On the existence of Nash strategies and solutions to coupled riccati equations in linear-quadratic games

The existence of linear Nash strategies for the linear-quadratic game is considered. The solvability of the coupled Riccati matrix equations and the stability of the closed-loop matrix are investigated by using Brower's fixed-point theorem. The conditions derived state that the linear closed-loop Nash strategies exist, if the open loop matrixA has a sufficient degree of stability which is determined in terms of the norms of the weighting matrices. WhenA is not necessarily stable, sufficient conditions for existence are given in terms of the solutions of auxiliary problems using the same procedure.This work was supported in part by the Joint Services Electronics Program (US Army, US Navy, and US Air Force) under Contract No. DAAG-29-78-C-0016, in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. ENG-74-20091, and in part by the Department of Energy, Electric Energy Systems Division, under Contract No. US-ERDA-EX-76-C-01-2088.     

Algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in deterministic LQ games

In this paper we review a number of algorithms to compute Nash equilibria in deterministic linear quadratic differential games. We will review the open-loop and feedback information case. In both cases we address both the finite and the infinite-planning horizon.     

On linear-quadratic Gaussian continuous-time Nash games

Two classes of linear-quadratic Gaussian continuous-time Nash games are considered. Their main characteristic is that the -fields with respect to which the control actions of the players have to be measurable at each instance of time are not affected by the past controls of the players. We show that, if a solution exists, then there exists a solution linear in the information, and also show how to construct all the solutions. Several conditions guaranteeing the existence of a unique solution are also given.This work was supported in part by the United States Air Force, Office of Scientific Research, under Grants Nos. AFOSR-80-0171 and AFOSR-82-0174.     

Magnus integrators for solving linear-quadratic differential games

We consider Magnus integrators to solve linear-quadratic N$N$-player differential games. These problems require to solve, backward in time, non-autonomous matrix Riccati differential equations which are coupled with the linear differential equations for the dynamic state of the game, to be integrated forward in time. We analyze different Magnus integrators which can provide either analytical or numerical approximations to the equations. They can be considered as time-averaging methods and frequently are used as exponential integrators. We show that they preserve some of the most relevant qualitative properties of the solution for the matrix Riccati differential equations as well as for the remaining equations. The analytical approximations allow us to study the problem in terms of the parameters involved. Some numerical examples are also considered which show that exponential methods are, in general, superior to standard methods.     

On the uniqueness of Nash strategies for a class of analytic differential games

The uniqueness of Nash equilibria is shown for the case where the data of the problem are analytic functions and the admissible strategy spaces are restricted to analytic functions of the current state and time.This work was supported in part by the Joint Services Electronics Program (US Army, US Navy, and US Air Force) under Contract No. DAAB-07-72-C-0259, in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. ENG-74-20091, and in part by the Department of Energy, Electric Energy Systems Division under Contract No. US ERDA EX-76-C-01-2088.     

Asymptotic Analysis of Linear Feedback Nash Equilibria in Nonzero-Sum Linear-Quadratic Differential Games

In this paper, we discuss nonzero-sum linear-quadratic differential games. For this kind of games, the Nash equilibria for different kinds of information structures were first studied by Starr and Ho. Most of the literature on the topic of nonzero-sum linear-quadratic differential games is concerned with games of fixed, finite duration; i.e., games are studied over a finite time horizon t _f. In this paper, we study the behavior of feedback Nash equilibria for t _f.In the case of memoryless perfect-state information, we study the so-called feedback Nash equilibrium. Contrary to the open-loop case, we note that the coupled Riccati equations for the feedback Nash equilibrium are inherently nonlinear. Therefore, we limit the dynamic analysis to the scalar case. For the special case that all parameters are scalar, a detailed dynamical analysis is given for the quadratic system of coupled Riccati equations. We show that the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the Riccati equations depends strongly on the specified terminal values. Finally, we show that, although the feedback Nash equilibrium over any fixed finite horizon is generically unique, there can exist several different feedback Nash equilibria in stationary strategies for the infinite-horizon problem, even when we restrict our attention to Nash equilibria that are stable in the dynamical sense.     

Sufficient conditions for Nash bargaining in differential games

Sufficient conditions for Nash bargaining in differential games are given. These conditions are compared with the sufficient conditions given by Liu (Ref. 1).     

A BSDE approach to Nash equilibrium payoffs for stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals

In this paper, we study Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games via the theory of backward stochastic differential equations. We obtain an existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals defined with the help of doubly controlled backward stochastic differential equations. Our results extend former ones by Buckdahn et al. (2004) [3] and are based on a backward stochastic differential equation approach.     

Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for linear-convex stochastic differential games

The uniqueness of Nash equilibria is shown for a class of stochastic differential games where the dynamic constraints are linear in the control variables. The result is applied to an oligopoly.This paper benefitted from comments by two anonymous referees and by L. Blume and C. Simon.     

State transformations and the derivation of Nash closed-loop equilibria for non-zero-sum differential games

In this paper the usefulness of state transformations in differential games is demonstrated. It is shown that different (admissible) state transformations give rise to different closed-loop Nash equilibrium candidates, which may all be found by solving systems of ordinary differential equations. A linear-quadratic duopoly differential game is solved to illustrate the results.     

Learning algorithms for repeated bimatrix Nash games with incomplete information

The purpose of this paper is to study a particular recursive scheme for updating the actions of two players involved in a Nash game, who do not know the parameters of the game, so that the resulting costs and strategies converge to (or approach a neighborhood of) those that could be calculated in the known parameter case. We study this problem in the context of a matrix Nash game, where the elements of the matrices are unknown to both players. The essence of the contribution of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it shows that learning algorithms which are known to work for zero-sum games or team problems can also perform well for Nash games. On the other hand, it shows that, if two players act without even knowing that they are involved in a game, but merely thinking that they try to maximize their output using the learning algorithm proposed, they end up being in Nash equilibrium.This research was supported in part by NSF Grant No. ECS-87-14777.     

Closed-form solution for discrete-time linear-quadratic Stackelberg games

A method is proposed for solving the two-point boundary-value problem occurring in discrete-time linear-quadratic Stackelberg games. It is shown that, for open-loop information structure, the necessary conditions can be ordered to form a symplectic matrix. The solution is then obtained by exploiting the properties of such a matrix.     

Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibria inN-person games over reflexive Banach spaces

Sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence of Nash equilibrium points inN-person games when the strategy sets are closed, convex subsets of reflexive Banach spaces. These conditions require that each player's cost functional is convex in that player's strategy, weakly continuous in the strategies of the other players, weakly lower semicontinuous in all strategies, and furthermore satisfies a coercivity condition if any of the strategy sets is unbounded. The result is applied to a class of linear-quadratic differential games with no information, to prove that equilibrium points exist when the duration of these games is sufficiently small.This work was supported by a Commonwealth of Australia, Postgraduate Research Award.     

Informational uniqueness of closed-loop Nash equilibria for a class of nonstandard dynamic games

This paper discusses an extension of the currently available theory of noncooperative dynamic games to game models whose state equations are of order higher than one. In a discrete-time framework, it first elucidates the reasons why the theory developed for first-order systems is not applicable to higher-order systems, and then presents a general procedure to obtain an informationally unique Nash equilibrium solution in the presence of random disturbances. A numerical example solved in the paper illustrates the general approach.Dedicated to G. LeitmannResearch that led to this paper was supported in part by the Office of Naval Research under Contract No N00014-82-K-0469 and in part by the U.S. Air Force under Grant No. AFOSR-84-0054.     

Identification of classes of differential games for which the open loop is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium

In general, it is clear that open-loop Nash equilibrium and feedback Nash equilibrium do not coincide. In this paper, we study the structure of differential games and develop a technique using which we can identify classes of games for which the open-loop Nash equilibrium is a degenerate feedback equilibrium. This technique clarifies the relationship between the assumptions made on the structure of the game and the resultant equilibrium.The author would like to thank E. Dockner, A. Mehlmann, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

A solution for noncooperative games

In this paper, we study solutions of strict noncooperative games that are played just once. The players are not allowed to communicate with each other. The main ingredient of our theory is the concept of rationalizing a set of strategies for each player of a game. We state an axiom based on this concept that every solution of a noncooperative game is required to satisfy. Strong Nash solvability is shown to be a sufficient condition for the rationalizing set to exist, but it is not necessary. Also, Nash solvability is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of the rationalizing set of a game. For a game with no solution (in our sense), a player is assumed to recourse to a standard of behavior. Some standards of behavior are examined and discussed.This work was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. DAAG29-75-C-0024 and by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. MCS-75-17385-A01. The author is grateful to J. C. Harsanyi for his comments and to S. M. Robinson for suggesting the problem.     

Sufficient conditions for Stackelberg and Nash strategies with memory

Sufficiency conditions for Stackelberg strategies for a class of deterministic differential games are derived when the players have recall of the previous trajectory. Sufficient conditions for Nash strategies when the players have recall of the trajectory are also derived. The state equation is linear, and the cost functional is quadratic. The admissible strategies are restricted to be affine in the information available.This work was supported in part by the Joint Services Electronics Program under Contract No. N00014-79-C-0424, in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. ECS-79-19396, and in part by Department of Energy under Contract No. EX-76-C-01-2088.