技术生态位视角下技术变迁过程的仿真分析:一个基于不同模式的对比研究

为解释不同技术变迁模式的作用原理,基于技术生态位理论,采用NetLogo软件进行智能体仿真实验。研究结果表明:技术外干扰的作用与强度是技术能否借助转变模式实现变迁的关键;技术变迁的去结盟与再结盟模式将导致生态位网络呈现区域高连通性,但主导技术出现空白阶段的情况;技术替代模式的技术变迁利于新技术通过生态位的积累与扩展建立市场权力,并逐步淘汰体制技术;技术变迁的重组模式是以成功的技术创新为前提,推动突破性创新涌现并彻底实现技术变革的方式。研究不仅从理论拓展和研究方法两个方面为技术生态位理论做出了贡献,而且所得结论亦从管理实践的角度,为管理者制定行之有效的技术变迁策略提供了有益借鉴。     

Capacity expansion and forward contracting in a duopolistic power sector

The surge in demand for electricity in recent years requires that power companies expand generation capacity sufficiently. Yet, at the same time, energy demand is subject to seasonal variations and peak-hour factors that cause it to be extremely volatile and unpredictable, thereby complicating the decision-making process. We investigate how power companies can optimise their capacity-expansion decisions while facing uncertainty and examine how expansion and forward contracts can be used as suitable tools for hedging against risk under market power. The problem is solved through a mixed-complementarity approach. Scenario-specific numerical results are analysed, and conclusions are drawn on how risk aversion, competition, and uncertainty interact in hedging, generation, and expansion decisions of a power company. We find that forward markets not only provide an effective means of risk hedging but also improve market efficiency with higher power output and lower prices. Power producers with higher levels of risk aversion tend to engage less in capacity expansion with the result that together with the option to sell in forward markets, very risk-averse producers generate at a level that hardly varies with scenarios.     

指数跟踪资产组合选股与原始数据处理对实证操作的影响

本文讨论用算法择优选股并研究股票与指数的相关性特征;以及对数据进行加工处理、采用数据平滑处理,平均加权、不平均加权,以解决实际问题中出现的具体情况：减缓因股市的短期震荡对再平衡的不利影响．并讨论各种处理方法对不同股市样本的效果,并且由此分析各种处理方法的特点及适用情况,以期提供给决策者以多方位的信息．在已有的模型中,这方面的研究并不多,尤其是结合中国股市的实证方面的工作是欠缺的．本文使用上证180在2006年的实际样本数据进行了数值实验并对结果进行比较,实证说明本文的处理方法是有效的、并对实际操作者有借鉴意义．     

Application of duopoly multi-periodical game with bounded rationality in power supply market based on information asymmetry

In the power market, each entity is not completely rational when generate strategy, and the market information held by each entity is not exactly the same. In this paper, duopoly power providers with different selling adjustment structures are simplified from the actual grid background, where one provider can sell part of its power to another at contract price to store the power. Each provider is trying to maximize its profit by adjusting its power selling strategy. The process of evolutionary game with multi-periods bounded rational is established. One provider adjusts its selling strategy through the multi-periods market price and another through its multi-periods marginal profit. The quantity of power sold by each provider will tend to Nash equilibrium and how information asymmetry affects the stability of Nash equilibrium is analyzed through comparing dynamic power selling with and without information asymmetry. Information asymmetry has a great impact on one provider but not another. The numerical simulations also show that the information asymmetry will increase the stability region of the system. Different adjustment suggestions are proposed for different providers when information asymmetry occurs.     

Capital Accumulation and Embodied Technological Progress

This paper combines technology adoption with capital accumulation taking into account technological progress. We model this as a multi-stage optimal control problem and solve it using the corresponding maximum principle. The model with linear revenue can be solved analytically, while the model with market power is solved numerically. We obtain that investment jumps upwards right at the moment that a new technology is adopted. We find that, if the firm has market power, the firm cuts down on investment before a new technology is adopted. Furthermore, we find that larger firms adopt a new technology later.     

An optimization problem in the electricity market

New types of optimization problems are faced by the generating companies that operate on deregulated electricity markets. The characteristics of these problems depend on the various market structures. In the framework of the recently settled Italian electricity market, one of these new problems is the transition from hourly energy programs, defined by the market, to more detailed power generation dispatches, defined for intervals of 15 min. Such a more detailed plan is needed on the one hand by the national system operator (Terna, Rete Elettrica Nazionale) for the assessment of power system stability and security, and on the other hand by the power plant operators for its implementation. The transition procedure should respect the hourly energy constraints and take the main operating constraints of the generating units into account. The paper presents possible solutions of the problem through linear optimization models and reports computational results on real-world instances.      

