Capacity switching options under rivalry and uncertainty

Deregulated infrastructure industries exhibit stiff competition for market share. Firms may be able to limit the effects of competition by launching new projects in stages. Using a two-stage real options model, we explore the value of such flexibility. We first demonstrate that the value of investing in a sequential manner for a monopolist is positive but decreases with uncertainty. Next, we find that a typical duopoly firm’s value relative to a monopolist’s decreases with uncertainty as long as the loss in market share is high. Intriguingly, this result is reversed for a low loss in market share. We finally show that this loss in value is reduced if a firm invests in a sequential manner and specify the conditions under which sequential capacity expansion is more valuable for a duopolist firm than for a monopolist.     

Global facility network design in the presence of competition

We study the facility network design problem for a global firm that is a monopolist seller in its domestic market but faces local competition in its foreign market. The global firm produces in the face of demand and exchange rate uncertainty but can postpone localization and distribution of the output until after uncertainties are resolved. The competitor in the foreign market, however, enjoys the flexibility of postponing all production activities until after uncertainties are resolved. The two firms engage in an ex-post Cournot competition in the foreign market. We consider three potential network configurations for the global firm. Under a linear demand function, we provide the necessary and sufficient condition that one of the three networks is the global firm’s optimal choice, and explore how the presence of foreign competition affects the sensitivity of the global firm’s design to various cost parameters and market uncertainties.     

Optimal production strategy under demand fluctuations: Technology versus capacity

This paper provides a comparative analysis of five possible production strategies for two kinds of flexibility investment, namely flexible technology and flexible capacity, under demand fluctuations. Each strategy is underpinned by a set of operations decisions on technology level, capacity amount, production quantity, and pricing. By evaluating each strategy, we show how market uncertainty, production cost structure, operations timing, and investment costing environment affect a firm’s strategic decisions. The results show that there is no sequential effect of the two flexibility investments. We also illustrate the different ways in which flexible technology and flexible capacity affect a firm’s profit under demand fluctuations. The results reveal that compared to no flexibility investment, flexible technology investment earns the same or a higher profit for a firm, whereas flexible capacity investment can be beneficial or harmful to a firm’s profit. Moreover, we prove that higher flexibility does not guarantee more profit. Depending on the situation, the optimal strategy can be any one of the five possible strategies. We also provide the optimality conditions for each strategy.     

Optimizing referral reward programs under impression management considerations

We examine referral reward programs (RRP) that are intended for a service firm to encourage its current customers (inductors) to entice their friends (inductees) to purchase the firm’s service. By considering the interplay among the firm, the inductor, and the inductee, we solve a “nested” Stackelberg game so as to determine the optimal RRP in equilibrium. We determine the conditions under which it is optimal for the firm to reward the inductor only, reward the inductee only, or reward both. Also, our results suggest that RRP dominates direct marketing when the firm’s current market penetration or the inductor’s referral effectiveness is sufficiently high. We then extend our model to incorporate certain key impression management factors: the inductor’s intrinsic reward of making a positive impression by being seen as helping a friend, the inductor’s concerns about creating a negative impression when making an incentivized referral, and the inductee’s impression of the inductor’s credibility when an incentive is involved. In the presence of these impression management factors, we show that the firm should reward the inductee more and the inductor less. Under certain conditions, it is optimal for the firm to reward neither the inductor nor the inductee so that the optimal RRP relies purely on unincentivized word of mouth.     

Dynamic pricing with uncertain production cost: An alternating-move approach

This article studies a two-firm dynamic pricing model with random production costs. The firms produce the same perishable products over an infinite time horizon when production (or operation) costs are random. In each period, each firm determines its price and production levels based on its current production cost and its opponent’s previous price level. We use an alternating-move game to model this problem and show that there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in production and pricing decisions. We provide a closed-form solution for the firm’s pricing policy. Finally, we study the game in the case of incomplete information, when both or one of the firms do not have access to the current prices charged by their opponents.     

Capacity decisions for high-tech products with obsolescence

Modern high-tech products experience rapid obsolescence. Capacity investments must be recouped during the brief product lifecycle, during which prices fall continuously. We employ a multiplicative demand model that incorporates price declines due to both market heterogeneity and product obsolescence, and study a monopolistic firm’s capacity decision. We investigate profit concavity, and characterize the structure of the optimal capacity solution. Moreover, for products with negligible variable costs, we identify two distinct strategies for capacity choice demarcated by an obsolescence rate threshold that relates both to market factors and capacity costs. Finally, we empirically test the demand model by analyzing shipping and pricing data from the PC microprocessor market.     

