Exploring the trade-off between immediate gratification and delayed network externalities in the consumption of information goods

Our motivation for this paper originates from recent advances in consumption and payment technologies available for mobile commerce. Ubiquitous computing is enabling consumers worldwide to reach digital content and services whenever and wherever they request it. This capability further fuels “impatience” in consumption of such information goods. We model such consumer behavior using a hyperbolic discounting approach. A subset of these products, especially software, also inherit delayed network externalities as part of their consumption characteristics. This builds a tension between decision to consume now or to expedite consumption. We build a stylized model to assess the impact of immediate gratification on the profit maximizing behavior of a monopolist firm which produces an information good with network externalities. We find that serving “impatient” consumers is always profitable for a monopolist. For lower levels of network externalities, the monopolist can increase first period and decrease second period prices in equilibrium. As network externalities effect increases, prices converge to the traditional market (with exponential discounters) levels.     

Capacity and price setting for dispersed,time-sensitive customer segments

We consider joint pricing and capacity decisions for a facility serving heterogeneous consumers that span a continuous range of locations, and are sensitive to time delays. Within this context, we analyze two contrasting service strategies: segmentation and pooling. Consumer segments differ with respect to their reservation prices and time sensitivities, and are dispersed over a single distance dimension. The firm serves these consumers using a process that we initially model as an M/M/1 queuing system. We analyze profit-maximizing price and capacity levels for a monopolist, and contrast the optimal segmentation and pooling policies. We find that when consumers are time sensitive, and can expect queuing delays at the firm’s facility (due to random arrival and service times), then scale economies from pooling can outweigh segmentation benefits. Yet, segmentation outperforms pooling when consumer segments differ substantively, in which case the firm can use capacity as a lever to price discriminate between the segments. Moreover, by contrasting a dedicated-services strategy, which directly targets specific segments and serves them separately, with the alternative of allowing consumers to self-select, we find that self-selection has a moderate negative influence on profits. We also examine the profit impact of employing alternative queuing systems, and find that a hybrid strategy based on a prioritized queuing discipline, that combines elements of segmentation (by offering different waiting times) and pooling (by sharing capacity across consumer segments), can outperform both the pure segmentation and pooling strategies.     

垄断企业垂直兼并前后的产品价格和利润比较

本文在垄断厂商供货周期确定的条件下 ,利用线性需求函数研究了垄断厂商与垄断销售商垂直兼并前后的产品价格和利润问题 .研究结果表明 :垄断企业兼并后的产品市场价格可能高于也可能低于垄断企业兼并前的产品市场价格 ,但是垄断企业兼并后的利润肯定高于垄断企业兼并前的利润 .     

Dynamic Harvesting Under Imperfect Catch Control

We analyze the optimal harvesting rule of a monopolist in a managed single-species fishery environment where we allow the fishery control to be imperfect. The monopolist’s control action consists of legal and illegal actions. Illegal actions might be detected at random times, in which case the monopolist is subject to a deterrence scheme in line with the Common Fishery Policy implemented by the European Union. We show that the introduction of the management policy, together with the inability of the regulator to perfectly monitor fishing activities, creates an incentive to harvest not only beyond the allowed quota, but also beyond the harvest in an unregulated but otherwise equal situation. This effect is particularly pronounced at lower levels of the legal quota. We also show that, if the monopolist is sufficiently impatient, over-harvesting with severe depletion of the resource might even occur under a reinforced deterrence scheme that considers the permanent withdrawal of the fishing license.     

网络效应影响下品牌商与模仿者的竞争策略

近年来,品牌商与模仿者的竞争问题引起了社会的广泛关注。本文构建了包含一个品牌商和一个潜在模仿者的两周期动态博弈模型,且消费者具有策略性行为。品牌商在第一周期是市场的垄断者,若模仿者在第二周期进入市场,那么第二周期会变成双寡头市场。模仿者入侵市场除了会引起竞争效应外,与品牌产品的相似性也会引起网络效应,从而增加品牌产品的市场接受度。因此,面对模仿者入侵,品牌商需要同时权衡竞争效应与网络效应两方面的影响。研究结果表明：(1)网络效应并不总是对品牌商和模仿者的价格和需求等产生积极影响。(2)模仿产品质量不可提升过高,当模仿产品质量和品牌产品质量过分接近时,两个企业的利润都会降低。(3)当网络效应较小或者模仿产品质量过高时,品牌商在双寡头市场的需求可能会高于垄断市场的需求。     

