Supplier default dependencies: Empirical evidence from the automotive industry

Common ways to mitigate the detrimental consequences of supplier bankruptcies are to install redundancy and to pursue a multiple-sourcing strategy. This is based on the assumption that the adverse event of one supplier going out of business is largely independent from the default of other suppliers. However, this implicit assumption does not hold in all cases. This study – based on empirical data from automotive suppliers – reveals that default dependencies among suppliers do often exist and can have significant consequences. We use copula functions, a method of representing joint distribution functions with particular marginals, to capture the default dependence between automotive suppliers and to simulate various default dependence scenarios. We also conduct a comparative static analysis illustrating the significant impact of default correlation in a supplier portfolio. Our findings should spur managers to analyze their supplier portfolios with respect to default dependencies, and to take this phenomenon into consideration when making sourcing decisions.     

Single versus multiple supplier sourcing strategies

Successful supply chain management necessitates an effective sourcing strategy to combat uncertainties in both supply and demand. In particular, supply disruption results in excessive downtime of production resources, upstream and downstream supply chain repercussions, and eventually a loss in the market value of the firm. In this paper we analyze single period, single product sourcing decisions under demand uncertainty. Our approach integrates product prices, supplier costs, supplier capacities, historical supplier reliabilities and firm specific inventory costs. A unique feature of our approach is the integration of a firm specific supplier diversification function. We also extend our analysis to examine the impact of minimum supplier order quantities. Our results indicate that single sourcing is a dominant strategy only when supplier capacities are large relative to the product demand and when the firm does not obtain diversification benefits. In other cases, we find that multiple sourcing is an optimal sourcing strategy. We also characterize a non-intuitive trade-off between supplier minimum order quantities, costs, and supplier reliabilities. Finally, we examine the robustness of our results through an extensive numerical analysis of the key parameters of our model.     

Coordination in a two-stage capacitated supply chain with multiple suppliers

The aim of this paper is to coordinate the inventory policies in a decentralized supply chain with stochastic demand by means of contracts. The system considered is a decentralized two-stage supply chain consisting of multiple independent suppliers and a manufacturer with limited production capacities. The suppliers operate on a make-to-stock basis and apply base stock policy to manage their inventories. On the other hand, the manufacturer employs a make-to-order strategy. Under the necessary assumptions, each supplier is modeled as an M/M/1 make-to-stock queue; and the manufacturer is modeled as a GI/M/1 queue after deriving an approximate distribution for the interarrival times of the manufacturer. Once the supply chain is modeled as a queuing system, centralized and decentralized models are developed. Comparison of the optimal solutions to these models reveals that the supply chain needs coordination. Three different transfer payment contracts are examined in this paper. These are the backorder and holding cost subsidy contracts, the transfer payment contract based on Pareto improvement, and the cost sharing contract. Each contract is evaluated according to its coordination ability and whether it is Pareto improving or not. The results indicate that all three contracts can coordinate the supply chain. However, when the Pareto improvement is taken into account, the cost sharing contract seems to be the one that will be preferred by all parties.     

Competitive strategies and market segmentation for suppliers with substitutable products

This research studies the competition between two coexisting suppliers in a two-echelon supply chain. The suppliers have different inventory cost structures (holding cost and setup cost). Each supplier offers one type of the two substitutable products to multiple buyers. Buyers’ preferences between the substitutable products differ. Each buyer has a particular order profile (order frequency and quantity). A buyer chooses between the suppliers based on the prices offered by both suppliers and his/her own preference. A Hotelling-type model is used to describe buyers’ preferences for the products. We are able to describe the conditions for buyers to switch between the suppliers, and therefore spot the buyer groups that may or may not switch when the suppliers compete. Pricing strategies for different buyer groups are suggested to the competitive suppliers accordingly. Furthermore, equilibrium prices, market segments, and overall profits for the suppliers are revealed based on Game Theory. An algorithm is also proposed to forecast buyers’ reactions to suppliers’ pricing strategies given the buyers’ order profiles and preferences between the substitutable products.     

