Design of contract parameters in a closed-loop supply chain

We study an extended joint economic lot size problem which incorporates the return flow of remanufacturable used products. The supply chain under consideration consists of a single supplier and a single buyer. The buyer orders a single product from the supplier, uses it for her own needs, and collects the remanufacturable items after use. The ordered items are shipped from the supplier to the buyer in the lot-for-lot fashion by a vehicle which also returns the collected used items from the buyer to the supplier for remanufacturing and subsequent service of the buyer’s demand in the next order cycle. For satisfying the total demand, the supplier manufactures new items or remanufactures used ones received from the buyer. For given demand, productivity, collection rate, disposal cost, setup cost, order cost, holding cost for serviceable and nonserviceable products at the supplier as well as the buyer the lot size (order size) for the supplier (buyer) has to be found which minimizes the total cost. Furthermore, we address a decentralised decision making of the parties under a two-part tariff and determine their equilibrium strategies within the Nash framework.     

The optimal pricing and ordering policy for an integrated inventory model when trade credit linked to order quantity

In traditional inventory models, it is implicitly assumed that the buyer must pay for the purchased items as soon as they have been received. However, in many practical situations, the vendor is willing to provide the buyer with a permissible delay period when the buyer’s order quantity exceeds a given threshold. Therefore, to incorporate the concept of vendor–buyer integration and order-size-dependent trade credit, we present a stylized model to determine the optimal strategy for an integrated vendor–buyer inventory system under the condition of trade credit linked to the order quantity, where the demand rate is considered to be a decreasing function of the retail price. By analyzing the total channel profit function, we developed some useful results to characterize the optimal solution and provide an iterative algorithm to find the retail price, buyer’s order quantity, and the numbers of shipment per production run from the vendor to the buyer. Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are given to illustrate the theoretical results, and some managerial insights are also obtained.     

Sourcing from suppliers with random yield for price-dependent demand

We study a multi-period inventory planning problem. In each period, the firm under consideration can source from two possibly unreliable suppliers for a price-dependent demand. Our analysis suggests that the optimal procurement policy is neither a simple reorder-point policy nor a complex one without any structure, as previous studies suggest. Instead, we prove the existence of a reorder point for each supplier. No order is placed to that supplier for any inventory level above the reorder point and a positive order is issued to that supplier for almost every inventory level below the reorder point. We characterize conditions under which the optimal policy reveals monotone response to changes in the inventory level. Furthermore, two special cases of our model are examined in detail to demonstrate how our analysis generalizes a number of well-known results in the literature.     

Joint pricing and inventory replenishment decisions with returns and expediting

We study a single-item periodic-review model for the joint pricing and inventory replenishment problem with returns and expediting. Demand in consecutive periods are independent random variables and their distributions are price sensitive. At the end of each period, after the demand is realized, a buyer can return excess stocks to a supplier. Or, if there are stockouts, the buyer can place an expediting order at the supplier to reduce the amount of shortage. Unfilled demands are fully backlogged. We characterize the optimal dynamic policy that determines the pricing, inventory replenishment, and adjustment decisions in each period so that the total expected discounted profit is maximized. For a very general stochastic demand function, we can show that the optimal replenishment policy is a modified base-stock policy, the optimal pricing policy is a modified base-stock-list-price policy, and the optimal policy for inventory adjustment follows a dual-threshold policy. We further study the operational effect of returns and expediting. Analytical and numerical results demonstrate that returns and expediting lead to a significant profit increase in a number of situations, including limited supply capacity, sufficient flexibility of the expediting order, high demand uncertainty, and a price-sensitive market.     

Supply chain coordination for the joint determination of order quantity and reorder point using credit option

Decisions regarding order quantity and reorder point are two major challenges in supply chain inventory management. In this paper, a coordination model of the joint determination of these two decision variables is proposed. A decentralized supply chain consisting of one buyer and one supplier in a multi-period setting is investigated. Demand and lead times are uncertain in our model. An incentive scheme based on credit option has been developed to encourage the buyer to participate in the coordination model. In this model, the downstream member has the option of using credit to purchase goods during the credit time, subject to its commitment to a jointly agreed order quantity and reorder point. The credit time is determined in such a way that the two parties have incentives to participate. The proposed incentive scheme can share the benefits of coordination between the two members based on their bargaining power. The proposed model shows that the coordination of the reorder point, together with order quantity, can increase the overall chain profitability as well as each member’s profitability.     