Capacity switching options under rivalry and uncertainty

Deregulated infrastructure industries exhibit stiff competition for market share. Firms may be able to limit the effects of competition by launching new projects in stages. Using a two-stage real options model, we explore the value of such flexibility. We first demonstrate that the value of investing in a sequential manner for a monopolist is positive but decreases with uncertainty. Next, we find that a typical duopoly firm’s value relative to a monopolist’s decreases with uncertainty as long as the loss in market share is high. Intriguingly, this result is reversed for a low loss in market share. We finally show that this loss in value is reduced if a firm invests in a sequential manner and specify the conditions under which sequential capacity expansion is more valuable for a duopolist firm than for a monopolist.     

Vertical separation as a defense against strong suppliers

We provide a simple model to investigate decisions about vertical separation. The key feature of this model is that more than one input is required for the final product of the downstream monopolist. We show that as the bargaining powers of independent complementary input suppliers grow larger, the downstream monopolist tends to separate from its input units. The results are related to a visible difference between the vertical structures of Japanese and US auto assemblers.     

Global facility network design in the presence of competition

We study the facility network design problem for a global firm that is a monopolist seller in its domestic market but faces local competition in its foreign market. The global firm produces in the face of demand and exchange rate uncertainty but can postpone localization and distribution of the output until after uncertainties are resolved. The competitor in the foreign market, however, enjoys the flexibility of postponing all production activities until after uncertainties are resolved. The two firms engage in an ex-post Cournot competition in the foreign market. We consider three potential network configurations for the global firm. Under a linear demand function, we provide the necessary and sufficient condition that one of the three networks is the global firm’s optimal choice, and explore how the presence of foreign competition affects the sensitivity of the global firm’s design to various cost parameters and market uncertainties.     

Non-cooperative monopolistic games and monopolistic market games

A class of non-cooperative games is discussed in which one player (“the monopolist”) by choosing his strategy restricts the other players to subsets of their strategy sets. Examples of such games in various fields are given. In particular it is shown that some very important economic situations fall within this class of games. A solution concept is defined and sufficient conditions for its existence are derived. The question of the advantages a player derives from being a monopolist is raised and conditions are derived for him to benefit from being a monopolist.     

Selling multiple units to strategic consumers

We consider a monopolist firm selling to strategic customers who may purchase more than one unit of a product in a two-period model. We provide closed-form solutions for the firm’s optimal prices and show that they are non-monotonic in both the value of the second unit and the strategic level of customers. Particularly, the first-period price can increase as customers become more strategic, in contrast to the single-unit setting where it always decreases in the strategic level of customers.     

考虑网络外部性的生鲜企业渠道选择策略研究

考虑到生鲜产品容易变质而且线上配送时间较长,并且线上销售可为消费者带来额外网络外部性,传统生鲜企业在电商冲击的背景下需要考虑是否入驻电商平台开拓线上业务。为解决此类企业所面临渠道选择问题,本文考虑一个传统生鲜企业和一个主导电商市场的电商平台,并通过构建理论模型研究企业最优生鲜产品定价和渠道选择策略。研究结果表明,若平台所收取年服务费较低,则企业应入驻平台;反之,企业不应入驻平台。此外,消费者网络外部性敏感程度对企业入驻平台行为具有正影响。在拓展模型,本文考虑分散式供应链情形下企业最优渠道选择,结果表明相较于集中式决策,分散式供应链情形下零售商更不愿意入驻平台。此外,本文通过设计收益共享契约以协调生鲜企业与电商平台,并发现通过契约协调,零售商更愿意入驻电商平台。     

Price setting policies for service systems in case of uncertain demand and service time

Building anM/M/1 queueing model, we determine price and capacity of a service system within monopolistic and competitive frameworks.The existence of a solution for a monopolist is shown and optimal capacity is determined, if demand is elastic.We also determine, within a competitive framework, the number of firms, outputs of each per unit of time, and the relation between price and the number of firms for elastic demands (which has a maximum).Finally, we show that competition supplies a much larger output than monopoly at the price set by the monopolist, if elasticity equals 2.     

