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1.
Ezra Einy Mridu Prabal Goswami Ori Haimanko Ram Orzach Aner Sela 《International Journal of Game Theory》2017,46(1):79-102
We study two-player common-value all-pay auctions in which the players have ex-ante asymmetric information represented by finite connected partitions of the set of states of nature. Our focus is on a family of such auctions in which no player has an information advantage over his opponent. We find sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium with monotone strategies, and show that such an equilibrium is unique. We further show that the ex-ante distribution of equilibrium effort is the same for every player (and hence the players’ expected efforts are equal), although their expected payoffs are different and they do not have the same ex-ante probability of winning. 相似文献
2.
David McAdams 《International Journal of Game Theory》2007,35(3):427-453
I study monotonicity of equilibrium strategies in first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, risk aversion, affiliated
types, and interdependent values. Every mixed-strategy equilibrium is shown to be outcome-equivalent to a monotone pure-strategy
equilibrium under the “priority rule” for breaking ties. This provides a missing link to establish uniqueness in the “general
symmetric model” of Milgrom and Weber (Econometrica 50:1089–1122, 1982). Non-monotone equilibria can exist under the “coin-flip
rule” but they are distinguishable: all non-monotone equilibria have positive probability of ties whereas all monotone equilibria
have zero probability of ties. This provides a justification for the standard empirical practice of restricting attention
to monotone strategies.
Hendricks et al. (2003) provide an overview of recent empirical work. For a survey of experimental work, see Kagel and Levin
(2002). 相似文献
3.
We prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among weakly asymmetric auctions with interdependent values, in which bidders have either asymmetric utility functions or asymmetric distributions of signals. 相似文献
4.
We study procurement auctions in which, as is common in practice, a group of sellers (incumbents, qualified bidders) is given an advantage, based, for example, on better reliability, quality, or incumbency status. We show conditions under which for any given first price handicap auction, there is a simple second-price design which dominates it. This generalizes a previous result for the case of an auction with one insider and one outsider (Mares and Swinkels in J Econ Theory, 2013) and sharpens our understanding of the classical result by Maskin and Riley (Rev Econ Stud 67:413–438, 2000). 相似文献
5.
6.
Paul Pezanis-Christou 《International Journal of Game Theory》2002,31(1):69-89
The paper reports on a series of asymmetric auction experiments with private-independent values and two buyers. Maskin and
Riley (2000) showed, under some conditions, that if one buyer has a greater probability than the other of not being able to
bid, first-price auctions could yield lower revenues to the seller than second-price auctions. The data rejected this prediction
because of an important overbidding when subjects received low values in first-price auctions. In this asymmetric setting,
the observed overbidding cannot be explained by the usual risk aversion hypothesis and the detection of a learning pattern
indicates that subjects used more an adaptive behaviour than a static one. An ad hoc bidding strategy for the buyers who are
the most likely to bid explains the observed low bids better than the risk neutral equilibrium strategy. Finally, as subjects
appear to have bid in equilibrium as if there were two other competitors instead of only one, their bidding behaviour can be thought to have displayed an over anxiousness
about winning.
Received: January 1999/Final version June 2001 相似文献
7.
Jawad Abrache Teodor Gabriel Crainic Michel Gendreau Monia Rekik 《Annals of Operations Research》2007,153(1):131-164
Combinatorial auctions are an important class of market mechanisms in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of
multiple heterogeneous items. In this paper, we discuss several complex issues that are encountered in the design of combinatorial
auctions. These issues are related to the formulation of the winner determination problem, the expression of combined bids,
the design of progressive combinatorial auctions that require less information revelation, and the need for decision support
tools to help participants make profitable bidding decisions. For each issue, we survey the existing literature and propose
avenues for further research.
An earlier version of this paper appeared in 4OR 2, 1–33, 2004. 相似文献
8.
Flow goods (like electricity) are sold through auctions in a dynamic framework. An important design question is the frequency of such auctions. We use a simple dynamic auction model in continuous time to answer this question. We focus on the relationship between the persistency of bidders’ valuations and the optimal choice of frequency. If the seller focuses on the equilibrium in which bidders follow a repeated static Nash strategy, then the frequency of auctions should typically increase when persistency declines. However, accounting for the fact that bidders can follow different equilibria that are collusive in nature, the comparative statics are reversed, forcing the seller to reduce the frequency when bidders’ valuations are less persistent. The argument builds on the fact that high frequency auctions are more conducive to collusion among bidders. 相似文献
9.
We discuss the design of a multi-dimensional procurement mechanism that combines Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and auction theory. The mechanism selects an agent to provide a project characterized by multiple attributes. The optimal configuration of the multiple attributes is settled endogenously by trading off the costs to the provider with the benefits to the acquirer. This is done within a context of asymmetric information and strategic behavior as well as possibly correlated costs. The mechanism makes it individually rational and incentive compatible to participate and reveal costs, and the outcome is socially optimal (allocatively efficient). 相似文献
10.
Auctions that select core allocations with respect to reported values generate competitive levels of sales revenues at equilibrium and limit bidder incentives to use shills. Among core-selecting auctions, the ones that minimize seller revenues also maximize incentives for truthful reporting, produce the Vickrey outcome when that lies in the core and, in contrast to the Vickrey auction, and create no incentive for a seller to exclude qualified bidders. Core-selecting auctions are related to and share properties with stable matching mechanisms. 相似文献
11.
