Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions

This paper surveys some applications of cooperative game theory to supply chain management. Special emphasis is placed on two important aspects of cooperative games: profit allocation and stability. The paper first describes the construction of the set of feasible outcomes in commonly seen supply chain models, and then uses cooperative bargaining models to find allocations of the profit pie between supply chain partners. In doing so, several models are analyzed and surveyed, and include suppliers selling to competing retailers, and assemblers negotiating with component manufacturers selling complementary components. The second part of the paper discusses the issue of coalition formation among supply chain partners. An exhaustive survey of commonly used stability concepts is presented. Further, new ideas such as farsightedness among supply chain players are also discussed and analyzed. The paper also opens some avenues of future research in applying cooperative game theory to supply chain management.     

“The island”: Developing a controlled game for teaching and research

This paper describes the development and use of a controlled game using the recently-developed Intelligence Man System. The game is intended for teaching and research use, and is set up to incorporate a predetermined ‘strategic surprise’ in the course of play. The design of the game itself is discussed, as is the set of issues that it was intended to explore. Use of the game in the teaching mode is discussed, and finally some implications for possible research use are suggested.     

设施选址博弈问题的无支付机制设计研究

选址博弈是目前国际相关学术领域的重要前沿课题之一. 在选址博弈问题中, 存在n个相互影响的``理性"居民, 他们的住址等信息是其私有信息;设计者需要设计选址机制, 以居民汇报的住址信息为输入, 输出设施位置. 在进行机制设计的过程中, 如何在没有金钱的刺激下, 保证所有居民``说真话", 设计出防策略性无支付机制是其中的重要研究内容. 设施选址博弈问题的无支付机制设计是组合优化和理论计算机科学的交叉学科课题, 在管理科学、信息科学以及社会经济学等领域有着重要的应用, 具有重要的理论意义和实际的应用价值. 现根据不同设施类型及个数、不同个人偏好、不同度量空间以及不同社会总体目标等条件, 介绍各种类型的设施选址博弈模型, 罗列相关的研究成果, 并总结其中尚待解决的问题.     

Board wargames for decision making research

This paper discusses some aspects of a game for research into decision making. From our experience with commercial board wargames, we identify six requirements for a research game, and three requirements for its control. The Organisational Control Game, a wargame which we have developed, is shown to satisfy the requirements. The Superior Commander system is used to control the game, and the importance of the dummy task is discussed. We conclude that commercial board wargames can be adapted to examine decision making scientifically, we offer some guidelines for game development, and we consider extensions to other contexts, particularly those related to business games.     

Dynamically Consistent Cooperative Solution in a Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution

This paper presents a cooperative differential game of transboundary industrial pollution. A noted feature of the game model is that the industrial sectors remain competitive among themselves while the governments cooperate in pollution abatement. It is the first time that time consistent solutions are derived in a cooperative differential game on pollution control with industries and governments being separate entities. A stochastic version of the model is presented and a subgame-consistent cooperative solution is provided. This is the first study of pollution management in a stochastic differential game framework. This research was supported by the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong Grant HKBU2103/04H and Hong Kong Baptist University Grant FRG/05-06/II22.     

客运问题的进化博弈分析

构建了客运车主群体之间以及客运车主群体与客运管理部门之间的博弈模型及其复制动态方程,并对复制动态方程做了分析与讨论,得出了博弈模型中各博弈方的进化稳定策略,并根据所提出的博弈模型,提出了合理性建议.     

The Level of Interpretation of Games

This paper argues that the level of detail at which the effects or experiences of a game are supposed to be interpreted is a useful classificatory criterion, and is a valuable component of a classification scheme for games according to their purpose. Research, teaching and learning games intended to be interpreted at fine levels and coarse levels of detail are discussed and compared. It is noted that coarse-level educational games may have unintentional fine-level effects, and some methods of preventing such effects are suggested. It is also noted that fine-level games require greater accuracy of game models and more realistic player behaviour than coarse-level games. The implications of this for game design are discussed.     

超速驾驶行为的进化博弈分析

针对交通管理中经常要面对的超速驾驶行为,建立了驾驶员群体之间以及驾驶员群体与交管部门之间的博弈模型及其复制动态方程,并对动态方程做了分析与讨论,得出了博弈模型中各博弈方的进化稳定策略,提出了一些控制和减少超速行为的合理建议.     

