On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against

We consider a continuous time principal-agent model where the principal/firm compensates an agent/manager who controls the output’s exposure to risk and its expected return. Both the firm and the manager have exponential utility and can trade in a frictionless market. When the firm observes the manager’s choice of effort and volatility, there is an optimal contract that induces the manager to not hedge. In a two factor specification of the model where an index and a bond are traded, the optimal contract is linear in output and the log return of the index. We also consider a manager who receives exogenous share or option compensation and illustrate how risk taking depends on the relative size of the systematic and firm-specific risk premia of the output and index. Whilst in most cases, options induce greater risk taking than shares, we find that there are also situations under which the hedging manager may take less risk than the non-hedging manager.     

声誉效应与经理报酬契约的关系研究

探讨了声誉对经理报酬契约的影响 .首先 ,分析了经理效用函数的组成 ,将声誉这个隐性激励约束因素引入经理的效用函数 .随后 ,建立了信息不对称下经理的报酬激励模型 .分析了声誉系数对契约中各要素的影响 ,说明了所有者可以利用经理的声誉效应来设计更加有利的报酬契约 .文章最后给出了主要结论 .     

Optimal dividend-financing strategies in a dual risk model with time-inconsistent preferences

In this paper, we consider an optimal dividend-financing problem for a company whose capital reserve is described by the dual of classical risk model. We assume that the manager of the company has time-inconsistent preferences, which are described by a quasi-hyperbolic discount function, and that financing is permitted to prevent the company from going bankrupt. The manager’s objective is to maximize the expected cumulative dividend payments minus financing costs. We solve the optimization problems for a naive manager and a sophisticated manager, and obtain explicit solutions for both managers. Our results show that the manager with time-inconsistent preferences tends to pay out dividends earlier. We also present some economic implications and sensitivity analysis for our results.     

防范经理事后隐藏信息的模型研究

首先,指出了经理隐匿信息的道德风险行为对所有者的危害性.其次,构造了一个防范经理在签约后隐匿信息的报酬契约.再次,在委托代理框架下给出了契约的最优解.最后,分析了最优契约的特征与性质.文章得到的一些结论对经理选任聘任机制和报酬激励机制的设计有一定的参考价值.     

Impacts of risk attitude and outside option on compensation contracts under different information structures

We consider an agency problem where a firm (she) hires a manager (he) who has related managerial expertise to implement a new project. The manager’s managerial expertise is his private information and characterized as an uncertain variable. The revenue brought about by the project in the future is also assumed to be uncertain. In light of these challenges, this paper investigates the impacts of the manager’s risk attitude and the type-and-effort dependent outside option on the optimal compensation contracts under different information structures. Through developing the manager’s decision criterion based on his risk attitude instead of the expected-utility-maximization criterion, we find that, if the manager is conservative and the outside option’s revenue uncertainty is sufficiently high, the optimal commission rate will be distorted upwards under asymmetric managerial expertise information compared with that under symmetric managerial expertise information. Our analysis also confirms that the existence of a type-and-effort dependent outside option distorts up the compensation structure tailored at a fixed outside option. We further show that, comparing with the setting of a fixed outside option when the manager is aggressive, the presence of a type-and-effort dependent outside option results in a surprising phenomenon that the manager’s private information makes no distortion of the firm’s profit.     

管理者过度自信行为下煤矿安全监管机制设计研究

针对我国煤矿安全监管的现状以及管理者的过度自信行为,建立了包括政府、煤矿企业以及过度自信的煤矿管理者的两阶段多任务委托代理模型,并从理论上分析了过度自信行为对煤矿管理者自身的安全管理投入、煤矿企业的激励参数、政府奖惩力度以及政府安全绩效的影响,并与煤矿管理者完全理性的情况对比。研究表明,煤矿管理者的安全管理投入、政府奖惩力度以及政府的安全绩效在过度自信程度增大时都会越来越偏离煤矿管理者完全理性时的情形,最后给出算例并验证了相关结论,为我国煤矿安全监管和实践提供了决策支持。     

基于遗传算法的项目经理评价

本文根据自然进化规则，把项目经理视为评价系统，项目经理所要满足的要求视为系统环境，用遗传算法的方法评价项目经理，力求提出一种比较客观科学的、且可以定量分析的项目经理的评价方法。     

证券投资基金管理人选择中的信号传递博弈

本文通过对证券投资基金这种资金运作方式的分析和研究,结合信号传递博弈模型,提出一种对资金管理人投资能力的评估方法.主要分析基金管理人的努力成本对最后投资能力评估结果的影响,为投资人选择基金管理人提供新的思路,也为基金管理人争取融资成功提供一定的帮助.     

信息不对称下制造商填塞分销渠道策略研究

由制造商和零售商构成的二级供应链,制造商管理者可能使用填塞分销渠道策略最大化自己的效用。本文研究在信息不对称的情形下,制造商填塞分销渠道决策对供应链绩效的影响。研究发现:随着修正财务报告的投资者增多,制造商的库存水平以及制造商管理者的效用都会降低;而随着制造商管理者对市场价值重视程度提高,制造商的利润降低,这表明填塞分销渠道对制造商的真实价值产生负面影响。同时,供应链的利润不仅与管理者填塞分销决策有关,还受到零售价格等外在因素的影响。进一步地,加强外部监管以及设计合理的激励制度,有助于减少管理者填塞分销渠道的行为。     

防范经理事后隐藏信息的模型研究

首先,指出了经理隐匿信息的道德风险行为对所有者的危害性.其次,构造了一个防范经理在签约后隐匿信息的报酬契约.再次,在委托代理框架下给出了契约的最优解.最后,分析了最优契约的特征与性质.文章得到的一些结论对经理选任聘任机制和报酬激励机制的设计有一定的参考价值.     