Competitive Multi-period Pricing for Perishable Products: A Robust Optimization Approach

We study a multi-period oligopolistic market for a single perishable product with fixed inventory. Our goal is to address the competitive aspect of the problem together with demand uncertainty using ideas from robust optimization and variational inequalities. The demand function for each seller has some associated uncertainty and we assume that the sellers would like to adopt a policy that is robust to adverse uncertain circumstances. We believe this is the first paper that uses robust optimization for dynamic pricing under competition. In particular, starting with a given fixed inventory, each seller competes over a multi-period time horizon in the market by setting prices and protection levels for each period at the beginning of the time horizon. Any unsold inventory at the end of the horizon is worthless. The sellers do not have the option of periodically reviewing and replenishing their inventory. We study non-cooperative Nash equilibrium policies for sellers under such a model. This kind of a setup can be used to model pricing of air fares, hotel reservations, bandwidth in communication networks, etc. In this paper we demonstrate our results through some numerical examples.     

Analysis of supply contracts with minimum total order quantity commitments and non-stationary demands

In this paper we address a buyer–supplier arrangement of particular importance: total order quantity commitment (TOQC). Under the TOQC contract that has been negotiated between the buyer and the supplier, the former agrees to an obligation to procure a certain quantity of an item from the latter over the predetermined period of time (additional quantity can be obtained maybe at a different price). The optimal inventory replenishment policy is shown to be dual order-up-to levels under a given TOQC, and the optimal TOQC is also demonstrated to be mathematically straightforward to obtain.     

Integrated inventory and inspection policies for stochastic demand

In this paper, we develop integrated inventory inspection models with and without replacement of nonconforming items. Inspection policies include no inspection, sampling inspection, and 100% inspection. We consider a buyer who places an order from a supplier when his inventory level drops to a certain point, due to demand which is stochastic in nature. When a lot is received, the buyer uses some type of inspection policy. The fraction nonconforming is assumed to be a random variable following a beta distribution. The order quantity, reorder point and the inspection policy are decision variables. In the inspection policy involving determining sampling plan parameters, constraints on the buyer and manufacturer risks is set in order to obtain a fair plan for both parties. A solution procedure for determining the operating policies for inventory and inspection consisting of order quantity, sample size, and acceptance number is proposed. Numerical examples are presented to conduct a sensitivity analysis for important model parameters and to illustrate important issues about the developed models.     

Optimal policy for a dynamic,non-stationary,stochastic inventory problem with capacity commitment

This paper studies a single-product, dynamic, non-stationary, stochastic inventory problem with capacity commitment, in which a buyer purchases a fixed capacity from a supplier at the beginning of a planning horizon and the buyer’s total cumulative order quantity over the planning horizon is constrained with the capacity. The objective of the buyer is to choose the capacity at the beginning of the planning horizon and the order quantity in each period to minimize the expected total cost over the planning horizon. We characterize the structure of the minimum sum of the expected ordering, storage and shortage costs in a period and thereafter and the optimal ordering policy for a given capacity. Based on the structure, we identify conditions under which a myopic ordering policy is optimal and derive an equation for the optimal capacity commitment. We then use the optimal capacity and the myopic ordering policy to evaluate the effect of the various parameters on the minimum expected total cost over the planning horizon.     

Game Theoretic Analysis of a Distribution System with Customer Market Search

Consider a distribution system with one supplier and two retailers. When a stockout occurs at one retailer customers may go to the other retailer. We study a single period model in which the supplier may have infinite or finite capacity. In the latter case, if the total quantity ordered (claimed) by the retailers exceeds the supplier’s capacity, an allocation policy is involved to assign the limited capacity to the retailers. We analyze the inventory control decisions for the retailers using a game theoretical approach. The necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. A computational procedure is also proposed to calculate the Nash equilibrium. In case the Nash equilibrium does not exist, we use the concept of Stackelberg game to develop optimal strategies for both the leader and the follower. The work was partially supported by the National Textile Center of the US Department of Commerce under Grant No. I01-S01. The second author is supported in part by NSF under DMI-0196084 and DMI-0200306.     

