A stackelberg model for Server-Proxies-Users systems

A Server-Proxies-Users communication system is studied by using Stackelberg strategy theory of game. A new model, in which the server, proxies and users are not equal is established, and that is a threelevel programming. The solution existence of the model is proved.     

A stackelberg game approach to distributed spectrum management

We consider a cognitive radio system with one primary (licensed) user and multiple secondary (unlicensed) users. Given the interference temperature constraint, the secondary users compete for the available spectrum to fulfill their own communication need. Borrowing the concept of price from market theory, we develop a decentralized Stackelberg game formulation for power allocation. In this scheme, the primary user (leader) announces prices for the available tones such that a system utility is maximized. Using the announced prices, secondary users (followers) compete for the available bandwidth to maximize their own utilities. We show that this Stackelberg game is polynomial time solvable under certain channel conditions. When the individual power constraints of secondary users are inactive (due to strict interference temperature constraint), the proposed distributed power control method is decomposable across the tones and unlike normal water-filling it respects the interference temperature constraints of the primary user. When individual power constraints are active, we propose a distributed approach that solves the problem under an aggregate interference temperature constraint. Moreover, we propose a dual decomposition based power control method and show that it solves the Stackelberg game asymptotically when the number of tones becomes large.     

Topological existence and stability for stackelberg problems

The aim of this paper is to study, in a topological framework, existence and stability for the solutions to a parametrized Stackelberg problem. To this end, approximate solutions are used, more precisely, -solutions and strict -solutions. The results given are of minimal character and the standard types of constraints are considered, that is, constant constraints, constraints defined by a finite number of inequalities, and more generally constraints defined by an arbitrary multifunction.     

Incentive compatible strategies for general stackelberg games with incomplete information

We study Stackelberg games with incomplete information in a general setting. In particular, we deduce the follower's reaction function, a set-valued function of the leader's action choice and a parameter specifying the follower's payoff type (a parameter about which the leader has only incomplete information), and using a generalized version of Komlos' Theorem due to Balder (1987), we show the existence of an expected payoff maximizing, incentive compatible strategy for the leader given the follower's reaction function.     

An elaborative unit cost structure-based fuzzy economic production quantity model

The purpose of this paper is to investigate and propose a fuzzy extended economic production quantity model based on an elaboratively modeled unit cost structure. This unit cost structure consists of the various lot-size correlative components such as on-line setups, off-line setups, initial production defectives, direct material, labor, and depreciation in addition to lot-size non-correlative items. Thus, the unit cost is correlatively modeled to the production quantity. Therefore, the modeling or the annual total cost function developed consists of not only annual inventory and setup costs but also production cost. Moreover, via the concept of fuzzy blurred optimal argument and the vertex method of the α-cut fuzzy arithmetic (or fuzzy interval analysis), two solution approaches are proposed: (1) a fuzzy EPQ and (2) a compromised crisp EPQ in the fuzzy sense. An optimization procedure, which can simultaneously determine the α-cut-vertex combination of fuzzy parameters and the optimizing decision variable value, is also proposed. The sensitivity model for the fuzzy total cost and thus EPQ to the various cost factors is provided. Finally, a numerical example with the original data collected from a firm demonstrates the usefulness of the new model.     

Evolutionary game model for a marketing cooperative with penalty for unfaithfulness

A game-theoretical model for the behaviour in a marketing cooperative is proposed. For the strategy choice an evolutionary dynamics is introduced. Considering a model with penalty for unfaithfulness and Cournot type market situation, it is shown that, if the penalty is effective then this strategy dynamics drives the players towards an attractive solution, a particular type of Nash equilibrium. A model with redistribution of penalty is also studied. For the symmetric case, on the basis of stability analysis of the strategy dynamics, in terms of the model parameters, sufficient conditions are provided for the strategy choice to converge to a strict Nash equilibrium.     

