Conceptualism and the Problem of Illusory Experience

According to the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception, we possess concepts for all the objects, properties, and relations which feature in our experiences. Richard Heck has recently argued that the phenomenon of illusory experience provides us with conclusive reasons to reject this view. In this paper, I examine Heck’s argument, I explain why I think that Bill Brewer’s conceptualist response to it is ineffective, and I then outline an alternative conceptualist response which I myself endorse. My argument turns on the fact that both Heck, in constructing his objection to conceptualism, and Brewer, in responding to it, miss a crucial distinction between perceptual demonstrative concepts of objects, on the one hand, and perceptual demonstrative concepts of properties, on the other.

Expressing and Describing Experiences. A Case of Showing Versus Saying

Experiences are interpreted as conscious mental occurrences that are of phenomenal character. There is already a kind of (weak) intentionality involved with this phenomenal interpretation. A stricter conception of experiences distinguishes between purely phenomenal experiences and intentional experiences in a narrow sense. Wittgenstein’s account of psychological (experiential) verbs is taken over: Usually, expressing mental states verbally is not describing them. According to this, “I believe” can be seen as an expression of one’s own belief, but not as an expression of a belief about one’s belief. Hence, the utterance “I believe it is raining” shows that I believe that it is raining, although it is not said by these words that I believe that it is raining. Thinking thoughts such as “I believe it is raining, but it is not raining” (a variant of Moore’s paradox) is an absurdity between what is already said by silently uttering “It is not raining” and what is shown by silently uttering “I believe it is raining.” The paper agrees with a main result of Wittgenstein’s considerations of Moore’s paradox, namely the view that logical structure, deducibility, and consistency cannot be reduced solely to propositions—besides a logic of propositions, there is, for example, a logic of assertions and of imperatives, respectively.     

What Mary’s Aboutness Is About

The aim of this paper is to reinforce anti-physicalism by extending the “hard problem” to a specific kind of intentional states. For reaching this target, I investigate the mental content of the new intentional states of Jackson’s Mary. I proceed in the following way: I start analyzing the knowledge argument, which highlights the “hard problem” tied to phenomenal consciousness. In a second step, I investigate a powerful physicalist reply to this argument: the phenomenal concept strategy. In a third step, I propose a constitutional account of phenomenal concepts that captures the Mary scenario adequately, but implies anti-physicalist referents. In a last step, I point at the ramifications constitutional phenomenal concepts have on the constitution of Mary’s new intentional states. Therefore, by focusing the attention on phenomenal concepts, the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness will be carried over to the alleged “easy problem” of intentional states as well.     

Van Gulick’s solution of the exclusion problem revisited

The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental causation, i.e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby to the results of experiments carried out in neurology; the latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and beliefs and despite the constant opposition of science still very much alive. Difficulties, however, arise from a combination of two claims that are widely accepted in philosophy of mind, namely, physical monism and mental realism, the acceptance of which leads us to the greatest problem of mental causation: the problem of causal exclusion. Since physical causes alone are always sufficient for physical effects mental properties are excluded from causal explanations of our behaviour, which makes them “epiphenomenal”. The article introduces Van Gulick’s solution to the exclusion problem which tries to prove that physical properties, in contrast to mental properties, do not have as much of a privileged status with respect to event causation as usually ascribed. Therefore, it makes no sense to say that physical properties are causally relevant whereas mental properties are not. This is followed by my objection to his argument for levelling mental and physical properties with respect to causation of events. I try to show that Van Gulick’s argument rests on a premise that no serious physicalist can accept. Also called The Problem of Causal Exclusion.     

Functionalism about Truth and the Metaphysics of Reduction

Functionalism about truth is the view that truth is an explanatorily significant but multiply-realizable property. According to this view the properties that realize truth vary from domain to domain, but the property of truth is a single, higher-order, domain insensitive property. We argue that this view faces a challenge similar to the one that Jaegwon Kim laid out for the multiple realization thesis. The challenge is that the higher-order property of truth is equivalent to an explanatorily idle disjunction of its realization bases. This consequence undermines the alethic functionalists’ non-deflationary ambitions. A plausible response to Kim’s argument fails to carry over to alethic functionalism on account of significant differences between alethic functionalism and psychological functionalism. Lynch’s revised view in his book Truth as One and Many (2009) fails to answer our challenge. The upshot is that, while mental functionalism may survive Kim’s argument, it mortally wounds functionalism about truth.     

