One-to-many non-cooperative matching games

We study a strategic model of wage negotiations between firms and workers. First, we define the stability of an allocation in an environment where firms can employ more than one worker. Secondly, we develop a one-to-many non-cooperative matching game, which is an extension of Kamecke’s one-to-one non-cooperative matching game. The main result shows the equivalence between the stable allocations and the outcomes of the subgame equilibria in the matching game: for any stable allocation in this game there is a subgame perfect equilibrium which induces the allocation on the equilibrium path, and every subgame perfect equilibrium induces a stable allocation on the equilibrium path. Furthermore, as for the existence of a stable allocation, we argue that a stable allocation, as with a subgame perfect equilibrium, does not always exist, but it exists under some conditions, using Kelso and Crawford’s modelling.     

Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems

We study competitive equilibria in generalized matching problems. We show that, if there is a competitive matching, then it is unique and the core is a singleton consisting of the competitive matching. That is, a singleton core is necessary for the existence of competitive equilibria. We also show that a competitive matching exists if and only if the matching produced by the top trading cycles algorithm is feasible, in which case it is the unique competitive matching. Hence, we can use the top trading cycles algorithm to test whether a competitive equilibrium exists and to construct a competitive equilibrium if one exists. Lastly, in the context of bilateral matching problems, we compare the condition for the existence of competitive matchings with existing sufficient conditions for the existence or uniqueness of stable matchings and show that it is weaker than most existing conditions for uniqueness.     

Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents

We employ the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (Int J Game Theory 1:111–130, 1972) to study the endogenous matching patterns in a market that consists of heterogenous principals and agents. We show that, in general, the equilibrium matching is non-assortative. We then characterize the equilibrium relationship between risk and performance pay and risk and fixed compensation. This is the first paper that characterizes the equilibrium matching, to its fullest possible extent, building on the Holmstrom and Milgrom (Econometrica 55:303–328, 1987) principal-agent model. This model has been used extensively in the empirical literature and therefore we hope that our results will be of value to empirical researchers who wish to study a principal-agent market.     

Geometric Optics Approach to First-Passage Distributions: Caustic Boundaries and Exponentially Small Eigenvalues

We develop singular perturbation methods for computing the first passage time distribution for one-dimensional diffusion processes. Detailed results are given for an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process, and the method is sketched for more general problems. For some parameter values, we find the presence of caustic boundaries; whereas, for other parameter values, there are exponentially small eigenvalues. We use the ray method of geometric optics and asymptotic matching.     

Cooperative advertising in a distribution channel with fairness concerns

Cooperative (co-op) advertising has been widely used in practice and employed as a strategy to improve the performance of a distribution channel. It is known from the existing models that co-op advertising could not achieve the channel coordination (i.e., maximize the total channel profit). In this paper, we consider a distribution channel consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, and investigate the effect of the retailer’s fairness concerns. Applying the equilibrium analysis, we obtain the following results: (1) Channel coordination can be achieved if the retailer has fairness concerns and model parameters satisfy certain conditions. (2) Although both channel members become better off with co-op advertising if neither channel member has fairness concerns, we find situations where co-op advertising brings detrimental effects to the retailer if the retailer has fairness concerns. (3) The retailer’s fairness concerns may increase or decrease the equilibrium participation rate, the equilibrium advertising effort, and the equilibrium profit of the manufacturer and the whole channel. (4) We identify the conditions under which the effectiveness of co-op advertising can be improved or reduced by the retailer’s fairness concerns. As long as co-op advertising can bring extra profit to the manufacturer, the retailer’s fairness concerns could improve the effectiveness of the co-op advertising. (5) There exists a Pareto improvement for the profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer when a retailer without fairness concerns becomes fair-minded.     

