基于管理效率的公私合作项目伙伴选择与激励机制

公私合作模式(PPP)进行公共项目建设有利于解决建设资金紧张以及政府在投资管理上的低效问题.目前用相关利益者理论把PPP模式作为社会博弈来研究,PPP模式相关的公共机构理论,PPP项目的政府监管与定价机制.针对公共项目在投资中期或运行期的公私合作伙伴选择和投资激励契约问题,在政府对项目已作了前期融资和了解的条件下,建立了公私合作伙伴关系的联合投资契约及补贴模型.区分对称和非对称信息两种情形,就如何设计最优契约才能使合作投资双方都能真实地表明他们的努力和管理水平信号进行了研究,分析了政府管理效率对合作投资契约的影响,为公共项目在投资中期或运行期实施公私合作伙伴关系投资提供了决策依据.     

基于资本约束的资本机会成本定价研究

资本约束与信息不对称密切相关 ,当企业内部存在信息不对称时 ,企业实施内部资本约束 ,此时 ,由于外部资本市场能够产生正确的资本机会成本信号 ,净现值准则可以用于项目选择 .而当企业外部资本市场存在信息不对称时 ,资本提供者会实施外部资本约束 ,由于信息不对称歪曲了资本机会成本的市场信号 ,净现值准则失效 ,此时 ,机会成本的定价研究需要引进效用函数及主观资本回报率等工具 .     

基于公私不同风险偏好的PPP项目政府补偿机制研究

本文在考虑双方风险偏好差异的基础上,围绕PPP项目补偿问题构建了公私双方的Stackelberg博弈模型,从集中决策和分散决策协调的角度研究了PPP项目的补偿机制。研究表明,在公私双方存在风险厌恶时,直接补贴契约无法诱导私人投资者做出符合整体最优的决策。因此,本文设计了一种基于政府部分承担建设投资的混合补偿契约改进前补贴模式。分析表明,当建设投资分担比例合适时,混合补偿契约可以协调风险厌恶下的PPP补偿博弈的分散决策和集中决策,实现Pareto改进。最后,通过数值分析进一步研究了补偿契约的影响因素和适用范围。     

不完全契约下政府实施公共品负担对私人部门行为选择影响机制研究

政府部门往往会承担公共品负担提高社会公共福利和满足社会诉求,私人部门在PPP项目建设运营中会采取机会主义行为损害政府部门利益和降低社会福利。本文运用演化博弈分析私人部门的机会主义行为演化机制。通过模型分析可得,当政府补贴系数低于一定程度时,私人部门采取机会主义行为的概率随着公共品负担强度的增加而增加;当政府实施公共品负担小于一定强度时,私人部门会随着政府补贴程度提高而不采取机会主义行为,而当公共品负担强度大于一定值时,政府补贴政策正相关性就被严重削弱;私人部门占据更多的利益分配比重,更有倾向采取机会主义行为。根据研究结果,政府部门应增强契约精神,公共品负担下,政府补贴并不能有效降低机会主义行为,而应完善监管机制和提升私人部门对项目收益的信心。     

乡村振兴战略下农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作行为演化博弈分析

农村人居环境整治是乡村振兴战略的重要内容,基于有限理性的演化博弈理论,构建了以地方政府、社会资本和农村居民为博弈主体的农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作行为演化博弈模型,运用Matlab软件分析了三方主体的初始意愿和政府规制对三方主体行为策略演化的影响。研究发现:(1)政府规制对农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作博弈系统演化的影响从大到小依次是:政府对社会资本的补贴资助、投机罚金、合作奖励和政府对农村居民的参与奖励。(2)与提高地方政府对社会资本的补贴资助力度和惩罚力度相比,提高地方政府的激励规制初始意愿更能促进农村人居环境整治PPP项目的顺利落地实施。(3)农村居民参与PPP项目的初始意愿的提升关键在于提高农村居民参与收益。最后,为促进PPP模式在农村环境治理领域的应用与发展和推动农村人居环境整治的可持续改善提出相应建议。     

碳交易规制下的制造商减排外包模式选择:定制vs订购?