Retracing our steps: Fodor’s new old way with concept acquisition

The acquisition of concepts has proven especially difficult for philosophers and psychologists to explain. In this paper, I examine Jerry Fodor’s most recent attempt to explain the acquisition of concepts relative to experiences of their referents. In reevaluating his earlier position, Fodor attempts to co-opt informational semantics into an account of concept acquisition that avoids the radical nativism of his earlier views. I argue that Fodor’s attempts ultimately fail to be persuasive. He must either accept his earlier nativism or adopt a rational causal model of concept acquisition. His animus towards the latter dictates, in my view, a return to the nativism with which he began.     

Is There a Conceptual Connection Between Intentionality and Consciousness?

It is argued that Searle’s argument for the thesis that there is a conceptual connection between intentionality and consciousness suffers from serious ambiguities. Searle’s argument is reconstructed as consisting of three premises that contain the notions of aspectual shape and irreducible subjectivity. Having identified two different readings of ‘aspectual shape’ and ‘irreducibly subjective,’ I conclude that each version of Searle’s argument incorporates at least one false premise. This paper is a descendant of a paper presented at the Wittgenstein Symposium at Kirchberg am Wechsel in August 2004. I would like to thank the reviewer of this journal for his/her helpful comments on a previous draft.     

The deliberative relevance of refraining from deciding: A response to McKenna and Pereboom

Readers familiar with Harry Frankfurt’s argument that we do not need leeway-liberty (or the power to bring about alternative possible actions or intentions) to be morally responsible will probably also know that the most famous and popular response on behalf of leeway-libertarianism remains a dilemma posed in similar forms by David Widerker, Robert Kane, and Carl Ginet: either the agent retains significant residual leeway in Frankfurt-style cases, or these cases beg the question by presupposing causal determinism. In the last few years, there have been several different attempts to defend Frankfurtian critiques of PAP in response this dilemma. In a novel approach, Derk Pereboom and Michael McKenna present cases in which all deliberatively relevant or “robust” alternatives are blocked, but the agent’s act or decision is not determined. Pereboom and McKenna argue that any plausible leeway-condition on responsibility must characterize the required alternatives as robust in two ways: being voluntary performances and having a practical relevance accessible to the agent’s mind. I agree with the requirement of robustness, and argue that we can build this notion into a complex concept of agent-possibility, or “agentive-can.” However, I argue that both McKenna’s and Pereboom’s conceptions of robustness are too demanding: they exclude alternatives that are intuitively relevant. Moreover, I argue that the alternative of refraining from deciding, or voluntarily failing to decide, is robust in the right sense. In agreement with a tradition running from Ockham back through Scotus to Aquinas, I argue that this robust alternative is necessary for responsibility. If the Frankfurt-controller eliminates it, then the agent’s responsibility is undermined. In particular, I argue that Pereboom’s tax evasion cases do not refute this leeway-condition on moral responsibility.     

On the combinatorics of the Boros-Moll polynomials

The Boros-Moll polynomials arise in the evaluation of a quartic integral. The original double summation formula does not imply the fact that the coefficients of these polynomials are positive. Boros and Moll proved the positivity by using Ramanujan’s Master Theorem to reduce the double sum to a single sum. Based on the structure of reluctant functions introduced by Mullin and Rota along with an extension of Foata’s bijection between Meixner endofunctions and bi-colored permutations, we find a combinatorial proof of the positivity. In fact, from our combinatorial argument one sees that it is essentially the binomial theorem that makes it possible to reduce the double sum to a single sum.     

