多主从博弈的轻微利他平衡点问题

基于经典非合作博弈的Nash平衡点问题,结合利他主义的思想,研究了多主从博弈的轻微利他平衡点问题.通过利用Fan-Glicksberg不动点定理,对两个领导者的多主从博弈在轻微利他情况下的平衡点存在性进行了讨论和研究.     

n人非合作博弈的轻微利他平衡点

对一类不连续的博弈证明了轻微利他平衡点存在且对这些不连续博弈,如果本质平衡点存在,则他们必是轻微利他平衡点,进而证明了大多数博弈(在Baire分类意义上)是轻微利他的,即它的所有平衡点都是轻微利他的.     

主从博弈的轻微利他平衡点

针对一个领导者的主从博弈问题,研究轻微利他平衡点的存在性问题.首先,基于非合作博弈Nash均衡的概念,给出了主从博弈轻微利他Nash均衡的定义;然后,应用非线性问题稳定性理论,证明了平衡点的存在性.     

轻微利他弱Pareto-Nash均衡

2008年,Marco和Morgan在正规型博弈中引入轻微利他均衡和友好均衡的概念.利用轻微利他的思想,研究多目标博弈.证明轻微利他弱Pareto-Nash均衡的存在性定理,进一步地讨论轻微利他弱Pareto-Nash均衡和本质均衡的关系.     

一类具有Watt型功能性反应的捕食系统的极限环与稳定性

研究一类具有Watt型功能性反应的捕食模型.讨论了该系统正平衡点的存在性以及非负平衡点的性态,应用Poincare-Bendixson定理和张芷芬定理,证明了极限环的存在性和唯一性,并采用构造Dulac函数的方法,获得了正平衡点全局渐近稳定性的一个充分条件.     

一类非连续病菌与免疫系统竞争模型的动力学分析

建立一类右端不连续的病菌与免疫系统竞争模型,讨论模型滑模的存在性,真假平衡点以及伪平衡点的存在性和全局稳定性及局部滑动边界点分歧等动力学性质.研究结果表明病菌与免疫细胞最终在伪平衡点或真平衡点处共存.最后,运用数学软件进行数值模拟,验证了所得的理论结果.     

食饵种群受毒素影响的三种群模型的最优收获问题

讨论了在毒素存在的情况下收获食饵的食饵—捕食模型的平衡点稳定性,生物经济平衡点的存在性和最优收获问题,利用Pontryagin极大值原理确定了最优收获策略.     

一类具有Allee效应的捕食系统的稳定性分析及模拟

建立了食饵具有Allee效应的捕食模型,讨论了系统的有界性和平衡点的存在性.并证明了平衡点的局部渐近稳定性,进而通过构造Lyapunov函数分析了正平衡点的全局渐近稳定性,利用数值模拟讨论了Allee效应对系统的影响:Allee效应是系统的不稳定因素.     

二阶Hopfield神经网络周期解的存在性

本文讨论了一类带有时滞的二阶Hopfield神经网络周期解的存在性问题。首先利用Brouwer不动点定理证明了平衡点的存在性,通过平衡点和拉格朗日中值定理,将高阶神经网络模型转换为一阶模型,然后利用重合度理论给出了周期解存在的充分条件。     

一类具免疫控制的SIR传染病模型的稳定性

利用微分方程理论研究了一类具有常数输入和免疫控制的数学模型,讨论了模型无病平衡点和地方病平衡点的存在性以及局部稳定性.构造Dulac函数的方法,得到了无病平衡点和地方病平衡点的全局稳定性充分条件,同时利用Matlab软件进行了数值模拟.     

Slightly Altruistic Equilibria

We introduce a refinement concept for Nash equilibria (slightly altruistic equilibrium) defined by a limit process and which captures the idea of reciprocal altruism as presented in Binmore (Proceedings of the XV Italian Meeting on Game Theory and Applications, [2003]). Existence is guaranteed for every finite game and for a large class of games with a continuum of strategies. Results and examples emphasize the (lack of) connections with classical refinement concepts. Finally, it is shown that, under a pseudomonotonicity assumption on a particular operator associated to the game, it is possible, by selecting slightly altruistic equilibria, to eliminate those equilibria in which a player can switch to a strategy that is better for the others without leaving the set of equilibria. Part of the results in this paper have been presented at: First Spain, Italy, Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory, Maastricht, 2005; Fifth International ISDG Workshop, Segovia, 2005; GATE, Université Lumière Lyon 2, 2005; XXX AMASES Workshop, Trieste 2006; CSEF, Università di Salerno, 2006.     