A mathematical model for personalized advertisement in virtual reality environments

We consider a personalized advertisement assignment problem faced by the manager of a virtual reality environment. In this online environment, users log in/out, and they spend time in different virtual locations while they are online. Every time a user visits a new virtual location, the site manager can show the ad of an advertiser. At the end of a fixed time horizon, the manager collects revenues from all of the advertisers, and the total revenue depends on the number of ads of different advertisers she displays to different users. In this setup, the objective of the manager is to find an optimal dynamic ad display policy in order to maximize her expected revenue. In the current paper, we formulate this problem as a continuous time stochastic optimization problem in which the actions of users are represented with two-state Markov processes and the manager makes display decisions at the transition times of these processes. To our best knowledge, no formal stochastic model and rigorous analysis has been given for this practical problem. Such a model and its analysis are the major contributions of this paper along with an optimal solution.     

博弈论在企业管理中的应用

本文把博弈论应用于企业管理 ,利用博弈论的委托 -代理理论构造了一个委托 -代理激励模型 ,针对信息对称与信息不对称情况进行了分析。在设计企业的委托代理机制时 ,若考虑了对经理的激励 ,则委托人的风险成本、代理成本都比没有考虑对经理的激励时要小。从理论上证明了对企业经理激励的必要性。     

Misrepresentation-proof strategies in poly-agent systems

False representation prevention is an important issue in the management of poly-agent systems when a system manager needs to collect information from agents. This paper aims at proposing strategies to prevent false representation effectively and efficiently.We suppose that the manager can know the truth by inspecting but can not inspect all reports due to the high cost of inspection, and the manager will announce a penalty rule and a probability of doing inspection for preventing false representation. After formulating three penalty rules, we obtain the minimal inspections required for inducing true information under each penalty rule.     

List signature schemes

A group signature scheme allows group members to issue signatures on behalf of the group, while hiding for each signature which group member actually issued it. Such scheme also involves a group manager, who is able to open any group signature by showing which group member issued it.We introduce the concept of list signatures as a variant of group signatures which sets a limit on the number of signatures each group member may issue. These limits must be enforced without having the group manager open signatures of honest group members—which excludes the trivial solution in which the group manager opens every signature to see whether some group members exceed their limits. Furthermore, we consider the problem of publicly identifying group members who exceed their limits, also without involving the group manager.     

基于能岗匹配的管理人员配置过程定性模拟研究

能岗匹配是人力资源配置的重要原则。实施动态环境下的能岗匹配需要模拟出管理者素质变量与岗位职能变量的变化趋势与程度，以及这两者的实时匹配程度。首先描述了管理者素质与管理岗位职能的变量，建立了用于能岗匹配的定性模拟模型，设计了状态变量知识表示方法及其转换规则。采用BP神经网络设计了管理人员能岗匹配度计算函数。最后设计了定性模拟步骤并给出了一个模拟应用实例。     

On the Performance of Managers and Controllers: A Polymatrix Game Approach for the Manager–Controller–Board of Directors’ Conflict

In this article, we focus on the conflict among the manager, the controller and the board of directors of a company. We model the problem as a three-player polymatrix game. Under a set of assumptions, we identify five potential Nash equilibria. We prove that the Nash equilibrium is unique, despite its changing structure. Next, we analyze the influence of the manager’s and controller’s bonuses and penalties on the Nash equilibria. Finally, we explain how the manager and the controller may decrease or maintain their performance, when their bonuses or penalties increase.     

一个可以揭示经理人私人信息的信息甄别模型

首先,分析了经理人隐匿信息的原因,其次,基于机制设计理论与显示原理建立了一个能够显示经理人私人信息的信息甄别模型,再次,运用优化分析工具在委托代理模型框架下给出了模型的最优解,最后,我们分析了最优报酬契约的性质.     

委托-代理关系下的企业筹资决策模型

本文建立了在委托代理关系下的企业筹资决策的数学模型 .模型分析表明 ,股东在设立经理激励合同时 ,将经理报酬与权益资本利润率联系起来 ,能够激励经理选择负债经营 ,但经理选择的最优资本结构可能会偏离股东效用最大化的资本结构 .     

约束商品经营者做虚假广告的两种博弈分析

广告是消费者了解商品的种类、价格和性能的重要信息途径 ,也是商品经营者重要的营销手段 .但是 ,目前社会上存在着商品经营者做虚假广告以追求超额利润的现象 .本文从政府监督部门与商品经营者之间、消费者与商品经营者之间的关系出发 ,对约束经营者做虚假广告作出博弈分析 ,并进一步讨论了消费者和经营者的多阶段 (无限次重复 )博弈等情况     

基于加权效用和VaR-PI约束下DC型养老金计划的最优资产配置

本文从养老金计划参与人和基金经理的双重视角出发,以最大化双方加权的期望效用为目标,研究了在最低保障和VaR约束下,DC养老金计划的最优资产配置问题。假设养老金计划参与人和基金经理均是损失厌恶的,分别用两个S型的效用函数来刻画双方的损失厌恶行为。VaR约束和加权的效用函数使得本文所研究的优化问题成为一个复杂的非凹效用最大化问题。利用拉格朗日对偶理论和凹化方法求得了最优财富和最优投资组合的封闭解。数值结论表明当更为看重养老金计划参与人的利益时,基金经理会采取更为激进的投资策略,VaR约束可以改进对DC养老金计划的风险管理。