三角形分布的双方叫价拍卖模型在电力交易中的应用

在完全开放的双边电力市场下,大用户直接购电问题已成为我国电力改革的重大课题.研究发电公司和大用户如何建立有效的报价策略具有十分重要的理论和实践价值.将发电公司看成卖方,将买电代理看成买方,针对卖方的成本和买方的估计是私有信息,并服从区间(0,1)上的三角形分布,建立了基于三角形分布的双方叫价拍卖的贝叶斯博弈模型,并得到了预期的均衡结果.通过一个数值例子与基于均匀分布的经典双方叫价拍卖模型进行比较.结果表明:建立的双方叫价拍卖模型在电力交易拍卖中的应用,能够提供更为准确的理论预期结果,具有更为现实的指导意义.     

Efficient algorithms for combined heat and power production planning under the deregulated electricity market

Combined heat and power (CHP) production is an important energy production technology that can yield much higher total energy efficiency than separate heat and power generation. In CHP production, the heat and power production follows a joint characteristic, which means that the production planning must be done in coordination. Cost-efficient operation of a CHP system can be planned by using an optimization model. A long-term planning model decomposes into thousands of hourly models. Earlier, in the regulated electric power market, the planning problem was symmetrically driven by heat and power demand. The liberalization of the power market has created an asymmetrical planning problem, where heat production responds to the demand and power production to the volatile market price. In this paper, we utilize this asymmetry to develop novel envelope-based dual algorithms for solving the hourly CHP models efficiently. The basic idea is to transform the three-dimensional characteristic operating region for heat and power production of each CHP plant into a two-dimensional envelope by taking the power price as a parameter. Then the envelopes of each plant are used for looking up the optimal solution rapidly. We propose two versions of the algorithm: the on-line envelope construction algorithm (ECON) where the envelopes are constructed for each hour based on the power price and the off-line envelope construction algorithm (ECOFF) where envelopes are pre-computed for all different power price ranges. We derive the theoretical time complexity of the two algorithms and compare their performance empirically with realistic test models against the ILOG CPLEX solver and the Power Simplex (PS) algorithm. PS is an extremely efficient specialized primal algorithm developed for the symmetrical CHP planning problem under the regulated market. On average, when reusing previous basic solutions, ECON is 603 times faster than CPLEX and 1.3 times faster than PS. ECOFF is 1860 times faster than CPLEX and four times faster than PS.     

Liquidity risks on power exchanges: a generalized Nash equilibrium model

The extreme volatility of electricity prices makes their financial derivatives important instruments for asset managers. Even if the volume of derivative contracts traded on Power Exchanges has been growing since the inception of the restructuring of the sector, electricity remains considerably less liquid than other commodity markets. This paper assesses the effect of limited liquidity in power exchanges using an equilibrium model where agents cannot hedge up to their desired level. Mathematically, the problem is formulated as a two stage stochastic Generalized Nash Equilibrium with possibly multiple equilibria. Computing a large panel of solutions, we show how the risk premium and players profits are affected by illiquidity. We also show that the illiquidity in the FTR market affects the trades in the electricity futures market.     

Evaluating the strategic behavior of cement producers: An equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints

This paper investigates the equilibria reached by a number of strategic producers in the cement sector through a technological representation of the market. We present a bilevel model for each producer that characterizes its profit maximizing behavior. In the bilevel model, the upper-level problem of each producer is constrained by a lower-level market clearing problem representing cement trading and whose objective function corresponds to social welfare. Replacing the lower level problem by its optimality condition yields a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). Then, all strategic producers are jointly considered. Representing their interaction requires solving jointly the interrelated MPECs of all producers, which results in an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC).A parametric analysis concerning cost, capacity and demand fluctuations has been conducted. Our analysis shows that the European cement sector is mature and has lost its competitiveness; African cement market can assume a prominent role in international markets in the coming future if investments in new and efficient capacity are carried out. Finally, the Far East will remain the reference exporter of cement at worldwide level.     

