Symmetric solutions of some production economies

A symmetricn-person game (n, k) (for positive integerk) is defined in its characteristic function form byv(S)=[¦S¦/k], where ¦S¦ is the number of players in the coalitionS and [x] denotes the largest integer not greater thanx, (i.e., anyk players, but not less, can “produce” one unit). It is proved that in any imputation in any symmetric von Neumann-Morgenstern solution of such a game, a blocking coalition ofp=n?k+1 players who receive the largest payoffs is formed, and their payoffs are always equal. Conditions for existence and uniqueness of such symmetric solutions with the otherk?1 payoffs equal too are proved; other cases are discussed thereafter.     

General decomposition theorems form-convex sets in the plane

A setS inR ^dis said to bem-convex,m≧2, if and only if for everym distinct points inS, at least one of the line segments determined by these points lies inS. Clearly any union ofm?1 convex sets ism-convex, yet the converse is false and has inspired some interesting mathematical questions: Under what conditions will anm-convex set be decomposable intom?1 convex sets? And for everym≧2, does there exist aσ(m) such that everym-convex set is a union ofσ(m) convex sets? Pathological examples convince the reader to restrict his attention to closed sets of dimension≦3, and this paper provides answers to the questions above for closed subsets of the plane. IfS is a closedm-convex set in the plane,m ≧ 2, the first question may be answered in one way by the following result: If there is some lineH supportingS at a pointp in the kernel ofS, thenS is a union ofm ? 1 convex sets. Using this result, it is possible to prove several decomposition theorems forS under varying conditions. Finally, an answer to the second question is given: Ifm≧3, thenS is a union of (m?1)³2 ^m?3 or fewer convex sets.     

Solution concepts ofk-convexn-person games

For any positive integersk andn, the subclass ofk-convexn-person games is considered. In casek=n, we are dealing with convexn-person games. Three characterizations ofk-convexn-person games, formulated in terms of the core and certain adapted marginal worth vectors, are given. Further it is shown that fork-convexn-person games the intersection of the (pre)kernel with the core consists of a unique point (namely the nucleolus), but that the (pre)kernel may contain points outside the core. For certain 1-convex and 2-convexn-person games the part of the bargaining set outside the core is even disconnected with the core. The Shapley value of ank-convexn-person game can be expressed in terms of the extreme points of the core and a correction-vector whenever the game satisfies a certain symmetric condition. Finally, theτ-value of ank-convexn-person game is given.     

Conjecture of Li and Praeger concerning the isomorphisms of Cayley graphs of A5

LetG be a finite group, andS a subset ofG \ |1| withS =S ^?1. We useX = Cay(G,S) to denote the Cayley graph ofG with respect toS. We callS a Cl-subset ofG, if for any isomorphism Cay(G,S) ≈ Cay(G,T) there is an α∈ Aut(G) such thatS ^α =T. Assume that m is a positive integer.G is called anm-Cl-group if every subsetS ofG withS =S ^?1 and | S | ≤m is Cl. In this paper we prove that the alternating groupA ₅ is a 4-Cl-group, which was a conjecture posed by Li and Praeger.     

Partizan octal games: Partizan subtraction games

A subtraction gameS=(s ₁, ...,s _k)is a two-player game played with a pile of tokens where each player at his turn removes a number ofm of tokens providedmεS. The player first unable to move loses, his opponent wins. This impartial game becomes partizan if, instead of one setS, two finite setsS _L andS _R are given: Left removes tokens as specified byS _L, right according toS _R. We say thatS _L dominatesS _R if for all sufficiently large piles Left wins both as first and as second player. We exhibit a curious property of dominance and provide two subclasses of games in which a dominance relation prevails. We further prove that all partizan subtraction games areperiodic, and investigatepure periodicity.     

On the minimal fourier degree of symmetric Boolean functions

In this paper we give a new upper bound on the minimal degree of a nonzero Fourier coefficient in any non-linear symmetric Boolean function. Specifically, we prove that for every non-linear and symmetric f: {0, 1} ^k → {0, 1} there exists a set; \(\not 0 \ne S \subset [k]\) such that ¦S¦ = O(Γ(k)+√k, and \(\hat f(S) \ne 0\) where Γ(m)≤m ^0.525 is the largest gap between consecutive prime numbers in {1,..., m}. As an application we obtain a new analysis of the PAC learning algorithm for symmetric juntas, under the uniform distribution, of Mossel et al. [10]. Our bound on the degree is a significant improvement over the previous result of Kolountzakis et al. [8] who proved that ¦S¦=O(k=log k). We also show a connection between lower-bounding the degree of non-constant functions that take values in {0,1,2} and the question that we study here.     

