考虑平台影响因素的虚拟社区知识共享演化博弈研究

知识共享是虚拟社区用户学习和传播知识的重要途径。本文考虑到虚拟社区平台对参与用户知识共享行为的激励作用,引入平台的奖励和不分享知识所产生的机会成本,以及知识共享收益因素,构建考虑虚拟社区平台影响因素的虚拟社区知识共享演化博弈支付矩阵,并求得演化均衡解。通过小米社区的案例引入,仿真模拟平台对用户知识共享的奖励、机会成本、收益分配系数以及参与用户共享程度等因素对参与用户知识共享行为意愿的影响。研究发现:虚拟社区参与用户的知识共享意愿对因为知识共享所产生新知识的收益系数变化较为敏感;平台的奖励以及不分享知识所产生的机会成本对用户知识共享意愿影响巨大;同时,不同参与用户因为知识水平层次不同,参与知识共享的目的也不相同,这会影响到他们的知识共享策略选择。     

The Assessment of Reservation Prices of an Intermediate R&D Result and Patent Reward Under Oligopolistic Competitive Behaviour

One of the shortcomings of R&D evaluation is a lack of emphasis on analytical assessment of the value of an on-going R&D project. This paper addresses the problem concerning the distributive aspect of access to superior knowledge. Decision tree analysis and probability models appear to be appropriate tools for assessing the values of an intermediate result and patent reward of a firm's R&D decision in an environment of perfect information and oligopolistic competition. The assessed values are used as minimum prices acceptable to the firm when the knowledge is disseminated to the public. This paper will attempt to resolve this problem through the determination of the appropriate values of the reservation price of the first-stage invention in terms of the final reward and of a patent reward for which the inventor is willing to apply.     

An approach to credit assignment in classifier systems

We present a conceptual framework within which we can analyze simple reward schemes for classifier systems. The framework consists of a set of classifiers, a learning mechanism, and a finite automaton environment that outputs payoff. We find that many reward schemes have negative biases that degrade system performance. We analyze bucket brigade schemes, which are subgoal reward schemes, and profit sharing schemes, which aren't. By contrasting these schemes, we hope to better understand the place of subgoal reward in learning and evolution. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Coordination in decentralized assembly systems with uncertain component yields

The literature on assembly systems with random component yields has focused on centralized systems, where a single decision maker chooses all components’ production quantities and incurs all the costs. We consider a decentralized setting where the component suppliers choose their production quantities based solely on their own cost/reward structure, and the assembly firm makes ordering decisions based on its own cost/reward structure. When the suppliers control their inputs but the outputs exhibit random yields, coordination in such systems becomes quite complex. In such situations, incentive alignment control mechanisms are needed so that the suppliers will choose production quantities as in the centralized system case. One such mechanism is to penalize the supplier with the worse delivery performance. We analyze the conditions under which system coordination is achieved while respecting participation constraints. Further, we determine the optimal component ordering policy for the assembly firm and derive the optimal coordinating penalties.     

企业员工专用性人力资本投资的模型分析

企业对员工的人力资本投资进行适宜的激励,对于提高组织的绩效、提高企业的价值具有重要作用.将员工的人力资本投资细分为企业专用性人力资本投资与经理专用性人力资本投资,并认为因其不同功能企业则偏向于员工进行企业专用性人力资本投资,在此基础上通过建立数学模型,分析了企业与员工合作与非合作两种情况下企业与员工各自的收益及企业分配给员工的报酬比例、员工对企业及经理的投资均衡等相关问题.     

Innovation and learning performance implications of free revealing and knowledge brokering in competing communities: insights from the Netflix Prize challenge

Firms increasingly use open competitions to extend their innovation process and access new diverse knowledge. The Netflix Prize case we study in this paper is a multi-stage repeat-submission open competition involving the creation of new knowledge from across knowledge domains, a process which benefits from knowledge sharing across competing communities. The extant literature says little about the effects of different types and levels of knowledge sharing behavior on the learning and innovation outcomes of such a competitive system, or what the performance boundaries may be for the system as a result of such differences. Our research explores those boundaries unveiling important tradeoffs involving free revealing behavior—defined as voluntarily giving away codified knowledge and making it into a ‘public good’—and knowledge brokering behavior—defined as using knowledge from one domain to innovate in another—on the learning performance of competing communities. The results, analyzing the system-level average and volatility of learning outcomes, lead to three conclusions: (i) greater knowledge sharing, as portrayed by greater free revealing and knowledge brokering, helps achieve better average learning for the system as a whole, however, (ii) achieving the best overall outcome possible from the system actually requires controlling the amount of knowledge brokering activity in the system. The results further suggest that (iii) it should not be possible to simultaneously achieve both the best overall outcome from the system and the best average learning for the system. The tradeoffs that ensue from these findings have important implications for innovation policy and management. This research contributes to practice by showing how it is possible to achieve different learning performance outcomes by managing the types and levels of knowledge sharing in open competitive systems.     