A changing trajectory of proof learning in the geometry inquiry classroom

The purpose of this study is to explore how students changes through learning to construct mathematical proofs in an inquiry-based middle school geometry class in Korea. Although proof has long been considered as one of the most important aspects of mathematics education, it is well-known that it is one of the most difficult areas of school mathematics for students. The geometry inquiry classroom (GIC) is an experimental class designed to teach geometry, especially focusing on teaching proof, based on students’ own inquiry. Based on a 2-year participant observation in the GIC, this study was conducted to address the following research question: how has students’ practice of mathematical proof been changed through their participation in the GIC? The in-depth analysis of the classroom discourse identified three stages through which the students’ practice of mathematical proof was transformed in the GIC: ‘emergent understanding of proof’, ‘proof learning as a goal-oriented activity’, ‘experiencing proof as the practice of mathematics’. The study found that as learning evolved through these stages, so the mathematics teacher’s role shifted from being an instructor to a mediator of communication. Most importantly, this research showed that the GIC has created a learning environment where students develop their competence in constructing meaningful mathematical proof and grow to be ‘a human who proves’, ultimately ‘a person who playfully engages with mathematics’.     

S-convexity revisited (fuzzy): long version

In this revisional article, we criticize (strongly) the use made by Medar et al., and those whose work they base themselves on, of the name ‘convexity’ in definitions which intend to relate to convex functions, or cones, or sets, but actually seem to be incompatible with the most basic consequences of having the name ‘convexity’ associated to them. We then believe to have fixed the ‘denominations’ associated with Medar’s (et al.) work, up to a point of having it all matching the existing literature in the field [which precedes their work (by long)]. We also expand his work scope by introducing s ₁-convexity concepts to his group of definitions, which encompasses only convex and its proper extension, s ₂-convex, so far. This article is a long version of our previous review of Medar’s work, published by FJMS (Pinheiro, M.R.: S-convexity revisited. FJMS, 26/3, 2007).     

Towards an Algebraic Proof of Deligne’s Regularity Criterion. An Informal Survey of Open Problems

We review the notion of regular singular point of a linear differential equation with meromorphic coefficients, from the viewpoint of algebraic geometry. We give several equivalent definitions of regularity along a divisor for a meromorphic connection on a complex algebraic manifold and discuss the global birational theory of fuchsian differential modules over a field of algebraic functions. We describe the generalized algebraic version of Deligne’s canonical extension, constructed in [1, I.4]. Our main interest lies in the algebraic form of Deligne’s regularity criterion [2, II.4.4 (iii)], asserting that, on a normal compactification, only one codimensional components of the locus at infinity need to be considered. If one considers the purely algebraic nature of the statement, it is surprising that the only existing proof of this criterion is the transcendental argument given by Deligne in his corrigendum to loc. cit. dated April 1971. The algebraic proof given in our book [1, I.5.4] is also incorrect, as J. Bernstein kindly indicated to us.We introduce some notions of logarithmic geometry to let the reader appreciate Bernstein’s (counter)examples to some statements in our book [1]. Standard methods of generic projection in projective spaces reduce the question to a two-dimensional puzzle. We report on ongoing correspondence with Y. André and N. Tsuzuki, leading to partial results and provide examples indicating the subtlety of the problem. Lecture held in the Seminario Matematico e Fisico on January 31, 2005 Received: June 2005     

A coloured window on pre-service teachers’ conceptions of rational numbers

In undergraduate mathematics courses, pre-service elementary school teachers are often faced with the task of re-learning some of the concepts they themselves struggled with in their own schooling. This often involves different cognitive processes and psychological issues than initial learning: pre-service teachers have had many more opportunities to construct understandings and representations than initial learners, some of which may be more complex and engrained; pre-service teachers are likely to have created deeply-held–and often negative–beliefs and attitudes toward certain mathematical ideas and processes. In our recent research, we found that pre-service teachers who used a particular computer-based microworld, one emphasising visual representations of and experimental interactions with elementary number theory concepts, overcame many cognitive and psychological difficulties reported in the literature. In this study, we investigate the possibilities of using a similarly-designed microworld that involves a set of rational number concepts. We describe the affordances of this microworld, both in terms of pre-service teacher learning and research on pre-service teacher learning, namely, the helpful “window” it gave us on the mathematical meaning-making of pre-service teachers. We also show how their interactions with this microworld provided many with a new and aesthetically-rich set of visualisations and experiences.     

