Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game

We examine the coalition-proof equilibria of a participation game in the provision of a (pure) public good. We study which Nash equilibria are achieved through cooperation, and we investigate coalition-proof equilibria under strict and weak domination. We show that under some incentive condition, (i) a profile of strategies is a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium that is not strictly Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium and (ii) every strict Nash equilibrium for non-participants is a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination.     

Global dynamics in a multi-group epidemic model for disease with latency spreading and nonlinear transmission rate

In this paper, we investigate a class of multi-group epidemic models with general exposed distribution and nonlinear incidence rate. Under biologically motivated assumptions, we show that the global dynamics are completely determined by the basic production number $R_0$. The disease-free equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable if $R_0\leq1$, and there exists a unique endemic equilibrium which is globally asymptotically stable if $R_0>1$. The proofs of the main results exploit the persistence theory in dynamical system and a graph-theoretical approach to the method of Lyapunov functionals. A simpler case that assumes an identical natural death rate for all groups and a gamma distribution for exposed distribution is also considered. In addition, two numerical examples are showed to illustrate the results.     

A Strong Anti-Folk Theorem

We study the properties of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, and semi-perfect equilibria. We show that: (1) If a strategy satisfies these properties then players play a Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every period; (2) The set of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, semi-perfect equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game equals the set of Nash equilibria payoffs in the stage game; and (3) A strategy vector satisfies these properties in a Pareto optimal way if and only if players play some Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every stage. Our second main result is a strong anti-Folk Theorem, since, in contrast to what is described by the Folk Theorem, the set of equilibrium payoffs does not expand when the game is repeated.This paper is a revised version of Chapter 3 of my Ph.D. thesis, which has circulated under the title “An Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions”.     

Global dynamics of a Vector‐Borne disease model with two delays and nonlinear transmission rate

In this paper, we investigate a Vector‐Borne disease model with nonlinear incidence rate and 2 delays: One is the incubation period in the vectors and the other is the incubation period in the host. Under the biologically motivated assumptions, we show that the global dynamics are completely determined by the basic reproduction number R₀. The disease‐free equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable if R₀≤1; when R₀>1, the system is uniformly persistent, and there exists a unique endemic equilibrium that is globally asymptotically. Numerical simulations are conducted to illustrate the theoretical results.     

Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games

If a finite strategic game is strictly dominance solvable, then every simultaneous best response adjustment path, as well as every non-discriminatory individual best response improvement path, ends at a Nash equilibrium after a finite number of steps. If a game is weakly dominance solvable, then every strategy profile can be connected to a Nash equilibrium with a simultaneous best response path and with an individual best response path (if there are more than two players, switches from one best response to another may be needed). Both statements remain valid if dominance solvability in the usual sense is replaced with “BR-dominance solvability”, where a strategy can be eliminated if it is not among the best responses to anything, or if it is not indispensable for providing the best responses to all contingencies. For a two person game, some implications in the opposite direction are obtained.     

Correlated equilibrium payoffs and public signalling in absorbing games

An absorbing game is a repeated game where some action combinations are absorbing, in the sense that whenever they are played, there is a positive probability that the game terminates, and the players receive some terminal payoff at every future stage.  We prove that every multi-player absorbing game admits a correlated equilibrium payoff. In other words, for every ε>0 there exists a probability distribution p _ε over the space of pure strategy profiles that satisfies the following. With probability at least 1−ε, if a pure strategy profile is chosen according to p _ε and each player is informed of his pure strategy, no player can profit more than ε in any sufficiently long game by deviating from the recommended strategy. Received: April 2001/Revised: June 4, 2002     

Global stability of multi-group epidemic models with distributed delays

We investigate a class of multi-group epidemic models with distributed delays. We establish that the global dynamics are completely determined by the basic reproduction number R₀. More specifically, we prove that, if R₀?1, then the disease-free equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable; if R₀>1, then there exists a unique endemic equilibrium and it is globally asymptotically stable. Our proof of global stability of the endemic equilibrium utilizes a graph-theoretical approach to the method of Lyapunov functionals.     