研究碳交易规制下制造商减排服务外包时供应链各成员的最优决策和绩效问题,对比分析了定制和订购两种减排模式下的供应链博弈均衡和供应链成员绩效。研究发现,在碳交易规制下,定制和订购两种减排合作模式下供应链成员均存在最优决策。在定制模式下,单位产品的初始排放量和制造商的减排成本系数提高一定会降低最优产量、单位产品减排量和减排服务价格,减排服务商的减排成本系数提高会降低最优产量和单位产品减排量,但不一定会降低减排服务价格;在订购模式下单位产品初始排放量、制造商和减排服务商的成本系数对企业决策的影响不一定如此。当需求函数满足均匀分布时,无论制造商和减排服务商的减排效率如何,订购模式对减排服务商更有利,定制模式对制造商更有利,但供应链系统总利润的高低与制造商的减排成本系数有关。     

基于政府政策规制的众包物流定价策略研究

考虑政府对众包物流市场采取激励性政策和约束性政策,基于不同的市场结构,以众包物流平台利润最大化为目标,构建政府政策规制的平台最优定价模型,运用最优化方法求解平台最优定价,最后利用数值分析对相关结论进行验证。研究结果表明：在垄断型市场结构下,当政府采取激励性政策时,平台定价随用户间交叉网络外部性的增加而增加;当政府采取约束性政策时,平台定价与政府限制力度负相关,平台定价随政府限制力度的增强而降低。在竞争型市场结构下,当政府采取激励性政策时,平台定价随平台服务差异化系数的增加而降低;当政府采取约束性政策时,平台定价随政府限制力度的增强呈先增后降的趋势。     

基于两阶段动态博弈的服务外包定价分析

本文通过引入动态博弈模型,从完全竞争市场博弈定价、税收减免下博弈定价、人才补贴下博弈定价三个角度定量研究了服务外包企业的最优定价策略及其影响因素。研究表明,服务外包均衡价格受企业需求函数和竞争对手决策等因素影响,并得出了在政府行业扶持政策下的服务外包均衡价格与各参数之间的关系。依据研究结果,本文对政府给予服务外包行业的相关扶持政策提出了若干合理性建议。     

市场化改革背景下养老机构服务供给博弈研究

考虑政府补贴、市场化程度、养老机构服务成本、老年人偏好等因素,构建了完全国有化、公私并存的半市场化和完全市场化三种情形下公办和民办养老机构之间的两阶段博弈模型,比较分析了市场化程度对养老机构服务价格制定和服务水平选择的影响,实证讨论了各参数变化对养老机构收益及社会福利的影响。研究表明:完全市场化机制会降低养老机构服务质量,完全国有化机制会陷入社会福利陷阱,探索公私并存的最佳市场化水平才能更好地提高社会福利;适度推进市场化改革,提高养老机构服务水平,降低民办养老机构服务成本,适度提高对民办养老机构的补贴,将有效缓解公办和民办养老机构的不公平竞争;提高老年人支付能力,推进养老机构供给侧结构性改革,将保障机构养老服务的有效供给,促进养老服务业的健康有序发展。     

政府补贴下考虑CSR投入的闭环供应链回收及定价决策

在考虑政府回收补贴及零售商CSR投入的情形下,研究零售商主导型闭环供应链的逆向回收渠道选择及定价决策问题。在三种不同回收模式下,分析了政府的回收补贴机制及零售商的CSR投入行为对废旧产品回收及闭环供应链绩效的影响。研究表明无论在何种回收模式下,政府回收补贴不仅能有效降低新产品的批发及零售价格、增强各回收方的废旧产品回收积极性,也能增加闭环供应链成员及系统整体利润。零售商的CSR投入总是有利于扩大新产品市场需求、提高废旧产品回收率。从提高零售商的CSR投入水平及改善闭环供应链整体绩效的角度,在制造商负责废旧产品回收时,政府实施回收补贴机制效果最佳。     