Robust equilibria in location games

In the framework of spatial competition, two or more players strategically choose a location in order to attract consumers. It is assumed standardly that consumers with the same favorite location fully agree on the ranking of all possible locations. To investigate the necessity of this questionable and restrictive assumption, we model heterogeneity in consumers’ distance perceptions by individual edge lengths of a given graph. A profile of location choices is called a “robust equilibrium” if it is a Nash equilibrium in several games which differ only by the consumers’ perceptions of distances. For a finite number of players and any distribution of consumers, we provide a complete characterization of robust equilibria and derive structural conditions for their existence. Furthermore, we discuss whether the classical observations of minimal differentiation and inefficiency are robust phenomena. Thereby, we find strong support for an old conjecture that in equilibrium firms form local clusters.     

Recovery of the scale-ε~2 pattern by lattice BGK model

IntroductionThe chemical oscillation and chemical waves are the chemical system of the order structuresdecided by the nonlinear features far from the state of equilibrium. If we consider the effecto f the diffusion and nonlinear reaction, then we can find two types of chemical phenomena:Turing pattern and nonlinear chemical wavesll--3]. Turing pattern is the periodic structure inthe spatial distribution. In 1952, Turing pointed out that the structure ealsts. The character ofthe TUring patter…     

Evolutionary games and matching rules

This study considers evolutionary games with non-uniformly random matching when interaction occurs in groups of \(n\ge 2\) individuals using pure strategies from a finite strategy set. In such models, groups with different compositions of individuals generally co-exist and the reproductive success (fitness) of a specific strategy varies with the frequencies of different group types. These frequencies crucially depend on the matching process. For arbitrary matching processes (called matching rules), we study Nash equilibrium and ESS in the associated population game and show that several results that are known to hold for population games under uniform random matching carry through to our setting. In our most novel contribution, we derive results on the efficiency of the Nash equilibria of population games and show that for any (fixed) payoff structure, there always exists some matching rule leading to average fitness maximization. Finally, we provide a series of applications to commonly studied normal-form games.     

The (conditional) matching preclusion for burnt pancake graphs

The matching preclusion number of a graph is the minimum number of edges whose deletion results in a graph that has neither perfect matchings nor almost-perfect matchings, and the conditional matching preclusion number of a graph is the minimum number of edges whose deletion leaves a resulting graph with no isolated vertices that has neither perfect matchings nor almost perfect matchings. In this paper, we find these two numbers for the burnt pancake graphs and show that every optimal (conditional) matching preclusion set is trivial.     

Multi-unit auctions with complementarities: Issues of efficiency in electricity auctions

In this paper, we analyze the ability of different auction structures to induce the efficient dispatch in a one-shot framework where generators know their own and competitors' costs with certainty. In particular, we are interested in identifying which, if any, rules in an auction structure yield only the efficient dispatch in equilibrium. We find that a critical component to a successful auction design is the way in which demand is bundled and hence the way bids are defined. While an auction mechanism which allows for more than one winner in an auction may support inefficient dispatches in equilibrium, we find that an auction where there is exactly one winner per lot, where the lots are formed to capture the cost structure of generation plants, and all lots are auctioned simultaneously, supports only efficient dispatches in equilibrium.     

Equilibrium and optimal strategies to join a queue with partial information on service times

In this paper, we study customer equilibrium as well as socially optimal strategies to join a queue with only partial information on the service time distribution such as moments and the range. Based on such partial information, customers adopt the entropy-maximization principle to obtain the expectation of their waiting cost and decide to join or balk. We find that more information encourages customers to join the queue. And it is beneficial for decision makers to convey partial information to customers in welfare maximization but reveal full information in profit maximization.     

Graphs with independent perfect matchings

A graph with at least two vertices is matching covered if it is connected and each edge lies in some perfect matching. A matching covered graph G is extremal if the number of perfect matchings of G is equal to the dimension of the lattice spanned by the set of incidence vectors of perfect matchings of G. We first establish several basic properties of extremal matching covered graphs. In particular, we show that every extremal brick may be obtained by splicing graphs whose underlying simple graphs are odd wheels. Then, using the main theorem proved in 2 and 3 , we find all the extremal cubic matching covered graphs. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Graph Theory 48: 19–50, 2005     

Implementation by mediated equilibrium

Implementation theory tackles the following problem given a social choice correspondence (SCC), find a decentralized mechanism such that for every constellation of the individuals’ preferences, the set of outcomes in equilibrium is exactly the set of socially optimal alternatives (as specified by the correspondence). In this paper we are concerned with implementation by mediated equilibrium; under such an equilibrium, the players’ strategies can be coordinated in a way that discourages deviation. Our main result is a complete characterization of SCCs that are implementable by mediated strong equilibrium. This characterization, in addition to being strikingly concise, implies that some important SCCs that are not implementable by strong equilibrium are in fact implementable by mediated strong equilibrium.     