Global dynamics of a viral infection model with a latent period and Beddington-DeAngelis response

In this paper, we study the global dynamics of a viral infection model with a latent period. The model has a nonlinear function which denotes the incidence rate of the virus infection in vivo. The basic reproduction number of the virus is identified and it is shown that the uninfected equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable if the basic reproduction number is equal to or less than unity. Moreover, the virus and infected cells eventually persist and there exists a unique infected equilibrium which is globally asymptotically stable if the basic reproduction number is greater than unity. The basic reproduction number determines the equilibrium that is globally asymptotically stable, even if there is a time delay in the infection.     

Global stability of a SEIR epidemic model with infectious force in latent, infected and immune period

In this paper, we studied the global dynamics of a SEIR epidemic model in which the latent and immune state were infective. The basic reproductive rate, R₀, is derived. If R₀  1, the disease-free equilibrium is globally stable and the disease always dies out. If R₀ > 1, there exists a unique endemic equilibrium which is locally stable. Furthermore, we proved the global stability of the unique endemic equilibrium when ₁ = ₂ = 0 and the disease persists at an endemic equilibrium state if it initially exists.     

Global stability of multi-group SEIR epidemic models with distributed delays and nonlinear transmission

The dynamics of multi-group SEIR epidemic models with distributed and infinite delay and nonlinear transmission are investigated. We derive the basic reproduction number R₀ and establish that the global dynamics are completely determined by the values of R₀: if R₀≤1, then the disease-free equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable; if R₀>1, then there exists a unique endemic equilibrium which is globally asymptotically stable. Our results contain those for single-group SEIR models with distributed and infinite delays. In the proof of global stability of the endemic equilibrium, we exploit a graph-theoretical approach to the method of Lyapunov functionals. The biological significance of the results is also discussed.     

Modeling diseases with latency and nonlinear incidence rates: global dynamics of a multi‐group model

In this paper, we perform global stability analysis of a multi‐group SEIR epidemic model in which we can consider the heterogeneity of host population and the effects of latency and nonlinear incidence rates. For a simpler version that assumes an identical natural death rate for all groups, and with a gamma distribution for the latency, the basic reproduction number is defined by the theory of the next generation operator and proved to be a sharp threshold determining whether or not disease spread. Under certain assumptions, the disease‐free equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable if R₀≤1 and there exists a unique endemic equilibrium which is globally asymptotically stable if R₀>1. The proofs of global stability of equilibria exploit a matrix‐theoretic method using Perron eigenvetor, a graph‐theoretic method based on Kirchhoff's matrix tree theorem and Lyapunov functionals. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Global stability of delay multigroup epidemic models with group mixing and nonlinear incidence rates

In this paper, we present a new delay multigroup SEIR model with group mixing and nonlinear incidence rates and investigate its global stability. We establish that the global dynamics of the models are completely determined by the basic reproduction number R₀. It is shown that, if R₀?1, then the disease free equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable and the disease dies out; if R₀>1, there exists a unique endemic equilibrium that is globally asymptotically stable and thus the disease persists in the population. Finally, a numerical example is also discussed to illustrate the effectiveness of the results.     

Global stability of a virus dynamics model with intracellular delay and CTL immune response

In this paper, the global stability of a virus dynamics model with intracellular delay, Crowley–Martin functional response of the infection rate, and CTL immune response is studied. By constructing suitable Lyapunov functions and using LaSalles invariance principle, the global dynamics is established; it is proved that if the basic reproductive number, R₀, is less than or equal to one, the infection‐free equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable; if R₀ is more than one, and if immune response reproductive number, R⁰, is less than one, the immune‐free equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable, and if R⁰ is more than one, the endemic equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On a game in manufacturing

We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved that a Nash equilibrium is unique if it exists and that a Nash equilibrium exists when the capital costs of the players are zero or when the players are equal in every respect. However, when the capital costs differ, in general a Nash equilibrium exists only when the players' capital costs are high compared to their profit rates.     