通用竞争战略研究方法论的历史反思——一个基于博弈与约束优化建模的新研究架构

本文从独特的方法论视角回顾了通用竞争战略实证研究的历史,首次关注了其中的Palepu战略识别假设和战略数理解析的研究,分析了制约其发展的关键方法论问题;评述了近期战略解析建模研究的突破性进展及相关实证研究的进展的新方法论涵义,发现了反传统的理论建构性研究所面临的机遇,预测了通用战略建模、Palepu战略识别假设的解析验证和相关实证研究可能成为研究前沿。最后,提出了一个跨战略管理、财务管理和博弈论-约束优化三个领域的新研究架构设想。     

信息非对称环境下产业创新平台多方主体博弈分析

研究产业创新平台在多方主体模式下的协同合作策略问题。我国产业创新平台发展时间较短,部分平台系统的资源共享和服务能力处于“弱势”,但通过多方主体协同合作能有效提升平台系统的技术创新水平,所以主体间的博弈会影响平台系统的存续质量与运行效率。基于此,本文构建了信息非对称环境下“产业链相关企业-各类研究型机构-政府管理部门”主要三方主体的静态博弈模型,从利益实现机制出发,强化各方主体在产业创新平台运行中的理性,以破解产业创新平台运行效率低下困局。研究表明,企业、研究机构和政府管理部门是否会严格遵循契约治理规范自身行为主要取决于各自的资源共享力度、资源共享成本以及资源共享的收益。     

Consistent and covariant solutions for TU games

One of the important properties characterizing cooperative game solutions is consistency. This notion establishes connections between the solution vectors of a cooperative game and those of its reduced game. The last one is obtained from the initial game by removing one or more players and by giving them the payoffs according to a specific principle (e.g. a proposed payoff vector). Consistency of a solution means that the restriction of a solution payoff vector of the initial game to any coalition belongs to the solution set of the corresponding reduced game. There are several definitions of the reduced games (cf., e.g., the survey of T. Driessen [2]) based on some intuitively acceptable characteristics. In the paper some natural properties of reduced games are formulated, and general forms of the reduced games possessing some of them are given. The efficient, anonymous, covariant TU cooperative game solutions satisfying the consistency property with respect to any reduced game are described.The research was supported by the NWO grant 047-008-010 which is gratefully acknowledgedReceived: October 2001     

The Training of Teachers of Management Subjects

There is some agreement between government sponsored committees and teachers in further and higher education that some improvement is required in teaching in educational institutions. Other reports have focused on a similar need in the area of management education. This article describes some research carried out by the Centre for the Development of Management Teachers and Trainers at the University of Lancaster which sheds some light on the nature of these needs as seen by serving management teachers and heads of management departments in Universities, Polytechnics and Further Education Colleges. The final part of the article describes some of the programmes which have been designed and run by this Centre to meet these needs, and reveals the principles underlying these designs. One expectation is that these programmes will encourage teachers to initiate and manage their own self development in the long term.     

基于不确定性回报的行为控制博弈分析

不确定型的行为控制较之确定型的行为控制更为复杂,但在现实中又有一定的广泛性,且目前的研究基础比较薄弱.把研究的视角放在不确定性回报下行为控制的博弈机理上,考察了博弈双方的行为观测偏差,定义了在信息不对称条件下管理者对被管理者的行为的观测矩阵、管理者的博弈策略矩阵、被管理者对管理者观测能力的估计矩阵及对管理者博弈策略的估计矩阵等,分析了管理者与被管理者之间的动态博弈过程和行为策略选择,给出了满足博弈均衡的不确定性回报的设计要求.这些都可以推广应用于各种具体管理制度的设计和改进当中,为行为控制研究提供了定量分析的新方法.在此基础上,选择房地产投资开发行为控制机制的实例进行了诊断研究.     