高速公路PPP项目股权结构、质量水平与VFM的关系研究

高速公路PPP项目属于具有经营收益的准经营性项目,政府制定有效的激励措施,可以鼓励项目公司发挥专业的建设和运营能力,提高项目质量和收益水平。本文以VFM作为政府绩效评价指标,通过构建完全信息静态博弈模型,研究了PPP项目股权结构、质量水平与VFM之间的关系,结果发现:虽然社会资本较多持有项目公司股份有助于提高VFM水平,但随着社会资本方股权比例的增加,项目质量水平在不断降低,所以政府应该将社会资本方的持股比例控制在一定范围内,在保证项目质量的同时达到VFM最大化,从而降低政府方风险,提高社会效益。在高速公路PPP项目中,政府应优化股权决策,激励项目公司改善项目质量和水平,为公私双方带来良好的绩效水平。     

Uniform pricing and subsidy coordination mechanism in a two-tier healthcare system under a co-payment policy

Recently, the lengthy waiting time in public hospitals (called the public system) under the free healthcare policy has become a serious problem. To address this issue, motivated by the Japanese healthcare system, this paper investigates a two-tier co-payment healthcare system under a uniform pricing and subsidy coordination mechanism. In such a setting, the public system and the private system (i.e., the private hospitals) compete for market share with different objectives, whereas the government uniformly sets the service price and the subsidy rate to maximize social welfare under a total budget constraint. Compared with two free healthcare policy cases implemented in the Canadian and Australian healthcare systems respectively in terms of social welfare, the results show that when the market demand (or the patient service quality sensitivity) is sufficiently high (sufficiently low), the uniform pricing and subsidy coordination mechanism is better and worse otherwise; and when the patient's waiting sensitivity (or the total government budget) is in an appropriate middle range (sufficiently low or high), the mechanism can outperform than the free policy cases.     

基于政府补贴的养老服务市场供给研究

随着我国老龄化速度加快,养老服务的有效供给问题是政府和学者关注的焦点。考虑政府财政补贴下,引入民办与公办养老服务的替代因子,构建民办养老机构与公办养老机构的服务动态供给模型,分析不同补贴方式和补贴力度对服务均衡供给量的影响,并进一步通过补贴乘数分析政府补贴对养老服务机构最优供给决策的影响程度。结果表明:政府对民办养老机构的财政补贴可以增加养老服务市场供给量,相较于运营补贴,政府建设补贴的政策效应更加明显;财政补贴降低了民办养老机构的建设成本和投资风险,刺激社会资本投入的积极性,民办养老服务供给增加幅度大于公办养老服务供给减少幅度,养老服务市场有效供给增加。在财政预算约束下,选择恰当的财政补贴方式,可以提高财政资源的配置效率,增加养老服务市场的有效供给,缓解养老服务财政压力。     

基于或有可换债的PPP项目资本证券化研究

PPP项目具有的“大而不倒”特性,致使其陷入财务困境时,政府不得不介入和对其进行救助。然而这种救助必然会扭曲PPP项目定价和加剧市场的不正当竞争。为对冲PPP项目资本短缺的风险及抑制项目“大而不倒”负面效应,建议社会资本方发行或有可换债(CEBs)。CEBs在可换债的基础上引入或有可转债的条款,使其具有危机救助功能和风险转移功能。且CEBs的发行不会增加项目运营公司的公司债务。只有当项目因资本短缺而陷入财务困境时,社会资本方可以通过CEBs转为项目特定收益权和债务减记的方式来增加可支配资本,以维持PPP项目正常运营。研究表明,CEBs通过类似保险的形式对冲项目的资本短缺的风险;为社会资本提供合理的退出机制;对冲政府的裸露头寸。     

