Fighting strategies in a market with counterfeits

Counterfeiting is a widely spread phenomenon and has seen rapid growth in recent years. In this paper, we adopt the standard vertical differentiation model and allow consumers the choices of purchasing an authentic product, purchasing a counterfeit, or not buying. We focus on how non-deceptive counterfeits, which consumers know at time of purchase that the products are counterfeits with certainty, affect the price, market share and profitability of brand name products. We also consider the strategies for brand name companies to fight counterfeiting. We compare different fighting strategies in a market with one brand name product and its counterfeit, and derive equilibrium fighting strategies in a market with two competing brand name products and a counterfeit under general conditions.     

Pricing policies under direct vs. indirect channel competition and national vs. store brand competition

This paper analyzes channel pricing in multiple distribution channels under competition between a national brand (NB) and a store brand (SB), where an NB can be distributed both through a direct channel (e-channel) and an indirect channel (local stores) but an SB can be distributed only through an indirect channel. We first explore cross-brand and cross-channel pricing policies. Formulating the problem as a Nash pricing game, we reach two findings: (1) brand loyalty building is profitable for both an NB and an SB; and (2) marketing decisions are more restrictive for an NB channel than they are for the SB channel. We next assess supply chain coordination and reach two findings: (1) wholesale price change does not coordinate the supply chain and (2) an appropriate combination of markup and markdown prices can achieve both supply chain coordination and a win–win outcome for each channel.     

The effects of demand uncertainty on channel structure

Motivated by the business practice whereby some manufacturers open their own retail stores despite the existence of more efficient independent retailers, this paper examines the distribution channel choice of competing manufacturers under demand uncertainty and resale price maintenance. We characterize the conditions for the equilibrium channel structures. We find that (1) manufacturers tend to distribute products with more design attributes through their own retail stores, (2) manufacturers with highly substitutable products are more likely to use independent retailers, and (3) at least one manufacturer has more incentive to open its own retail stores when facing an increase of the market size asymmetry.     

考虑供应链渠道冲突的零售商自有品牌产品定价方法

自有品牌产品定价是电子商务环境下零售商实施渠道管理的关键因素,其合理与否直接影响到零售商利润和供应链稳定.鉴于此,针对存在供应链渠道冲突的零售商自有品牌定价问题,从协调的角度,利用对偶理论与优化模型,构建了基于最小协调成本的零售商自有品牌产品定价决策方法,并利用其探讨协调的经济意义,求解零售商自有品牌产品最优定价.结果表明,所构建的模型能够有效描述和解决零售商自有品牌产品定价问题,并在一定程度上消除供应链渠道冲突,保证供应商和零售商长期有效合作和供应链可持续发展.     

Pricing policies for substitutable products in a supply chain with Internet and traditional channels

This study considers pricing policies in a supply chain with one manufacturer, who sells a product to an independent retailer and directly to consumers through an Internet channel. In addition to the manufacturer’s product, the retailer sells a substitute product produced by another manufacturer. Given the wholesale prices of the two substitute products, the manufacturer decides the retail price of the Internet channel, and the retailer decides the retail prices of the two substitute products. Both the manufacturer and the retailer choose their own decision variables to maximize their respective profits. This work formulates the price competition, using the settings of Nash and Stackelberg games, and derives the corresponding existence and uniqueness conditions for equilibrium solutions. A sensitivity analysis of an equilibrium solution is then conducted for the model parameters, and the profits are compared for two game settings. The findings show that improving brand loyalty is profitable for both of the manufacturer and retailer, and that an increased service value may alleviate the threat of the Internet channel for the retailer and increase the manufacturer’s profit. The study also derives some conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer mutually prefer the Stackelberg game. Based on these results, this study proposes an appropriate cooperation strategy for the manufacturer and retailer.     

