Local Minority Game with Evolutionary Strategies

We study a model of local minority game in the random Kauffman network with evolutionary strategies and propose three methods to update the strategy of poor agents, with lower points in a given generation： namely to update either the Boolean function of their strategies randomly, or their local information of randomly adjacent m agents, or the number m of randomly chosen adjacent agents. The results of extended numerical simulations show that the behaviour of strategies in the three methods may enhance significantly the entire coordination of agents in the system. It is also found that a poor agent tends to use both small m strategies and correlated strategies, and the strategies of agents will finally self-organize into a steady-state distribution for a long time playing of the game.     

Coevolution with weights of names in structured language games

We propose a coevolutionary version to investigate the naming game, a model recently introduced to describe how shared vocabulary can emerge and persist spontaneously in communication systems. We base our model on the fact that more popular names have more opportunities to be selected by agents and then spread in the population. A name’s popularity is concerned with its communication frequency, characterized by its weight coevolving with the name. A tunable parameter governs the influence of name weight. We implement this modified version on both scale-free networks and small-world networks, in which interactions proceed between paired agents by means of the reverse naming game. It is found that there exists an optimal value of the parameter that induces the fastest convergence of the population. This illustration indicates that a moderately strong influence of evolving name weight favors the rapid achievement of final consensus, but very strong influences inhibit the convergence process. The rank-distribution of the final accumulated weights of names qualitatively explains this nontrivial phenomenon. Investigations of some pertinent quantities are also provided, including the time evolution of the number of different names and the success rate, as well as the total memory of agents for different parameter values, which are helpful for better understanding the coevolutionary dynamics. Finally, we explore the scaling behavior in the convergence time and conclude a smaller scaling parameter compared to the previous naming game models.     

The Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem and resource utilization

We study the dynamics of the “Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem”. The problem is the following: In each period, N agents have to choose between N restaurants. Agents have a common ranking of the restaurants. Restaurants can only serve one customer. When more than one customer arrives at the same restaurant, one customer is chosen at random and is served; the others do not get the service. We first introduce the one-shot versions of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem which we call one-shot KPR games. We then study the dynamics of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem (which is a repeated game version of any given one shot KPR game) for large N. For statistical analysis, we explore the long time steady state behavior. In many such models with myopic agents we get under-utilization of resources, that is, we get a lower aggregate payoff compared to the social optimum. We study a number of myopic strategies, focusing on the average occupation fraction of restaurants.     

Kinetic step pairing

We report on the theoretical and experimental discovery of pairing of identical crystal steps. We first show that step bunching always occurs at long wavelength in the vicinity of an instability threshold when step dynamics is local. But an instability towards a stable train of pairs can be obtained when steps dynamics is nonlocal. This instability is shown to occur for transparent steps under electromigration. Observations on Si(111) under electromigration around 1230 degrees C show stable trains of pairs. By controlling both supersaturation and electromigration, we establish an experimental morphology diagram, from which we conclude that the transparency kinetic coefficient is negative.     

Network evolution based on minority game with herding behavior

The minority game (MG) is used as a source of information to design complex networks where the nodes represent the playing agents. Differently from classical MG consisting of independent agents, the current model rules that connections between nodes are dynamically inserted or removed from the network according to the most recent game outputs. This way, preferential attachment based on the concept of social distance is controlled by the agents wealth. The time evolution of the network topology, quantitatively measured by usual parameters, is characterized by a transient phase followed by a steady state, where the network properties remain constant. Changes in the local landscapes around individual nodes depend on the parameters used to control network links. If agents are allowed to access the strategies of their network neighbors, a feedback effect on the network structure and game outputs is observed. Such effect, known as herding behavior, considerably changes the dependence of volatility σ on memory size: it is shown that the absolute value of σ as well as the corresponding value of memory size depend both on the network topology and on the way along which the agents make their playing decisions in each game round.     

Competition-driven network dynamics: emergence of a scale-free leadership structure and collective efficiency

Using the minority game as a model for competition dynamics, we investigate the effects of interagent communications across a network on the global evolution of the game. Agent communication across this network leads to the formation of an influence network, which is dynamically coupled to the evolution of the game, and it is responsible for the information flow driving the agents' actions. We show that the influence network spontaneously develops hubs with a broad distribution of in-degrees, defining a scale-free robust leadership structure. Furthermore, in realistic parameter ranges, facilitated by information exchange on the network, agents can generate a high degree of cooperation making the collective almost maximally efficient.     