Nonzero-sum non-stationary discounted Markov game model

The goal of this paper is provide a theory of K-person non-stationary Markov games with unbounded rewards, for a countable state space and action spaces. We investigate both the finite and infinite horizon problems. We define the concept of strong Nash equilibrium and present conditions for both problems for which strong Nash or Nash equilibrium strategies exist for all players within the Markov strategies, and show that the rewards in equilibrium satisfy the optimality equations.     

A game theoretic model for two types of customers competing for service

Two types of customers arrive at a single server station and demand service. If a customer finds the server busy upon arrival (or retrial) he immediately departs and conducts a retrial after an exponential period of time and persists this way until he gets served. Both types of customers face linear costs for waiting and conducting retrials and wish to find optimal retrial rates which will minimize these costs. This problem is analysed as a two-person nonzero sum game. Both noncooperative strategies are studied.     

An equilibrium model for urban transit assignment based on game theory

The urban public transport system is portrayed as a special commodity market where passenger is consumer, transit operator is producer and the special goods is the service for passenger’s trip. The generalized Nash equilibrium game is applied to describe how passengers adjust their route choices and trip modes. We present a market equilibrium model for urban public transport system as a series of mathematical programmings and equations, which is to describe both the competitions among different transit operators and the interactive influences among passengers. The proposed model can simultaneously predict how passengers choose their optimal routes and trip modes. An algorithm is designed to obtain the equilibrium solution. Finally, a simple numerical example is given and some conclusions are drawn.     

A bargaining game model for measuring performance of two-stage network structures

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a method for measuring the efficiency of peer decision making units (DMUs), where the internal structures of DMUs are treated as a black-box. Recently DEA has been extended to examine the efficiency of DMUs that have two-stage network structures or processes, where all the outputs from the first stage are intermediate measures that make up the inputs to the second stage. The resulting two-stage DEA model not only provides an overall efficiency score for the entire process, but also yields an efficiency score for each of the individual stages. The current paper develops a Nash bargaining game model to measure the performance of DMUs that have a two-stage structure. Under Nash bargaining theory, the two stages are viewed as players and the DEA efficiency model is a cooperative game model. It is shown that when only one intermediate measure exists between the two stages, our newly developed Nash bargaining game approach yields the same results as applying the standard DEA approach to each stage separately. Two real world data sets are used to demonstrate our bargaining game model.     

A game theoretical model of DEA efficiency

Motivated by the inherent competitive nature of the DEA efficiency assessment process, some effort has been made to relate DEA models to game theory. Game theory is considered not only a more natural source of representing competitive situations, but also beneficial in revealing additional insights into practical efficiency analysis. Past studies are limited to connecting efficiency games to some particular versions of DEA models. The generalised DEA model considered in this study unifies various important DEA models and presents a basic formulation for the DEA family. By introducing a generalised convex cone constrained efficiency game model in assembling the generalised DEA model, a rigorous connection between game theory and the DEA family is established. We prove the existence of optimal strategies in the generalised efficiency game. We show the equivalence between game efficiency and DEA efficiency. We also provide convex programming models for determination of the optimal strategies of the proposed games, and show that the game efficiency unit corresponds to the non-dominated solution in its corresponding multi-objective programming problem. Our study largely extends the latest developments in this area. The significance of such an extension is for research and applications of both game theory and DEA.     

A zero-sum stochastic game model of duopoly

We consider a discrete time zero-sum stochastic game model of duopoly and give a partial characterization of each firm's optimal pricing strategy. An extension to a continuous time model is also discussed.     

A dynamic model for road protection against flooding

This paper focuses on the problem of identifying optimal protection strategies to reduce the impact of flooding on a road network. We propose a dynamic mixed-integer programming model that extends the classic concept of road network protection by shifting away from single-arc fortifications to a more general and realistic approach involving protection plans that cover multiple components. We also consider multiple disruption scenarios of varying magnitude. To efficiently solve large problem instances, we introduce a customised GRASP heuristic. Finally, we provide some analysis and insights from a case study of the Hertfordshire road network in the East of England. Results show that optimal protection strategies mainly involve safeguarding against flooding events that are small and likely to occur, whereas implementing higher protection standards are not considered cost-effective.     