Inventory and coordination issues with two substitutable products

This study considers a two level supply chain in a newsboy setting with two substitutable products. Demands for the two products are assumed independent as long as both are available. If, however, a product stocks out, some of its demand is transferred to the available one with a known probability which ultimately creates a dependence on the amount of purchased items. The retailer is allowed to return some or all of the unsold products to the manufacturer with some credit. The expected chain profit, the retailer’s and the manufacturer’s profit expressions are derived under general conditions. Special cases are inspected to investigate the conditions under which channel coordination is achieved. It is demonstrated that channel coordination can not be achieved if unlimited returns are allowed with full credit, a result that agrees with the findings of Pasternak [B.A. Pasternack, Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Market. Sci. 4 (1985) 166–176] for the single item case. For the cases of unlimited returns with partial credit, the conditions for coordination are derived for one way full substitutions. For exponential demand explicit expressions for the channel and retailer’s expected profit functions are provided.     

Sell through a local retailer or operate your own store? Channel structure and risk analysis

Either a company store or a local retailer can be used to establish a sales channel. For high-value products with an existing competing brand, this choice represents a crucial decision a brand-named manufacturer must make for a new market. Under the burden of high operating costs, a weak local retailer may find it difficult to sustain and using it may hurt the manufacturer’s chance to successfully establish the channel. We consider a chain-to-chain competition model comprising two manufacturers and two retailers, in which one retailer may be unable to continue its operation because of high financing costs. We identify a threshold policy for the manufacturers to select the channel structure. Interestingly, we find that channel integration is not always better. Without the consideration of contract termination risk, the manufacturer will bear the operating expenses when its opportunity cost is low or the retailer’s financing cost is sufficiently high. In equilibrium, the manufacturers will choose either (decentralized, decentralized) or (integrated, integrated) channel structure. However, when the termination risk is considered, the equilibrium channel structure would be more likely (integrated, integrated) or (integrated, decentralized).     

“Bricks vs. Clicks”: The impact of manufacturer encroachment with a dealer leasing and selling of durable goods

In durable goods markets, many brand name manufacturers, including IBM, HP, Epson, and Lenovo, have adopted dual-channel supply chains to market their products. There is scant literature, however, addressing the product durability and its impact on players’ optimal strategies in a dual-channel supply chain. To fill this void, we consider a two-period dual-channel model in which a manufacturer sells a durable product directly through both a manufacturer-owned e-channel and an independent dealer who adopts a mix of selling and leasing to consumers. Our results show that the manufacturer begins encroaching into the market in Period 1, but the dealer starts withdrawing from the retail channel in Period 2. Moreover, as the direct selling cost decreases, the equilibrium quantities and wholesale prices become quite angular and often nonmonotonic. Among other results, we find that both the dealer and the supply chain may benefit from the manufacturer’s encroachment. Our results also indicate that both the market structure and the nature of competition have an important impact on the player’s (dealer’s) optimal choice of leasing and selling.     

Price competition and store competition: Store brands vs. national brand

This paper studies pricing strategies in a market channel composed of one national brand manufacturer and two retailers who, each, carry their own store brand and a national brand products. The model accounts for product competition between store brands and the national brand products, as well as for store competition between retailers.     

Determination of economic packaging frequency in a multi-brand joint replenishment inventory system

The search procedure developed in this paper is typically applicable in those inventory systems where a product is packaged immediately after manufacture into a number of container sizes and the packaged items of similar sizes are sold under more than one brand name. The most common example of such items can be seen in supermarkets where grocery items of identical characteristics (produced by the same manufacture) are available under the supermarket's own brand and under the manufacturer's nationally advertised brand. An example has been solved to illustrate the method.     

贴牌生产供应链混合渠道构建基础及优化机理研究

研究由制造商和品牌商组成的混合渠道贴牌生产供应链渠道结构优化问题,制造商通过直销和贴牌两条渠道销售产品.通过与单一渠道比较,分别推导出制造商和品牌商选择混合渠道的依据和优越性,进而归纳出双方共同接受混合渠道的制造商生产成本和品牌商品牌溢价优化条件,分析了渠道转移系数对双方构建混合渠道结构条件的影响,得出了制造商生产成本和品牌商品牌溢价作为竞争要素的互动决策改进贴牌供应链整体绩效的优化机理.     