Persistence of equilibria as periodic solutions of forced systems

Given an autonomous system with an isolated equilibrium, we consider general periodic perturbations. We say that the equilibrium persists if it can be continued as a periodic solution. The question of persistence is very classical and we find that the search of sharp conditions is linked with Topology. Besides the topological degree, the notion of diffeotopy and Hopf?s Theorem of homotopy classes play a role. For dimension two we find a complete characterization of persistence.     

Variational inequalities and discrete and continuum models of network equilibrium problems

In this paper, we present different equilibrium models (the traffic equilibrium model in the static, in the dynamic and in the continuum case, the market equilibrium problem in the static and in the dynamic case) and we find the variational inequality related to each problem. We propose also a computational procedure for the calculation of the equilibrium solution and present the dual formulation of the variational inequality related to the traffic equilibrium problem.     

基于剪枝信任度传播的手写体目标形状匹配方法

手写体识别中,目标形状的匹配是较为重要的工作.为了提高手写体目标形状的匹配速度,提出一种新的匹配方法.由于手写体目标形状的几何先验知识已知,并可以采用少量的参数进行表示,新方法采用参数化可变形模板匹配目标形状,确定其后验概率模型,并定义剪枝信任度空间,依据信任度传播算法的特性,首次将剪枝信任度传播算法应用于求解可变形模板与目标形状之间的最佳匹配.实验结果显示,在灰度图像中,对手写体目标形状的轮廓检测与定位速度显著提高.提出将剪枝信任度传播方法应用于手写体目标形状的匹配工作,能够使得目标形状填补空白,应用于相关性较为稀疏的图模型中.     

Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems

We study many-to-many matching with substitutable and cardinally monotonic preferences. We analyze stochastic dominance (sd) Nash equilibria of the game induced by any probabilistic stable matching rule. We show that a unique match is obtained as the outcome of each sd-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, individual-rationality with respect to the true preferences is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium outcome. In the many-to-one framework, the outcome of each equilibrium in which firms behave truthfully is stable for the true preferences. In the many-to-many framework, we identify an equilibrium in which firms behave truthfully and yet the equilibrium outcome is not stable for the true preferences. However, each stable match for the true preferences can be achieved as the outcome of such equilibrium.     

Noninformative priors for the ratio of the shape parameters of two Weibull distributions

The Weibull distribution is one of the most widely used lifetime distributions in reliability engineering. Here, the noninformative priors for the ratio of the shape parameters of two Weibull models are introduced. The first criterion used is the asymptotic matching of the coverage probabilities of Bayesian credible intervals with the corresponding frequentist coverage probabilities. We develop the probability matching priors for the ratio of the shape parameters using the following matching criteria: quantile matching, matching of the distribution function, highest posterior density matching, and matching via inversion of the test statistics. We obtain one particular prior that meets all the matching criteria. Next, we derive the reference priors for different groups of ordering. Our findings show that some of the reference priors satisfy a first-order matching criterion and the one-at-a-time reference prior is a second-order matching prior. Lastly, we perform a simulation study and provide a real-world example.     

THE SPLIT GENERALIZED EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM INVOLVING INVERSE-STRONGLY MONOTONE MAPPINGS AND ITS CONVERGENCE ALGORITHMS

In this paper, we introduce a split generalized equilibrium problem and consider some iterative sequences to find a solution of the equilibrium problem such that its image under a given bounded linear operator is a solution of another equilibrium problem. We obtain some strong and weak convergence theorems.