Dynamic equilibria of group vaccination strategies in a heterogeneous population

In this paper we present an evolutionary variational inequality model of vaccination strategies games in a population with a known vaccine coverage profile over a certain time interval. The population is considered to be heterogeneous, namely its individuals are divided into a finite number of distinct population groups, where each group has different perceptions of vaccine and disease risks. Previous game theoretical analyses of vaccinating behaviour have studied the strategic interaction between individuals attempting to maximize their health states, in situations where an individual’s health state depends upon the vaccination decisions of others due to the presence of herd immunity. Here we extend such analyses by applying the theory of evolutionary variational inequalities (EVI) to a (one parameter) family of generalized vaccination games. An EVI is used to provide conditions for existence of solutions (generalized Nash equilibria) for the family of vaccination games, while a projected dynamical system is used to compute approximate solutions of the EVI problem. In particular we study a population model with two groups, where the size of one group is strictly larger than the size of the other group (a majority/minority population). The smaller group is considered much less vaccination inclined than the larger group. Under these hypotheses, considering that the vaccine coverage of the entire population is measured during a vaccine scare period, we find that our model reproduces a feature of real populations: the vaccine averse minority will react immediately to a vaccine scare by dropping their strategy to a nonvaccinator one; the vaccine inclined majority does not follow a nonvaccinator strategy during the scare, although vaccination in this group decreases as well. Moreover we find that there is a delay in the majority’s reaction to the scare. This is the first time EVI problems are used in the context of mathematical epidemiology. The results presented emphasize the important role played by social heterogeneity in vaccination behaviour, while also highlighting the valuable role that can be played by EVI in this area of research.      

Cooperation among mobile individuals with payoff expectations in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

We propose a model to address the problem how the evolution of cooperation in a social system depends on the spatial motion and the payoff expectation. In the model, if the actual payoff of an individual is smaller than its payoff expectation, the individual will either move to a new site or simply reverse its current strategy. It turns out that migration of dissatisfied individuals with relatively low expectation level leads to the aggregation of cooperators and promotion of cooperation. Moreover, under appropriate parameters migration leads to some interesting spatiotemporal patterns which seems not to have been reported in previously studied spatial games. Furthermore, it also found that a population with constant expectation can better favor cooperative behavior than a population with adaptive aspiration.     

GLOBAL STABILITY OF AN SVIR EPIDEMIC MODEL WITH VACCINATION

In this paper, an SIR epidemic model with vaccination for both the newborns and susceptibles is investigated, where it is assumed that the vaccinated individuals have the temporary immunity. The basic reproduction number determining the extinction or persistence of the infection is found. By constructing a Lyapunov function, it is proved that the disease free equilibrium is globally stable when the basic reproduction number is less than or equal to one, and that the endemic equilibrium is globally stable wh...     

一类带有接种的SIR传染病模型的全局分析

基于经典的SIR传染病模型,建立了一类具有接种的SIR-V传染病模型,考虑了被接种者具有确定免疫期和免疫力按指数消失两种情形,得到了相应的基本再生数,并证明了其全局渐近稳定性.     

Epidemic model with vaccinated age that exhibits backward bifurcation

Vaccination of susceptibilities is included in a transmission model for a disease that confers immunity. In this paper, interplay of vaccination strategy together with vaccine efficacy and the vaccinated age is studied. In particular, vaccine efficacy can lead to a backward bifurcation. At the same time, we also discuss an abstract formulation of the problem, and establish the well-posedness of the model.     

Cooperation in an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with probabilistic strategies

In this work, we investigate an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game in structured populations with probabilistic strategies instead of the pure strategies of cooperation and defection. We explore the model in details by considering different strategy update rules and different population structures. We find that the distribution of probabilistic strategies patterns is dependent on both the interaction structures and the updating rules. We also find that, when an individual updates her strategy by increasing or decreasing her probabilistic strategy a certain amount towards that of her opponent, there exists an optimal increment of the probabilistic strategy at which the cooperator frequency reaches its maximum.     

