Learning horizon and optimal alliance formation

We develop a theoretical Bayesian learning model to examine how a firm’s learning horizon, defined as the maximum distance in a network of alliances across which the firm learns from other firms, conditions its optimal number of direct alliance partners under technological uncertainty. We compare theoretical optima for a ‘close’ learning horizon, where a firm learns only from direct alliance partners, and a ‘distant’ learning horizon, where a firm learns both from direct and indirect alliance partners. Our theory implies that in high tech industries, a distant learning horizon allows a firm to substitute indirect for direct partners, while in low tech industries indirect partners complement direct partners. Moreover, in high tech industries, optimal alliance formation is less sensitive to changes in structural model parameters when a firm’s learning horizon is distant rather than close. Our contribution lies in offering a formal theory of the role of indirect partners in optimal alliance portfolio design that generates normative propositions amenable to future empirical refutation.     

Optimal gainshare/painshare in alliance projects

Alliances are popularly used in delivering infrastructure. However, discussion is ongoing as to what is the optimal gainshare/painshare arrangement. This paper derives a result for the optimal gainshare/painshare between risk-averse parties, where the level of aversion may range from very large to being risk neutral. The derivation is based on solving an optimization problem using concepts from agency theory. The influence of the parties’ level of risk aversion and outcome uncertainty is examined. Practitioners were engaged in a designed exercise in order to validate the approach and propositions. The paper shows that: (i) the optimal gainshare/painshare arrangement in alliances is linear in the project outcome; (ii) the optimal gain/pain share to the contractor should decrease with increasing contractor level of risk aversion and/or decreasing owner level of risk aversion; and (iii) the outcome uncertainty has no influence on the optimal gainshare/painshare. The paper provides those who write alliance contracts with recommendations on gainshare/painshare. This study casts new light on establishing optimal alliance arrangements in the construction industry.     

Finding the most preferred alliance structure between banks and insurance companies

In this paper we have studied alternative alliances between banks and insurance companies. First we defined six different possible structure models for such alliances, and nine criteria used to evaluate the models. The models and the criteria were introduced together with bank and insurance experts. The experts are representatives of the top management of Finnish banks and insurance companies. Searching for the most preferred alliance model is a multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) problem. To solve the problem, we used an expert panel and the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). Based on the evaluations of the panel, the alternatives Financial Conglomerate and Cross-Selling Agreement, no Overlapping Service Channels are most preferred. Which one is chosen, depends on how risk is emphasized.     

Interactive multiobjective programming in airline network design for international airline code-share alliance

This study presents an interactive airline network design procedure to facilitate bargaining interactions necessitated by international code-share alliance agreements. Code sharing involves partner airlines individually maximizing their own profits, while mutually considering overall profitability, traffic gains, and quality benefits for the markets in which they cooperate with their partners. This study uses a reference point method to solve the interactive multiobjective programming model, to support the bargaining interactions between two partner-airlines in an alliance negotiation. The impact of the code-share alliance network on market demand, alliance partners’ costs and profits, and levels of service are also discussed. A case study demonstrates the feasibility of applying the proposed models and elucidates how interactive multiobjective programming models may be applied to determine flight frequencies for airline code-share alliance networks. The results of this study provide ways by which alliance airlines can evaluate iteratively the output and profits of the alliance members under code-share alliance agreements.     

物流服务供应商联盟构建及分析

在分析供应链环境下物流服务运作的基础上,建立了信息对称情况下物流服务供应商分散控制和集中控制策略模型,并从物流服务联盟的总体产出效果和物流服务联盟对盟员利润的影响两个方面对其进行了定量分析,结果表明,建立物流服务联盟有利于增加联盟产出,抑制竞争对手的产出;如果物流服务企业之间有增加合作利润的需要,则都有建立联盟的积极性.最后对物流服务联盟的实现机理进行了分析.     

An option-based revenue management procedure for strategic airline alliances

An airline has to decide whether to accept an incoming customer request for a seat in the airplane or to reject it in hope that another customer will request the seat later at a higher price. Capacity control, as one of the instruments of revenue management, gives a solution to this decision problem. In the presence of strategic alliances capacity control changes. For the case of two airlines in the alliance and a single flight leg we propose an option-based capacity control process. The determination of booking limits for capacity control is done with real options. A simulation model is introduced to evaluate the booking process of the partner airlines within the strategic alliance, considering the option-based procedure. In an iterative process the booking limits are improved with simulation-based optimization. The results of the option-based procedure will be compared with the results of the simulation-based optimization, the results of a first-come-first-served (FCFS) approach and ex post optimal solutions.     

On the global offensive alliance number of a graph

An offensive alliance in a graph Γ=(V,E) is a set of vertices S⊂V where for each vertex v in its boundary the majority of vertices in v’s closed neighborhood are in S. In the case of strong offensive alliance, strict majority is required. An alliance S is called global if it affects every vertex in V?S, that is, S is a dominating set of Γ. The global offensive alliance numberγ_o(Γ) is the minimum cardinality of a global offensive alliance in Γ. An offensive alliance is connected if its induced subgraph is connected. The global-connected offensive alliance number, γ_co(Γ), is the minimum cardinality of a global-connected offensive alliance in Γ.In this paper we obtain several tight bounds on γ_o(Γ) and γ_co(Γ) in terms of several parameters of Γ. The case of strong alliances is studied by analogy.     

