供应链视角下的增值税改革影响研究

构建了一个制造商和一个零售商所组成的两级供应链模型,研究增值税税率下调对供应链决策和社会福利的影响.结果表明,下调制造商、零售商增值税税率都会使产品零售价降低,提高零售商和制造商的利润.下调增值税税率给制造商带来的利润增量大于给零售商带来的利润增量.制造商税率下调导致批发价降低,零售商税率下调反而提高批发价.社会福利的变化趋势与潜在需求规模有关.当潜在需求规模较高时,社会福利总是随降税幅度的增大而增大,且税率降低后的社会福利大于税率降低前;当潜在需求规模中等时,社会福利随降税幅度的增大而减小,但税率降低后的社会福利仍大于税率降低前;当潜在需求规模较小时,社会福利随降税幅度的增大而减小,增值税税率下调损害了社会福利.     

The generation of a social welfare function under ordinal preferences

Against the background of recent impossibility theorems, the paper establishes a number of rules for the formation of social preferences to ensure the generation of a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function of the desired ‘individualistic’ form. It demonstrates that such welfare functions can indeed exist under conditions of simply ordinality of individual preferences and a lack of interpersonal comparability, for the general n-person case with only weak restrictions upon individual preferences. A valuable tool of social welfare theory for the single-profile case is therefore restored under a wide set of conditions. By examining Kemp and Ng's justification for their A3 condition in this context, we are able also to highlight a number of key differences between the conditions satisfied by many political constitutions and the requirements for achieving the positive existence of a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. In particular the paper focusses here on the weighting systems on individual preferences that are consistent with generating an individualistic welfare function and examines the information content of individual ordinal preferences which must be utilized if the desired welfare function is to result.     

银行卡产业的兼容与多方持有——基于双边市场理论的分析

银行卡平台的兼容和多方持有都能增加持卡人和商户的交叉网络外部性收益,这两种方式也在一定程度上增加社会成本.但总体上来说,收益很可能大于成本,因此,兼容和多方持有都能提高社会总福利.正是由于这一点,许多人认为多方持有能很好地替代兼容.本文以Doganoglu和Wright模型的基础,证明了兼容和多方持有也存在着关键的差异...     

基于社会福利最大化的油气资源税费研究

合理的油气资源税费能够引导企业优化开发决策,平衡当代与后代利益关系,实现跨期资源有效配置。从跨期油气资源最优分配的角度,通过最优控制理论构建寡头垄断市场中社会福利最大化和企业利润最大化目标下的油气资源开发决策模型,并以社会福利最大化目标下的资源开发决策为基准,研究从价、从量、储量三种不同形式的油气资源税费对资源开发决策的调节作用,研究发现:(1)征收从价税费,最优的从价税率为26.4%,政府既可以保障社会最优,还可以获得较多的税费收入;(2)征收从量税费,从量税率为1.77元/吨,政府可以保证社会福利最大化,但相比从价税费政府的税费收入较少;(3)征收储量税费,社会福利最大化下的储量税费为-0.13元/吨,也就是政府需向企业进行补贴才可以保证社会最优,会形成一定的财政压力。     

社会福利函数独裁的特征

在这篇短文中,给出了关于社会福利函数F的半严格正向响应的概念,并且证明了如果备选对象至少有三个,则弱帕累托性质与半严格正向响应性质是独裁的充分必要条件.作为应用,我们给出了社会选择函数防止策略性操纵的一个等价描述,并对社会福利函数引进了防止局部策略性操纵的概念,得到了一个类似于Gibbard—Satterthwaite定理的结论.     

市场化改革背景下养老机构服务供给博弈研究

考虑政府补贴、市场化程度、养老机构服务成本、老年人偏好等因素,构建了完全国有化、公私并存的半市场化和完全市场化三种情形下公办和民办养老机构之间的两阶段博弈模型,比较分析了市场化程度对养老机构服务价格制定和服务水平选择的影响,实证讨论了各参数变化对养老机构收益及社会福利的影响。研究表明:完全市场化机制会降低养老机构服务质量,完全国有化机制会陷入社会福利陷阱,探索公私并存的最佳市场化水平才能更好地提高社会福利;适度推进市场化改革,提高养老机构服务水平,降低民办养老机构服务成本,适度提高对民办养老机构的补贴,将有效缓解公办和民办养老机构的不公平竞争;提高老年人支付能力,推进养老机构供给侧结构性改革,将保障机构养老服务的有效供给,促进养老服务业的健康有序发展。     

