Existence of competitive equilibrium in coalition production economies with a continuum of agents

Aumann (Econometrica 34: 1–17, 1966) established the existence of competitive equilibria in exchange economies with a continuum of traders. This result has been extended to special production economies under the condition that the production sets are countably additive or superadditive in the literature. In this paper, we extend Aumann’s result to coalition production economies with a continuum of traders in which each coalition can have a different production set and the production sets need not to be additive or superadditive. Our new existence theorem for competitive equilibrium implies the classical result by Hildenbrand (Econometrica 38: 608–623, 1970), and implies those by Sondermann (J Econ Theory 8: 259–291, 1974) and Greenberg et al. (J Math Econ 6: 31–41, 1979) under the assumption that the production sets are convex.     

Markets with countably infinitely many traders

In this paper we will show how to construct, in a canonical way, a continuous economy in the sense of R. J. Aumann [1]. This construction is based on W. Hildenbrand's [3] definition of “pure competition” for an exchange economy with countably infinitely many participants.     

Aggregate preferred correspondence and the existence of a maximin REE

A general model of a pure exchange differential information economy is studied. In this economic model, the space of states of nature is a complete probability measure space, the space of agents is a finite measure space, and the commodity space is the Euclidean space. Under some appropriate and standard assumptions on agents' characteristics, results on continuity and measurability of the aggregate preferred correspondence similar to that of Aumann [8] are established. These results together with other techniques are then employed to prove the existence of a maximin rational expectations equilibrium (maximin REE) of the economic model.     

Strong equilibria of a repeated game with randomized strategies

A version of Aumann's (1976) model of a repeated game with randomized strategies is studied. The pure strategy set of each player is assumed to be a compact metric spacnd complexities due to the information structures are explicitly handled. It is shown that one can extend Aumann's argument to this setup and still prove the Aumann Proposition on equivalence of the β-core of a one-shot game with correlated strategies and the strong equilibrium utility allocations of the associated repeated game with randomized strategies. To this extended version of the Aumann Proposition, the author's theorem for nonemptiness of the β-core with correlated strategies is applicable, so this version is non-vacuous.     

Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach

The Aumann (In: Gabszewicz JJ, Richard JF, Wolsey L (eds) Economic decision making: games, econometrics and optimisation, 1990) conjecture states that cheap-talk messages do not necessarily help to coordinate on efficient Nash equilibria. In an experimental test of Aumann’s conjecture, Charness (Games Econ Behav 33(2):177–194, 2000) found that cheap-talk messages facilitate coordination when they precede the action, but not when they follow the action. Standard game-theoretical modeling abstracts from this timing effect, and therefore cannot account for it. To allow for a formal analysis of the timing effect, I study the sequential equilibria of the signaling game in which the sender is modeled as comprising two selves: an acting self and a signaling self. I interpret Aumann’s argument in this context to imply that all of the equilibria in this game are ‘babbling’ equilibria, in which the message conveys no information and does not affect the behavior of the receiver. Using this framework, I show that a fully communicative equilibrium exists—only if the message precedes the action but not when the message follows the action. In the latter case, no information is transmitted in any equilibrium. This result provides a game-theoretical explanation for the puzzling experimental results obtained by Charness (2000). I discuss other explanations for this timing-of-message effect and their relationship to the current analysis.     

An algorithm for optimizing network flow capacity under economies of scale

The problem of optimally allocating a fixed budget to the various arcs of a single-source, single-sink network for the purpose of maximizing network flow capacity is considered. The initial vector of arc capacities is given, and the cost function, associated with each arc, for incrementing capacity is concave; therefore, the feasible region is nonconvex. The problem is approached by Benders' decomposition procedure, and a finite algorithm is developed for solving the nonconvex relaxed master problems. A numerical example of optimizing network flow capacity, under economies of scale, is included.This research was supported by the National Science Foundation, Grant No. GK-32791.     

