Generalized coalitional semivalues

In this paper we change some axioms in the axiom system which defines coalitional semivalues [Albizuri, M.J., Zarzuelo J.M., 2004. On coalitional semivalues. Games and Economic Behavior 49, 221–243] and we define generalized coalitional semivalues. Generalized coalitional semivalues, like coalitional semivalues, are “compositions” of semivalues, but they form a broader set of “compositions”. Like coalitional semivalues, generalized coalitional semivalues are extensions to the coalitional context of semivalues for transferable utility games [Dubey, P., Neyman, A., Weber, R.J., 1981. Value theory without efficiency. Mathematics of Operations Research 6, 122–128].     

Matrix analysis for associated consistency in cooperative game theory

Hamiache axiomatized the Shapley value as the unique solution verifying the inessential game property, continuity and associated consistency. Driessen extended Hamiache’s axiomatization to the enlarged class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values. In this paper, we introduce the notion of row (resp. column)-coalitional matrix in the framework of cooperative game theory. The Shapley value as well as the associated game are represented algebraically by their coalitional matrices called the Shapley standard matrix M^Sh and the associated transformation matrix M_λ, respectively. We develop a matrix approach for Hamiache’s axiomatization of the Shapley value. The associated consistency for the Shapley value is formulated as the matrix equality M^Sh = M^Sh · M_λ. The diagonalization procedure of M_λ and the inessential property for coalitional matrices are fundamental tools to prove the convergence of the sequence of repeated associated games as well as its limit game to be inessential. In addition, a similar matrix approach is applicable to study Driessen’s axiomatization of a certain class of linear values. In summary, it is illustrated that matrix analysis is a new and powerful technique for research in the field of cooperative game theory.     

A new look at the role of players’ weights in the weighted Shapley value

everal new families of semivalues for weighted n-person transferable utility games are axiomatically constructed and discussed under increasing collections of axioms, where the weighted Shapley value arises as the resulting one member family. A more general approach to such weighted games defined in the form of two components, a weight vector λ and a classical TU-game v, is provided. The proposed axiomatizations are done both in terms of λ and v. Several new axioms related to the weight vector λ are discussed, including the so-called “amalgamating payoffs” axiom, which characterizes the value of a weighted game in terms of another game with a smaller number of players. They allow for a new look at the role of players’ weights in the context of the weighted Shapley value for the model of weighted games, giving new properties of it. Besides, another simple formula for the weighted Shapley value is found and examples illustrating some surprising behavior of it in the context of players’ weights are given. The paper contains a wide discussion of the results obtained.     

On the symmetric and weighted shapley values

We present new axiomatic characterizations of the symmetric Shapley value and of weighted Shapley values for transferable utility coalitional form games without imposing the axiom ofadditivity (Shapley [1953a,b]). Our main condition iscoalitional strategic equivalence, introduced by Chun [1989]. We show thatcoalitional strategic equivalence, together withefficiency, andsymmetry, characterizes the symmetric Shapley value, and this axiom, together withefficiency, positivity, homogeneity, andpartnership, characterizes weighted Shapley values.     

The class of microarray games and the relevance index for genes

Nowadays, microarray technology is available to generate a huge amount of information on gene expression. This information must be statistically processed and analyzed, in particular, to identify those genes which are useful for the diagnosis and prognosis of specific diseases. We discuss the possibility of applying game-theoretical tools, like the Shapley value, to the analysis of gene expression data. Via a “truncation” technique, we build a coalitional game whose aim is to stress the relevance (“sufficiency”) of groups of genes for the specific disease we are interested in. The Shapley value of this game is used to select those genes which deserve further investigation. To justify the use of the Shapley value in this context, we axiomatically characterize it using properties with a genetic interpretation. The authors are grateful to two anonymous referees for their extremely helpful comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the VI Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Practice, July 12–14, 2004, Elche, Spain. S. Moretti gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the EU project NewGeneris, European Union 6th FP (FOOD-CT-2005-016320).     

Factorizing τ-spectra of mappings

In this paper by a spectrum of mappings we mean a morphism of spectra of spaces. However, using the notion of a mapping of mappings, we give the definition of a spectrum of mappings similar to that of a spectrum of spaces. In this case, the formulations of the given results are also similar to the formulations of the corresponding results concerning the spectra of spaces.For the spectra of mappings we define the notion of a τ-spectrum of mappings factorizing in a special sense and prove a version of the Spectral Theorem for such spectra. Furthermore, to a given indexed collection F of mapping we associate a τ-spectrum factorizing in the above special sense whose mappings are Containing Mappings for F constructed in Iliadis (2005) [4]. These associated τ-spectra and the corresponding version of the Spectral Theorem imply that for a given indexed collection F of mappings any so-called “natural” τ-spectrum for F factorizing in the special sense contains a cofinal and τ-closed subspectrum whose mappings are Containing Mapping for F. Thus, Containing Mappigs for F appear here without any concrete construction. The associated τ-spectra are used also in order to define and characterize the so-called second-type saturated classes of mappings (which are “saturated” by universal elements).     

Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures

This paper studies a non-cooperative mechanism implementing a cooperative solution for a situation in which members of a society are subdivided into groups and/or coalitions and there is asymmetry among the individuals of the society. To describe hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structure simultaneously, we present unified classes of games, the games with social structure, and define a weighted value for these games. We show that our mechanism works in any zero-monotonic environment and implements the Shapley value, the weighted Shapley value, the Owen’s coalitional value, and the weighted coalitional value, in some special cases.     

Random marginal and random removal values

We propose two variations of the non-cooperative bargaining model for games in coalitional form, introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (Econometrica 64:357–380, 1996a). These strategic games implement, in the limit, two new NTU-values: the random marginal and the random removal values. Their main characteristic is that they always select a unique payoff allocation in NTU-games. The random marginal value coincides with the Consistent NTU-value (Maschler and Owen in Int J Game Theory 18:389–407, 1989) for hyperplane games, and with the Shapley value for TU games (Shapley in In: Contributions to the theory of Games II. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307–317, 1953). The random removal value coincides with the solidarity value (Nowak and Radzik in Int J Game Theory 23:43–48, 1994) in TU-games. In large games we show that, in the special class of market games, the random marginal value coincides with the Shapley NTU-value (Shapley in In: La Décision. Editions du CNRS, Paris, 1969), and that the random removal value coincides with the equal split value.      

Weighted multiple majority games with unions: Generating functions and applications to the European Union

An a priori system of unions or coalition structure is a partition of a finite set of players into disjoint coalitions which have made a prior commitment to cooperate in playing a game. This paper provides “ready-to-apply” procedures based on generating functions that are easily implementable to compute coalitional power indices in weighted multiple majority games. As an application of the proposed procedures, we calculate and compare coalitional power indices under the decision rules prescribed by the Treaty of Nice and the new rules proposed by the Council of the European Union.     

Stability and Shapley value for an n-persons fuzzy game

The aim of the paper is to explain new concepts of solutions for n-persons fuzzy games. Precisely, it contains new definitions for ‘core’ and ‘Shapley value’ in the case of the n-persons fuzzy games. The basic mathematical results contained in the paper are these which assert the consistency of the ‘core’ and of the ‘Shapley value’. It is proved that the core (defined in the paper) is consistent for any n-persons fuzzy game and that the Shapley values exists and it is unique for any fuzzy game with proportional values.     

The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures

In this study, we provide a new solution for cooperative games with coalition structures. The collective value of a player is defined as the sum of the equal division of the pure surplus obtained by his coalition from the coalitional bargaining and of his Shapley value for the internal coalition. The weighted Shapley value applied to a game played by coalitions with coalition-size weights is assigned to each coalition, reflecting the size asymmetries among coalitions. We show that the collective value matches exogenous interpretations of coalition structures and provide an axiomatic foundation of this value. A noncooperative mechanism that implements the collective value is also presented.     

The fuzzy core in games with fuzzy coalitions

In this paper, the fuzzy core of games with fuzzy coalition is proposed, which can be regarded as the generalization of crisp core. The fuzzy core is based on the assumption that the total worth of a fuzzy coalition will be allocated to the players whose participation rate is larger than zero. The nonempty condition of the fuzzy core is given based on the fuzzy convexity. Three kinds of special fuzzy cores in games with fuzzy coalition are studied, and the explicit fuzzy core represented by the crisp core is also given. Because the fuzzy Shapley value had been proposed as a kind of solution for the fuzzy games, the relationship between fuzzy core and the fuzzy Shapley function is also shown. Surprisingly, the relationship between fuzzy core and the fuzzy Shapley value does coincide, as in the classical case.     

基于区间与模糊Shapley值的合作收益分配策略

将经典Shapley值三条公理进行拓广,提出具有模糊支付合作对策的Shapley值公理体系。研究一种特殊的模糊支付合作对策,即具有区间支付的合作对策,并且给出了该区间Shapley值形式。根据模糊数和区间数的对应关系,提出模糊支付合作对策的Shapley值,指出该模糊Shapley值是区间支付模糊合作对策的自然模糊延拓。结果表明:对于任意给定置信水平α,若α=1,则模糊Shapley值对应经典合作对策的Shapley值,否则对应具有区间支付合作对策的区间Shapley值。通过模糊数的排序,给出了最优的分配策略。由于对具有模糊支付的合作对策进行比较系统的研究,从而为如何求解局中人参与联盟程度模糊化、支付函数模糊化的合作对策,奠定了一定的基础。     

