (PRS) contracts indicating that the revenues are shared by all pairs of adjacent entities. The third one is spanning revenue-sharing (SRS) contract indicating that the retailer simultaneously shares his revenues with all supply chain members. First, we discuss the effects of competition between manufacturers on both decentralized and centralized supply chains under the WP contracts. Second, we discuss the coordination mechanisms. The PRS and SRS contracts are used to coordinate the entire supply chain. We present the drawbacks of the PRS contracts in coordinating this competing supply chain and suggest using the SRS contract instead. After an SRS contract is adopted, it is evaluated using the WP contracts as a benchmark. The conditions necessary for an SRS contract to achieve a win–win outcome are then presented. Finally, some numerical examples are provided.     

软件服务供应链合同设计与协调策略

考虑了整合式软件服务供应链和分散式软件服务供应链两种模式,以整合供应链为基准对分散供应链下的软件开发合同设计与协调问题进行了研究。在分散供应链下,分析了固定价格合同、销量激励合同和成本分担合同三种合同对供应链收益的影响,探索了这些合同的激励机制,考察了这些合同的适用环境。研究表明:三种合同中,成本分担合同对软件开发商的激励最高,达到了整合供应链下的协调水平;固定价格合同适用于软件用户对质量不太注重而对价格比较敏感、以及开发成本较高的情形,销量激励合同适用于软件用户对质量比较注重而对价格不太敏感、以及开发成本较低的情形,成本分担合同适用于平台运营商易于监测软件开发商开发成本的情形。     

The valuation of options on capacity with cost and demand uncertainty

Options contracts can provide trading partners with enhanced flexibility to respond to uncertain market conditions and allow for superior capacity planning thanks to early information on future demand. We develop an analytical framework to value options on capacity for production of non-storable goods or dated services. The market consists of a sequence of contract and spot market. Reservations are made during the contract market session in period 0, where the buyer’s future demand, the seller’s future marginal costs as well as the future spot price are uncertain, the latter being impacted neither by the buyer nor the seller. During the spot market session in period 1, the buyer may execute his options or satisfy his entire or additional demand from a competing seller in the spot market. The seller allocates reserved capacity now being called and attempts to sell remaining capacity into the spot market. Analytical expressions for the buyer’s optimal reservation quantity and the seller’s tariff are derived, making explicit the risk-sharing benefits of options contracts. The combination of an options contract and a spot market is demonstrated to be Pareto improving as compared to alternative market schemes. An analysis of the determinants of the efficiency gain characterizes industries particularly suitable to the options approach.     

Joint decision on production and pricing for online dual channel supply chain system

Online dual channel supply chain system and its joint decision on production and pricing under information asymmetry are investigated. First, optimal production and pricing strategies are depicted according to the centralized system. Next, two kinds of contracts are designed for the decentralized system to coordinate the channel system, and their production and pricing decisions are depicted using a principle-agent method for the asymmetric information on the traditional channel. Finally, some interesting insights are found: the centralized system is not always being better than the decentralized system with a feasible contract if the traditional and professional retailer has lower selling cost. When uncertainty in the traditional channel information is higher, the manufacturer prefers a menu of contracts according to different channel settings. When uncertainty is lower, the manufacturer prefers a single contract. Furthermore, the higher the uncertainty in the traditional channel, the more the information welfare of the traditional retailer will gain. Performance with a menu of contracts cannot outperform that with a single contract integrating optimistic and pessimistic market setting well; their difference in performance is bigger when uncertainty in the traditional channel information is less.     

Design outsourcing in the fashion supply chain: OEM <Emphasis Type="Italic">versus</Emphasis> ODM

Design innovation is the engine of fashion. Many fashion firms outsource design innovation to their suppliers. Design outsourcing is on the rise in the fashion supply chain, but research in this area lags behind industry practice. In this paper, we examine how design outsourcing affects the supply chain, and we compare supply chain performance under an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) strategy versus an Original Design Manufacturer (ODM) strategy. We evaluate a market size outsourcing model where design enhancement influences market size, and a success probability outsourcing model where design enhancement influences the success probability of innovation. We find that when the supplier trades with the retailer via a wholesale price contract under the ODM strategy, the supplier has no incentive to invest in innovation. In the market size outsourcing model, the design innovation in the centralized supply chain is higher than that under the OEM strategy. However, in the success probability outsourcing model, the success probability of innovation under the OEM strategy is higher than that in the centralized supply chain. Furthermore, we find that a profit sharing contract can achieve supply chain coordination under both OEM and ODM strategies; whereas, revenue sharing and buyback contracts cannot.     

Electricity swing options: Behavioral models and pricing

Electricity swing options are supply contracts for power, which give the owner the right to change the required delivery on short time notice. It gives more flexibility than fixed base load or peak load contracts. The name “option” is a bit misleading, since it gives the owner multiple exercise rights at many different time horizons with exercise amounts on a continuous scale. We look at the problem to determine a rational ask price for such a contract from the viewpoint of the contract seller. The pricing of these contracts differs drastically from the pricing of financial options. First, peculiar properties arise from the non-storability of the underlying (the energy) and therefore the impossibility to hedge with the underlying, hedging is only possible with some future contracts. Second, the behavior of the owner plays an important role. Based on some behavioral model for the option holder, we develop a game-theoretic model, which allows to identify the equilibrium price. Besides some theoretical results, we present some numerical results which clarify the dependence of the asked price on the amount of flexibility offered in the swing option.     