考虑海外代购的品牌商定价模型研究

随着海外代购体量的日趋增大,代购带来的低价威胁对于在不同国家不同市场销售产品的公司来说已经成为一个日益严重的问题。同时,代购渠道中假货的问题也愈发严重。因此,在海外代购背景下探究产品定价模型具有必要性。以往研究普遍认为这种未经授权的销售会削减品牌方的利润,但实则不然。基于这一发现,本研究为在两个不同市场销售相同产品但面临代购低价威胁的公司制定考虑代购的市场定价模型。由公司制定两个市场的价格,消费者选择是否从包括代购在内的三个渠道购买产品。推出两个授权市场的最优价格,分析各参数变化对最优价格的影响,并校验最优价格对消费者需求和总利润的影响。模型分析表明,高价市场中有部分消费者需求转向海外代购,同时低价市场的消费者需求也受到了影响,且在一定条件下,提高高价市场的产品定价能够扩大低价市场的需求,从代购的角度解释了现实中需求曲线向上倾斜的现象。此外,两个独立市场之间的价格差距对代购市场的销售也产生了积极影响,并且在某些条件下,增大价格差距可以提高公司的收益水平。随后讨论了一种极端模型和三种扩展模型,通过模型分析表示,扩展后的定价模型也显示出与基础市场模型相似的灵敏度分析结果,同样得到两个市场的价差扩大会导致代购市场的销售额增加的结论,并且在一定条件下,公司的利润更高,增加了结论的可信度。     

An advertising game with multiplicative interference

Two competing manufacturers provide a homogeneous market with substitutable products and want to maximize their profits. Each firm may advertise its brand, with a positive effect on its own brand and negative on the competitor's one. Moreover, each firm may choose an advertising medium to use among several available media. We assume that the advertising effect on demand is mediated by the goodwill variable and that a competitor's interference may be represented as a proportional reduction of the virtual goodwill. We model the manufacturers' problem as a noncooperative game under complete information and discuss the existence and features of its Nash equilibria.     

E-供应链竞争下自营品牌商的第三方零售渠道引入与定价策略

基于电商平台销售渠道的多样性,决策是否引入第三方零售渠道是自营品牌商在现实的E-供应链竞争中常常面临的重要难题。在多渠道竞争环境下,构建由两个自营品牌商和一个电商平台组成的E-供应链系统。考虑品牌商不引入、单一品牌商引入与两个品牌商均引入第三方零售渠道三种情形,分别建立Stackelberg博弈模型并求解,分析了平台佣金、消费者的自营零售渠道偏好和交叉价格弹性系数等因素对第三方零售渠道引入及E-供应链各成员最优策略的影响。研究表明:不同的交叉价格弹性系数和消费者自营渠道偏好对第三方零售渠道引入策略具有差异性,且两个品牌商均引入第三方零售渠道对电商平台最有利。此外,平台佣金、消费者自营渠道偏好和交叉价格弹性系数对自营、第三方商品的定价以及电商平台、品牌商的利润具有重要影响。     

A mathematical model of market competition

We consider a mathematical model of decision making by a company attempting to win a market share. We assume that the company releases its products to the market under the competitive conditions that another company is making similar products. Both companies can vary the kinds of their products on the market as well as the prices in accordance with consumer preferences. Each company aims to maximize its profit. A mathematical statement of the decision-making problem for the market players is a bilevel mathematical programming problem that reduces to a competitive facility location problem. As regards the latter, we propose a method for finding an upper bound for the optimal value of the objective function and an algorithm for constructing an approximate solution. The algorithm amounts to local ascent search in a neighborhood of a particular form, which starts with an initial approximate solution obtained simultaneously with an upper bound. We give a computational example of the problem under study which demonstrates the output of the algorithm.     