基于FDI收益分成视角的FTA网络演化

本文假定双边自由贸易协定(bilateral free trade agreement,简称FTA)包含着无限制对外直接投资(foreign direct investment,简称FDI),并且通过FDI销售到非FTA伙伴国的收益按照一定比例在母国和东道国之间进行分配。基于Goyal和Joshi^[1],本文构建了FTA网络形成博弈模型。本文发现,FTA网络演化过程分为两个阶段:第一阶段,从空FTA网络到星状FTA网络,存在一条路径使得个体国家福利、世界总福利均改善,在此过程中,国家福利存在不对称性;第二阶段,从星状FTA网络到全连接FTA网络,存在一条路径使得个体国家福利改善,在此过程中,世界总福利不变,国家福利不对称性逐步消除。     

中国电子废弃物押金返还政策决策模型及效应

应用博弈论研究了中国电子废弃物押金返还政策的决策模型及效应。研究表明,电子废弃物非正规回收环境成本较高时,社会福利最大化下的押金返还政策既能提高社会福利又能减少非正规回收数量;这时,只要押金返还额足够高,就可以使电子废弃物完全由正规回收者环保回收;合意的最小押金返还额取决于两类回收者单位电子废弃物处理利润:正规回收者处理利润越高、非正规回收者处理利润越低,合意的最小押金返还额越小;正规回收者单位电子废弃物处理利润越大、消费者对电子废弃物残值估计的最大值越小,社会福利越大。电子废弃物非正规回收环境成本较低时,不宜再使用社会福利最大化作为押金返还政策的决策目标。     

基于风险偏好的供应链企业社会责任投入与定价策略研究

本文研究制造商承担企业社会责任时,竞争市场下供应链的均衡价格策略。通过Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨供应链成员的风险规避程度、竞争市场的需求波动性和竞争市场的需求相关性以及制造商企业社会责任水平对供应链均衡策略的影响。研究表明,在制造商承担企业社会责任时,风险规避程度对价格策略的影响依赖于制造商企业社会责任水平的高低;竞争市场的需求波动性较大或竞争市场需求相关性较高时,制造商向下游风险规避型零售商提供较低的批发价格合约, 此时产品的市场价格降低,消费者福利增加;当制造商的生产成本较低时,承担越高的企业社会责任导致消费者福利增加;反之,当制造商的生产成本较高时,消费者福利总是减少。     

低碳经济下政企博弈与政府补贴策略研究

在低碳经济的背景下,研究了政府补贴策略对政企博弈关系及企业决策行为的影响。通过引入两阶段动态博弈的方法,深入分析了不同政府补贴模式对需求量、产品价格、制造商的收益、消费者剩余以及社会福利所产生的影响。研究表明,价格对需求的影响系数以及政府补贴消费者对需求的影响系数等因素会影响政府补贴策略的选择,并得出了不同政府补贴策略下消费者剩余、制造商收益以及社会福利与单位产品补贴额的关系,本文为政府科学制定补贴政策以及在政府补贴背景下制造商和消费者应采取何种应对策略提供一定的决策支持。     

基于医保规制和消费者效用的双渠道医药供应链竞争策略

医药消费者在面对双渠道零售时,会明显受到实体渠道医保报销政策的影响。基于这一现象,本文构建了同时考虑医保规制政策和消费者效用的双渠道医药供应链博弈模型,研究了医保报销比例和电商佣金比例对双渠道定价、供应链绩效以及社会福利的影响规律。研究结果表明:医药双渠道定价会同时随着平台收费标准和医保报销比例的增加而降低;医保报销比例的增加会提高社会福利、降低供应链绩效,同时会弱化网络渠道低价优势,能够有效抑制渠道蚕食现象;电商平台佣金比例的增加虽然在一定程度上提高了社会福利,但是会严重瓜分渠道利润,加剧渠道竞争,导致供应链绩效降低。     

How mathematical impossibility changed welfare economics: A history of Arrow's impossibility theorem

During the 20th century, impossibility theorems have become an important part of mathematics. Arrow's impossibility theorem (1950) stands out as one of the first impossibility theorems outside of pure mathematics. It states that it is impossible to design a welfare function (or a voting method) that satisfies some rather innocent looking requirements. Arrow's theorem became the starting point of social choice theory that has had a great impact on welfare economics. This paper will analyze the history of Arrow's impossibility theorem in its mathematical and economic contexts. It will be argued that Arrow made a radical change of the mathematical model of welfare economics by connecting it to the theory of voting and that this change was preconditioned by his deep knowledge of the modern axiomatic approach to mathematics and logic.     

