重复性赛制中的数学问题

1引言在体育比赛中,如果以一局定胜负,由于随机因素的影响,不能较好地展示双方实力,也不能展现胜者风范,故这种赛制难以使观众和参赛者信服.因此,为了体现公平竞争的精神,比赛就应该让参赛者有多次表现的机会,这一精神体现在赛制中,即重复性赛制.例如球类比赛中常常采用“三局两胜”或“五局三胜”制来决定胜负.那么,这种赛制公平吗?对在一局比赛中获胜概率不同的选手,“三局两胜”制与“五局三胜”制有何差异呢?一般地,“2n-1局n胜”制公平吗?不同的n,对于同一个选手有何差异呢?2“三局两胜”制和“五局三胜”制问题甲、乙两人参加比赛,设p…     

哪一种胜制最有利?

甲乙两人进行乒乓球单打比赛,已知每一局甲获胜的概率是0.6,乙获胜的概率是0.4,比赛时可以采用三局两胜制,五局三胜制,七局四胜制,在哪一种比赛制度下,甲获胜的概率最大?     

世乒赛中的胜率问题

20 0 3年5月1 9日—2 5日举行的第4 7届世乒赛采用了新的比赛规则:7局4胜制;每局先得1 1分者获胜,如出现1 0平接下来以先连得2分者胜,这其中涉及到特定条件下的获胜的概率问题.让我们把所学的概率知识用于解决比赛中实际问题,以加深同学们对概率知识的理解,提高应用数学解决实际问题的能力.问题1　若甲对乙比赛的某一局的前6只球中,每一球甲胜乙的概率均为12 ,试求:1 )甲仅得3分的概率P1 ;2 )甲所得的3分是连得3分的概率P2 ;3)甲得3分且恰好有2分连得的概率P3.分析　1 )本小题是基本的独立重复试验问题,打6只球甲胜了3只相当于6次试验中发…     

歪打正着与似是而非

<正>问题甲、乙两队进行排球比赛,已知在一局比赛中甲队胜的概率为(2/3),没有平局,若采用五局三胜制规则比赛,则甲队获胜的概率是多少?误解开始我认为,甲队获胜应包括以下三种互斥的情况:(1)五局胜三局;(2)五局胜四局;(3)五局全胜.     

一道课本概率习题 三种流行解法辨析

高中数学教材（人教A版）选修2—3第60页有这样一道习题： 题目 甲、乙选手比赛,假设每局比赛甲胜的概率为0．6,乙胜的概率为0．4,那么采用3局2胜制还是采用5局3胜制对甲更有利？你对局制长短的设置有何认识？     

"三局两胜、五局三胜"制公平吗?

在体育比赛中 ,一局定胜负 ,虽然比赛双方获胜的概率均为二分之一 ,但是由于实验的次数太少 ,偶然因素较多 ,不能较好地展示双方实力 ,故这种赛制难以使参赛者信服 ,不能展现胜者风范 .而比赛组织者普遍采用的“三局两胜”或“五局三胜”制决定胜负的方法 ,既令参赛选手满意 ,又被观众所接受 .那么 ,这种比赛制度公平吗 ?下面用概率的观点和知识加以阐述 :由于一场比赛前两位选手的水平或胜率是一个不可测的未知数 ,因此 ,赛事组织者理应撇开比赛中甲、乙双方的原有水平 ,而认为在一次比赛中甲、乙双方获胜的概率各为 p =12 ,即在一局比赛中…     

“三局两胜、五局三胜”制公平吗？

在体育比赛中 ,一局定胜负 ,虽然比赛双方获胜的概率均为二分之一 ,但是由于实验的次数太少 ,偶然因素较多 ,不能较好地展示双方实力 ,故这种赛制难以使参赛者信服 ,不能展现胜者风范 .而比赛组织者普遍采用的“三局两胜”或“五局三胜”制决定胜负的方法 ,既令参赛选手满意 ,又被观众所接受 .那么 ,这种比赛制度公平吗 ?下面用概率的观点和知识加以阐述 .由于一场比赛前两位选手的水平或胜率是一个不可测的未知数 ,因此 ,赛事组织者理应撇开比赛中甲、乙双方的原有水平 ,而认为在一次比赛中甲、乙双方获胜的概率各为 ｐ=12 ,即在一局比赛中…     