On the core and nucleolus of minimum cost spanning tree games

We develop two efficient procedures for generating cost allocation vectors in the core of a minimum cost spanning tree (m.c.s.t.) game. The first procedure requires O(n ²) elementary operations to obtain each additional point in the core, wheren is the number of users. The efficiency of the second procedure, which is a natural strengthening of the first procedure, stems from the special structure of minimum excess coalitions in the core of an m.c.s.t. game. This special structure is later used (i) to ease the computational difficulty in computing the nucleolus of an m.c.s.t. game, and (ii) to provide a geometric characterization for the nucleolus of an m.c.s.t. game. This geometric characterization implies that in an m.c.s.t. game the nucleolus is the unique point in the intersection of the core and the kernel. We further develop an efficient procedure for generating fair cost allocations which, in some instances, coincide with the nucleolus. Finally, we show that by employing Sterns' transfer scheme we can generate a sequence of cost vectors which converges to the nucleolus. Part of this research was done while the author was visiting the Department of Operations Research at Stanford University. This research was partially supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council Canada Grant A-4181.     

工程项目主体行为博弈分析

在工程项目建设过程中,项目主体扮演着重要的角色,同时相互之间构成了一定的经济伙伴关系.由于项目主体之间的信息存在不对称性,项目各主体为追求自身利益最大化相互之间形成了博弈关系.在分析项目主体之间的博弈关系的基础上,分别建立了一般项目和政府投资项目主体三方之间的行为博弈模型,分析了博弈混合策略纳什均衡解.最后从建立完善的建设管理制度、建立事先监督机制与事后惩罚机制、建立激励机制与约束机制等方面提出了规范项目主体行为的具体对策.     

Competition under different reimbursement systems: The concept of an internet-based hospital management game

We have developed an internet-based management game to illustrate the economic and organisational decision-making process in a hospital by using discrete event simulation. Up to six hospitals compete against each other for inpatients with different disease categories and budget depending on hospital mission, regional health policy, inpatient reimbursement system (day-, case- and global-budget based) as well as labour and radiology technology market for 12 decision periods. Players can evaluate alternative actions for capacity planning as well as patient scheduling and control problems depending on different game situations. The uniqueness of COREmain hospital game consists of the internet-based framework, the combination of resource, process and financial result management, the competition of hospitals within a region and the consideration of different inpatient reimbursement systems. The deployment of this game in teaching, policy and research might improve policy making both at a hospital, regional and national level and also induce further research in these fields.     

On a Resurgence of Management Simulations and Games

The past few years have seen a significant resurgence of interest in ‘management games’ and ‘management flight simulators’, one particularly active source of such work being the system dynamics community. After proposing a distinction between games and simulations, this paper provides some background to these developments by briefly describing the historical roots of the field and the fundamental ideas of the system dynamics community, which are now giving rise to ‘microworlds’. The training advantages of management simulations and games are then discussed. The paper closes with a note on the research and findings of the system dynamics field and by offering some words of warning on the perils of simulation and game use. Two scenarios for how the use of simulations and games as management education devices might develop in the future are proposed. An Appendix describes five examples of very different types of management simulations and games.     

Technical efficiency,managerial efficiency and objective-setting in the educational system: an international comparison

This study uses data envelopment analysis to analyse the efficiency of educational systems in 31 countries. This type of evaluation is of interest both when formulating a model for analysis and when applying such a model empirically. The efficiency of an educational system must take into account the students' economic and social background, as this is an environmental factor that decisively influences their performance. This is a highly important aspect and so we propose a specific evaluative process for it. Secondly, we evaluate the efficiency of educational systems in different countries, an analysis that has few forerunners since the majority of previous research has focused on analysing a single country. The results suggest that, in general, the most efficient management of educational systems can be found in those countries with a Communist past. They also suggest that there is a series of developed countries, which, judging by the results obtained, could increase their students' performance with even fewer resources than those currently allocated to their educational systems.     

公路客运监管的进化博弈分析

运用进化博弈理论研究公路客运监管问题,建立了公路客运监管问题的博弈模型,分析了公路客运车主和公路客运管理者之间的行为选择,得到了博弈方的复制动态方程,研究了博弈模型的进化稳定策略。探讨了影响进化稳定策略的因素。研究结果表明公路客运车主和公路客运管理者在有限理性基础上得到的进化稳定策略与博弈双方的收益、系统所处的初始状态有关,并根据所提出的博弈模型,提出了合理性建议。