Memory-based prisoner’s dilemma on square lattices

We investigate the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma with memory-based agents on a square lattice. By introducing memory effects into this game, we assume that individuals’ performance is evaluated in terms of the accumulative payoffs in their memories. It is shown that if individuals behave as their successful neighbors, then cooperation can be significantly promoted. The mechanism responsible for the promotion of cooperation is discussed in detail. We confirm that the promotion of cooperation induced by memory effects remains effective when a preferential selection rule or an asynchronous updating rule is employed. Our work may shed some new light on the study of evolutionary games in real-world situations where the effects of individuals’ memories play a key role in the evolution of cooperation.     

Reheating and entropy perturbations in fibre inflation

We study reheating in some one and two field realizations of fibre inflation.We find that reheating begins with a phase of preheating in which long wavelength fluctuation modes are excited.In two field models there is a danger that the parametric amplification of infrared fluctuations in the second scalar field-associated with an entropy mode-might induce an instability of the curvature fluctuations.We show that,at least in the models we consider,the entropy mode has a sufficiently large mass to prevent this instability.Hence,from the point of view of reheating the models we consider are well-behaved.     

Importance of positive feedbacks and overconfidence in a self-fulfilling Ising model of financial markets

Following a long tradition of physicists who have noticed that the Ising model provides a general background to build realistic models of social interactions, we study a model of financial price dynamics resulting from the collective aggregate decisions of agents. This model incorporates imitation, the impact of external news and private information. It has the structure of a dynamical Ising model in which agents have two opinions (buy or sell) with coupling coefficients, which evolve in time with a memory of how past news have explained realized market returns. We study two versions of the model, which differ on how the agents interpret the predictive power of news. We show that the stylized facts of financial markets are reproduced only when agents are overconfident and mis-attribute the success of news to predict return to herding effects, thereby providing positive feedbacks leading to the model functioning close to the critical point. Our model exhibits a rich multifractal structure characterized by a continuous spectrum of exponents of the power law relaxation of endogenous bursts of volatility, in good agreement with previous analytical predictions obtained with the multifractal random walk model and with empirical facts.     

The emergence of leadership in social networks

We study a networked version of the minority game in which agents can choose to follow the choices made by a neighbouring agent in a social network. We show that for a wide variety of networks a leadership structure always emerges, with most agents following the choice made by a few agents. We find a suitable parameterisation which highlights the universal aspects of the behaviour and which also indicates where results depend on the type of social network.     

Global optimization of minority game by intelligent agents

We propose a new model of minority game with intelligent agents who use trail and error method to make a choice such that the standard deviation σ² and the total loss in this model reach the theoretical minimum values in the long time limit and the global optimization of the system is reached. This suggests that the economic systems can self-organize into a highly optimized state by agents who make decisions based on inductive thinking, limited knowledge, and capabilities. When other kinds of agents are also present, the simulation results and analytic calculations show that the intelligent agent can gain profits from producers and are much more competent than the noise traders and conventional agents in original minority games proposed by Challet and Zhang.     

Mean-field approximation for two- and three-person Prisoner’s Dilemmas

We consider the mean-field approximation (MFA) to the system of interacting agents playing two- and three-person Prisoner’s Dilemma games (2-PD and 3-PD). The agents have three available strategies: All-C, All-D, and a third one, which we choose in various ways. Long-time distribution of the strategies is compared for both games. The latter game admits coexistence of larger number of strategies in the long run. In the case of external pressure for cooperation, more pressure is in general necessary for 3-PD than for 2-PD to guarantee cooperation for almost all initial compositions of the strategies. Results for different types of tit-for-tat strategies for 3-PD are discussed. Unlike the 2-PD case, the more forgiving tit-for-tat strategy can survive in the long run in 3-PD.     

Memory effects in nuclear Fermi-liquid

The kinetic theory is applied to the nuclear Fermi liquid. The nuclear collective dynamics is treated in terms of the observable variables: particle density, current density, pressure etc. The influence of Fermi-surface distortion, relaxation processes and memory effects on the nuclear dynamics is studied. We show that the presence of the dynamic Fermi-surface distortion gives rise to some important consequences in the nuclear dynamics which are absent in classical liquids. We discuss the nuclear small amplitude excitations, the spinodal instability, the nuclear fission and the bubble instability in heated Fermi-liquid in presence of the memory effects.     

Jump detection and long range dependence

Memory properties of financial assets are investigated. Using Detrended Fluctuation Analysis we show that the long memory detection in volatility is affected by the presence of jumps, realized volatility being a biased volatility proxy. We propose threshold bipower variation as an alternative volatility estimator unaffected by discontinuous variations. We also show that, with typical sample sizes, DFA is unable to disentangle long memory from short range dependence with characteristic time comparable to the whole sample length.     

Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma game on hypergraph networks

We study the possible advantages of adopting quantum strategies in multi-player evolutionary games. We base our study on the three-player Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. In order to model the simultaneous interaction between three agents we use hypergraphs and hypergraph networks. In particular, we study two types of networks: a random network and a SF-like network. The obtained results show that in the case of a three-player game on a hypergraph network, quantum strategies are not necessarily stochastically stable strategies. In some cases, the defection strategy can be as good as a quantum one.     

Stability of strategies in payoff-driven evolutionary games on networks

We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0, 1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing mixed strategies in which each player may act as a cooperator or a defector over a large number of interactions with a certain probability. Our model is payoff-driven, i.e., we assume that the level of accumulated payoff at each node is a relevant parameter in the selection of strategies. Also, we consider that each player chooses his∕her strategy in a context of limited information. We present a deterministic nonlinear model for the evolution of strategies. We show that the final strategies depend on the network structure and on the choice of the parameters of the game. We find that polarized strategies (pure cooperator∕defector states) typically emerge when (i) the network connections are sparse, (ii) the network degree distribution is heterogeneous, (iii) the network is assortative, and surprisingly, (iv) the benefit of cooperation is high.     

Other-regarding preference and the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on complex networks

Prevailing models of the evolutionary prisoner’s game on networks always assume that agents are pursuing their own profit maximization. But the results from experimental games show that many agents have other-regarding preference. In this paper, we study the emergence of cooperation from the prisoner’s dilemma game on complex networks while some agents exhibit other-regarding preference such as inequality aversion, envious and guilty emotions. Contrary to common ideas, the simulation results show that the existence of inequality aversion agents does not promote cooperation emergence on a BA (Barabási and Albert) scale-free network in most situations. If the defection attraction is big and agents exhibit strong preference for inequality aversion, the frequency of cooperators will be lower than in situations where no inequality aversion agents exist. In some cases, the existence of the inequality agents will even induce the frequency of cooperators to zero, a feature which is not observed in previous research on the prisoner’s dilemma game when the underlying interaction topology is a BA scale-free network. This means that if an agent cares about equality too much, it will be difficult for cooperation to emerge and the frequency of cooperators will be low on BA networks. The research on the effect of envy or guilty emotions on the emergence of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game on BA networks obtains similar results, though some differences exist. However, simulation results on a WS (Watts and Strogatz) small-world network display another scenario. If agents care about the inequality of agents very much, the WS network favors cooperation emergence in the prisoners’ dilemma game when other-regarding agents exist. If the agent weight on other-regarding is lowered, the cooperation frequencies emerging on a WS network are not much different from those in situations without other-regarding agents, although the frequency of cooperators is lower than those of the situation without other-regarding preference agents sometimes. All the simulation results imply that inequality aversion and its variations can have important effects on cooperation emergence in the prisoner’s dilemma game, and different network topologies have different effects on cooperation emergence in the prisoner’s dilemma game played on complex networks.     

Asset price dynamics in a financial market with heterogeneous trading strategies and time delays

In this paper we present a continuous time dynamical model of heterogeneous agents interacting in a financial market where transactions are cleared by a market maker. The market is composed of fundamentalist, trend following and contrarian agents who process market information with different time delays. Each class of investors is characterized by path dependent risk aversion. We also allow for the possibility of evolutionary switching between trend following and contrarian strategies. We find that the system shows periodic, quasi-periodic and chaotic dynamics as well as synchronization between technical traders. Furthermore, the model is able to generate time series of returns that exhibit statistical properties similar to those of the S&P 500 index, which is characterized by excess kurtosis, volatility clustering and long memory.     

GLAD: a simple adaptive strategy that yields cooperation in dilemma games

We introduce a simple adaptive rule where agents choose a cooperative effort on a grid. Agents can adjust this effort step by step and G ains and L osses A djust D irections. We show that this process converges to the cooperative outcome in a two-person Prisoners’ Dilemma game, and we provide simulations showing that the results also holds with a larger number of agents.     

Limits of filopodium stability

Filopodia are long, fingerlike membrane tubes supported by cytoskeletal filaments. Their shape is determined by the stiffness of the actin filament bundles found inside them and by the interplay between the surface tension and bending rigidity of the membrane. Although one might expect the Euler buckling instability to limit the length of filopodia, we show through simple energetic considerations that this is in general not the case. By further analyzing the statics of filaments inside membrane tubes, and through computer simulations that capture membrane and filament fluctuations, we show under which conditions filopodia of arbitrary lengths are stable. We discuss several in vitro experiments where this kind of stability has already been observed. Furthermore, we predict that the filaments in long, stable filopodia adopt a helical shape.