《European Journal of Operational Research》2005,166(2):430-448
In this paper, we analyze the ability of different auction structures to induce the efficient dispatch in a one-shot framework where generators know their own and competitors' costs with certainty. In particular, we are interested in identifying which, if any, rules in an auction structure yield only the efficient dispatch in equilibrium. We find that a critical component to a successful auction design is the way in which demand is bundled and hence the way bids are defined. While an auction mechanism which allows for more than one winner in an auction may support inefficient dispatches in equilibrium, we find that an auction where there is exactly one winner per lot, where the lots are formed to capture the cost structure of generation plants, and all lots are auctioned simultaneously, supports only efficient dispatches in equilibrium. 相似文献
12.
13.
We study private-value auctions with n risk-averse bidders, where n is large. We first use asymptotic analysis techniques to calculate explicit approximations of the equilibrium bids and of the seller’s revenue in any k-price auction (k = 1, 2, . . .). These explicit approximations show that in all large k-price auctions the effect of risk-aversion is O(1/n 2) small. Hence, all large k-price auctions with risk-averse bidders are O(1/n 2) revenue equivalent. The generalization, that all large auctions are O(1/n 2) revenue equivalent, is false. Indeed, we show that there exist auction mechanisms for which the limiting revenue as ${n\longrightarrow \infty }We study private-value auctions with n risk-averse bidders, where n is large. We first use asymptotic analysis techniques to calculate explicit approximations of the equilibrium bids and of
the seller’s revenue in any k-price auction (k = 1, 2, . . .). These explicit approximations show that in all large k-price auctions the effect of risk-aversion is O(1/n
2) small. Hence, all large k-price auctions with risk-averse bidders are O(1/n
2) revenue equivalent. The generalization, that all large auctions are O(1/n
2) revenue equivalent, is false. Indeed, we show that there exist auction mechanisms for which the limiting revenue as n? ¥{n\longrightarrow \infty } with risk-averse bidders is strictly below the risk-neutral limit. Therefore, these auction mechanisms are not revenue equivalent
to large k-price auctions even to leading-order as n? ¥{n\longrightarrow \infty }. 相似文献
14.
Combinatorial auctions are an important class of market mechanisms in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of multiple heterogeneous items. In this paper, we discuss several complex issues that are encountered in the design of combinatorial auctions. These issues are related to the formulation of the winner determination problem, the expression of combined bids, the design of progressive combinatorial auctions that require less information revelation, and the need for decision support tools to help participants make profitable bidding decisions. For each issue, we survey the existing literature and propose avenues for further research.Received: April 2003, Revised: July 2003, AMS classification:
91B26, 90BXX, 90C27All correspondence to:Jawad Abrache 相似文献
15.
Dries Goossens 《4OR: A Quarterly Journal of Operations Research》2007,5(4):335-338
This is a summary of the author’s PhD thesis supervised by Frits Spieksma and defended on 20 December 2006 at the Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven. The thesis is written in English and is available from the author’s website (http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/dries.goossens/public).
This work deals with combinatorial auctions, i.e., auctions where bidders can bid on sets of items. We study two special cases,
namely the total quantity discount auction and the matrix bid auction.
相似文献
16.
In combinatorial auctions the pricing problem is of main concern since it is the means by which the auctioneer signals the result of the auction to the participants. In order for the auction to be regarded as fair among the various participants the price signals should be such that a participant that has won a subset of items knows why his bid was a winning bid and that agents that have not acquired any item easily can detect why they lost. The problem in the combinatorial auction setting is that the winner determination problem is a hard integer programming problem and hence a linear pricing scheme supporting the optimal allocation might not exist. 相似文献
17.
We study independent private-value all-pay auctions with risk-averse players. We show that: (1) Players with low values bid lower and players with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. (2) Players with low values bid lower and players with high values bid higher than they would bid in a first-price auction. (3) Players’ expected utilities in an all-pay auction are lower than in a first-price auction. We also use perturbation analysis to calculate explicit approximations of the equilibrium strategies of risk-averse players and the seller’s expected revenue. In particular, we show that in all-pay auctions the seller’s expected payoff in the risk-averse case may be either higher or lower than in the risk neutral case. 相似文献
18.
We analyze an independent private values model where a number of objects are sold in sequential first- and second-price auctions. Bidders have unit demand and their valuation for an object is decreasing in the rank number of the auction in which it is sold. We derive efficient equilibria if prices are announced after each auction or if no information is given to bidders. We show that the sequence of prices constitutes a supermartingale. Even if we correct for the decrease in valuations for objects sold in later auctions we find that average prices are declining.Received June 2004We are grateful to Christian Groh, Wolfgang Köhler and Benny Moldovanu for helpful suggestions. Financial support from the German Science Foundation through SFB 504 and SFB/TR 15 at the University of Mannheim and the University of Bonn is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
19.
We investigate derandomizations of digital good randomized auctions. We propose a general derandomization method which can be used to show that for every random auction there exists a deterministic auction having asymptotically the same revenue. In addition, we construct an explicit optimal deterministic auction for bi‐valued auctions. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Random Struct. Alg., 46, 478–493, 2015 相似文献