利他扰动与Nash均衡点集的利他稳定性

引入了一个新的利他扰动.定义了KyFan点集的利他本质集,进一步证明在此扰动下,KyFan点集的利他本质连通区的存在性.证明了满足一定条件的n人非合作博弈中,Nash均衡点集至少存在一个利他本质连通区,而且Nash均衡点集的每一个本质集必是利他稳定集,Nash均衡点集的本质连通区也是利他本质集连通区.     

A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium

We introduce a minimal notion of altruism and use it to refine Nash equilibria in normal form games. We provide three independent existence proofs, relate minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium to other equilibrium concepts, conduct an in-depth sensitivity analysis, and provide examples where minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium leads to improved predictions.     

A mathematical analysis for a model arising from public goods games

We study the effects of altruistic behaviors in a public goods game model which describes the competition between the farmers and the exploiters. Corresponding to different parametric regions, we analyze in detail the stability of the equilibrium states and obtain attraction regions for stable equilibria. Then using the upper–lower solution method and monotone iterations, we further show that for a family of wave speeds, there exist traveling wave solutions connecting one of the unstable states to the stable state. This answers a conjecture made by Wakano in [J.Y. Wakano, A mathematical analysis on public goods games in the continuous space, Math. Biosci. 201 (2006) 72–89]. The results indicate that when the penalty for the altruistic behavior is small, the growth rate of the population determines its survival or extinction states in the long run. Furthermore, if the two populations have the same total growth rate, altruism in the competition leads to a wide range of co-existent states. Numerical simulations are also presented to illustrate the theoretical results.     

Equilibrium selection and altruistic behavior in noncooperative social networks

Given their importance in determining the outcome of many economic interactions, different models have been proposed to determine how social networks form and which structures are stable. In Bala and Goyal (Econometrica 68, 1181–1229, 2000), the one-sided link formation model has been considered, which is based on a noncooperative game of network formation. They found that the empty networks, the wheel in the one-way flow of benefits case and the center-sponsored star in the two-way flow case play a fundamental role since they are strict Nash equilibria of the corresponding games for a certain class of payoff functions. In this paper, we first prove that all these network structures are in weakly dominated strategies whenever there are no strict Nash equilibria. Then, we exhibit a more accurate selection device between these network architectures by considering “altruistic behavior” refinements. Such refinements that we investigate here in the framework of finite strategy sets games have been introduced by the authors in previous papers.     

基于利他偏好的电商供应链最优决策与契约协调

构建了由一个占主导地位的电商平台和一个处于跟随地位的制造商组成的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,研究了电商平台有无利他偏好时电商供应链的最优决策和契约协调问题,并通过数值算例验证了本文的主要结论.研究表明:电商平台的利他偏好行为能够促使自身服务水平提高、正向影响制造商的最优销售价格并削弱自身利润.但电商平台的让利行为能够提高制造商的利润水平、缓和供应链冲突并改善供应链整体绩效."销售佣金比例+服务成本共担"契约能够完美的协调电商供应链,使双方最优利润获得帕累托改进,从而保证电商平台有足够的激励执行利他偏好行为.另外,进一步分析发现电商平台的利他偏好正向影响制造商支付给电商平台的固定技术服务费、制造商占有的电商供应链利润份额和服务成本分担比例,负向影响自身的销售佣金比例.     

Local and global stability for Lotka-Volterra systems with distributed delays and instantaneous negative feedbacks

This paper addresses the local and global stability of n-dimensional Lotka-Volterra systems with distributed delays and instantaneous negative feedbacks. Necessary and sufficient conditions for local stability independent of the choice of the delay functions are given, by imposing a weak nondelayed diagonal dominance which cancels the delayed competition effect. The global asymptotic stability of positive equilibria is established under conditions slightly stronger than the ones required for the linear stability. For the case of monotone interactions, however, sharper conditions are presented. This paper generalizes known results for discrete delays to systems with distributed delays. Several applications illustrate the results.     

Dynamical analysis of a Lotka-Volterra learning-process model

A Lotka-Volterra learning-process model was proposed by Monteiro and Notargiacomo in [{\it Commum. Nonlinear Sci. Numer. Simulat.} {\bf 47}(2017), 416-420] to approach learning process as an interplay between understanding and doubt. They studied the stability of the boundary equilibria and gave some numerical simulations but no further discussion for bifurcations. In this paper, we study the qualitative properties of the interior equilibria and a singular line segment completely. Moreover, we discuss their bifurcations such as transcritical, pitchfork, Hopf bifurcation on isolated equilibria and transcritical bifurcation without parameters on non-isolated equilibria. Finally, we also demonstrate these analytical theory by numerical simulations.