碳减排外包下的契约优化与选择研究

在政府碳配额、碳交易市场机制和消费者低碳偏好背景下,研究了制造商与低碳服务提供商合作下的碳减排外包问题。对技术交易型契约和合作共享型契约两种契约进行了优化,分别得到了两种契约下的最优决策和契约可达成条件,并进一步分析了制造商和低碳服务提供商对两种契约的偏好,最后利用转移支付的方式对契约偏好冲突问题进行了协调。研究结果表明,单位减排成本和碳排放权市场价格均是影响技术交易型契约和合作共享型契约可行性的关键因素;当单位最小碳排放量、单位减排成本和碳排放权市场价格同时满足一定条件时,两种契约可同时达成;制造商总是偏好技术交易型契约,但低碳服务提供商对于契约类型的偏好并不是确定的;利用转移支付协调的方式可以解决合作双方的契约偏好冲突问题,并使得双方最终达成技术交易型契约。     

Sales effort free riding and coordination with price match and channel rebate

This paper studies sales effort coordination for a supply chain with one manufacturer and two retail channels, where an online retailer offers a lower price and free-rides a brick-and-mortar retailer’s sales effort. The free riding effect reduces brick-and-mortar retailer’s desired effort level, and thus hurts the manufacturer’s profit and the overall supply chain performance. To achieve sales effort coordination, we designed a contract with price match and selective compensation rebate. We also examined other contracts, including the target rebate contract and the wholesale price discount contract, both with price match. The numerical analysis shows that the selective rebate outperforms other contracts in coordinating the brick-and-mortar retailer’s sales effort and improving supply chain efficiency.     

Pareto analysis of supply chain contracts under satisficing objectives

Supply chain coordination has become critical to firms as increased pressure is placed on them to improve performance. We evaluate the performance of Push, Pull, and Advance-purchase discount (APD) contracts in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain where one or both firms have a satisficing objective of maximizing the probability of achieving a target profit. We identify the resulting operational modes of the supply chain and potential conflicts over the preferred contracts under the Push, Pull, and APD contracts. When both firms are satisficing, conflict over the preferred contract arises when the manufacturer has an ambitious profit target or the retailer has a low profit target. We show that the Push contract can result in a large decrease in the expected profit of a risk-neutral manufacturer when the retailer maximizes the probability of achieving her maximum expected profit. We find that a modified buy-back and profit guarantee contracts can provide significant Pareto improvement over Push or APD contracts when the manufacturer is risk-neutral and the retailer is satisficing, while revenue-sharing contracts cannot. In contrast, revenue sharing and modified buy-back contracts are Pareto dominant under certain conditions when the manufacturer is satisficing and the retailer is risk-neutral.     

Contract type and decision right of sales promotion in supply chain management with a capital constrained retailer

From the practices of Chinese consumer electronics market, we find there are two key issues in supply chain management: The first issue is the contract type of either wholesale price contracts or consignment contracts with revenue sharing, and the second issue is the decision right of sales promotion (such as advertising, on-site shopping assistance, rebates, and post-sales service) owned by either manufacturers or retailers. We model a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer who has limited capital and faces deterministic demand depending on retail price and sales promotion. The two issues interact with each other. We show that only the combination (called as chain business mode) of a consignment contract with the manufacturer’s right of sales promotion or a wholesale price contract with the retailer’s right of sales promotion is better for both members. Moreover, the latter chain business mode is realized only when the retailer has more power in the chain and has enough capital, otherwise the former one is realized. But which one is preferred by customers? We find that the former is preferred by customers who mainly enjoy low price, while the latter is preferred by those who enjoy high sales promotion level.     

Supply chain operations in the presence of a spot market: a review with discussion

We survey the recent literature on the use of spot market operations to manage procurement in supply chains. We present results in two categories: work that deals with optimal procurement strategies and work related to the valuation of procurement contracts. As an example of the latter, we provide new results on valuation of a supply contract with abandonment option. Based on our review, we also discuss the scope for doing further work.     

Entry and exit of service providers under cost uncertainty: a real options approach

From a real options perspective, this paper examines a service provider's entry and exit decisions toward two types of service outsourcing contracts under service transaction cost uncertainties. Specifically, for a service contract with a flexible duration, the service provider has an option to terminate the contract at any time point by paying a pre-determined exit penalty. For a contract with a fixed-duration, the service provider is obligated to deliver services for a pre-determined period of time. Under this framework, this study seeks to derive the transaction cost conditions that trigger the service provider’s exercise of entry and exit options. Furthermore, via analytical and numerical examinations, this study also uncovers how service transaction cost uncertainty and other business factors (eg, exit penalty and contract duration) influence the service provider’s entry and exit decisions as well as the choice of contract type (ie, fixed-duration versus flexible-duration).     

Dynamic conformance and design quality in a supply chain: an assessment of contracts’ coordinating power

We consider a two-echelon supply chain involving one manufacturer and one supplier who collaborate on improving both design and conformance quality. Design quality is supposed to increase product desirability, and therefore market demand, while conformance quality should reduce the proportion of defective items, and therefore increase the manufacturer’s sales revenue. We investigate how the supply chain parties allocate effort between design and conformance quality under both cooperative and non-cooperative settings in an intertemporal framework. Furthermore, we evaluate wholesale price contracts and revenue-sharing contracts in terms of their performance and coordination power. We show that although a revenue-sharing contract enables the manufacturer to effectively involve the supplier in quality improvement, neither contract type allows for perfect coordination resulting in the quality that can be achieved by a cooperative supply chain. We thus suggest a reward-based extension to the revenue-sharing contract, to ensure system-wide optimal quality performance. Importantly, we find that the supplier would be better off adopting a reward-based revenue sharing contract and refusing a standard revenue-sharing contract, while the opposite would be true for the manufacturer.