Outsourcing suppliers as downstream competitors: Biting the hand that feeds

In this paper, we highlight an aspect of supplier opportunism in the outsourcing paradox that has largely been ignored by extant research – the supplier as a direct competitor of the buyer firm. In light of this paradox, we offer a game-theoretic framework in which we identify conditions under which firms could alleviate or mitigate this outsourcing problem. Our results show that apart from transaction costs, firm-level capabilities (both ordinary and dynamic) play important roles in determining the make only, buy only, or make-and-buy options a firm could exercise in countering the threat of the supplier as a potential competitor in the downstream marketplace.     

Incorporating quantity discounts and their inventory impacts into the centralized purchasing decision

Multi-site organizations must balance conflicting forces to determine the appropriate degree of purchasing centralization for their respective supplies. The ability to garner quantity discounts represents one of the primary reasons that organizations centralize procurement. This paper provides methodologies to calculate optimal order quantities and compute total purchasing and inventory costs when products have quantity discount pricing. Procedures for both all-units and incremental quantity discount schedules are provided for four different strategic purchasing configurations (scenarios): complete decentralization, centralized pricing with decentralized purchasing, centralized purchasing with local distribution, and centralized purchasing and warehousing. For ordering decisions under local distribution, procedures to determine optimal order quantities and costs are presented in a precise form that could be easily implemented into spreadsheets by practicing managers. For the more complicated multi-echelon scenarios, we introduce a single-cycle policy with a tailored aggregation refinement step that performs very well under experimentation when compared to a conservative bound.     

Jointly pricing and ordering for a multi-product multi-constraint newsvendor problem with supplier quantity discounts

We present an extension to the multi-product newsvendor problem by incorporating the retailer’s pricing decision as well as considering supplier quantity discount. The objective is to maximize the expected profit of the retailer through jointly determining the ordering quantities and selling prices for the products, subject to multiple capacity constraints. We formulate the problem as a Generalized Disjunctive Programming (GDP) model and develop a Lagrangian heuristic approach for its solution. Randomly produced instances involving up to 1000 products are used to test the proposed approach. Computational results show that the Lagrangian heuristic approach can present very good solutions to all instances in reasonable time.     

Allocating procurement to capacitated suppliers with concave quantity discounts

We consider a procurement problem where suppliers offer concave quantity discounts. The resulting continuous knapsack problem involves the minimization of a sum of separable concave functions. We identify polynomially solvable special cases of this NP-hard problem, and provide a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for the general problem.     

A serial inventory system with supplier selection and order quantity allocation

Given the prevalence of both supplier selection and inventory control problems in supply chain management, this article addresses these problems simultaneously by developing a mathematical model for a serial system. This model determines an optimal inventory policy that coordinates the transfer of items between consecutive stages of the system while properly allocating orders to selected suppliers in stage 1. In addition, a lower bound on the minimum total cost per time unit is obtained and a 98% effective power-of-two (POT) inventory policy is derived for the system under consideration. This POT algorithm is advantageous since it is simple to compute and yields near optimal solutions.     

Markdown money contracts for perishable goods with clearance pricing

It is common in practice that retailers liquidate unsold perishable goods via clearance pricing. Markdown money is frequently used between manufacturers and retailers in such a supply chain setting. It is a form of rebate from a manufacturer to subsidize a retailer’s clearance pricing after the regular season. Two forms of markdown money are percent markdown money, in which the markdown money is limited to only a certain percentage of the retail price markdown, and quantity markdown money, which is essentially a buyback contract or returns policy with a rebate credit paid to the retailer for each unsold unit after the regular season. We show both forms of markdown money contracts can coordinate the supply chain and we discuss their strengths and limitations.     