Некоторые точные инт егральные оценки про изводных рациональных и алгеб раических функций. Пр иложения

Exact estimates are obtained for integrals of absolute values of derivatives and gradients, for integral moduli of continuity and for major variations of piecewise algebraic functions (in particular, for polynomials, rational functions, splines, etc.). These results are applied to the problems of approximation theory and to the estimates of Laurent and Fourier coefficients. Typical results:

1. IfE is a measurable subset of the circle or of a line in thez-plane andR(z) is a rational function of degree ≦n, ¦R(z)¦≦ (z∈E), then ∝_E ¦R′(z)¦dz¦≦ 2πn; the latter estimate is exact forn=0, 1, ... and everyE with positive measure;
2. Iff(x ₁,x ₂, ...,x _m) is a real valued piecewise algebraic function of order (n, k) on the unit ballD?R ^m (in particular, a real valued rational function of order ≦n), and ¦f¦≦1 onD, then ∝_D¦gradf¦dx≦2π ^m/2n/Π(m/2); herem≧1, n≧0, 1≦k<∞;
3. LetE=Π={z∶¦z¦=1}, and letc _m(R) be the mth Laurent coefficient ofR onΠ,C _m(n)=sup{¦cm(R)¦}, where sup is taken over allR from 1), then 1/7 min {n/¦m¦, 1} ≦C _m(n) ≦ min {n/¦m¦, 1}.

     

Everywhere divergent Φ-means of Fourier series

For a function ? ∈, L ¹( $\mathbb{T}$ ), we investigate the sequence (C, 1) of mean values Φ(¦S _k (x, ?) ? ?(x)¦), where Φ(t): [0, +∞) → [0,+∞), Φ(0) = 0, is a continuous increasing function. We prove that if Φ increases faster than exponentially, then these means can diverge everywhere. Divergence almost everywhere of such means was established earlier.     

Nonzero decomposable symmetrized tensors

Suppose k₁ ? ? ? k_t ? 1, m₁ ? ?? m_r ? 1, k₁+ ? +k_t = m₁+ ? +m_r = m. Let λ=(k₁,…,k_t) be a character of the symmetric group S_m. The restriction of λ to S_m1X…XS_mr contains the principal character as a component if and only if λ majorizes (m₁,…,m_r). This result is used to characterize the index set of the nonzero decomposable symmetrized tensors, corresponding to S_m and λ, which are induced from a basis of the underlying vector space.     

Some dimensional results for homogeneous Moran sets

Let ?(¦n _k ¦k?1,¦c _k ¦k?1) be the collection of homogeneous Moran sets determined by ¦n _k ¦k?1 and ¦c _k ¦k?1, where ¦n _k ¦k?1 is a sequence of positive integers and ¦c _k ¦k?1 a sequence of positive numbers. Then the maximal and minimal values of Hausdorff dimensions for elements in ? are determined. The result is proved that for any values between the maximal and minimal values, there exists an element in ?(¦n _k ¦k?1,¦c _k¦k?1) such that its Hausdorff dimension is equal tos. The same results hold for packing dimension. In the meantime, some other properties of homogeneous Moran sets are discussed.     

k-convexn-person games and their cores

For any natural numbersk andn, the subclass ofk-convexn-person games is introduced. In casek=n, the subclass consists of the convexn-person games. Ak-convexn-person game is characterized in several ways in terms of the core and certain marginal worth vectors. The marginal worth vectors of a game are described in terms of an upper bound for the core and the corresponding gap function. It is shown that thek-convexity of ann-person gamev is equivalent to

1. all marginal worth vectors ofv belong to the core ofv; or
2. the core ofv is the convex hull of the set consisting of all marginal worth vectors ofv; or
3. the extreme points of the core ofv are exactly the marginal worth vectors ofv.

Examples ofk-convexn-person games are also treated.     

Upper bounds for the autocorrelation coefficients of the Rudin-Shapiro polynomials

Givena _m to be them ^th correlation coefficient of the Rudin-Shapiro polynomials of degrees 2 ⁿ ? 1, ¦a _m¦ ≤ C(2 ⁿ )^3/4 and there existsk ≠ 0 such that ¦a _k¦ >D(2 ⁿ )^0.73 (C andD are universal constants). Here we show that the 0.73 is optimal in the upper bound case.     

On Isomorphisms of Finite Cayley Graphs

A Cayley graph Cay(G,S) of a groupGis called a CI-graph if wheneverTis another subset ofGfor which Cay(G,S) Cay(G,T), there exists an automorphism σ ofGsuch thatS^σ = T. For a positive integerm, the groupGis said to have them-CI property if all Cayley graphs ofGof valencymare CI-graphs; further, ifGhas thek-CI property for allk ≤ m, thenGis called anm-CI-group, and a |G|-CI-groupGis called a CI-group. In this paper, we prove that Ais not a 5-CI-group, that SL(2,5) is not a 6-CI-group, and that all finite 6-CI-groups are soluble. Then we show that a nonabelian simple group has the 4-CI property if and only if it is A₅, and that no nonabelian simple group has the 5-CI property. Also we give nine new examples of CI-groups of small order, which were found to be CI-groups with the assistance of a computer.     