Robust reward–risk ratio optimization with application in allocation of generation asset

In this article, we study reward–risk ratio models under partially known message of random variables, which is called robust (worst-case) performance ratio problem. Based on the positive homogenous and concave/convex measures of reward and risk, respectively, the new robust ratio model is reduced equivalently to convex optimization problems with a min–max optimization framework. Under some specially partial distribution situation, the convex optimization problem is converted into simple framework involving the expectation reward measure and conditional value-at-risk measure. Compared with the existing reward–risk portfolio research, the proposed ratio model has two characteristics. First, the addressed problem combines with two different aspects. One is to consider an incomplete information case in real-life uncertainty. The other is to focus on the performance ratio optimization problem, which can realize the best balance between the reward and risk. Second, the complicated optimization model is transferred into a simple convex optimization problem by the optimal dual theorem. This indeed improves the usability of models. The generation asset allocation in power systems is presented to validate the new models.     

The dynamics of price, quality and productivity improvement decisions

Although quality has received significant attention during the last decades and its economic benefits are beyond any doubt, lots of questions have remained unanswered as to how much, when, and in what to invest to maintain sustainable competitive advantage. A model is introduced here to guide a firm in addressing these questions. The firm produces a single product and operates in a market where monopolistic competition is effective. Demand for the product in the industry depends on both price and performance quality. Increasing productivity knowledge decreases unit production cost, but demand for the company’s product decreases over time, as competitors will be able to offer products with similar performance. Productivity and quality knowledge can be developed through induced and autonomous learning in order to strengthen company position. The paper provides an optimal control formulation of the problem and develops necessary conditions for optimality and characterizes the dynamics of optimal price, quality and investment decisions.     

Productivity change in the water industry in England and Wales: application of the meta-Malmquist index

This paper uses a meta-Malmquist index for measuring productivity change of the water industry in England and Wales and compares this to the traditional Malmquist index. The meta-Malmquist index computes productivity change with reference to a meta-frontier, it is computationally simpler and it is circular. The analysis covers all 22 UK water companies in existence in 2007, using data over the period 1993–2007. We focus on operating expenditure in line with assessments in this field, which treat operating and capital expenditure as lacking substitutability. We find important improvements in productivity between 1993 and 2005, most of which were due to frontier shifts rather than catch up to the frontier by companies. After 2005, the productivity shows a declining trend. We further use the meta-Malmquist index to compare the productivities of companies at the same and at different points in time. This shows some interesting results relating to the productivity of each company relative to that of other companies over time, and also how the performance of each company relative to itself over 1993–2007 has evolved. The paper is grounded in the broad theory of methods for measuring productivity change, and more specifically on the use of circular Malmquist indices for that purpose. In this context, the contribution of the paper is methodological and applied. From the methodology perspective, the paper demonstrates the use of circular meta-Malmquist indices in a comparative context not only across companies but also within company across time. This type of within-company assessment using Malmquist indices has not been applied extensively and to the authors’ knowledge not to the UK water industry. From the application perspective, the paper throws light on the performance of UK water companies and assesses the potential impact of regulation on their performance. In this context, it updates the relevant literature using more recent data.     

Optimizing referral reward programs under impression management considerations

We examine referral reward programs (RRP) that are intended for a service firm to encourage its current customers (inductors) to entice their friends (inductees) to purchase the firm’s service. By considering the interplay among the firm, the inductor, and the inductee, we solve a “nested” Stackelberg game so as to determine the optimal RRP in equilibrium. We determine the conditions under which it is optimal for the firm to reward the inductor only, reward the inductee only, or reward both. Also, our results suggest that RRP dominates direct marketing when the firm’s current market penetration or the inductor’s referral effectiveness is sufficiently high. We then extend our model to incorporate certain key impression management factors: the inductor’s intrinsic reward of making a positive impression by being seen as helping a friend, the inductor’s concerns about creating a negative impression when making an incentivized referral, and the inductee’s impression of the inductor’s credibility when an incentive is involved. In the presence of these impression management factors, we show that the firm should reward the inductee more and the inductor less. Under certain conditions, it is optimal for the firm to reward neither the inductor nor the inductee so that the optimal RRP relies purely on unincentivized word of mouth.     