Selection of contract suppliers under price and demand uncertainty in a dynamic market

In this paper, we consider a supply contracting problem in which the buyer firm faces non-stationary stochastic price and demand. First, we derive analytical results to compare two pure strategies: (i) periodically purchasing from the spot market; and (ii) signing a long-term contract with a single supplier. The results from the pure strategies show that the selection of suppliers can be complicated by many parameters, and is particularly affected by price uncertainty. We then develop a stochastic dynamic programming model to incorporate mixed strategies, purchasing commitments and contract cancellations. Computational results show that increases in price (demand) uncertainty favor long-term (short-term) suppliers. By examining the two-way interactions of contract factors (price, demand, purchasing bounds, learning and technology effect, salvage values and contract cancellation), both intuitive and non-intuitive managerial insights in outsourcing strategies are derived.     

A heuristic for single-warehouse multiretailer supply chains with all-unit transportation cost discounts

In supply chain management research, transportation costs, if explicitly considered at all, are frequently assumed to be linear. These costs often have a more complex form, such as an all-unit discount structure – this piecewise cost function adds significant complexity when included in supply chain management problems and is therefore often ignored due to solution time or tractability concerns. We present and evaluate a new heuristic procedure which provides good solutions to problems involving all-unit discount cost functions while significantly reducing solution times. The general nature of this procedure does not require assumptions about the supply chain structure or policies, and is therefore applicable in a wide range of settings.     

Designing a quantity discount scheme for a newsvendor-type product with numerous heterogeneous retailers

This paper presents a practical approach for designing a quantity-discount (“qd”) scheme for a manufacturer who supplies a newsvendor-type product to a large number of heterogeneous retailers. The main components of our approach are: (i) an information structure for handling a large number of heterogeneous retailers with changing identities; and (ii) expected-profit expressions for any given qd scheme. We show that these expected-profit expressions can be easily optimized to produce attractive qd schemes; also, these schemes are shown to be quite robust against errors in parameter estimation.     

An integrated model for lot sizing with supplier selection and quantity discounts

Good inventory management is essential for a firm to be cost competitive and to acquire decent profit in the market, and how to achieve an outstanding inventory management has been a popular topic in both the academic field and in real practice for decades. As the production environment getting increasingly complex, various kinds of mathematical models have been developed, such as linear programming, nonlinear programming, mixed integer programming, geometric programming, gradient-based nonlinear programming and dynamic programming, to name a few. However, when the problem becomes NP-hard, heuristics tools may be necessary to solve the problem. In this paper, a mixed integer programming (MIP) model is constructed first to solve the lot-sizing problem with multiple suppliers, multiple periods and quantity discounts. An efficient Genetic Algorithm (GA) is proposed next to tackle the problem when it becomes too complicated. The objectives are to minimize total costs, where the costs include ordering cost, holding cost, purchase cost and transportation cost, under the requirement that no inventory shortage is allowed in the system, and to determine an appropriate inventory level for each planning period. The results demonstrate that the proposed GA model is an effective and accurate tool for determining the replenishment for a manufacturer for multi-periods.     

An integrated revenue sharing and quantity discounts contract for coordinating a supply chain dealing with short life-cycle products

This paper develops a combined contract model for coordinating a two stage supply chain where the demand at the retailer’s end is price sensitive and stock dependent. It has been shown that proposed coordination mechanism achieves perfect coordination and win–win situation for both the members of the supply chain. Further, an extensive sensitivity analysis is performed to examine the impact of various parameters on supply chain performance. It has been found that stock dependency factor has positive impact on order quantity and subsequently on supply chain performance. The paper has also made a comparative statics analysis to see the impact of certain parameters on the pricing and replenishment policies of the retailer.     

