Pricing and clearing combinatorial markets with singleton and swap orders

In this article we consider combinatorial markets with valuations only for singletons and pairs of buy/sell-orders for swapping two items in equal quantity. We provide an algorithm that permits polynomial time market-clearing and -pricing. The results are presented in the context of our main application: the futures opening auction problem. Futures contracts are an important tool to mitigate market risk and counterparty credit risk. In futures markets these contracts can be traded with varying expiration dates and underlyings. A common hedging strategy is to roll positions forward into the next expiration date, however this strategy comes with significant operational risk. To address this risk, exchanges started to offer so-called futures contract combinations, which allow the traders for swapping two futures contracts with different expiration dates or for swapping two futures contracts with different underlyings. In theory, the price is in both cases the difference of the two involved futures contracts. However, in particular in the opening auctions price inefficiencies often occur due to suboptimal clearing, leading to potential arbitrage opportunities. We present a minimum cost flow formulation of the futures opening auction problem that guarantees consistent prices. The core ideas are to model orders as arcs in a network, to enforce the equilibrium conditions with the help of two hierarchical objectives, and to combine these objectives into a single weighted objective while preserving the price information of dual optimal solutions. The resulting optimization problem can be solved in polynomial time and computational tests establish an empirical performance suitable for production environments.     

Consignment contracts with retail competition

Consignment contracts have been widely employed in many industries. Under such contracts, items are sold at a retailer’s but the supplier retains the full ownership of the inventory until purchased by consumers; the supplier collects payment from the retailer based on actual units sold. We investigate how competition among retailers influences the supply chain decisions and profits under different consignment arrangements, namely a consignment price contract and a consignment contract with revenue share. First, we investigate how these two consignment contracts and a price only contract compare from the perspective of each supply chain partner. We find that the retailers benefit more from a consignment price contract than from a consignment contract with revenue share or a price only contract, regardless of the level of retailer differentiation. The supplier’s most beneficial contact, however, critically depends upon the level of retailer differentiation: a consignment contract with revenue share is preferable for the supplier if retailer differentiation is strong; otherwise a consignment price contract is preferable. Second, we study how retailer differentiation affects the profits of all supply chain partners. We find that less retailer differentiation improves the supplier’s profit for both types of consignment contract. Moreover, less retailer differentiation improves profits of the retailers in a consignment price contract, but not necessarily in a consignment contract with revenue share.     

Optimal procurement strategies for online spot markets

Spot markets have emerged for a broad range of commodities, and companies have started to use them in addition to their traditional, long-term procurement contracts (forward contracts). In comparison to forward contracts, spot markets offer products at essentially negligible lead time, but typically command a higher expected price for this added flexibility while also exhibiting substantial price uncertainty. In our research, we analyze the resulting procurement challenge and quantify the benefits of using spot markets from a supply chain perspective. We develop and solve mathematical models that determine the optimal order quantity to purchase via forward contracts and the optimal quantity to purchase via spot markets. We analyze the most general situation where commodities can be both bought and sold via a spot market and derive closed-form results for this case. We compare the obtained results to the reference scenario of pure contract sourcing and we include results for situations where the use of spot markets is restricted to either buying or selling only. Our approaches can be used by decision makers to determine optimal procurement strategies based on key parameters such as, demand and spot price volatilities, correlation between demand and spot prices, and risk aversion. The results of our analysis demonstrate that significant profit improvements can be achieved if a moderate fraction of the commodity demand is procured via spot markets. The results also show that companies who use spot markets can offer a higher expected service level, but that they might experience a higher variability in profits than companies who do not use spot markets. We illustrate our analytical results with numerical examples throughout the paper.     