Scale‐free power‐laws as interaction between progress and diffusion

While scale‐free power‐laws are frequently found in social and technological systems, their authenticity, origin, and gained insights are often questioned, and rightfully so. The article presents a newly found rank‐frequency power‐law that aligns the top‐500 supercomputers according to their performance. Pursuing a cautious approach in a systematic way, we check for authenticity, evaluate several potential generative mechanisms, and ask the “so what” question. We evaluate and finally reject the applicability of well‐known potential generative mechanisms such as preferential attachment, self‐organized criticality, optimization, and random observation. Instead, the microdata suggest that an inverse relationship between exponential technological progress and exponential technology diffusion through social networks results in the identified fat‐tail distribution. This newly identified generative mechanism suggests that the supply and demand of technology (“technology push” and “demand pull”) align in exponential synchronicity, providing predictive insights into the evolution of highly uncertain technology markets. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 19: 56–65, 2014     

坑口电厂低碳经济发展系统动力学仿真研究

通过分析坑口电厂低碳经济系统的复杂结构特征和动态反馈机制,建立了坑口电厂低碳经济系统动力学模型,描述系统内部各要素之间的相互关系,并以平煤集团坑口电厂为例,对不同发展方案下的坑口电厂低碳经济系统进行仿真模拟.结果表明:科技投资、环保投资、能源利用率、能源消费结构等因素是影响坑口电厂低碳经济发展的关键因素;可以通过优化能源消费结构,提高煤矸石消耗比例;增加科技投资和环保投资,提高能源利用和转换效率,降低污染物和二氧化碳排放量,从而达到高效率、低能耗、低排放的低碳经济发展模式.     

Power supply–demand balance in a Smart Grid: An information sharing model for a market mechanism

In the future, global energy balance of a Smart Grid system can be achieved by its agents deciding on their own power demand and production (locally) and the exchange of these decisions. In this paper, we develop a network model that describes how the information of power imbalance of individual agents can be exchanged in the system. Compared to existing network models with hierarchical structures, our developed model, together with a market mechanism, achieve the power balance in the system in a completely distributed way. Additionally, dynamics, constraints and forecasts of each agent can be conveniently involved.     

Spatial oligopolistic equilibria with arbitrage,shared resources,and price function conjectures

This paper considers equilibria among multiple firms that are competing non-cooperatively against each other to sell electric power and buy resources needed to produce that power. Examples of such resources include fuels, power plant sites, and emissions allowances. The electric power market is a spatial market on a network in which flows are constrained by Kirchhoffs current and voltage laws. Arbitragers in the power market erase spatial price differences that are non-cost based. Power producers can compete in power markets à la Cournot (game in quantities), or in a generalization of the Cournot game (termed the conjectured supply function game) in which they anticipate that rivals will respond to price changes. In input markets, producers either compete à la Bertrand (price-taking behavior) or they can conjecture that price will increase with consumption of the resource. The simultaneous competition in power and input markets presents opportunities for strategic price behavior that cannot be analyzed using models of power markets alone. Depending on whether the producers treat the arbitrager endogenously or exogenously, we derive two mixed nonlinear complementarity formulations of the oligopolistic problem. We establish the existence and uniqueness of solutions as well as connections among the solutions to the model formulations. A numerical example is provided for illustrative purposes.Support was provided by the National Science Foundation under grant ECS-0080577.This authors research was partially supported by the National Science Foundation under grants ECS-0080577 and CCR-0098013.The authors thank Chris Day, Fieke Riekers, and Adrian Wals for their collaboration. They are particularly indebted to Grant Roch for writing AMPL and MATLAB codes for solving the numerical example reported in the paper.     

基于Stackelberg模型下边际成本变化对技术创新的影响

基于零售商Stackelberg博弈,采用逆序归纳法,分析了技术创新后边际成本变化率与企业利润的关系,从而探讨了企业如何根据边际成本变化率选择技术创新策略的问题。从技术创新导致产品边际成本变化角度出发,建立了三阶段博弈模型。博弈第1阶段是企业判断技术创新后边际成本增加的可行范围;第2阶段是企业技术创新后对产品分销价格的决策;第3阶段是零售商在产品市场上进行竞争决定产量。结果显示,没有任何产能约束时,企业更愿意选择低成本创新,当边际成本增加超过30%时,由于成本过高得不到更大利润,企业宁愿选择不创新。     

