<Emphasis Type="Italic">p</Emphasis>-additive games: a class of totally balanced games arising from inventory situations with temporary discounts

We introduce a new class of totally balanced cooperative TU games, namely p-additive games. It is inspired by the class of inventory games that arises from inventory situations with temporary discounts (Toledo Ph.D. thesis, Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche, 2002) and contains the class of inventory cost games (Meca et al. Math. Methods Oper. Res. 57:481–493, 2003). It is shown that every p-additive game and its corresponding subgames have a nonempty core. We also focus on studying the character of concave or convex and monotone p-additive games. In addition, the modified SOC-rule is proposed as a solution for p-additive games. This solution is suitable for p-additive games, since it is a core-allocation which can be reached through a population monotonic allocation scheme. Moreover, two characterizations of the modified SOC-rule are provided. This work was partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science and Generalitat Valenciana (grants MTM2005-09184-C02-02, ACOMP06/040, CSD2006-00032). Authors acknowledge valuable comments made by the Editor and the referee.     

Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games

In this paper we consider finitely repeated games in which players can unilaterally commit to behave in an absentminded way in some stages of the repeated game. We prove that the standard conditions for folk theorems can be substantially relaxed when players are able to make this kind of compromises, both in the Nash and in the subgame perfect case. We also analyze the relation of our model with the repeated games with unilateral commitments studied, for instance, in García-Jurado et al. (Int. Game Theory Rev. 2:129–139, 2000). Authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Educaci ón y Ciencia, FEDER and Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia through projects SEJ2005-07637-C02-02, ECO2008-03484-C02-02, MTM2005-09184-C02-02, MTM2008-06778-C02-01 and 08716/PI/08.     

Values for strategic games in which players cooperate

In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of finite two-player zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games and finite two-player zero-sum games, respectively.The authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia, FEDER andXunta de Galicia through projects BEC2002-04102-C02-02 and PGIDIT03PXIC20701PN.We wish to thank Professor William Thomson as well as an anonymous referee for useful comments.     

A core-allocation family for generalized holding cost games

Inventory situations, introduced in Meca et al. (Eur J Oper Res 156: 127–139, 2004), study how a collective of firms can minimize its joint inventory cost by means of co-operation. Depending on the information revealed by the individual firms, they analyze two related cooperative TU games: inventory cost games and holding cost games, and focus on proportional division mechanisms to share the joint cost. In this paper we introduce a new class of inventory games: generalized holding cost games, which extends the class of holding cost games. It turns out that generalized holding cost games are totally balanced.We then focus on the study of a core-allocation family which is called N-rational solution family.It is proved that a particular relation of inclusion exists between the former and the core. In addition, an N-rational solution called minimum square proportional ruleis studied. This work was partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, and the Generalitat Valenciana (grants MTM2005-09184-C02-02, CSD2006-00032, ACOMP06/040). The author thanks Javier Toledo, Josefa Cá novas, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

On the existence of a minimum integer representation for?weighted voting systems

A basic problem in the theory of simple games and other fields is to study whether a simple game (Boolean function) is weighted (linearly separable). A second related problem consists in studying whether a weighted game has a minimum integer realization. In this paper we simultaneously analyze both problems by using linear programming. For less than 9 voters, we find that there are 154 weighted games without minimum integer realization, but all of them have minimum normalized realization. Isbell in 1958 was the first to find a weighted game without a minimum normalized realization, he needed to consider 12 voters to construct a game with such a property. The main result of this work proves the existence of weighted games with this property with less than 12 voters. This research was partially supported by Grant MTM 2006-06064 of “Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología y el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional” and SGRC 2005-00651 of “Generalitat de Catalunya”, and by the Spanish “Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología” programmes ALINEX (TIN2005-05446 and TIN2006-11345).     

Loss of skills in coordination games

This paper deals with 2-player coordination games with vanishing actions, which are repeated games where all diagonal payoffs are strictly positive and all non-diagonal payoffs are zero with the following additional property: At any stage beyond r, if a player has not played a certain action for the last r stages, then he unlearns this action and it disappears from his action set. Such a game is called an r-restricted game. To evaluate the stream of payoffs we use the average reward. For r = 1 the game strategically reduces to a one-shot game and for r ≥ 3 in Schoenmakers (Int Game Theory Rev 4:119–126, 2002) it is shown that all payoffs in the convex hull of the diagonal payoffs are equilibrium rewards. In this paper for the case r = 2 we provide a characterization of the set of equilibrium rewards for 2 × 2 games of this type and a technique to find the equilibrium rewards in m × m games. We also discuss subgame perfection.     

Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players

Most work in game theory assumes that players are perfect reasoners and have common knowledge of all significant aspects of the game. In earlier work (Halpern and Rêgo 2006, arxiv.org/abs/0704.2014), we proposed a framework for representing and analyzing games with possibly unaware players, and suggested a generalization of Nash equilibrium appropriate for games with unaware players that we called generalized Nash equilibrium. Here, we use this framework to analyze other solution concepts that have been considered in the game-theory literature, with a focus on sequential equilibrium.     

Multicriteria games and potentials

In this note we study how far the theory of strategic games with potentials, as reported by Monderer and Shapley (Games Econ Behav 14:124–143, 1996), can be extended to strategic games with vector payoffs, as reported by Shapley (Nav Res Logist Q 6:57–61, 1959). The problem of the existence of pure approximate Pareto equilibria for multicriteria potential games is also studied.      

Generalized Cayley graphs of semigroups II

Following Zhu (Semigroup Forum, 2011, doi:), we study generalized Cayley graphs of semigroups. The Cayley D-saturated property, a particular combinatorial property, of generalized Cayley graphs of semigroups is considered and most of the results in Kelarev and Quinn (Semigroup Forum 66:89–96, 2003), Yang and Gao (Semigroup Forum 80:174–180, 2010) are extended. In addition, for some basic graphs and their complete fission graphs, we describe all semigroups whose universal Cayley graphs are isomorphic to these graphs.     

Gelfand-Kirillov Dimension and Local Finiteness of Symmetrizations of Associative Superalgebras

In this work we extend to superalgebras a result of Skosyrskii [Algebra and Logic, 18 (1) (1979) 49–57, Lemma 2] relating associative and Jordan structures. As an application, we show that the Gelfand-Kirillov dimension of an associative superalgebra coincides with that of its symmetrization, and that local finiteness is equivalent in associative superalgebras and in their symmetrizations. In this situation we obtain that having zero Gelfand-Kirillov dimension is equivalent to being locally finite.Partially supported by MCYT and Fondos FEDER BFM2001-1938-C02-02, and MEC and Fondos FEDER MTM2004-06580-C02-01.Partially supported by a F.P.I. Grant (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología).     

Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Equilibria

Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players, having more than one criterion to take into account, don’t have an a-priori opinion on the relative importance of all these criteria. Roemer (Econ. Bull. 3:1–13, 2005) introduces an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player can be viewed as running a bargaining game among criteria. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (see Kalai and Smorodinsky in Econometrica 43:513–518, 1975). We provide existence results for the so called Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria for a general class of disagreement points which properly includes the one considered by Roemer (Econ. Bull. 3:1–13, 2005). Moreover we look at the refinement power of this equilibrium concept and show that it is an effective selection device even when combined with classical refinement concepts based on stability with respect to perturbations; in particular, we consider the extension to multicriteria games of the Selten’s trembling hand perfect equilibrium concept (see Selten in Int. J. Game Theory 4:25–55, 1975) and prove that perfect Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria exist and properly refine both the perfect equilibria and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria.     

The multichoice coalition value

In this paper we define a solution for multichoice games which is a generalization of the Owen coalition value (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems: Essays in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, Springer, New York, pp. 76–88, 1977) for transferable utility cooperative games and the Egalitarian solution (Peters and Zanks, Ann. Oper. Res. 137, 399–409, 2005) for multichoice games. We also prove that this solution can be seen as a generalization of the configuration value and the dual configuration value (Albizuri et al., Games Econ. Behav. 57, 1–17, 2006) for transferable utility cooperative games.     

Convexity properties for interior operator games

Interior operator games arose by abstracting some properties of several types of cooperative games (for instance: peer group games, big boss games, clan games and information market games). This reason allow us to focus on different problems in the same way. We introduced these games in Bilbao et al. (Ann. Oper. Res. 137:141–160, 2005) by a set system with structure of antimatroid, that determines the feasible coalitions, and a non-negative vector, that represents a payoff distribution over the players. These games, in general, are not convex games. The main goal of this paper is to study under which conditions an interior operator game verifies other convexity properties: 1-convexity, k-convexity (k≥2 ) or semiconvexity. But, we will study these properties over structures more general than antimatroids: the interior operator structures. In every case, several characterizations in terms of the gap function and the initial vector are obtained. We also find the family of interior operator structures (particularly antimatroids) where every interior operator game satisfies one of these properties.     