Sequential stochastic assignment under uncertainty: estimation and convergence

This paper generalizes the sequential stochastic assignment problem, involving the assignment of workers to sequentially arriving jobs, by introducing uncertainty into the job value distribution. Three estimators are presented that address various levels of uncertainty while simultaneously improving worker assignments. Specifically, each estimator is designed to utilize the unbiased and consistent properties of the sample mean to estimate the expected job value, while suppressing high variance effects during start-up. The key contribution is that closed-loop decision policies involving past job value observations can responsively adapt to changing environments and improve the overall reward resulting from pairing workers with jobs. Examples of applications that can benefit from these results include aviation passenger screening and the real estate market, as well as applications of the stochastic knapsack problem.     

Controlling the bullwhip effect in a supply chain system with constrained information flows

The bullwhip effect problem is one of the most important issues in supply chain management. Limited information sharing increases the difficulty of reducing the bullwhip effect and leads to inefficient supply chain management. The purpose of this paper is to explore new ways to reduce the bullwhip effect in supply chain systems that face uncertainties with respect to information sharing. We first present a supply chain state transition model, based on which we explore the endogenous mechanism of bullwhip effect, especially those related to impacts from limited information sharing. Then we propose a novel inventory control method and study the corresponding control optimization problem, with the aim of reducing inventory volatility in supply chains. Both quantitative analysis and simulation study are conducted. Simulation results show the effectiveness and flexibility of our proposed method in reducing bullwhip effect and in improving supply chain performance, even under conditions of limited information sharing.     

政府监管下的医院医疗信息分享演化博弈分析

在分析政府监管下医院间医疗信息分享特征的基础上,结合我国当前正在推行的医联体医院间信息分享运作模式,引入梅特卡夫定律并考虑患者评价的影响,分析了监管部门与医院各自的利益组成,建立了监管部门与医院两者之间的演化博弈模型,并采用复制动态方程研究了不同情形下医院间信息分享的演化博弈轨迹。研究表明,政府通过监管并建立激励惩罚机制等引导措施对医院最终达到的演化稳定态具有极大影响;降低医院主体信息分享的风险成本、规范提高医院分享信息的质量、引导患者增强对医院信息分享的关注、制定有吸引力和威慑力的奖惩政策,是促进医院医疗信息分享的关键。研究结果可为政府监管部门预测医院间的信息分享趋势和制定精准化政策以促进分享提供参考。     

Decomposing technical inefficiency using the principle of least action

In for-profit organizations, profit efficiency decomposition is considered important since estimates on profit drivers are of practical use to managers in their decision making. Profit efficiency is traditionally due to two sources – technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. The contribution of this paper is a novel decomposition of technical efficiency that could be more practical to use if the firm under evaluation really wants to achieve technical efficiency as soon as possible. For this purpose, we show how a new version of the Measure of Inefficiency Proportions (MIP), which seeks the minimization of the total technical effort by the assessed firm, is a lower bound of the value of technical inefficiency associated with the directional distance function. The targets provided by the new MIP could be beneficial for firms since it specifies how firms may become technically efficient simply by decreasing one input or increasing one output, suggesting that each firm should focus its effort on a specific dimension (input or output). This approach is operationalized in a data envelopment analysis framework and applied to a dataset of airlines.     

Approaches to sharing knowledge in group problem structuring

Problem-structuring techniques are an integral aspect of ‘Soft-OR’. SSM, SAST, Strategic Choice, and JOURNEY Making, all depend for their success on a group developing a shared view of a problem through some form of explicit modelling. The negotiated problem structure becomes the basis for problem resolution. Implicit to this process is an assumption that members of the group share and build their knowledge about the problem domain. This paper explores the extent to which this assumption is reasonable. The research is based on detailed records from the use of JOURNEY Making, where it has used special purpose Group Support software to aid the group problem structuring. This software continuously tracks the contributions of each member of the group and thus the extent to which they appear to be ‘connecting’ and augmenting their own knowledge with that of other members of the group. Software records of problem resolution in real organisational settings are used to explore the sharing of knowledge among senior managers. These explorations suggest a typology of knowledge sharing. The implications of this typology for problem structuring and an agenda for future research are considered.     