Statistical Causality,Extremal Measures and Weak Solutions of Stochastic Differential Equations with Driving Semimartingales

In this paper we consider different concepts of causality in filtered probability spaces. Especially, we consider a generalization of a causality relationship “G is a cause of J within H ” which was first given by Mykland (1986) and which is based on Granger’s definition of causality (Granger, Econometrica 37:424–438, 1969). Then we apply this concept on weak solutions of stochastic differential equations with driving semimartingales. We also show that the given causality concept is closely connected to the concept of extremality of measures and links Granger’s causality with the concept of adapted distribution. Finally, the concept of causality is applied on solution of martingale problem.     

A validation study of the use of mathematical knowledge for teaching measures in Ireland

Researchers who study mathematical knowledge for teaching (MKT) are interested in how teachers deploy their mathematical knowledge in the classroom to enhance instruction and student learning. However, little data exists on how teachers’ scores on the US-developed measures relate to classroom instruction in other countries. This article documents a validation study of Irish teachers’ scores on measures of MKT that were adapted for use in Ireland. A validity argument is made identifying elemental, structural and ecological assumptions. The argument is evaluated using qualitative and quantitative data to analyse inferences related to the three assumptions. The data confirmed the elemental assumption but confirming the structural and ecological assumptions was more difficult. Only a weak association was found between teachers’ MKT scores and the mathematical quality of instruction. Possible reasons for this are outlined and challenges in validating the use of measures are identified.     

Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge

In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed a novel argument against moral intuitionism. I suggest a defense on behalf of the intuitionist against Sinnott-Armstrong’s objections. Rather than focus on the main premises of his argument, I instead examine the way in which Sinnott-Armstrong construes the intuitionistic position. I claim that Sinnott-Armstrong’s understanding of intuitionism is mistaken. In particular, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong mischaracterizes non-inferentiality as it figures in intuitionism. To the extent that Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of intuitionism has been adopted by others uncritically, intuitionists have cause for concern. I develop an alternative, and more accurate, reading of what is non-inferential about intuitionistic moral knowledge. In light of this alternative reading, certain elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s case against intuitionism are significantly weakened. But perhaps more importantly, this paper helps clarify what circumspect intuitionists mean when they claim that some moral knowledge is non-inferential.     

Kvanvig on Pointless Truths and the Cognitive Ideal

Jonathan Kvanvig has recently attempted to reconcile the problem of (apparently) pointless truths with the claim that the value of truth is unrestricted—that truth is always and everywhere valuable. In this paper, I critically evaluate Kvanvig’s argument and show it to be defective at a crucial juncture. I propose my own alternative strategy for generating Kvanvig’s result—an alternative that parts ways with Kvanvig’s own conception of the cognitively ideal.     

Direct realism: Proximate causation and the missing object

Direct Realists believe that perception involves direct awareness of an object not dependent for its existence on the perceiver. Howard Robinson rejects this doctrine in favour of a Sense-Datum theory of perception. His argument against Direct Realism invokes the principle ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’. Since there are cases in which direct awareness has the same proximate cerebral cause as awareness of a sense datum, the Direct Realist is, he thinks, obliged to deny this causal principle. I suggest that although Direct Realism is in more than one respect implausible, it does not succumb to Robinson’s argument. The causal principle is true only if ‘proximate cause’ means ‘proximate sufficient cause’, and the Direct Realist need not concede that there is a sufficient cerebral cause for direct awareness of independent objects.     

A primer on triangle functions II

In Saminger-Platz and Sempi (Aequationes Math 76:201–240, 2008) we presented an overview of concepts, facts and results on triangle functions based on the notions of t-norm, copula, (generalized) convolution, semicopula, quasi-copula. Here, we continue our presentation. In particular, we treat the concept of duality and study a few important cases of functional equations and inequalities for triangle functions like, e.g., convolution, Cauchy’s equation, dominance, and Jensen convexity.     

Understanding the Small Object Argument

The small object argument is a transfinite construction which, starting from a set of maps in a category, generates a weak factorisation system on that category. As useful as it is, the small object argument has some problematic aspects: it possesses no universal property; it does not converge; and it does not seem to be related to other transfinite constructions occurring in categorical algebra. In this paper, we give an “algebraic” refinement of the small object argument, cast in terms of Grandis and Tholen’s natural weak factorisation systems, which rectifies each of these three deficiencies.