Game analysis of technology innovation alliance stability based on knowledge transfer

Under incomplete information, a game model is used to investigate the influence of ownership level and learning ability on the stability of technology innovation alliance from the perspective of knowledge transfer. The decision-making processes of involved parties are divided into two stages in the model. In the first stage, the firm possessing advanced technology decides on the level of knowledge it transfers to its alliance partner. In the second stage, the decision of the parties on whether to maintain or terminate the alliance is based on two factors: the level of knowledge learned and profits gained. The outcomes of the Cournot–Nash equilibrium in the model can reveal when the parties decide to maintain or terminate the alliance. The model explores the status of alliance stability under different ownership levels and learning abilities to provide theoretical support for the selection of optimal dynamic competitive-cooperative relationship and managerial flexibility.     

突破性创新研发联盟最优伙伴组合方案研究

突破性创新研发联盟的研究已成为国内外学术界共同关注的重大课题,而伙伴选择是研发联盟中一个十分重要的问题,伙伴挑选的成功与否直接关系到研发联盟的合作效果和成败.在分析Bernardo方法缺陷的基础上,提出改进的Bernardo方法,进而建立具有资源约束的伙伴选择的改进Bernardo模型,并将其应用到突破性创新研发联盟最优伙伴的选择中,不仅可以求得资源约束下候选伙伴的优劣排序,还能求得参与研发联盟的最优伙伴数量和最优伙伴组合方案.     

基于模糊综合评判的航空公司战略联盟合作伙伴选择研究

航空公司战略联盟成功的关键是能否选择出理想的合作伙伴,这是一个复杂的决策问题.提出了一个比较新颖的算法.首先根据AHP方法确定模糊评价矩阵和权重向量,并针对航空联盟的敏捷性要求和特定的市场需求,提出了评价指标两两间的比较标度的修正方法,然后通过模糊运算对目标函数进行排序,实现对合作伙伴的最优选择.最后以实例表明本算法能有效的支持伙伴选择.     

Using an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Exit Option to Study Alliance Behavior: Results of a Tournament and Simulation

Nearly half of all strategic alliances fail (Park and Russo, 1996; Dyer et al., 2001), often because of opportunistic behavior by one party or the other. We use a tournament and simulation to study strategies in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game with exit option to shed light on how a firm should react to an opportunistic partner. Our results indicate that a firm should give an alliance partner a second chance following an opportunistic act but that subsequent behavior should be contingent on the value of the next best opportunity outside the alliance. Firms should be more forgiving if the potential benefits from the alliance exceed other opportunities. The strategies were also found to be robust across a wide range of game lengths. The implications of these results for alliance strategies are discussed. Steven E. Phelan received his PhD in economics from La Trobe University (Australia) in 1998. Following five years at the University of Texas at Dallas, he joined the faculty of the University of Nevada Las Vegas in 2003. Dr. Phelan's research interests include competitive dynamics, organizational efficiency, acquisition and alliance performance, and entrepreneurial competence. His methods of choice to study these phenomena include agent-based modelling, experimental game theory, and event studies. Prior to joining academia, Dr. Phelan held executive positions in the telecommunications and airline industries and was a principal partner in Bridges Management Group, a consultancy specializing in strategic investment decisions. Richard J. Arend is a graduate of the University of British Columbia's doctoral program in Policy Analysis and Strategy. He is on the Management faculty of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, arriving most recently from the Management faculty of New York University's Stern School of Business. Dr. Arend's interests lie in the analysis of unusual modes of firm value creation and destruction, where he has published in several top journals. He is a professional engineer with work and consulting experience in aerospace and computing. Darryl A. Seale joined the faculty of UNLV in 1999, following three years at Kent State University and the University of Alabama in Huntsville. Prior to Alabama, he completed his Ph.D. and M.S. degrees in Business Administration at the University of Arizona, his M.B.A. from Penn State University, and spent over ten years in management and market planning positions in the health care industry. Professor Seale's research interests include strategic decision making, bargaining and negotiation, and behavioral game theory. His research has been funded by the National Science Foundation and has been published in top-tier journals including Management Science, OBHDP, Games and Economic Behavior, and Strategic Management Journal. His teaching interests include business policy/strategy, managerial decision making, and bargaining and negotiation.     