Contract design and supply chain coordination in the electricity industry

In this article we propose a model of the supply chain in electricity markets with multiple generators and retailers and considering several market structures. We analyze how market design interacts with the different types of contract and market structure to affect the coordination between the different firms and the performance of the supply chain as a whole. We compare the implications on supply chain coordination and on the players’ profitability of two different market structures: a pool based market vs. bilateral contracts, taking into consideration the relationship between futures and spot markets. Furthermore, we analyze the use of contracts for differences and two-part-tariffs as tools for supply chain coordination. We have concluded that there are multiple equilibria in the supply chain contracts and structure and that the two-part tariff is the best contract to reduce double marginalization and increase efficiency in the management of the supply chain.     

上证50股指期货、ETF期权与ETF市场的价格发现能力对比分析

比较基于上证50指数的股指期货、ETF期权与现货ETF市场的价格发现能力,选取5分钟高频数据进行实证分析,并将暴涨暴跌行情与全样本区间进行了对比分析。首先,采用买权卖权等价理论反推期权价格隐含的现货价格;其次,运用向量误差修正模型,结合广义脉冲响应函数等分析方法研究市场间价格的领先滞后关系;最后,运用广义信息共享模型量化各个市场的价格发现贡献度。结果表明:在不同区间中,期货市场均领先其他市场至少5分钟;从长期来看,期货在价格发现中的贡献度最大,期权次之;在暴涨区间中,ETF的价格发现贡献度最大,期货次之;在暴跌区间中,期权的价格发现贡献度最大,期货次之。     

The dynamics of the relationship between spot and futures markets under high and low variance regimes

This investigation is one of the first studies to examine the dynamics of the relationship between spot and futures markets using the Markov‐switching vector error correction model. Three mature stock markets including the U.S. S&P500, the U.K. FTSE100 and the German DAX 30, and two emerging markets including the Brazil Bovespa and the Hungary BSI, are used to test the model, and the differences between the two sets of markets are examined. The empirical findings of this study are consistent with the following notions. First, after filtering out the high variance regime, the futures price is shown to lead the spot price in the price discovery process, as demonstrated by prior studies; conversely, the spot market is more informationally efficient than the futures market under the high variance condition. Second, the price adjustment process triggered by arbitrage trading between spot and futures markets during a high variance state is greater in scale than that based on a low variance state, and the degree of the co‐movement between spot and futures markets is significantly reduced during the high variance state. Third, a crisis condition involved in the high variance state is defined for the two emerging markets, whereas an unusual condition is presented for the three mature markets. Last, the lagged spot–futures price deviations perform as an information variable for the variance‐turning process. However, the portion of the variance‐switching process accounted for by this signal variable is statistically marginal for the three mature markets selected for this study. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Theoretically Consistent Version of the Nelson and Siegel Class of Yield Curve Models

A popular class of yield curve models is based on the Nelson and Siegel approach of ‘fitting’ yield curve data with simple functions of maturity. However, such models cannot be consistent across time. This article addresses that deficiency by deriving an intertemporally consistent and arbitrage‐free version of the Nelson and Siegel model. Adding this theoretical consistency expands the potential applications of the Nelson and Siegel approach to exercises involving a time‐series context, such as forecasting the yield curve and pricing interest rate derivatives. As a practical example, the intertemporal consistency of the model is exploited to derive a theoretical framework for forecasting the yield curve. The empirical application of that framework to United States data results in out‐of‐sample forecasts that outperform the random walk over the sample period of almost 50 years, for forecast horizons ranging from six months to three years.     

A note on arbitrage‐free pricing of forward contracts in energy markets

Arbitrage theory is used to price forward (futures) contracts in energy markets, where the underlying assets are non‐tradeable. The method is based on the so‐called ‘fitting of the yield curve’ technique from interest rate theory. The spot price dynamics of Schwartz is generalized to multidimensional correlated stochastic processes with Wiener and Lévy noise. Findings are illustrated with examples from oil and electricity markets.     

零售商占优下的两部定价合同与通道费

本文考虑由单个占优的零售商和单个供应商组成的二级供应链模型.在价格相依的随机需求下,研究分散系统下的批发价格合同与两部定价合同.在一定的条件下得到两种合同中供应链成员的最优决策和利润以及供应链系统的利润.分析表明,当零售商占优时两部定价合同比批发价格合同更有效.这在一定程度上说明当前零售业中收取通道费的合理性.     