基于双重差分模型的参与PPP项目与企业技术创新关系研究

以2011～2018年沪深主板市场上市的企业作为研究对象,分析了上市企业参与PPP项目建设对企业自身技术创新水平的影响,并进一步探讨行业竞争对二者关系的调节效应。研究发现企业参与PPP项目建设总体会抑制企业技术创新投入,并且参与PPP项目程度越深,抑制作用越明显。二者的关系在科技型行业和传统型行业中存在异质,参与PPP项目有助于提高科技型企业技术创新,但是不利于提高传统型企业技术创新。行业竞争对PPP项目与企业技术创新的关系产生显著的调节作用,随着行业竞争加强,参与PPP项目与科技型企业技术创新的正相关越大,参与PPP项目与传统型企业技术创新的负相关越小。对此,企业家要有长远意识,坚持创新型发展,同时监管部门要充分利用行业竞争机制加快产业转型升级,破除垄断关系。     

OR and energy: Problems of modelling

Attention is focused on three problem areas in energy modelling: (1) identifying the essential elements of the system, (2) coping with multiple criteria, (3) incorporating learning in the system. These aspects are illustrated through examples in current energy systems research, involving the oil market, power systems planning, and the role of nuclear energy.In modelling the word oil market, too heavy emphasis is placed on economic forces, but practically non on the political forces. However, certain economics-oriented studies indicate that financial gains of OPEC may actually be intensitive to the oil pricing policy followed. If that is indeed the case, the significant (political) elements and their motives have to be captured in the model in order to arrive at consistent results.Modelling the different objectives in power systems planning is an area where advances are urgently needed. A method is proposed, where decision alternatives are generated a posteriori, in contrast to recent approaches involving a priori articulation of preferences, or interactive methods. A multicriterion dynamic linear programming model and a fast algorithm are used in generating efficient solutions, which are then grouped, based on the clustering in objective values.The problem associated with changing system objectives is discussed and the nuclear programme is given as an example of how the system objectives move from costs to perceived risks. In line with the real system that ‘learns’ from its experience, we need models that change their objective functions as a result of their own outputs at prior times.     

Implicit collusion and individual market power in electricity markets

Wholesale electricity markets may not produce competitive outcomes, either as a result of the exercise of market power, or through problems of implicit collusion. In comparison with the great amount of attention paid to issues of market power, the problems of implicit collusion have not been extensively studied. In this paper, we use a coevolutionary approach to explore the effect of the price elasticity of demand, capacity and forward contracts on implicit collusion in a duopoly. We will demonstrate that implicit collusion has the most importance in market conditions under which there is an intermediate amount of market power. Thus markets which are either highly competitive or in which one or both of the two generators can exercise considerable market power, are also markets in which implicitly collusive outcomes are less likely to arise.     

随机波动率市场存在股票误价时的最优投资策略

本文研究了随机波动率市场中存在股票误价(mispricing)时的最优投资组合选择问题.假设投资者的目标是最大化终端财富的期望幂效用;其可投资于无风险资产、市场指数和两支相同权益或近似度极高的股票,其中至少有一支股票存在误价;市场收益的波动率和股票系统风险由Heston随机波动率模型刻画.运用动态规划方法和Lagrange乘子法,分别得到不存在/存在有限卖空约束时,投资者的最优投资策略及最优值函数的解析式,并通过理论分析和数值算例,阐述了投资时间水平和价格随机误差对最优投资策略的影响.     

Evaluating the impact of average cost based contracts on the industrial sector in the European emission trading scheme

The inception of the emission trading scheme in Europe has contributed to power price increases. Energy intensive industries have reacted by arguing that this may affect their competitiveness and will induce them to leave Europe. Taking up a proposal of these industrial sectors, we explore the possible application of special contracts, where electricity is sold at average generation cost to mitigate the impact of CO₂ cost on power prices. The model supposes fixed generation capacities. We first consider a reference model representing a perfectly competitive market where all consumers (industries and the rest of the market) are price-takers and buy electricity at short-run marginal cost. We then change the market design by assuming that energy intensive industries pay power either at a regional or at a zonal average cost price. The analysis is conducted with simulation models applied to the Central Western European power market. The models are implemented in GAMS/PATH. This work has been financially supported by the Chair Lhoist Berghmans in Environmental Economics and Management and by the Italian project PRIN 2006, Generalized monotonicity: models and applications, whose national responsible is Prof. Elisabetta Allevi.