Stay-in-a-set games

There exists a Nash equilibrium (ε-Nash equilibrium) for every n-person stochastic game with a finite (countable) state space and finite action sets for the players if the payoff to each player i is one when the process of states remains in a given set of states G _i and is zero otherwise. Received: December 2000     

Global analysis of virus dynamics model with logistic mitosis,cure rate and delay in virus production

In this paper, we study a virus dynamics model with logistic mitosis, cure rate, and intracellular delay. By means of construction of a suitable Lyapunov functionals, obtained by linear combinations of Volterra—type functions, composite quadratic functions and Volterra—type functionals, we provide the global stability for this model. If R₀, the basic reproductive number, satisfies R₀ ≤ 1, then the infection‐free equilibrium state is globally asymptotically stable. Our system is persistent if R₀ > 1. On the other hand, if R₀ > 1, then infection‐free equilibrium becomes unstable and a unique infected equilibrium exists. The local stability analysis is carried out for the infected equilibrium, and it is shown that, if the parameters satisfy a condition, the infected equilibrium can be unstable and a Hopf bifurcation can occur. We also have that if R₀ > 1, then the infected equilibrium state is globally asymptotically stable if a sufficient condition is satisfied. We illustrate our findings with some numerical simulations. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dynamical behaviors of a discrete HIV‐1 virus model with bilinear infective rate

We establish a discrete virus dynamic model by discretizing a continuous HIV‐1 virus model with bilinear infective rate using ‘hybrid’ Euler method. We discuss not only the existence and global stability of the uninfected equilibrium but also the existence and local stability of the infected equilibrium. We prove that there exists a crucial value similar to that of the continuous HIV‐1 virus dynamics, which is called the basic reproductive ratio of the virus. If the basic reproductive ratio of the virus is less than one, the uninfected equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable. If the basic reproductive ratio of the virus is larger than one, the infected equilibrium exists and is locally stable. Moreover, we consider the permanence for such a system by constructing a Lyapunov function v_n. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fictitious play with incomplete learning

In this paper, we consider a case that a game is played repeatedly in an incomplete learning process where each player updates his belief only in the learning periods rather than all the stages. For fictitious play process with incomplete learning, we discuss the absorbability of Nash equilibriums and the consistency of utilities in a finite game and discuss the convergence in a 2×2 game with an identical learning-period set. The main results for incomplete learning models are that, if it is uniformly played, a strict Nash equilibrium is absorbing in a fictitious play process; a fictitious play has the property of utility consistency if it exhibits infrequent switches and players learn frequently enough; a 2×2 game with an identical learning-period set has fictitious play property that any fictitious process for the game converges to equilibrium provided that players learn frequently enough.     

一类具免疫应答和非线性感染函数的时滞HIV-1感染模型的全局稳定性

考虑到HIV-1感染过程中免疫反应和非线性感染函数,建立了一类具有三个分布时滞的HIV-1感染动力学模型.得到了关于病毒感染的基本再生数R0和CTLs免疫反应的基本再生数R1 ＜R0.通过构造Lyapunov泛函证明了系统具有阈值动力学性质,即当R0≤1时,系统存在全局渐近稳定的无感染平衡点;当R1≤1＜R0时,系统出...     

Evolutionary game model for a marketing cooperative with penalty for unfaithfulness

A game-theoretical model for the behaviour in a marketing cooperative is proposed. For the strategy choice an evolutionary dynamics is introduced. Considering a model with penalty for unfaithfulness and Cournot type market situation, it is shown that, if the penalty is effective then this strategy dynamics drives the players towards an attractive solution, a particular type of Nash equilibrium. A model with redistribution of penalty is also studied. For the symmetric case, on the basis of stability analysis of the strategy dynamics, in terms of the model parameters, sufficient conditions are provided for the strategy choice to converge to a strict Nash equilibrium.