On the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core

The seminal contribution of Debreu and Scarf (Int Econ Rev 4:235–246, 1963) connects the two concepts of core and competitive equilibrium in exchange economies. In effect, their core-equilibrium equivalence result states that, when the set of economic agents is replicated, the set of core allocations of the replica economy shrinks to the set of competitive allocations. Florenzano (J Math Anal Appl 153:18–36, 1990) defines the fuzzy core as the set of allocations which cannot be blocked by any coalition with an arbitrary rate of participation and then shows the asymptotic limit of cores of replica economies coincides with the fuzzy core. In this note, we provide an elementary proof of the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core for an exchange economy. Hence, in motivation, our result is similar to the contribution of Vohra (On Scarf’s theorem on the non-emptiness of the core: a direct proof through Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Brown University Working Paper, 1987) and Shapley and Vohra (Econ Theory 1:108–116, 1991) for the core. Unlike the classical Debreu–Scarf limit theorem (Debreu and Scarf in Int Econ Rev 4:235–246, 1963) and its numerous extensions our result does not require any asymptotic intersection—or limit—of the set of core allocations of replica economies. The author would like to thank the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for financial support.     

Criteria for convexity in Banach spaces

In this paper two convexity criteria are proven. The first one characterizes compact convex sets in a locally convex space and extends a previous result by G. Aumann, while the second one characterizes closed bounded convex sets with the Radon-Nikodým property in a Banach space.

     

On the complexity of simultaneous price-quantity adjustment processes

While the Walrasian price tâtonnement represents the traditional dynamic process in the general equilibrium context with and without production, Walras and other classics designed the process exclusively for pure exchange economies. In productive economies, the short-run output adjustment of existing firms and the entry/exit of firms should be modeled as well. So-called cross-dual processes which represent the classical approach to the dynamics of productive economies are discussed and extended. Complex motion can emerge in a discrete-time version of the original two-dimensional system when the aggregate demand function has a non-standard shape. A simultaneous process of price and short-run quantity adjustment with free entry and exit of competitive firms in a single market with a continuum of firms can generate closed orbits via a Hopf bifurcation when the slope of the demand function is positive at equilibrium. When the continuum economy is replaced by an economy with a finite number of firms, noisy limit cycles and complicated behavior can be observed.     

Refinements of the β-core and the strong equilibrium and the Aumann proposition

The Aumann proposition establishes that an outcome in the -core of the one-shot gameG is the same as the strong equilibrium utility allocations of the associated supergame. We refine the -core by requiring that the threat strategies used to deter deviations be credible and examine the consequences for the Aumann proposition in the case of the refinement. We show that a refinement of the strong-equilibrium notion is always in the refined -core. The converse is not necessarily true unless the utility allocations are linear.I am grateful to T. Ichiishi for several discussions that helped in the development of this paper. This is part of the author's Ph.D. dissertation submitted at the university of Iowa in December 1985.     

Exploring multiple equilibria for symmetric 2×2 CES/LES pure exchange economies

This paper explores the existence of 3 equilibria for symmetric 2-individual 2-good CES/LES pure exchange economies. For certain parameterizations in the economies, we show analytically that there are no more than 3 equilibria. We generalize our analytical results of existence of 3 equilibria for a wide range of parameterizations. Then we provide examples of 3 equilibria and parameter zones of 3 equilibria for CES and CES/LES economies.     

集值映射的一个积分表示定理

本文庆可分自反Ｂａｎａｃｈ空间的情况下，得到了集值映射可由Ａｕｍａｎｎ积分表示的充要条件。     

Factors affecting international product design

In this paper we examine the impact of changes of such factors as tariffs/import cost, exchange rate, and unit savings derived from economies of scale, on the product design of four international strategies which are characterised by two dimensions. The first dimension describes whether the company offers a standardised or a customised product. The second indicates whether the company centralises its production to a single facility in one country or decentralises its production to facilities located in each country. To address the above issue, we present a model that has elements from marketing and manufacturing.For the case where the product has one attribute, we show that when tariffs/import cost decrease, an international enterprise should respond by enhancing the features of its products. Similarly, the product features should be enhanced when the exchange rate increases or the unit savings derived from economies of scale increases. Numerical examples indicate that an international enterprise should change its production configuration from decentralised to centralised, in environments of high tariffs/import cost. Furthermore, an international enterprise should change its product policies from customised to standardised when the savings derived from economies of scale are high, and the exchange rate increases.     