The influence of large coalitions

This paper contains two results on influence in collective decision games. The first part deals with general perfect information coin-flipping games as defined in [3].Baton passing (see [8]), ann-player game from this class is shown to have the following property: IfS is a coalition of size at most \(\frac{n}{{3\log n}}\) , then the influence ofS on the game is only \(O\left( {\frac{{\left| S \right|}}{n}} \right)\) . This complements a result from [3] that for everyk there is a coalition of sizek with influence Ω(k/n). Thus the best possible bounds on influences of coalitions of size up to this threshold are known, and there need not be coalitions up to this size whose influence asymptotically exceeds their fraction of the population. This result may be expected to play a role in resolving the most outstanding problem in this area: Does everyn-player perfect information coin flipping game have a coalition ofo(n) players with influence 1?o(1)? (Recently Alon and Naor [1] gave a negative answer to this question.) In a recent paper Kahn, Kalai and Linial [7] showed that for everyn-variable boolean function of expectation bounded away from zero and one, there is a set of \(\frac{{n\omega (n)}}{{\log n}}\) variables whose influence is 1?o(1), wherew(n) is any function tending to infinity withn. They raised the analogous question where 1?o(1) is replaced by any positive constant and speculated that a constant influence may be always achievable by significantly smaller sets of variables. This problem is almost completely solved in the second part of this article where we establish the existence of boolean functions where only sets of at least \(\Omega \left( {\frac{n}{{\log ^2 n}}} \right)\) variables can have influence bounded away from zero.     

On stronger conjectures that imply the Erd?s-Moser conjecture

The Erd?s-Moser conjecture states that the Diophantine equation Sk(m)=mk, where Sk(m)=k¹+k²+?+k(m−1), has no solution for positive integers k and m with k?2. We show that stronger conjectures about consecutive values of the function Sk, that seem to be more naturally, imply the Erd?s-Moser conjecture.     

Quota games with a continuum of players

In this paper the notion ofm-quota game with a continuum of players is defined and the theory of bargaining sets is generalized to this new class of games. We discuss only the bargaining setM ₀ and our results are similar to those obtained in the finite case. Our main result is that for maximal coalition structures the stable payoff functions are exactly those in which almost every non-weak player receives no more than his quota and the weak players receive zero.     

Ramanujan graphs

A large family of explicitk-regular Cayley graphsX is presented. These graphs satisfy a number of extremal combinatorial properties.

1. For eigenvaluesλ ofX eitherλ=±k or ¦λ¦≦2 √k?1. This property is optimal and leads to the best known explicit expander graphs.
2. The girth ofX is asymptotically ≧4/3 log _k?1 ¦X¦ which gives larger girth than was previously known by explicit or non-explicit constructions.

     

On then-cutset property

For a partially ordered setP and an elementx ofP, a subsetS ofP is called a cutset forx inP if every element ofS is noncomparable tox and every maximal chain ofP meets {x}∪S. We letc(P) denote the smallest integerk such that every elementx ofP has a cutsetS with ‖S‖?k: Ifc(P)?n we say thatP has then-cutset property. Our results bear on the following question: givenP, what is the smallestn such thatP can be embedded in a partially ordered set having then-cutset property? As usual, 2 ⁿ denotes the Boolean lattice of all subsets of ann-element set, andB _n denotes the set of atoms and co-atoms of 2 ⁿ . We establish the following results: (i) a characterization, by means of forbidden configurations, of whichP can be embedded in a partially ordered set having the 1-cutset property; (ii) ifP contains a copy of 2 ⁿ , thenc(P)?2^[n/2]?1; (iii) for everyn>3 there is a partially ordered setP containing 2 ⁿ such thatc(P)<c(2 ⁿ ); (iv) for every positive integern there is a positive integerN such that, ifB _m is contained in a partially ordered set having then-cutset property, thenm?N.     

Convexity and a certain propertyP m

The propertyP _m (directly analogous to Valentine’s propertyP ₃) is used to prove several curious results concerning subsets of a topological linear space, among them the following: (a) If a closed setS has propertyP _m and containsk points of local nonconvexity no distinct pair of which can see each other viaS, thenS is the union ofm − k − 1 or fewer starshaped sets. (b) Any closed connected set with propertyP _m is polygonally connected. (c) A closed connected setS with propertyP _m is anL _m−1 set (each pair of points may be joined by a polygonal arc ofm − 1 of fewer sides inS). (d) A finite-dimensional set with propertyP _m is anL _{2m − 3} set. A new proof of Tietze’s theorem on locally convex sets is given, and various examples refute certain plausible conjectures.     

Pairs of alternating forms and products of two skew-symmetric matrices

Let k be a field, and let S,T,S₁,T₁ be skew-symmetric matrices over k with S,S₁ both nonsingular (if k has characteristic 2, a skew-symmetric matrix is a symmetric one with zero diagonal). It is shown that there exists a nonsingular matrix P over k with P'SP = S₁, P'TP = T₁ (where P' denotes the transpose of P) if and only if S^-1T and S^-1₁T₁ are similar. It is also shown that a 2m×2m matrix over k can be factored as ST, with S,T skew-symmetric and S nonsingular, if and only if A is similar to a matrix direct sum B⊕B where B is an m×m matrix over k. This is equivalent to saying that all elementary divisors of A occur with even multiplicity. An extension of this result giving necessary and sufficient conditions for a square matrix to be so expressible, without assuming that either S or T is nonsingular, is included.