Beginners’ progress in early arithmetic in the Swedish compulsory school

This article focuses on spontaneous knowledge-building in the field of “the arithmetic of the child.” The aim is to investigate the conceptual progress of fifteen children during their early school years in the compulsory school. The study is based on the epistemology of radical constructivism and the methodology of “multiple clinical interviews”. A model of “the arithmetic of the child” elucidates mental structures used by the child in solving problems. The individual interviews are video-recorded. The results show that the children's solutions are compatible with the model. When the researcher adapts problems to the children's available concepts to bring out their capability, they all solve them in their own ways. Further, the conceptual levels of the children differ to a great extent at school start and do not all show conceptual progress after 2 years of traditional teaching. An implication for an alternative teaching process is suggested, namely “the arithmetic for the child”, accomplished in a triadic teaching process.     

On contracts for VMI program with continuous review (r, Q) policy

Based on continuous review (r, Q) policy, this paper deals with contracts for vendor managed inventory (VMI) program in a system comprising a single vendor and a single retailer. Two business scenarios that are popular in VMI program are “vendor with ownership” and “retailer with ownership”. Taking the system performance in centralized control as benchmark, we define a contract “perfect” if the contract can enable the system to be coordinated and can guarantee the program to be trusted. A revenue sharing contract is designed for vendor with ownership, and a franchising contract is designed for retailer with ownership. Without consideration of order policy and related costs at the vendor site, it is shown that one contract can perform satisfactorily and the other one is a perfect contract. With consideration of order policy and related costs at the vendor site, it is shown that one contract can perform satisfactorily and the performance of the other one depends on system parameters.     

A degree sum condition for graphs to be prism hamiltonian

Win, in 1975, and Jackson and Wormald, in 1990, found the best sufficient conditions on the degree sum of a graph to guarantee the properties of “having a k-tree” and “having a k-walk”, respectively. The property of “being prism hamiltonian” is an intermediate property between “having a 2-tree” and “having a 2-walk”. Thus, it is natural to ask what is the best degree sum condition for graphs to be prism hamiltonian. As an answer to this problem, in this paper, we show that a connected graph G of order n with σ₃(G)≥n is prism hamiltonian. The degree sum condition “σ₃(G)≥n” is best possible.     

New affine measures of symmetry for convex bodies

Grünbaum introduced measures of symmetry for convex bodies that measure how far a given convex body is from a centrally symmetric one. Here, we introduce new measures of symmetry that measure how far a given convex body is from one with “enough symmetries”.To define these new measures of symmetry, we use affine covariant points. We give examples of convex bodies whose affine covariant points are “far apart”. In particular, we give an example of a convex body whose centroid and Santaló point are “far apart”.     

Generalization of Ulam stability problem for Euler-Lagrange quadratic mappings

In 1968 S.M. Ulam proposed the problem: “When is it true that by changing a little the hypotheses of a theorem one can still assert that the thesis of the theorem remains true or approximately true?” In 1978 P.M. Gruber proposed the Ulam type problem: “Suppose a mathematical object satisfies a certain property approximately. Is it then possible to approximate this object by objects, satisfying the property exactly?” In this paper we solve the generalized Ulam stability problem for non-linear Euler-Lagrange quadratic mappings satisfying approximately a mean equation and an Euler-Lagrange type functional equations in quasi-Banach spaces and p-Banach spaces.     

Extension of VIKOR method for decision making problem based on hesitant fuzzy set

The multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) methods VIKOR and TOPSIS are all based on an aggregating function representing “closeness to the ideal”, which originated in the compromise programming method. The VIKOR method of compromise ranking determines a compromise solution, providing a maximum “group utility” for the “majority” and a minimum of an “individual regret” for the “opponent”, which is an effective tool in multi-criteria decision making, particularly in a situation where the decision maker is not able, or does not know to express his/her preference at the beginning of system design. The TOPSIS method determines a solution with the shortest distance to the ideal solution and the greatest distance from the negative-ideal solution, but it does not consider the relative importance of these distances. And, the hesitant fuzzy set is a very useful tool to deal with uncertainty, which can be accurately and perfectly described in terms of the opinions of decision makers. In this paper, we develop the E-VIKOR method and TOPSIS method to solve the MCDM problems with hesitant fuzzy set information. Firstly, the hesitant fuzzy set information and corresponding concepts are described, and the basic essential of the VIKOR method is introduced. Then, the problem on multiple attribute decision marking is described, and the principles and steps of the proposed E-VIKOR method and TOPSIS method are presented. Finally, a numerical example illustrates an application of the E-VIKOR method, and the result by the TOPSIS method is compared.