Existence of solutions for nonlinear inequalities in locally convex separated space

An existence result for abstract nonlinear inequalities. As a consequence of our result, we obtain some further generalizations of recent known results. According to this result, we show the existence of g-saddle point and Aumann strong equilibrium for a constrained noncooperative game.     

Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation

Using the discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation, we investigate the implications of the requirement that demand manipulations must not affect the agents’ shares. In a context where the enforcing authority cannot prevent agents (who seek to reduce their cost shares) from splitting or merging their demands, the cost sharing methods used must make such artifices unprofitable. The paper introduces a family of rules that are immune to these demand manipulations, the pattern methods. Our main result is the characterization of these methods using the above requirement. For each one of these methods, the associated pattern indicates how to combine the technologies in order to meet the agents’ demands. Within this family, two rules stand out: the public Aumann–Shapley rule, which never rewards technological cooperation; and the private Aumann–Shapley rule, which always rewards technology providers. Fairness requirements imposing natural bounds (for the technological rent) allow to further differentiate these two rules.     

Brazilian exchange rate complexity: Financial crisis effects

With the financial market globalization, foreign investments became vital for the economies, mainly in emerging countries. In the last decades, Brazilian exchange rates appeared as a good indicator to measure either investors’ confidence or risk aversion. Here, some events of global or national financial crisis are analyzed, trying to understand how they influenced the “dollar-real” rate evolution. The theoretical tool to be used is the López-Mancini-Calbet (LMC) complexity measure that, applied to real exchange rate data, has shown good fitness between critical events and measured patterns.     

Stochastic stability in the Scarf economy

We present a mathematical model for the analysis of the bargaining games based on private prices used by Gintis to simulate the dynamics of prices in exchange economies in Gintis (2007). We then characterize, in the Scarf economy, a class of dynamics for which the Walrasian equilibrium is the only stochastically stable state. Hence, we provide dynamic foundations for general equilibrium for one of the best-known example of instability of the tâtonement process.     

Regularity and Integration of Set-Valued Maps Represented by Generalized Steiner Points

A family of probability measures on the unit ball in generates a family of generalized Steiner (GS-)points for every convex compact set in . Such a “rich” family of probability measures determines a representation of a convex compact set by GS-points. In this way, a representation of a set-valued map with convex compact images is constructed by GS-selections (which are defined by the GS-points of its images). The properties of the GS-points allow to represent Minkowski sum, Demyanov difference and Demyanov distance between sets in terms of their GS-points, as well as the Aumann integral of a set-valued map is represented by the integrals of its GS-selections. Regularity properties of set-valued maps (measurability, Lipschitz continuity, bounded variation) are reduced to the corresponding uniform properties of its GS-selections. This theory is applied to formulate regularity conditions for the first-order of convergence of iterated set-valued quadrature formulae approximating the Aumann integral.      

Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon

In this paper we propose a new class of games, the “strategically zero-sum games,” which are characterized by a special payoff structure. We show that for a large body of correlation schemes which includes the correlated strategies “à la Aumann”, strategically zero-sum games are exactly these games for which no completely mixed Nash equilibrium can be improved upon.     

The Mcshane Integral of Fuzzy-Valued Functions

In this paper, the Mcshane integrals of fuzzy-valued functions are defined, discussed, and characterized. It shows that, in a sense, the Mcshane integrals of interval-valued functions and fuzzy-valued functions are the Riemann-type definitions of the Aumann integral and (K) integral respectively.AMS Subject Classification (2000) 28EI0 (04A72)The authors are supported by the Special Fund of China for Ph.D. Instructors in Universities