Intergenerational risk sharing in closing pension funds

We model intergenerational risk sharing in closing funded pension plans. Specifically, we consider a setting in which in each period, the pension fund’s investment and indexation policy is the outcome of a bargaining process between representatives of the then living generations. Because some generations might be under- or overrepresented in the board, we use the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution to allow for differences in bargaining powers. In a numerical study, we compare the welfare that the generations derive from the outcome of this repeated bargaining to the welfare that they would derive if a social planner’s optimal policy would instead be implemented. We find that as compared to the social optimum, older generations benefit substantially from the repeated bargaining, even if all generations are equally well-represented in the board. If older generations are relatively over-represented, as is sometimes argued, these effects are attenuated.     

Examining risk attitudes

The existence of risky choices makes the study of attitudes toward risk important. In this article we ask the following questions: Do risk‐neutral preferences maximize utility? Are there other measures of social welfare that can explain risk aversion in society? What effect does evolution have on the distribution of risk attitudes and the measures of social welfare? In a static environment risk‐neutral risk attitudes maximize utilitarian measures of social welfare, and risk‐averse attitudes maximize Rawlsian measures. In a dynamic system agents will tend toward risk, preferring greater affinity for risk when they can accumulate wealth. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 9: 25–30, 2004     

网络效应下的架构标准创新及其社会福利分析

通过对网络效应下的架构标准创新进行研究,本文发现,在位厂商通过采取开放架构标准,推动市场标准快速形成,在进入厂商新产品创新成功率不高,或新产品效率提高不是很大的情况下,迅速统一的市场标准提高了社会福利;然而,在进入厂商新产品创新成功率较高,或新产品效率提高较大的情况下,迅速统一的市场标准降低了社会福利.也就是说,开放架...     

A marriage matching mechanism menagerie

For each of several measures of social welfare we present a marriage matching mechanism that produces a welfare maximizing matching, and our basic approach generalizes to many other welfare measures.     

奖惩机制下零售商信息分享对闭环供应链的影响研究

研究奖惩机制下零售商的信息分享策略以及对闭环供应链的影响,建立了由制造商和零售商以及消费者组成的闭环供应链,其中制造商负责回收废旧产品并进行再制造。分别研究了集中式决策的情形和分散式决策下零售商信息分享和不分享的情形。研究发现,若政府在社会总福利目标中不考虑奖惩成本且回收难度较小时,零售商信息分享使社会总福利提高,反之,导致社会总福利降低;零售商信息分享总会使消费者剩余的期望值降低,但能够提高废旧产品的回收率。最后,针对零售商信息分享引起社会福利提高的情况设计了回收责任分担契约激励零售商分享信息。关键词:信息分享;奖惩机制;闭环供应链;社会福利;消费者剩余     

财政分权的博弈分析

构建一个完全信息两阶段博弈模型,分别对财政分权的两个极点—完全分权和完全集权进行讨论,研究财政分权对经济增长及社会福利的影响.     

On construction of social welfare orders satisfying Hammond equity and Weak Pareto axioms

This paper examines the constructive nature of a social welfare order that respects Hammond equity axiom and Weak Pareto axiom. It describes the domains (of the one period utilities) on which an explicit construction is possible. A social welfare order satisfying the Hammond equity and Weak Pareto admits an explicit construction if and only if the domain is a well-ordered set.     

An Optimal Congestion and Cost-sharing Pricing Scheme for Multiclass Services

We study in this paper a social welfare optimal congestion-pricing scheme for multiclass queuing services which can be applied to telecommunication networks. Most of the literature has focused on the marginal price. Unfortunately, it does not share the total cost among the different classes. We investigate here an optimal Aumann–Shapley congestion-price which verifies this property. We extend the work on the Aumann–Shapley price for priority services, based on the results on the marginal price: instead of just determining the cost repartition among classes for given rates, we obtain the rates and charges that optimize the social welfare.