概率中5个比较著名的问题

概率是中学数学的新增内容 ,对学生解决问题的能力提出了更高的要求 .下面介绍概率中 5个比较著名的问题 ,供大家了解和理解概率及其在生活中的应用 .1　赌徒分金币问题概率论的产生 ,还有段名声不好的故事 .1 7世纪的一天 ,保罗与著名的赌徒梅尔赌钱 ,每人拿出 6枚金币 ,然后玩骰子 ,约定谁先胜三局谁就得到 1 2枚金币 .比赛开始后 ,保罗胜了一局 ,梅尔胜了两局 ,这时一件意外的事中断了他们的赌博 .于是 ,他们商量这1 2枚金币应怎样分配才合理 ?保罗认为 ,根据胜的局数 ,他应得总数的13,即 4枚金币 ,梅尔得总数的 23,即 8枚金币 ;但精通赌…     

用“虚满”法处理一类概率问题

求“达到某种要求就结束”的问题的概率时,由于结束的情况不一样,常没有统一性,要分别考虑,比较麻烦,也容易“重”或“漏”.若用“虚满”法:即达到某种要求,还“虚拟”地继续下去,到最后再求它的概率,往往有统一性,这样处理常常简明快捷.问题1甲、乙进行一场乒乓球比赛,采用七局四胜制,即谁先获胜四局,谁就赢得这场比赛.若每局比赛甲获胜的概率为0.6,求甲赢得这场比赛的概率.解析若着眼于“赢了就结束”,就要考虑甲第4、5、6、7局赢得这场比赛的四种情况,比较麻烦.甲第4局就赢得这场比赛的概率为C44·0.64,若继续比赛下去,打满7局,则甲赢得…     

"n局k胜"制比赛中各方胜出的概率计算

《中学数学》2 0 0 2年第 6期上刊登了《“三局两胜、五局三胜”制公平吗 ?》[1] .我们认为文 [1 ]存在前后矛盾的问题 ,前半部分存在两个错误 :一是文 [1 ]以第三段中“赛事组织者理应撇开比赛中甲、乙双方的原有水平 ,而认为在一次比赛中甲、乙双方获胜的概率各为 p =12 ,即在一局比赛中每位选手的‘胜’和‘负’的发生是等可能的 .”为制定比赛规则的前提是不公正的 .公正的比赛规则应该是以“选出真正的强手”为准则 ,在每一局比赛中每位选手的原有水平常常是不同的 ,“选出真正的强手”的规则应是“使原有水平相同的选手 ,最后胜出的概…     

On Birkhoff-Young quadrature of analytical functions

A simple method is given for constructing quadrature rules for the numerical integration of an analytic function over a line segment in the complex plane. The Birkhoff-Young 5-point, degree 5 rule is obtained as a special case. An error analysis is used to show how rules preferable to the Birkhoff-Young rule are easily developed.     

Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice

In this paper, we define the notion of binary game in constitutional form. For this game, we define a core and give a necessary and sufficient condition for a game to be stable.We define a representation of a collective choice rule by a binary game in constitutional form and characterize those collective choice rules which are representable.We finally introduce the notion of c-social decision function and characterize, as an application of our theorem on stability of binary constitutional games, the collective choice rules which are c-social decision functions.Our representation of a collective choice rule by a binary game in constitutional form is an obvious improvement of the classical representation by a simple game.     

Sequencing games

Sequencing situations with linear cost functions are considered. A division rule for the cost savings is introduced and characterized axiomatically. Cooperative game theory is applied to analyse these situations and expressions for division rules induced by solution concepts from cooperative game theory are derived.     