考虑传统双渠道和BOPS双渠道的消费者和零售商决策研究

本论文在全渠道零售的BOPS模式下,考虑允许退货研究消费者渠道选择问题。首先研究传统双渠道和实施BOPS的双渠道下的消费者和零售商决策。然后加入退货设定,对二者的决策进行重新研究和对比分析。研究发现:不考虑退货的情况下,引入BOPS模式能够提升实体店对零售商及消费者的吸引力;退货情况下,引入BOPS使消费者更愿意选择线下购买和销售,但不一定总能带来销售总量的增加;实施BOPS时,退货允许让零售商更愿意在实体店销售,同时消费者的购买渠道选择也变得复杂。     

Agency selling or reselling: E-tailer information sharing with supplier offline entry

Nowadays, some suppliers are looking for offline expansion in addition to their preexisting online channels relying on e-tailers. This study focuses on the e-tailer’s demand information sharing strategy with the supplier who may build upon brick-and-mortar stores. Both prevailing agreements between the supplier and the e-tailer are investigated: agency selling and reselling. The equilibrium results are quite different under these two agreements. Specifically, when the supplier’s offline entry cost is very small or large, the e-tailer shares information under agency selling while keeps information private under reselling. When the entry cost is intermediate, channel substitution rate is large and information uncertainty is small, the e-tailer withholds the demand information under agency selling while shares information under reselling to deter the supplier from entering an offline channel. Furthermore, two extensions about consumer behavior in multichannel selection are discussed: showrooming and webrooming. With showrooming or webrooming, the e-tailer’s information sharing decisions qualitatively hold, while with showrooming the drive factor behind may change; that is, withholding information under agency selling and sharing information under reselling may also serve as measures to encourage supplier offline entry when the effect of showrooming is strong.     

Cutoffs for product chains

We consider products of ergodic Markov chains and discuss their cutoffs in total variation. Our framework is general in that rates to pick up coordinates are not necessary equal, and different coordinates may correspond to distinct chains. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for cutoffs of product chains in terms of those of coordinate chains under certain conditions. A comparison of mixing times between the product chain and its coordinate chains is made in detail as well. Examples are given to show that neither cutoffs for product chains nor for coordinate chains imply others in general.     

Forecasting demand for single-period products: A case study in the apparel industry

The problem considered is that of forecasting demand for single-period products before the period starts. We study this problem for the case of a mail order apparel company that needs to order its products pre-season. The lack of historical demand data implies that other sources of data are needed. Advance order data can be obtained by allowing a selected group of customers to pre-order at a discount from a preview catalogue. Judgments can be obtained from purchase managers or other company experts. In this paper, we compare several existing and new forecasting methods for both sources of data. The methods are generic and can be used in any single-period problem in the apparel or fashion industries. Among the pre-order based methods, a novel ‘top-flop’ approach provides promising results. For a small group of products from the case company, expert judgment methods perform better than the methods based on advance demand information. The comparative results are obviously restricted to the specific case study, and additional testing is required to determine whether they are valid in general.     

A model for analyzing multi-channel distribution systems

To capture customers in different market segments, many firms distribute their products using multiple channels involving in-store, mail-order and electronic mediums. Nevertheless, the business literature is replete with examples where the management of multiple distribution channels becomes unwieldy. As a way to evaluate different distribution strategies arising from multiple channels, we develop a model of a general multi-channel distribution system subject to stochastic demand. Since the exact analysis of our model is intractable, we propose a decomposition scheme that enables us to develop a near-optimal distribution policy with minimum total expected distribution cost. We utilize our analysis of this multi-channel system in two specific applications arising from multi-channel distribution. The first application deals with a store-based retailer expanding into a direct sales channel. The retailer can fill the orders generated from this additional sales channel by using the existing stores or the existing depots. For this application, we evaluate the trade-off between these two options. The second application intends to find a cost-effective way to distribute products by utilizing the combined distribution system of two retailers after a potential merger-and-acquisition (M&A). For this application, we quantify the benefit of an M&A in terms of distribution efficiency.