Supplier switching decisions

In order to maximize profit, a buying firm should continuously search for and access sources which offer more favorable prices. While the literature is replete with works on the formation and development of buyer–supplier relationships, there is surprisingly only scarce research on the termination of such relationships and supplier switching. Using the concept of switching costs in a principal-agent framework, we at first analyze whether a firm switches the entire or a partial quantity to an alternative supplier when there is either symmetric or asymmetric information about the alternative supplier’s cost structure. Information asymmetry results in inert supplier switching decisions. Subsequently, we extend our model and take competitive reactions of the incumbent supplier and economies of scale effects into consideration. We find conditions under which ‘no’, ‘partial’ and ‘complete’ switching occurs, which depend on the buying firm’s beliefs about the alternative supplier’s unit costs, switching costs, the price offered by the incumbent supplier, and refinements of the price offered by the incumbent supplier due to competitive reactions and economies of scale. Broader implications for supplier relationship management and sourcing strategy decisions are also provided.     

Transport economies of scale and firm location

This paper studies the impact of economies of scale in transportation on a firm’s location decision. We relate the location problem to weighted Fermat problems and ramified optimal transportation problems and analyze how transport technologies affect the firm’s transportation and location choices. It is found that in general when the level of transport economies of scale is high, the firm locates its factory in the interior of the Weber triangle with a branching transport structure. Two examples are constructed to illustrate how interactions between transport technology and production technology would affect the firm’s input purchase and factory location.     

Analyzing online B2B exchange markets: Asymmetric cost and incomplete information

This research applies the discriminating auction to analyze the online B2B exchange market in which a single buyer requests multiple items and several suppliers having equal capacity and asymmetric cost submit bids to compete for buyer demand. In the present model, we examine the impact of asymmetric cost and incomplete information on the participants in the market. Given the complete cost information, each supplier randomizes its price and the lower bound of the price range is determined by the highest marginal cost. In addition, the supplier with a lower marginal cost has a larger considered pricing space but ultimately has a smaller equilibrium one than others with higher marginal costs. When each supplier’s marginal cost is private information, the lowest possible price is determined by the number of suppliers and the buyer’s reservation price. Comparing these two market settings, we find whether IT is beneficial to buyers or suppliers depends on the scale of the bid process and the highest marginal cost. When the number of suppliers and the difference between the highest marginal cost and the buyer’s reservation price are sufficiently large, each supplier can gain a higher profit if the marginal costs are private information. On the contrary, when the highest marginal cost approaches the buyer’s reservation price, complete cost information benefits the suppliers.     

Adverse selection or advantageous selection? Risk and underwriting in China’s health-insurance market

Using data from China’s individual health-insurance market, we study the problem of information asymmetry. Our preliminary results appear to contradict standard-model predictions, showing that higher-risk buyers are more likely to purchase “additional” insurance than lower-risk buyers, but that they also tend to purchase lower limits of “basic” insurance coverage. We therefore develop a theoretical model to capture the effects of buyers’ wealth levels and loss amounts, and show empirically that these effects, in the context of asymmetric information, lead to the coexistence of adverse selection and advantageous selection in China’s health-insurance market.     

Optimal ordering and pricing strategies in the presence of a B2B spot market

In the current paper, we examine the effect of a B2B spot market on the strategic behavior and the performance of a reseller who continues to use the traditional channel while participating in a B2B spot market. We analyze the case in which a risk-neutral reseller faces an additive or multiplicative demand function and identify sufficient conditions under which the optimal order quantity and retail price exist and are unique. We then analytically examine the case in which a risk-averse reseller participates in a fully liquid spot market. We also study numerically how varying liquidity, spot price volatility, demand variability, and correlation coefficient affect a firm’s strategies and performance. We find that demand variability significantly affects both pricing and ordering strategies, whereas the spot price volatility has less influence on pricing decisions. Our results also show that for a risk-averse reseller to charge a lower retail price when the spot market liquidity increases is desirable. We further show that a B2B spot market cannot always improve a reseller’s utility. These findings shed light on how resellers can adjust their procurement and pricing strategies to align with the new business environment created by the emergence of B2B spot markets, as well as have obvious implications for the development of a B2B spot market.     

Pricing under quality of service uncertainty: Market segmentation via statistical QoS guarantees

This article examines how performance-contingent pricing schemes with long-term statistical performance guarantees can be applied to many IT services. We study two forms of performance-contingent pricing, with rebate proportional to failure rate and fixed rebate for below-threshold performance. We show that threshold-performance contingency pricing can increase both profits and fairness (customers who receive higher benefits pay higher effective price) relative to standard pricing. But an even better solution is to offer a menu of performance guarantees: this can increase the firm’s profit and segment the market. Only service providers whose performance level is sufficiently better than the industry standard can benefit from this pricing mechanism.     

Dynamic investment strategies with demand-side and cost-side risks

Investments in cost reductions are critical for the long run success of companies that operate in dynamic and stochastic market environments. This paper studies optimal investment in cost reductions as a real option under the assumption that a single firm faces two different sources of risk, stochastic demand and input prices. We derive optimal investment strategies for a monopoly as well as a firm in a perfectly competitive market and show that in case of high marginal costs, cost reductions take place earlier in competitive than in monopoly markets. While the existence of an option to invest in cost reductions increases firm value it also increases a firm’s systematic risk. Risk can be smaller in a monopolistic than in a competitive industry.     

When should service firms provide free experience service?