考虑库存和市场占有率的纵向一体化

本文将传统的双重加价模型扩展到包含库存因素的上下游厂商均为垄断企业、下游厂商为寡头垄断企业而上游厂商为完全垄断企业以及上游厂商为寡头垄断企业而下游厂商为完全垄断企业的一体化模型，着重探讨了库存成本和市场占有率对纵向一体化的影响。研究结果表明，只有在库存成本较低时，传统的结论才得以维持；一体化始终导致消费者福利上升而不受市场占有率的影响，但一体化使厂商的总利润增加要在市场占有率较高时才能实现。     

Operational issues and network effects in vaccine markets

One of the most important concerns for managing public health is the prevention of infectious diseases. Although vaccines provide the most effective means for preventing infectious diseases, there are two main reasons why it is often difficult to reach a socially optimal level of vaccine coverage: (i) the emergence of operational issues (such as yield uncertainty) on the supply side, and (ii) the existence of negative network effects on the consumption side. In particular, uncertainties about production yield and vaccine imperfections often make manufacturing some vaccines a risky process and may lead the manufacturer to produce below the socially optimal level. At the same time, negative network effects provide incentives to potential consumers to free ride off the immunity of the vaccinated population. In this research, we consider how a central policy-maker can induce a socially optimal vaccine coverage through the use of incentives to both consumers and the vaccine manufacturer. We consider a monopoly market for an imperfect vaccine; we show that a fixed two-part subsidy is unable to coordinate the market, but derive a two-part menu of subsidies that leads to a socially efficient level of coverage.     

The effect of vertical integration on consumer price in the presence of inventory costs

This paper investigates the effect on consumer price of a vertical merger between a monopolist manufacturer and his retailer, when inventory costs are taken into consideration. We find that the traditional result (lower prices) remains true only when inventory costs are sufficiently small. The direction of the price change also depends on the market size.     

EMISSION PERMITS UNDER MONOPOLY

This paper studies the regulation of pollution emissions when one polluting firm is a monopolist in its output market and other polluting firms are competitive in their output markets. It is shown that an emissions permit system can generally support a second-best allocation when the monopolistic firm has market power in the emission permit market. The second-best permit regulation specifies a permit endowment for the monopolist such that the monopolist is a net supplier of permits in the equilibrium. Extensions to cases of multiple monopoly, monopsony, and oligopoly are discussed.     

The impact of dynamic pricing on the economic order decision

This paper analyzes the impact of dynamic pricing on the single product economic order decision of a monopolist retailer. Items are procured from an external supplier according to the economic order quantity (EOQ) model and are sold to customers on a single market without competition following the simple monopolist pricing problem. Coordinated decision making of optimal pricing and ordering is influenced by operating costs – including ordering and inventory holding costs – and the demand rate obtained from a price response function. The retailer is allowed to vary the selling price, either in a fixed number of discrete points in time or continuously. While constant and continuous pricing have received much attention in the literature, problems with a limited number of price changes are rather rare. This paper illustrates the benefit of dynamically changing prices to achieve operational efficiency in the EOQ model, that is to trigger high demand rates when inventories are high. We provide structural properties of the optimal time instants when the price should be changed. Taking into account costs for changes in price, it provides numerical guidance on number, timing, and size of price changes during an order cycle. Numerical examples show that the benefits of dynamic pricing in an EOQ framework can be achieved with only a few price changes and that products being unprofitable under static pricing may become profitable under dynamic pricing.     

Technological Efficiency and Organizational Inertia: A Model of the Emergence of Disruption

We study the influence of technological efficiency and organizational inertia on the emergence of competition when firms decide myopically. Using a multi-agent computer simulation model, we observe the competitive reaction of a former monopolist to the advent of a new competitor. While the entrant uses a new technology, the monopolist is free either to stick to his former technology or to switch to the new one. We find that—irrespective of details regarding the demand side—a change of industry leadership occurs only if the new (disruptive) technology is not too efficient and organizations are inert.     

MONOPOLY,POTENTIAL COMPETITION AND PRIVATE STOCK INFORMATION IN EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCE MARKETS

ABSTRACT. This paper develops an exhaustible resource model with an incumbent monopolist that faces future potential entry of a single rival or backstop technology. The model is characterized by private stock information in the sense that firms do not know with certainty the size and/or quality of their rival's reserve stock. Results indicate that if such information is private, the strategic response of the monopolist to an entry threat is to extract reserves in the pre‐entry era at a rate faster than would a pure monopolist in an uncontested market, and thus could lead to an improvement in economic welfare relative to the situation where entry is restricted.