PPP项目中国有企业与民营企业的融资效率对比研究

目前PPP模式的应用范围不断扩大,但投资者的融资效率普遍不高。投资者融资效率低下严重影响PPP项目绩效,制约PPP模式的可持续发展。本文以51家主营业务为PPP项目的国有企业与民营企业为样本,运用DEA模型分别从整体、不同领域和不同地区之间对比分析双方融资效率的异同。结果显示参与PPP项目投资者的规模效率普遍不足,主营成本与股权集中度是导致融资效率低下的主要因素,净资产收益率较低则是投资者不愿积极参与PPP项目的一个主要原因。对国企而言,优化企业对PPP项目的规模效率是提高融资效率的关键;而民企应注重优化和降低资产负债率,合理均衡地分配股权。因此,建议具有规模效率和纯技术效率优势的投资者通过组建联合体等方式参与PPP项目,实现优势互补,从而提高项目公司的整体效率。此外,也要针对不同领域和不同地区PPP项目的特点和对投资者的要求,有针对性地选择投资者,充分发挥国企资金实力雄厚和民企专业技术的优势,提高融资效率,助力PPP实践的可持续发展。     

Optimal admission and pricing control problems in service industries with multiple servers and sideline profit

This paper deals with the problem of selecting profitable customer orders sequentially arriving at a company operating in service industries with multiple servers in which two classes of services are provided. The first class of service is designed to meet the particular needs of customers; and the company (1) makes a decision on whether to accept or to reject the order for this service (admission control) and (2) decides a price of the order and offers it to an arriving customer (pricing control). The second class of service is provided as a sideline, which prevents servers from being idle when the number of customer orders for the first class is less than the number of servers. This yields the sideline profit. A cost is paid to search for customer orders, which is called the search cost. In the context of search cost, the company has an option whether to conduct the search or not. In this paper, we discuss both admission control and pricing control problems within an identical framework as well as examine the structure of the optimal policies to maximize the total expected net profit gained over an infinite planning horizon. We show that when the sideline profit is large, the optimal policies may not be monotone in the number of customer orders in the system. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pavement rehabilitation scheduling and toll pricing under different regulatory regimes

This paper addresses the highway pavement rehabilitation scheduling and toll pricing issues over a planning horizon. In the highway system concerned, two types of agents are considered, namely highway operator and road users. Two models, which account for different highway regulatory regimes (i.e. public and private), are proposed. In the public regulatory model, the government aims to maximize total discounted social welfare of the transportation system over the planning horizon by determining the optimal pavement rehabilitation schedule and toll level. In the private regulatory regime, a profit-driven private operator seeks to optimize the pavement rehabilitation schedule and toll level to maximize its own discounted net profit over the planning horizon. The proposed models treat the interactions between the highway operator and the road users in the system as a bi-level hierarchical problem in which the upper level is a multi-period pavement rehabilitation scheduling and toll pricing problem, while the lower level is a multi-period route choice equilibrium problem. A heuristic solution algorithm that combines a greedy approach and a sensitivity analysis based approach is developed to solve the proposed bi-level multi-period optimization models. An illustrative example is used to show the applications of the proposed models. The findings show that the highway regulatory regime, pavement deterioration parameter and the roughness-induced vehicle operating cost can significantly affect the pavement rehabilitation schedules and the toll level as well as the performance of transportation system in terms of total life-cycle travel demand, net profit and social welfare.     

Government-provided annuities under insolvency risk

This paper seeks to determine whether governments should intervene in the private annuity market by directly providing public insurance in the form of annuities when both the government and the insurance companies could default. It is found that, although the government could default, intervening by means of an annuity can improve social welfare if the insurance companies could default and the expected return on the public annuity is greater than the rate of return on a risk-free bond. We also find that, under actuarially fair pricing, the government should provide more in terms of a public annuity than the optimal amount of the annuity that the individual purchases in the private market if the government is less likely to default on the public annuity than an insurance company would in the case of a private annuity.     

Government-provided annuities under insolvency risk

This paper seeks to determine whether governments should intervene in the private annuity market by directly providing public insurance in the form of annuities when both the government and the insurance companies could default. It is found that, although the government could default, intervening by means of an annuity can improve social welfare if the insurance companies could default and the expected return on the public annuity is greater than the rate of return on a risk-free bond. We also find that, under actuarially fair pricing, the government should provide more in terms of a public annuity than the optimal amount of the annuity that the individual purchases in the private market if the government is less likely to default on the public annuity than an insurance company would in the case of a private annuity.