The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation

It is well known that any decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free mechanism for allocating a single object with transfers is vulnerable to manipulation. In this paper we examine whether the possible manipulations can have a serious impact on the outcome. Specifically, we examine which allocations are realized in the direct revelation game of any rule satisfying certain normative properties. For this class of rules we show that decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free allocations are the only ones realized through an ?-Nash equilibrium for any sufficiently small ? > 0.     

Conference structures and fair allocation rules

To describe how the outcome of a cooperative game might depend on which groups of players hold cooperative planning conferences, we study allocation rules, which are functions mapping conference structures to payoff allocations. An allocation rule is fair if every conference always gives equal benefits to all its members. Any characteristic function game without sidepayments has a unique fair allocation rule. The fair allocation rule also satisfies a balanced contributions formula, and is closely related to Harsanyi's generalized Shapley value for games without sidepayments. If the game is superadditive, then the fair allocation rule also satisfies a stability condition.     

Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models

In this paper we consider the minimum cost spanning tree model. We assume that a central planner aims at implementing a minimum cost spanning tree not knowing the true link costs. The central planner sets up a game where agents announce link costs, a tree is chosen and costs are allocated according to the rules of the game. We characterize ways of allocating costs such that true announcements constitute Nash equilibria both in case of full and incomplete information. In particular, we find that the Shapley rule based on the irreducible cost matrix is consistent with truthful announcements while a series of other well-known rules (such as the Bird-rule, Serial Equal Split, and the Proportional rule) are not.     

Explicit optimal value for Dynkin's stopping game

Under the One-step Look Ahead rule of Dynamic Programming, an explicit game value of Dynkin's stopping problem for a Markov chain is obtained by using a potential operator. The condition on the One-step rule could be extended to the k-step and infinity-step rule. We shall also decompose the game value as the sum of two explicit functions under these rules.     

A noncooperative approach to bankruptcy problems with an endogenous estate

We introduce a new class of bankruptcy problems in which the value of the estate is endogenous and depends on agents’ investment decisions. There are two investment alternatives: investing in a company (risky asset) and depositing money into a savings account (risk-free asset). Bankruptcy is possible only for the risky asset. We define a game between agents each of which aims to maximize his expected payoff by choosing an investment alternative and a company management which aims to maximize profits by choosing a bankruptcy rule. Our agents are differentiated by their incomes. We consider three most prominent bankruptcy rules in our base model: the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule. We show that only the proportional rule is a part of any pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This result is robust to changes in income distribution in the economy and can be extended to a larger set of bankruptcy rules and multiple types. However, extension to multiple company framework with competition leads to equilibria where the noncooperative support for the proportional rule disappears.     

Impact of binary and Fibonacci expansions of numbers on winning strategies for Nim-like games

An analysis of the successful moves for the game of solitaire, played in reverse, has resulted in the formulation of a set of rules, the observance of which leads to success. The principal rules entail symmetry properties and also the density of packing of pegs. Subsidiary rules are formulated in terms of both the current location of play and its direction. When play has proceeded for some way, a difficulty is encountered which can be surmounted by applying a modified form of the rule for density of packing.

The interesting fact emerges that within the game of solitaire there are two separate symmetrical situations which are species of mini‐solitaire.     

An interpretability improvement for fuzzy rule bases obtained by the iterative rule learning approach

Interpretability is one of the key concepts in many of the applications using the fuzzy rule-based approach. It is well known that there are many different criteria around this concept, the complexity being one of them. In this paper, we focus our efforts in reducing the complexity of the fuzzy rule sets. One of the most interesting approaches for learning fuzzy rules is the iterative rule learning approach. It is mainly characterized by obtaining rules covering few examples in final stages, being in most cases useless to represent the knowledge. This behavior is due to the specificity of the extracted rules, which eventually creates more complex set of rules. Thus, we propose a modified version of the iterative rule learning algorithm in order to extract simple rules relaxing this natural trend. The main idea is to change the rule extraction process to be able to obtain more general rules, using pruned searching spaces together with a knowledge simplification scheme able to replace learned rules. The experimental results prove that this purpose is achieved. The new proposal reduces the complexity at both, the rule and rule base levels, maintaining the accuracy regarding to previous versions of the algorithm.