Price markdown scheme in a multi-echelon supply chain in a high-tech industry

This paper studies the price markdown scheme in a supply chain that consists of a supplier, a contract manufacturer (CM), and a buyer (retailer). The buyer subcontracts the production of the final product to the CM. The CM buys the components from the supplier and charges the buyer a service fee for the final product produced. The price markdown is made possible by the supplier with the development of new manufacturing technologies that reduce the production cost for the sourced component. Consequently, the buyer adjusts the retail price in order to possibly stimulate stronger demand that may benefit both the supplier and the buyer. Under this scenario, we identify the optimal discount pricing strategies, capacity reservation, and the stocking policies for the supplier and the buyer. We also investigate the optimal inventory decision for the CM to cope with the price discount by considering both demand and delivery uncertainties. Our results suggest that higher production cost accelerates the effects of higher price sensitivity on lowering the optimal capacity and stocking policies in the supply chain. The effect of mean demand error on the optimal prices is relatively marginal compared with that from price sensitivity. We also found that increasing the standard deviation of the random demand does not necessarily increase the stocking level as one would predict. The results show that delivery uncertainty plays an important role in the inventory carried beyond the price break. We discuss potential extensions for future research.     

Optimizing delivery lead time/inventory placement in a two-stage production/distribution system

In this paper we study a system composed of a supplier and buyer(s). We assume that the buyer faces random demand with a known distribution function. The supplier faces a known production lead time. The main objective of this study is to determine the optimal delivery lead time and the resulting location of the system inventory. In a system with a single-supplier and a single-buyer it is shown that system inventory should not be split between a buyer and supplier. Based on system parameters of shortage and holding costs, production lead times, and standard deviations of demand distributions, conditions indicating when the supplier or buyer(s) should keep the system inventory are derived. The impact of changes to these parameters on the location of system inventory is examined. For the case with multiple buyers, it is found that the supplier holds inventory for the buyers with the smallest standard deviations, while the buyers with the largest standard deviations hold their own inventory.     

Mitigating supply risk: an approach with quantity flexibility procurement

This paper considers a buyer that procures from its major supplier whose production is subject to random yield risk. To mitigate supply risk, the buyer can procure from another reliable supplier who provides quantity flexibility (QF) contract. Under both deterministic and stochastic demand, we study the buyer’s optimal procurement decisions. We analyze the structural properties of optimal solutions and identify the conditions under which the quantity flexibility procurement policy should be used. We also examine the effect of supply risk, flexibility, wholesale price and demand risk on the procurement decisions. We find that the higher supply risk and demand risk reduce the buyer’s profit but have different impact on the buyer’s order policy. For the QF supplier, it may not obtain more orders by providing larger flexibility to the buyer, on the contrary, doing this may benefit the risky supplier. For the QF supplier or risky supplier, given its competitor’s wholesale price, it can increase its order share by lower wholesale price.     

A deterministic,multi-item inventory model with supplier selection and imperfect quality

This paper considers the scenario of supply chain with multiple products and multiple suppliers, all of which have limited capacity. We assume that received items from suppliers are not of perfect quality. Items of imperfect quality, not necessarily defective, could be used in another inventory situation. Imperfect items are sold as a single batch, prior to receiving the next shipment, at a discounted price. The demand over a finite planning horizon is known, and an optimal procurement strategy for this multi-period horizon is to be determined. Each of products can be sourced from a set of approved suppliers, a supplier-dependent transaction cost applies for each period in which an order is placed on a supplier. A product-dependent holding cost per period applies for each product in the inventory that is carried across a period in the planning horizon. Also a maximum storage space for the buyer in each period is considered. The decision maker, the buyer, needs to decide what products to order, in what quantities, with which suppliers, and in which periods. Finally, a genetic algorithm (GA) is used to solve the model.     

提前期需求为模糊随机条件下的连续库存补货策略

考虑提前期内需求为模糊随机变量且提前期为可缩短情形下,建立由购买商和供应商所组成的简单供应链连续库存补货策略优化模型,其中订单量、再订货点和提前期为决策变量.首先推导出模糊随机需求条件下购买商和供应链的成本函数,然后,进一步考虑总需求为三角模糊数,推导出供应商、购买商和供应链的模糊成本函数.在此基础上分别从购买商成本最小和供应链成本最小角度对模型进行求解,结合具体算例对模型进行应用分析和比较分析,结果表明模型具有有效性和实用性,并得出如下结论:从购买商本身角度考虑订购策略所产生的供应链成本总是大于从供应链整体角度考虑订货策略所产生的供应链成本,同时从购买商本身角度考虑订货策略所产生的最优订购量、购买商成本低于从供应链整体角度考虑订货策略所产生的最优订购量、购买商成本.     