Holomorphic Operators Generating Dense Images

The existence of infinite dimensional closed linear spaces of holomorphic functions f on a domain G in the complex plane such that Tf has dense images on certain subsets of G, where T is a continuous linear operator, is analyzed. Necessary and sufficient conditions for T to have the latter property are provided and applied to obtain a number of concrete examples: infinite order differential operators, composition operators and multiplication operators, among others. This work was supported in part by the Plan Andaluz de Investigación de la Junta de Andalucía FQM-127 and by MEC DGES Grants MTM2006-13997-C02-01 and MTM2004-21420-E.     

Local embeddings of some families of subgroups of finite groups

In this paper we study the influence of the partial cover and avoidance property on the subgroups of some relevant families of subgroups in a finite group.     

Extremal dependence analysis of network sessions

We refine a stimulating study by Sarvotham et al. (Comput Networks 48:335–350, 2005) which highlighted the influence of peak transmission rate on network burstiness. From TCP packet headers, we amalgamate packets into sessions where each session is characterized by a 5-tuple (S,D,R,R ^∨,Γ)=(total payload, duration, average transmission rate, peak transmission rate, initiation time). After careful consideration, a new definition of peak rate is required. Unlike Sarvotham et al. (Comput Networks 48:335–350, 2005) who segmented sessions into two groups labelled alpha and beta, we segment into 10 sessions according to the empirical quantiles of the peak rate variable as a demonstration that the beta group is far from homogeneous. Our more refined segmentation reveals additional structure that is missed by segmentation into two groups. In each segment, we study the dependence structure of (S,D,R) and find that it varies across the groups. Furthermore, within each segment, session initiation times are well approximated by a Poisson process whereas this property does not hold for the data set taken as a whole. Therefore, we conclude that the peak rate level is important for understanding structure and for constructing accurate simulations of data in the wild. We outline a simple method of simulating network traffic based on our findings.     

Parametric approximation of isotropic and anisotropic elastic flow for closed and open curves

Deckelnick and Dziuk (Math. Comput. 78(266):645–671, 2009) proved a stability bound for a continuous-in-time semidiscrete parametric finite element approximation of the elastic flow of closed curves in \mathbbR^d, d 3 2{\mathbb{R}^d, d\geq2} . We extend these ideas in considering an alternative finite element approximation of the same flow that retains some of the features of the formulations in Barrett et al. (J Comput Phys 222(1): 441–462, 2007; SIAM J Sci Comput 31(1):225–253, 2008; IMA J Numer Anal 30(1):4–60, 2010), in particular an equidistribution mesh property. For this new approximation, we obtain also a stability bound for a continuous-in-time semidiscrete scheme. Apart from the isotropic situation, we also consider the case of an anisotropic elastic energy. In addition to the evolution of closed curves, we also consider the isotropic and anisotropic elastic flow of a single open curve in the plane and in higher codimension that satisfies various boundary conditions.     

A consistent value for games with n players and r alternatives

In Bolger [1993], an efficient value was obtained for a class of games called games with n players and r alternatives. In these games, each of the n players must choose one and only one of the r alternatives. This value can be used to determine a player’s “a priori” value in such a game. In this paper, we show that the value has a consistency property similar to the “consistency” for TU games in Hart/Mas-Colell [1989] and we present a set of axioms (including consistency) which characterizes this value.  The games considered in this paper differ from the multi-choice games considered by Hsiao and Raghavan [1993]. They consider games in which the actions of the players are ordered in the sense that, if i >j, then action i carries more “weight” than action j.  These games also differ from partition function games in that the worth of a coalition depends not only on the partitioning of the players but also on the action chosen by each subset of the partition. Received: April 1994/final version: June 1999     

Infinitesimal generators associated with semigroups of linear fractional maps

We characterize the infinitesimal generator of a semigroup of linear fractional self-maps of the unit ball in ℂⁿ, n ≥ 1. For the case n = 1, we also completely describe the associated Koenigs function and solve the embedding problem from a dynamical point of view, proving (among other things) that a generic semigroup of holomorphic self-maps of the unit disc is a semigroup of linear fractional maps if and only if it contains a linear fractional map for some positive time. Partially supported by the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and the European Union (FEDER) project BFM2003-07294-C02-02 and by La Consejería de Educación y Ciencia de la Junta de Andalucía.