共查询到19条相似文献,搜索用时 500 毫秒
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具有合作结构的对策是指带有可行结盟集族的合作对策,而可行结盟描述了在对策中可以进行协商的结盟.本文研究了合作结构的模型及相应的限制以策,在此限制对策中可行结盟是那些属于分割系统的结盟;定义了具有合作结构对策的τ-值,它是TU-对策的τ-值在具有合作结构对策中的推广,讨论了它的一些性质和公理化特征. 相似文献
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对有限制结盟的NTU对策提出一种分配形式,即RC解,研究了这个解与对应的TU对策的有限制结盟边际贡献值之间的关系,同时给出RC解的刻划公理. 相似文献
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首先给出了单调集值测度的S^(*)性质、集值双零渐近可加性等概念,然后在此基础上研究了单调集值测度空间上函数列依测度收敛的一些性质,并且得到了函数列依测度收敛的几个充分条件。 相似文献
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n 人对策核和准核的研究是对策论中心课题之一,这方面理论正在完善.但对复杂的结盟结构对策核和准核一直没有得到充分研究.文[3]只研究了结盟结构核与导出对策(Reduced Game)核间的联系;文[4]在研究相对总体结盟(Grand Coalition)对策核的结构时,曾推测结盟结构对策核研究需要下列条件:相对每个核元素的导出对策都是0-规范单凋对策.本文证明了这一推测是正确的,并且讨论了核和准核的结构及相互关系.在此基础上,我们确定了核和准核的下界. 相似文献
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In this paper we characterize a value, called a marginalistic value, for monotonic set games, which can be considered to be the analog of the Shapley value for TU-games. For this characterization we use a modification of the strong monotonicity axiom of Young, but the proof is rather different from his. 相似文献
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本文将单调集合对策边缘解推广到一般集合对策上,利用三个公理,确定了集合对策边缘解的唯—性.在证明唯—性的过程中,引进了单调集合对策将集合对策进行分解.证明过程与Aarts等人的方法完全不一样,在某些地方吸收了Young的有关思想. 相似文献
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《Mathematical Social Sciences》2013,65(3):247-257
Indices that evaluate the distribution of power in simple games are commonly required to be monotonic in voting weights when the game represents a voting body such as a shareholder meeting, parliament, etc. The standard notions of local or global monotonicity are bound to be violated, however, if cooperation is restricted to coalitions that are connected by a communication graph. This paper proposes new monotonicity concepts for power in games with communication structure and investigates the monotonicity properties of the Myerson value, the restricted Banzhaf value, the position value, and the average tree solution. 相似文献
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《Mathematical Social Sciences》1988,15(1):1-10
It is shown that the restriction of the Shapley value to the lattice of all monotonic games whose range is contained in an arbitrary set of non-negative real numbers (which contains 0) can be uniquely characterized by the axioms that were given by Dubey (in order to characterize the Shapley value on the class of monotonic simple games). We also derive formulas for the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices in terms of the minimal winning coalitions of the game. 相似文献
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本文提出了集合对策的两类定量边缘解,并给出了两类解的公理化特征:有效性、对称性、哑元性、Banzhaf总和性和传递性.这两类解分别与TU-对策的Banzhaf权力指数和Shapley-Shubik权力指数类似.同时,本文将Shapley解与Banzzhaf解扩展到k-维欧氏空间. 相似文献
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A Coalitional Power Value for Set Games 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
HaoSun Sheng-guiZhang Xue-liangLi 《应用数学学报(英文版)》2003,19(3):417-424
We propose the concept of a coalitional power value for set games, and present its axiomatic characterization of global efficiency, equal treatment property and coalitional power monotonicity. The coalitional power value is a generalization of the marginalistic value introduced by Aarts et al. 相似文献
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E. Algaba J. M. Bilbao R. van?den Brink J. J. López 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》2012,155(2):650-668
In this paper, the set of feasible coalitions in a cooperative game is given by a union stable system. Well-known examples of such systems are communication situations and permission structures. Two games associated with a game on a union stable system are the restricted game (on the set of players in the game) and the conference game (on the set of supports of the system). We define two types of superfluous support property through these two games and provide new characterizations for the Myerson value. Finally, we analyze inheritance of properties between the restricted game and the conference game. 相似文献
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1977年, Myerson建立了以图作为合作结构的可转移效用博弈模型(也称图博弈), 并提出了一个分配规则, 也即"Myerson 值", 它推广了著名的Shapley值. 该模型假定每个连通集合(通过边直接或间接内部相连的参与者集合)才能形成可行的合作联盟而取得相应的收益, 而不考虑连通集合的具体结构. 引入图的局部边密度来度量每个连通集合中各成员之间联系的紧密程度, 即以该连通集合的导出子图的边密度来作为他们的收益系数, 并由此定义了具有边密度的Myerson值, 证明了具有边密度的Myerson值可以由"边密度分支有效性"和"公平性"来唯一确定. 相似文献