Evaluating shortfall distributions in periodic inventory systems with stochastic endogenous demands and lead-times

This paper addresses a multi-period production/inventory problem with two suppliers, where demand sizes and supplier lead time are stochastic and correlated. A discrete time, single item inventory system is considered, where inventory levels are reviewed periodically and managed using a base-stock policy. At the end of each period, a replenishment order is placed, which enters a queue at the buffer stage and is consequently forwarded to the first available supplier. We present a mathematical model of this inventory system and determine optimal safety stock levels for it, in closed form, using matrix analytic techniques and the properties of phase type distributions. To account for the effect of order crossovers, which occur whenever replenishment orders do not arrive in the sequence in which they were placed, the inventory shortfall distribution is analyzed. Finally, a set of numerical experiments with a system with two suppliers is presented, where the proposed model is compared to other existing models.     

An economic order quantity with imperfect quality and quantity discounts

Previous studies in the issue of inventory models with imperfect quality assumed the defectives could be sold in a batch by the end of the inspection process and the manufacturing systems were push systems. However, the above assumptions may not be true in the pull system in which buyer is powerful. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a new inventory model for items with imperfect quality and quantity discounts where buyer has exerted power over its supplier. Based on the concept of powerful buyer, there are three considerations included in this new model: (1) the order quantity is manufactured at one setup and is shipped over multiple deliveries, (2) the defectives are screened out by a 100% inspection for each shipment but sold in a batch by the end of inspection at the last shipment of each cycle, and (3) the supplier offers quantity discounts to response the request of the powerful buyer. Further, an algorithm is developed to help the powerful buyer to determine the optimal order policy accurately and quickly. Two numerical examples are available in this paper to illustrate the proposed model and algorithm. Besides, based on the numerical examples, a sensitivity analysis is made to investigate the effects of four important parameters (the inspection rate, the defective rate, the receiving cost, and the ordering cost) on the optimal solution.     

Order splitting in single sourcing with scheduled-release orders

Traditional inventory models assume that a buyer places one order with a supplier in each order cycle. A large number of researchers have studied the benefits of dual sourcing such that an order quantity is split and placed simultaneously with two suppliers. We show that many of the benefits of dual sourcing are due to order splitting rather than using two suppliers. We investigate order splitting with one supplier such that the first part of the order is sent out immediately but the second part of the order is released later (scheduled-release). Through extensive computational results, we show that in many situations where dual sourcing or the use of a cheaper supplier would be cost effective, single sourcing with order splitting using scheduled-release orders is better. The paper provides a quantitative rationale to continue with one supplier. We also summarize the qualitative reasons to prefer single sourcing or multiple sourcing.     

Game theoretic analysis of the bargaining process over a long-term replenishment contract

This paper presents supplier–buyer models to describe the bargaining process between a supplier and a buyer over a long-term replenishment contract. Two different models are developed: one for the situation where the supplier has superior bargaining power over the buyer, and the other for the reverse situation. For each model, a method is derived that employs game theory-based analysis to determine the best strategy for each agent. A computational experiment is conducted to estimate the efficiency of the methods and to determine the economic implications of the results. The result indicates that each algorithm is very efficient compared to other strategies. We also verify that the solutions derived from each model are Nash equilibrium. Significantly improved outcomes are obtained for both agents by agreeing to the terms generated by the algorithms over the terms selected in the usual manner.     

A two-stage supply chain coordination mechanism considering price sensitive demand and quantity discounts

This paper explores the coordination between a supplier and a buyer within a decentralized supply chain, through the use of quantity discounts in a game theoretic model. Within this model, the players face inventory and pricing decisions. We propose both cooperative and non-cooperative approaches considering that the product traded experiences a price sensitive demand. In the first case, we study the dynamics of the game from the supplier's side as the leader in the negotiation obtaining a Stackelberg equilibrium, and then show how the payoff of this player could still improve from this point. In the second case, a cooperative model is formulated, where decisions are taken simultaneously, emulating a centralized firm, showing the benefits of the cooperation between the players. We further formulate a pricing game, where the buyer is allowed to set different prices to the final customer as a reaction to the supplier's discount decisions. For the latter we investigate the difference between feasibility of implementing a retail discount given a current coordination mechanism and without it. Finally the implications of transportation costs are analyzed in the quantity discount schedule. Our findings are illustrated with a numerical example showing the difference in the players’ payoff in each case and the optimal strategies, comparing in each case our results with existing work.