基于综合流动性度量指标的中国期货市场流动性溢价研究

本文从流动性成本、流动性波动和到期日三个角度出发构建了衡量期货市场的综合流动性度量指标,并利用该指标对中国期货市场的流动性溢价问题进行研究。实证结果表明,流动性水平的差异对不同到期日期货合约的收益差异的影响存在差异性,当期流动性水平差异及其滞后期对收益差额的波动影响显著,其中,期货铜和铝市场中流动性对收益差额的影响存在过度反应→适度矫正的过程。     

Horizontal coordinating contracts in the semiconductor industry

Integrated device manufacturers (IDMs) and foundries are two types of manufacturers in the semiconductor industry. IDMs integrate both design and manufacturing functions whereas foundries solely focus on manufacturing. Since foundries often have cost advantage over IDMs due to their specialization and economies of scale, IDMs have incentives to source from foundries for the purpose of avoiding excessive capacity investment risk. As the IDM is also a potential capacity source, the IDM and foundry are in a horizontal setting rather than a purely vertical setting. In the absence of sophisticated contracts, the benchmark contract for the IDM and foundry is a wholesale price contract. We define “coordinating” contracts as those that improve both the IDM’s and foundry’s expected profits over the benchmark wholesale price contract and also lead to the maximum system profit. This paper examines if there exist coordinating capacity reservation contracts. It is found that wholesale price contracts in the horizontal setting cannot achieve the maximum system profit due to either double marginalization effect, or “misalignment of capacity-usage-priority”. In contrast, if the IDM’s capacity investment risk is not too low, there always exist coordinating capacity reservation contracts. Furthermore, under coordinating contracts, the IDM’s sourcing structure, either sole sourcing from the foundry or dual sourcing, is contingent on the firms’ cost structures.     

中国国债期货与隐含择券期权定价

本文提出了一种双树拼接的改进BDT模型,在此基础上发展出两种方法为中国市场上的国债期货和择券期权定价。其中"直接定价法"直接使用双树拼接树图,"两步定价法"则是经期权调整的持有成本模型。对中国TF1403和T1603国债期货合约的实证研究表明,两种方法都是合理的,且各有优势,"两步定价法"与市场价格差异较小,"直接定价法"与市场价格同步性较高。     

Optimal contracts in portfolio delegation

The optimal contracts in portfolio delegation under general preferences are characterized when the underlying state variable is not contractible, and the principal must rely on the final returns of portfolios to design the compensation schemes for the fund manager. We show that the optimal contracts satisfy a second-order nonlinear ordinary differential equation that depends on the utility functions and the distribution of state price density. In general, there is an efficiency loss for the optimal contracts unless the utility functions of both the principal and the agent exhibit linear risk tolerance with identical cautiousness. Additional contractible observables, like stock indexes, can be used to improve the efficiency of the second-best contracts, even if they are not perfectly correlated with the underlying state price. A continuous-time example with power utilities is presented to illustrate the features of the optimal contracts.     

Contracting with demand uncertainty under supply chain competition

We examine supply chain contracts for two competing supply chains selling a substitutable product, each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Both manufacturers are Stackelberg leaders and the retailers are followers. Manufacturers in two competing supply chains may choose different contracts, either a wholesale price contract in which the retailer??s demand forecasting information is not shared, or a revenue-sharing contract in which the retailer??s demand forecasting information is shared. Under supply chain competition and demand uncertainty, we identify which contract is more advantageous for each supply chain, and under what circumstances.     