基于伙伴关系建构的联盟标准扩散效应

在技术标准扩散动机下,为技术标准联盟设计了一种“以公共供应商为结构洞的、由上下游企业共同组成的三元伙伴结构,分析了这种伙伴结构对于技术标准扩散的影响方式以及有效性,并讨论了共赢结果的实现条件以及稳定性,从而从技术标准联盟内部伙伴关系建构的角度,提出了新的内源性技术标准扩散机制。研究结论主要有三个:第一,技术标准联盟中以公共供应商为结构洞的长期性上下游伙伴结构对于加速技术标准扩散具有内源性促进作用,贡献度取决于以结构洞为中介的双向知识流动比率的大小;第二,共赢结果的实现条件为:三方伙伴同时遵守关于双向知识流动比率的临界值;第三,共赢结果的稳定性取决于供应商与生产商之间的技术相似程度以及生产商专有知识的价值性等因素,而且上下游伙伴之间的技术相似度越高,则供应商对于合作均衡稳定性的决定作用就越大于生产商。     

Global defensive alliances in star graphs

A defensive alliance in a graph G=(V,E) is a set of vertices S⊆V satisfying the condition that, for each v∈S, at least one half of its closed neighbors are in S. A defensive alliance S is called a critical defensive alliance if any vertex is removed from S, then the resulting vertex set is not a defensive alliance any more. An alliance S is called global if every vertex in V(G)?S is adjacent to at least one member of the alliance S. In this paper, we shall propose a way for finding a critical global defensive alliance of star graphs. After counting the number of vertices in the critical global defensive alliance, we can derive an upper bound to the size of the minimum global defensive alliances in star graphs.     

A financial alliance compromise between executives and supervisory authorities

In this paper, we are looking for the best financial alliance compromise structure between the executives of the banks and insurance companies and the bank and insurance supervisory authorities in Finland. First, we studied alternative alliance structures between banks and insurance companies from the point of view of supervisory authorities. Together with leaders and experts of the supervisory authorities, we introduced eight criteria for the evaluation of the six alternative alliance structures. The evaluation was carried out by an expert panel consisting of the representatives of the supervisory authorities.In our earlier research, the financial conglomerate was preferred by bank and insurance executives to the other alternatives. The alliance models based on plain cross-selling agreements received the highest ranks in the evaluation of supervisory authorities. Under certain conditions, the financial conglomerate might be an acceptable compromise alternative for the supervisory authorities as well.     

Brand value in horizontal alliances: the case of twin-cars

Rival firms often cooperate horizontally in order to share risks and achieve scale advantages in production or in their research and development projects. The output of these strategic alliances is usually sold by the individual ally company under its own brand and using its own marketing mix strategies. Marketing strategies create a cumulative effect that is reflected in brand value. Although horizontal alliances often have a significant overall impact on firm profitability, undesired brand value dilution is a worrisome possibility for the partners and therefore a relevant subject of study. In this paper, we consider brand value to be the economic added value of a brand, and propose two market-based measures of brand value: (1) price premia (which are relevant for a unit sale) and (2) revenue premia (which also account for the premia in sales volume). We apply this analysis to the Spanish market for new automobiles, in which successful and long-lasting horizontal alliances have formed. Our findings suggest that, during the introduction stage of the product life cycle, horizontal allies did not charge different price premia, but that horizontal allies profit from differences in brand reputation obtained from demand side effects such as revenue premia (specifically, the impact on sales volume). Consequently, horizontal cooperation among brands does not dilute their value at the introduction stage. Furthermore, our results suggest that horizontal allies do charge different price premia during the growth stage of the product life cycle. Consequently, horizontal allies have recognized strategies that do not dilute brand value in intense competition mitigating the brand value diluting risk.     

Using DEA to assess NATO burden-sharing

As the member making many of the most visible contributions to NATO, the USA has often claimed that they shoulder the heaviest ‘burden’ in maintaining the objectives of the alliance. This claim has been backed by research which has concentrated on contributions such as defence expenditure and benefits such as protection from external threats. However, modern alliances entail the exchange of multiple forms of alliance benefits and liabilities and therefore the study of ‘burden-sharing’ in these alliances is a more complicated accounting problem than has been acknowledged by previous research. In this paper, burden-sharing is studied using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This is a novel application of DEA. Instead of calculating relative ‘efficiencies’, the analysis produces a ‘net-burden index’ for each member nation of NATO. The results of the analysis indicate that whilst the USA shoulders a heavy burden, some other member nations, including Canada and Spain, may in fact shoulder a heavier burden.     

竞争性企业技术联盟的知识共享效应研究

通过三阶段博弈模型分析竞争性企业技术联盟知识共享效应,结果表明:知识共享的程度是随着竞争性企业技术联盟规模的扩大而增加的.因为随着技术联盟规模的扩大,知识共享的规模收益会逐渐上升,从而减少了由于知识溢出而带来的损失.因此,在企业技术联盟内部构建一个能够有效地吸收、保持和共享知识的机制对于提高技术联盟的绩效具有积极的作用.     

Partitioning a graph into alliance free sets

A strong defensive alliance in a graph G=(V,E) is a set of vertices A⊆V, for which every vertex v∈A has at least as many neighbors in A as in V−A. We call a partition A,B of vertices to be an alliance-free partition, if neither A nor B contains a strong defensive alliance as a subset. We prove that a connected graph G has an alliance-free partition exactly when G has a block that is other than an odd clique or an odd cycle.