一类带有接种的流行病模型的全局稳定性

该文讨论了一类带有接种的流行病模型. 在该模型中假设恢复后的个体与被接种的个体均具有确定的免疫期, 它是一个时滞微分系统. 通过分析, 得到了地方病平衡点存在的阈值, 以及无病平衡点和地方病平衡点局部渐近稳定和全局渐近稳定的充分条件.     

Optimal commutable annuities to minimize the probability of lifetime ruin

We find the minimum probability of lifetime ruin of an investor who can invest in a market with a risky and a riskless asset and who can purchase a commutable life annuity. The surrender charge of a life annuity is a proportion of its value. Ruin occurs when the total of the value of the risky and riskless assets and the surrender value of the life annuity reaches zero. We find the optimal investment strategy and optimal annuity purchase and surrender strategies in two situations: (i) the value of the risky and riskless assets is allowed to be negative, with the imputed surrender value of the life annuity keeping the total positive; (ii) the value of the risky and riskless assets is required to be non-negative. In the first case, although the individual has the flexibility to buy or sell at any time, we find that the individual will not buy a life annuity unless she can cover all her consumption via the annuity and she will never sell her annuity. In the second case, the individual surrenders just enough annuity income to keep her total assets positive. However, in this second case, the individual’s annuity purchasing strategy depends on the size of the proportional surrender charge. When the charge is large enough, the individual will not buy a life annuity unless she can cover all her consumption, the so-called safe level. When the charge is small enough, the individual will buy a life annuity at a wealth lower than this safe level.     

The impact of other-regarding tendencies on the spatial vaccination game

Using the evolutionary game framework to describe the vaccination behaviors of individuals, this work focuses on the impact of other-regarding tendencies on collective decision-making of vaccination. With extensive computational simulations, we find that when the vaccination cost is small or moderate, the variance of vaccination coverage as well as epidemic size is monotonically depending on the other-regarding effect. However, with a high price of vaccine, a moderate deviation from being entirely self-centered results in a poor communal vaccination benefit. In addition, we also find that the other-regarding effect may lead to an optimal total social cost.     

一类带有潜伏期和部分免疫的传染病模型的全局分析

通过假设被接种者具有部分免疫,建立了一类具有潜伏期和接种的SEIR传染病模型,借助再生矩阵得到了确定此接种模型动力学行为的基本再生数.当基本再生数小于1时,模型只有无病平衡点;当基本再生数大于1时,除无病平衡点外,模型还有唯一的地方病平衡点.借助Liapunov函数,证明了无病平衡点和地方病平衡点的全局稳定性.     

Stability and bifurcation of an SIVS epidemic model with treatment and age of vaccination

In this paper, we consider a two-dimensional SIS model with vaccination. It is assumed that vaccinated individuals become susceptible again when vaccine loses its protective properties with time. Here the rate at which vaccinated individual move to susceptible class again, depends upon vaccine age and hence it is assumed to be a variable. This SIVS model with treatment exhibits backward bifurcation under certain conditions on treatment which complicate the criteria for the success of the treatment by making it possible to have stable endemic states. We also show how the infectivity and the recovery function affect the existence of backward bifurcation.     

Multicriteria Goal Games

In this paper, we deal with multicriteria matrix games. Different solution concepts have been proposed to cope with these games. Recently, the concept of Pareto-optimal security strategy which assures the property of security in the individual criteria against an opponent's deviation in strategy has been introduced. However, the idea of security behind this concept is based on expected values, so that this security might be violated by mixed strategies when replications are not allowed. To avoid this inconvenience, we propose in this paper a new concept of solution for these games: the G-goal security strategy, which includes as part of the solution the probability of obtaining prespecified values in the payoff functions. Thus, attitude toward risk together with payoff values are considered jointly in the solution analysis.     

Learning How Amanda,a High School Cerebral Palsy Student,Understands Angles

Little is known about how well cerebral palsy students learn high school geometry. A case study was used to better understand how one student, Amanda, understood angles. Three major accommodations were made to assist her in learning: a) a self-paced curriculum, b) The Geometer's Sketchpad, and c) nontraditional assessment (portfolio, interviews, observations). It was found that Amanda needed a lot of time to process visual information. The orientation of angles, the complexity of the diagram, and the length of the side of an angle all had an impact on her understanding. The software was beneficial for Amanda, because she could hide unnecessary and distracting information, she could make her drawings legible, and she could measure the angles without relying on her own visual perception.     