Understanding herding based on a co-evolutionary model for strategy and game structure

So far, there has been no conclusion on the mechanism for herding, which is often discussed in the academia. Assuming escaping behavior of individuals in emergency is rational rather than out of panic according to recent findings in social psychology, we investigate the behavioral evolution of large crowds from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. Specifically, evolution of the whole population divided into two subpopulations, namely the co-evolution of strategy and game structure, is numerically simulated based on the game theoretical models built and the evolutionary rule designed, and a series of phenomena including extinction of one subpopulation and herding effect are predicted in the proposed framework. Furthermore, if the rewarding for rational agents becomes significantly larger than that for emotional ones, herding effect will disappear. It is exciting that some phase transition points with interesting properties for the system can be found. In addition, our model framework is able to explain the fact that it is difficult for mavericks to prevail in society. The current results of this work will be helpful in understanding and restraining herding effect in real life.     

A differential game model of the marketing-operations interface

In the development of their dynamic strategies, the marketing and operations functions within a firm have differing objectives, and conflict between the two functions is common. The strategic interdependence involving marketing and operations decisions is modeled as a noncooperative differential game. Demand is assumed to be a function of price and advertising goodwill, and marketing controls price and advertising to maximize its discounted stream of revenue net of advertising costs. Backlogging is allowed, and operations controls production to minimize its discounted stream of production and backlog costs. A feedback Nash equilibrium is derived for the game, which allows a solution of the system of differential equations for goodwill and backlog, and is analyzed to study the nature of the dynamic strategies for price, advertising, and production.     

Optimal pricing in a dynamic duopoly game model

This paper deals with optimal pricing of new products over a finite planning period in a duopolistic market. Modelling saturation effects and no cost-side learning effects optimal pricing strategies for different kinds of demand functions are determined. In this direction the paper extends some results known from the monopolistic case. It turns out, that the optimal prices are decreasing functions of time, where the prices at each moment of time are higher than the marginal costs. Thus the optimal pricing strategies can be characterized as skimming policies.

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Zusammenfassung Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der optimalen Preisgestaltung von neuen Produkten in einer endlichen Planungsperiode unter der Annahme einer duopolistischen Marktform. Das Modell beschränkt sich auf die Analyse von Sättigungseffekten, wobei es möglich ist, optimale Preispfade für verschiedene Klassen von Nachfragefunktionen herzuleiten. Die Ergebnisse der Arbeit stellen Verallgemeinerungen des Monopolfalles dar. Durch die Anwendung von quantitativen Lösungsmethoden wird gezeigt, daß die optimalen Preispfade fallende Funktionen der Zeit sind. Dadurch, und durch das Resultat, daß die Preise stets größer sind als die Grenzkosten, stellen die optimalen Preisstrategien Skimming Politiken dar.

     

A DEA game model approach to supply chain efficiency

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a useful method to evaluate the relative efficiency of peer decision making units (DMUs). Based upon the definitions of supply chain efficiency, we investigate the efficiency game between two supply chain members. It is shown that there exist numerous Nash equilibriums efficiency plans for the supplier and the manufacturer with respect to their efficiency functions. A bargaining model is then proposed to analyze the supplier and manufacturer's decision process and to determine the best efficiency plan strategy. DEA efficiency for supply chain operations is studied for the central control and the decentralized control cases. The current study is illustrated with a numerical example.     

Stochastic differential game model of a common property fishery

The paper presents a stochastic differential game model of a common-property commercial fishery and determines a feedback Nash equilibrium of the game. Closed-form expressions for the value functions, the equilibrium harvesting strategies, and stationary distributions of the fish stock are derived. Sensitivity analyses with respect tot he model parameters are carried out. The paper also considers equilibrium outcomes under joint maximization and surplus maximization. In the latter case, an optimal market size (i.e., number of firms) is identified.The research of the first author was supported in part by Grant 5.20.31.02 from the Danish Research Council for the Social Sciences. The research of the second author was supported in part by the CRGC Fund of the University of Hong Kong. The authors would like to thank the editor for constructive comments.