By providing a free experience service, a service firm can attract more uninformed customers. However, it could reversely effect the delay-sensitive, informed customers’ decision. In this paper, we study a priority queueing system with free experience services. We study the customer behavior in equilibrium after we derive the expected customer waiting time. We then construct the service firm’s revenue function and obtain an optimal strategy for the service firm. Our results suggest that when the market size of informed customers is relatively small, the firm should consider providing free experience services for uninformed customers. Conversely, if the demand rate of potential informed customers is quite high, the firm should ignore uninformed customers.     

Patent-investment games under asymmetric information

This paper analyzes preemptive patenting in a two-stage real options game where an incumbent firm competes with a potential entrant firm for the patent of a substitute product in a product market with profit flow uncertainty. The incumbent suffers loss of monopoly in the product market if the entrant acquires the patent of a substitute product and later commercializes the product. Our patent-investment game model assumes that the entrant has complete information on the incumbent’s commercialization cost while the incumbent only knows the distribution of the entrant’s cost. We investigate the impact of information asymmetry on the preemption strategies adopted by the two competing firms on patenting the substitute product by comparing the optimal preemption strategies and the real option value functions of the two competing firms under complete information and information asymmetry. Our analysis reveals that the informationally disadvantaged incumbent always suffers from loss in its real option value of investment since it tends to act more aggressively in competing for the patent. On the other hand, the real option value of investment of the informationally advantaged entrant may be undermined or enhanced. The incumbent’s aggressive response under information asymmetry may lead to reversal of winner in the patent race. We also examine how information asymmetry may affect the occurrence of sleeping patent and the corresponding expected duration between the two stages of patenting and product commercialization.     

Revisiting corporate growth options in the presence of state-dependent cashflow risk

Given a non-trivial market price of risk, we study the impact of state-dependent cashflow risk on the optimal investment policy and on the ensuing value of an unlevered firm that holds the option of scaling up cashflows from its assets in place upon incurring an irreversible cost. The firm’s investment decision and value are studied as a function of the market price of risk and of the degree of state dependence in cashflow risk.     

Optimal capacity for substitutable products under operational postponement

We consider a monopolist producing two substitutable products with one flexible (shared) capacity. The demand of each product is a linear function of the prices of both products, and is subject to an additive shock. We study the impact of two key drivers, namely the degree of substitution between the products and the level of operational postponement, on the optimal capacity and the resulting expected profit. We show that the relationship between the optimal capacity and the degree of product substitution is not impacted by the different postponement strategies the firm can utilize or by the different settings (forced clearance versus holdback) considered in the previous literature. On the other hand, how capacity is affected by postponement critically depends on how closely substitutable the products are. In particular, we show that the well-known result that operational postponement and capacity are strategic complements in a single-product setting (Van Mieghem and Dada, 1999) no longer holds in our setting, because the two substitutable products are now linked through consumer-driven substitution, which the firm can influence through pricing. In particular, capacity and operational postponement (in the form of quantity postponement) can be either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and this depends on both the firm’s cost structure and the degree of substitution between the products. We also study the impact of forced clearance on the firm’s expected profit and find that clearance deteriorates the firm’s earnings more when the products it offers are highly differentiated.     

Finite-time dividend-ruin models

We consider the finite-time horizon dividend-ruin model where the firm pays out dividends to its shareholders according to a dividend-barrier strategy and becomes ruined when the firm’s asset value falls below the default threshold. The asset value process is modeled as a restricted Geometric Brownian process with an upper reflecting (dividend) barrier and a lower absorbing (ruin) barrier. Analytical solutions to the value function of the restricted asset value process are provided. We also solve for the survival probability and the expected present value of future dividend payouts over a given time horizon. The sensitivities of the firm asset value and dividend payouts to the dividend barrier, volatility of the firm asset value and firm’s credit quality are also examined.     

Debt and entrenchment: Evidence from Thailand and Indonesia

This paper examines the relation between debt and corporate governance in emerging market economies. We use firm-level panel data of listed companies from Thailand and Indonesia to analyze the firm’s corporate financing behaviors in connection with its corporate governance arrangements. Our results show that the debt structure is linked to the corporate governance. We find that weaker corporate governance firms, in particular measured by the entrenchment effects, tend to have a higher debt level. The evidence is relatively stronger during the crisis period. Our results also shed lights on the importance of the country-specific institutional settings that would affect the empirical results.     

Non-cooperative joint replenishment under asymmetric information

We consider jointly replenishing n ex-ante identical firms that operate under an EOQ like setting using a non-cooperative game under asymmetric information. In this game, each firm, upon being privately informed about its demand rate (or inventory cost rate), submits a private contribution to an intermediary that specifies how much it is willing to pay for its replenishment per unit of time and the intermediary determines the maximum feasible frequency for the joint orders that would finance the fixed replenishment cost. We show that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium in this game. We also show that the contributions are monotone increasing in each firm’s type. We finally conduct a numerical study to compare the equilibrium to solutions obtained under independent and cooperative ordering, and under full information. The results show that while information asymmetry eliminates free-riding in the contributions game, the resulting aggregate contributions are not as high as under full information, leading to higher aggregate costs.