一类带有感染年龄SIR模型最优化免疫策略的存在性

对于一个免疫策略来讲,付出(单位时间内接种疫苗的数量)和效果(再生数的大小)是两个重要概念.在给定的费用下找到带有最小再生数的策略和在给定的再生数下找到最小费用的策略是两个最优问题.对一个确定的免疫策略来说,人群中的易感群体和染病群体会趋于相对稳定的状态.当一种疾病侵袭已免疫人群时,用带有感染年龄的SIR模型去描述这类疾病的传播更为准确.因此,本文研究了一类带有感染年龄的SIR模型,得到了最优化策略的存在性.     

The Promotion and Evolution of Cooperation Through Projection: Implications for Social Dilemmas and Trust

It is rational for individuals to defect in social dilemmas. However, sometimes individuals display cooperative behaviors. This article focuses on one psychological mechanism proposed by some researchers as a promoter of cooperation—projection. Projection is a psychological mechanism that leads an individual to expect others to behave as he or she behaves. I model the emergence of cooperation in society through agent-based simulations. Results of the simulations suggest that projection evolves and promotes cooperation in a society where both structural embeddedness and opportunity costs are high, or where structural embeddedness is moderate and opportunity costs are low. I discuss the implication of the simulation results for studies of social dilemmas and trust.     

工程承包中的套期保值策略分析研究

在国际工程承包投标时,当存在非系统风险的情况下,风险溢价(Risk Premium)会影响当事人的套期保值策略.在以往的研究中,仅仅局限于选择一个最优的套期保值比率,而在实践中,当事人的偏好对套期保值的策略影响很大,当事人的不同偏好,风险溢价对工程项目的套期保值策略影响也存在很大的不同.     

How behaviors spread in dynamic social networks

In this paper, we explore how decentralized local interactions of autonomous agents in a network relate to collective behaviors. Earlier work in this area has modeled social networks with fixed agent relations. We instead focus on dynamic social networks in which agents can rationally adjust their neighborhoods based on their individual interests. We propose a new connection evaluation theory, the Highest Weighted Reward (HWR) rule: agents dynamically choose their neighbors in order to maximize their own utilities based on rewards from previous interactions. We prove that, in the two-action pure coordination game, our system would stabilize to a clustering state in which all relationships in the network are rewarded with an optimal payoff. Our experiments verify this theory and also reveal additional interesting patterns in the network.     

Risk assesment of a new high-speed railway

A quantitative risk assessment has been carried out for theconceptual stage of the proposed Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL).The assessment is one of the first for a railway system. Itincludes an integrated computer model. The whole risk modelfor the CTRL from base event data, through fault and event trees,to individual, collective, and societal risks is processed usingLotus 1-2-3 spreadsheets. Variations to the design and operationalassumptions and to the input data can be introduced into themodel, and the effect on risk calculated rapidly. This versatilityis particularly useful because of the early stage of the project.It can be used to assist designers in consideration of possibledesign changes.     

Optimal non-proportional reinsurance control and stochastic differential games

We study stochastic differential games between two insurance companies who employ reinsurance to reduce risk exposure. We consider competition between two companies and construct a single payoff function of two companies’ surplus processes. One company chooses a dynamic reinsurance strategy in order to maximize the payoff function while its opponent is simultaneously choosing a dynamic reinsurance strategy so as to minimize the same quantity. We describe the Nash equilibrium of the game and prove a verification theorem for a general payoff function. For the payoff function being the probability that the difference between two surplus reaches an upper bound before it reaches a lower bound, the game is solved explicitly.     

A note on the equilibria of the unbounded traveler’s dilemma

When there is no upward limit on admissible claims, the traveler’s dilemma admits a continuum of symmetric mixed strategy equilibria in addition to the pure strategy equilibrium in which both players ask and obtain the minimum. The payoff of any of these equilibria exceeds the payoff of the pure strategy one and any claim represents an attainable payoff. If the distinction between a large and an unbounded action set is fuzzy, this result can explain some puzzling stylized facts on the behavior of experimental subjects in the game.