Asymmetric Supply Function Equilibria with Forward Contracts

We consider markets in which firms offer supply functions, rather than a quantity or price alone: the most important examples are wholesale electricity markets. The equilibria in such markets can be hard to characterize. In many cases, whole families of supply function equilibria occur so there are difficulties in determining which equilibrium will be chosen. In this paper, we consider supply function equilibria, when firms hold forward contracts, which is common in electricity markets. Under the assumption that contract positions have been fixed in advance, we characterize the families of supply function equilibria in a duopoly. The existence of forward contracts implies a tightening of the conditions for an equilibrium, and a greater likelihood that no equilibrium solution exists. In the case of three firms, there can be at most one supply function equilibrium, provided that the lowest demand be small enough.     

离散时间单位连结人寿保险合同的局部风险最小对冲策略

单位连结人寿保险合同是保险利益依赖于某特定股票的价格的保险合同。当保险公司发行这样的保险合同后，保险公司将面临金融和被保险人死亡率两类风险。因此这样的保险合同相当对不完全金融市场上的或有索取权，不能利用自我融资交易策略复制出。本提出利用不完全市场的局部风险最小对冲方法对冲保险的风险，我们在离散时间的框架下给出了局部风险最小对冲策略。     

离散时间单位连结人寿保险合同的局部风险最小对冲策略

单位连结人寿保险合同是保险利益依赖于某特定股票的价格的保险合同 .当保险公司发行这样的保险合同后 ,保险公司将面临金融和被保险人死亡率两类风险 .因此这样的保险合同相当于不完全金融市场上的或有索取权 ,不能利用自我融资交易策略复制出 .本文提出利用不完全市场的局部风险最小对冲方法对冲保险者的风险 .我们在离散时间的框架下给出了局部风险最小对冲策略 .     

Towards a methodology for measuring the true degree of efficiency in a speculative market

Betting markets have drawn much attention in the economics, finance and operational research literature because they provide a valuable window on the manner in which individuals use information in wider financial markets. One question that has received particular attention is to what extent individuals discount information in market prices. The predominant approach to explore this issue involves predictive modeling to forecast market outcomes and examining empirically whether abnormal returns can be made by employing these forecasts. It is argued here that present practices to assess such forecasting models, including the use of point estimates and information, which would not be available in practice (at the forecasting stage) and failing to update forecasting models with information from the recent past, may give rise to misleading conclusions regarding a market's informational efficiency. Hypotheses are developed to conceptualize these views and are tested by means of extensive empirical experimentation using real-world data from the Hong Kong horserace betting market. Our study identifies several sources of bias and confirms that current practices may not be relied upon. A more appropriate modeling procedure for assessing the true degree of market efficiency is then proposed.     

Strategic interactions in traditional franchise systems: Are franchisors always better off?

The effects of price competition and advertising spillover on franchisees’ decision to cooperate and on franchisor’s contractual preferences are investigated. We show that the franchisees’ decision to cooperate or not depends on the type of franchise contracts. Under exclusive territory contracts, any mode of play between franchisees give the same profits to the franchisees and franchisor. Contracts that allow price competition and well targeted local advertising offer a good ground for horizontal cooperation, which may or may not benefit the franchisor depending on whether the prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. Contracts in which price competition is allowed and the burden of advertising decisions is totally transferred to the franchisor lead to cooperation between franchisees at the expense of the franchisor. Franchisees do not cooperate to the benefit of the franchisor if local advertising is predatory and price competition is not allowed in the contract, but franchisees are given the responsibility to undertake local advertising. Also, the franchisor endorses cooperation between franchisees when local advertising has a public good nature, but such a cooperation may never occur when the impact of local advertising on demand is significant. We finally show that while some contracts always dominate others, the choice of a franchise contract may also depend on local competition and/or the franchise goodwill.     

Revenue-sharing versus wholesale price mechanisms under different channel power structures

We consider a supply chain channel with two manufacturers and one retailer. Each manufacturer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the retailer. We discuss and compare the results of two different types of contracts under different channel power structures, to check whether it is beneficial for manufacturers to use revenue-sharing contracts under different scenarios. Then we consider a supply chain channel with one manufacturer and two retailers. Each retailer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the manufacturer. We analyze the likely outcomes under different scenarios to discover whether it is beneficial to use revenue-sharing contracts.