Coordinating order quantity decisions in the supply chain contract under random demand

In this paper, we are concerned with the coordinating quantity decision problem in a supply chain contract. The supply chain contract is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer to meet the random demand of a single product with a short lifecycle. Our analysis show that the retailer expects to obtain higher profit under proper ordering policies, which can also maximize the expected profit of the supply chain. The manufacturer may induce the retailer to order the coordinated quantity by adjusting the unit return price. As a result, the supply chain is expected to achieve the optimal expected profit.     

A capacity reservation game for suppliers with multiple blocks of capacity

This paper studies a supplier competition model in which a buyer reserves capacity from a number of suppliers that each have multiple blocks of capacity (e.g., production or power plants). The suppliers each submit a bid that specifies a reservation price and an execution price for every block, and the buyer determines what blocks to reserve. This game involves both external competition between suppliers and internal competition between blocks from each supplier. We characterize the properties of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for the game. Such equilibria may not always exist, and we provide the conditions under which they do.     

Analysis of supply chains with quantity based fixed incentives

This paper examines the use of quantity based fixed incentives to coordinate inventory decisions in a decentralized supply chain. We consider a two stage supply chain of autonomous supplier and distributor and prove that the optimal ordering policy for the newsvendor distributor under fixed incentives is an (s,S)$(s\text{,}S)$ type policy. We further show that external and internal quantity based incentives can restore channel coordination in single period and channel members can benefit through arbitrary splitting of the resulting additional chain profit. The single period results are extended to multiple periods and the impact of fixed incentives on the distributor’s optimal stocking policy and channel efficiency are examined under three different multi-period supplier strategies. Numerical examples are used to compare the multi-period strategies and to provide additional managerial insights. The results show that contrary to common belief, incentive plans developed and maintained based only on current inventory data perform poorly in long term and that such incentive plans must be periodically updated to enhance their efficiency. Furthermore, we show that high level of incentives designed to push too much inventory downstream of the supply chain can actually reduce the chain’s efficiency.     

A two-stage supply chain coordination mechanism considering price sensitive demand and quantity discounts

This paper explores the coordination between a supplier and a buyer within a decentralized supply chain, through the use of quantity discounts in a game theoretic model. Within this model, the players face inventory and pricing decisions. We propose both cooperative and non-cooperative approaches considering that the product traded experiences a price sensitive demand. In the first case, we study the dynamics of the game from the supplier's side as the leader in the negotiation obtaining a Stackelberg equilibrium, and then show how the payoff of this player could still improve from this point. In the second case, a cooperative model is formulated, where decisions are taken simultaneously, emulating a centralized firm, showing the benefits of the cooperation between the players. We further formulate a pricing game, where the buyer is allowed to set different prices to the final customer as a reaction to the supplier's discount decisions. For the latter we investigate the difference between feasibility of implementing a retail discount given a current coordination mechanism and without it. Finally the implications of transportation costs are analyzed in the quantity discount schedule. Our findings are illustrated with a numerical example showing the difference in the players’ payoff in each case and the optimal strategies, comparing in each case our results with existing work.     

Production control and replenishment strategy with multiple suppliers

This paper considers the joint supplier selection, replenishment and manufacturing control problem in a dynamic stochastic context. This problem is characterized by conflicting interests between suppliers, the manufacturer, and clients, which raise the need for coordination and information sharing. This paper contributes to the discourse mainly by developing and resolving an integrated mathematical model leading to information sharing strategies for supplier selection, replenishments and production activities. This is an optimal control problem with state constraints and hybrid dynamics. A dynamic stochastic model is thus proposed, and the optimality conditions obtained are then solved numerically. It is shown that the problem considered leads to a modified state-dependent multi-level (s, S) policy for the supplier selection and replenishment strategy and a base-stock policy for the production activities. The fact that these control policies are coupled confirms the necessity of considering the interactions present in the system in an integrated model. The obtained results show clearly that it is always profitable to consider multiple suppliers to make replenishment and production decisions. Moreover, it is shown that the availability rates of the supply chain actors and the replenishment lead time are important parameters to consider when choosing the best supplier.