Increasing flexibility and productivity in Industry 4.0 production networks with autonomous mobile robots and smart intralogistics

Manufacturing flexibility improves a firm’s ability to react in timely manner to customer demands and to increase production system productivity without incurring excessive costs and expending an excessive amount of resources. The emerging technologies in the Industry 4.0 era, such as cloud operations or industrial Artificial Intelligence, allow for new flexible production systems. We develop and test an analytical model for a throughput analysis and use it to reveal the conditions under which the autonomous mobile robots (AMR)-based flexible production networks are more advantageous as compared to the traditional production lines. Using a circular loop among workstations and inter-operational buffers, our model allows congestion to be avoided by utilizing multiple crosses and analyzing both the flow and the load/unload phases. The sensitivity analysis shows that the cost of the AMRs and the number of shifts are the key factors in improving flexibility and productivity. The outcomes of this research promote a deeper understanding of the role of AMRs in Industry 4.0-based production networks and can be utilized by production planners to determine optimal configurations and the associated performance impact of the AMR-based production networks in as compared to the traditionally balanced lines. This study supports the decision-makers in how the AMR in production systems in process industry can improve manufacturing performance in terms of productivity, flexibility, and costs. 

     

知识型员工行为能力的构成要素与评价研究

行为能力对于解释员工绩效具有重要意义.本文以知识型员工为研究对象,通过规范的实证研究获得了知识型员工行为能力的构成要素,以此为基础构建了知识型员工行为能力的评价指标体系.根据指标模糊性的特点,将三角模糊数理论与FAHP的融合,提出了一种基于三角模糊数的FAHP评价方法.以DR公司招聘某岗位的知识型员工为实例,说明了本文提出的方法在知识型员工行为能力评价中的适用性.     

竞争性企业技术联盟的知识共享效应研究

通过三阶段博弈模型分析竞争性企业技术联盟知识共享效应,结果表明:知识共享的程度是随着竞争性企业技术联盟规模的扩大而增加的.因为随着技术联盟规模的扩大,知识共享的规模收益会逐渐上升,从而减少了由于知识溢出而带来的损失.因此,在企业技术联盟内部构建一个能够有效地吸收、保持和共享知识的机制对于提高技术联盟的绩效具有积极的作用.     

Profit maximizing coalitions with shared capacities in distribution networks

We study the distribution network structure of multiple firms in the context of demand sensitivity to market offers. The problem consists in determining the profitability of horizontal collaboration between firms in a collaborative distribution schema. It considers the case of a set of regional distribution centers (DCs) where each DC is initially dedicated solely to one firm’s distribution activities and studies when it is beneficial that the DC owners collaborate through sharing their storage-throughput capacity. Such strategic decisions are made in order to improve the distribution capabilities of firms in terms of response time and cost-efficiency compared to the stand-alone situation. The problem is modeled as a coalition formation game in a cooperative framework, and we propose a collaborative distribution game with profit maximization. Three sharing mechanisms are modeled and tested: egalitarian allocation, proportional allocation, and Shapley value. The collaboration decision conditions for a given firm are analytically derived according to the sharing method considered and used to enhance the solution approach. Our numerical results clearly highlight the impact of this innovative collaboration opportunity on the firms’ performance in terms of distribution cost savings and revenue increases. An observed behavior is that the formation of several sub-coalitions prevails over the formation of a grand coalition, and that different cost sharing methods can lead to different sub-coalitions. We also provide managerial insights on the appropriate size of a coalition in various business instances tested, and on the key drivers that foster horizontal collaborative behavior among firms.     

Planning the supply of rewards with cooperative promotion considerations in coalition loyalty programmes management

Coalition loyalty programmes (CLPs) are owned and operated as for-profit enterprises. We consider the ordering decisions of rewards that arise in this context, under a general setting in which not only is the demand for rewards uncertain, but also the CLP firm offers bonus points, a very common cooperative promotion mechanism used in loyalty programmes. The rewards are acquired either at a wholesale ‘discounted’ cost or at a wholesale ‘non-discounted’ cost by the CLP firm from its multiple commercial partners and supplied to customers seeking to redeem their accumulated ‘reward points’, subject to commercial partners’ capacities for offering rewards, the firm’s overall budget for purchasing rewards, and its control policy on points liability. We formulate the problem as a stochastic linear programme with recourse and solve it using a sampling-based heuristic solution procedure previously discussed in the literature. We report on the managerial applicability of our model in dealing with the redemption budget spending resulting from changes in demand variability, changes in the redemption budget, and the control of liability levels within a reasonable range.