A game-theoretic formulation of joint implementation of environmental projects

The aim of this paper is to provide a game-theoretic interpretation of joint implementation in environmental projects and to assess the merit of such a strategy. More specifically, we consider a two-player game and solve it under three different cases. In the first case, countries play a non-cooperative game and optimize their welfare under an environmental constraint without having access to joint implementation. In the second case, we assume countries do have access to JI, which allows us to assess its merits by comparing the players’ welfare levels achieved with and without JI. In the last case, the players jointly optimize their welfare under a collective environmental constraint. Comparing welfare levels in this case to those in the second case allows us to assess the merits of cooperation.     

Pollution control quasi-equilibrium problems with joint implementation of environmental projects

In this paper, we show how one of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, the so-called joint implementation in environmental projects, can be transformed into and studied as an infinite-dimensional quasi-variational inequality. Specifically, we examine the situation in which different countries attempt to fulfill Kyoto commitments by investing in emission reduction or emission removal projects in countries where the abatement costs are lower. We derive the equilibrium conditions and prove their characterization in terms of an infinite-dimensional quasi-variational inequality problem. Finally, we discuss the existence of solutions.     

多产品公司创建平台邀请竞争对手进行联合销售的策略研究

由于资金分配或生产规模的限制,多产品公司的某类产品与专门销售此类产品的专业产品公司相比,会有一定的不足.以两个产品公司为对象,研究了两个竞争性公司的联合销售模式,即多产品公司投资建设平台,邀请销售单一产品的专业公司在平台上共同销售某类产品.运用主从博弈建立联合销售的基础模型,探讨不同销售模式下的相关投资,并利用数值计算进行决策分析.研究表明,通过创建平台进行联合销售,一方面,消除了消费者的额外购物成本;另一方面,在平台进行联合销售使得两个公司由单纯的竞争关系转化为相互补充,不仅能够吸引更多有不同产品需求的客户,而且能够在一定程度上提高两个产品公司的利润.     

Trembling hand perfection for mixed quantal/best response equilibria

The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is a powerful alternative to full rationality equilibrium concepts. At a QRE, all joint moves have non-zero probability. However in “mixed scenarios”, where some players use quantal response and some use best response, equilibrium strategy profiles can have joint moves with zero probability. This raises the question of applying the trembling hand refinement to such mixed scenarios. To address this I first show how to reformulate the QRE as a “best response” equilibrium where expected utilities are replaced by more general objective functions. I then show that under this reformulation the two popular types of trembling hand perfection can differ when some players use quantal response and some use best response. I end by showing that one of those types of trembling hand perfection cannot be used to remove certain troubling kinds of equilibrium in such mixed scenarios, while the other type can. The conclusion is that only the one type of trembling hand perfection should be applied when we allow some players to be quantal response and some to be best response.     

An intelligent decision support system for assisting industrial wastewater management

Sustainable economic development requires the inclusion of environmental factors in the decision making procedure. The generic objective of the Environmentally Sensitive Investment System (ESIS) Project is to provide industry and governmental departments or agencies with a tool to assess the technical and economic implications of capital-intensive projects, in response to stated environmental policies. More specifically, the ESIS prototype helps to find wastewater management alternatives that meet given environmental regulatory standards in a technologically sound and cost-efficient manner. The use of this decision support system will enhance the ability of managers and planners to explore the quantitative implications of a wide range of options. ESIS incorporates a combination of artificial intelligence and operations research techniques, database management and visualization tools, integrated under a graphical user interface. The ESIS prototype runs on top-of-the-line personal computers.     

Algorithms for discounted stochastic games

In this paper, a two-person zero-sum discounted stochastic game with a finite state space is considered. The movement of the game from state to state is jointly controlled by the two players with a finite number of alternatives available to each player in each of the states. We present two convergent algorithms for arriving at minimax strategies for the players and the value of the game. The two algorithms are compared with respect to computational efficiency. Finally, a possible extension to nonzero sum stochastic game is suggested.This research was supported in part by funds allocated to the Department of Operations Research, School of Management, Case Western Reserve University under Contract No. DAHC 19-68-C-0007 (Project Themis) with the U.S. Army Research Office, Durham, North Carolina. The authors thank the referees for their valuable suggestions.     

Technology choice under several uncertainty sources

We analyze a model of irreversible investment with two sources of uncertainty. A risk-neutral decision maker has the choice between two mutually exclusive projects under input price and output price uncertainty. We propose a complete study of the shape of the rational investment region and we prove that it is never optimal to invest when the alternative investments generate the same payoff independently of its size. A key feature of this bidimensional degree of uncertainty is thus that the payoff generated by each project is not a sufficient statistic to make a rational investment. In this context, our analysis provides a new motive for waiting to invest: the benefits associated with the dominance of one project over the other. As an illustration, we apply our methodology to power generation under uncertainty.     

A unifying model of strategic network formation

We provide a model that merges two basic models of strategic network formation and incorporates them as extreme cases: Jackson and Wolinsky’s connections model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal’s two-way flow model, where links can be unilaterally formed. In our model a link can be created unilaterally, but when it is only supported by one of the two players the flow through it suffers some friction or decay, but more than when it is supported by both players. When the friction in singly-supported links is maximal (i.e. there is no flow) we have Jackson and Wolinsky’s connections model, while when flow in singly-supported links is as good as in doubly-supported links we have Bala and Goyal’s two-way flow model. In this setting, a joint generalization of the results relative to efficiency and stability in both seminal papers is achieved, and the robustness in both models is tested with positive results.     

市场与规制双重不确定下企业环境投资行为选择

通过主体适应性规则构建企业环境投资行为模型,从政府环境规制和市场波动等方面刻画企业环境投资决策面临的不确定性,基于计算实验方法探寻企业在基准、震荡、上涨与下跌等4种情景下的环境投资行为规律。研究发现:政府规制强度越强,企业环境投资越充分,但投资偏差现象越明显。在震荡情景中,企业的环境投资行为表现出非理性状态,在上涨情景中,企业环境投资表现出过度反应。当市场产品价格波动处在单边行情,政府可以通过较为宽松的环境规制实现目标,而当市场产品价格处在震荡波动时,政府需要通过较为严格的环境规制刺激企业进行环境投资。企业的环境投资受到政府规制与市场信号的共同影响,政府的环境规制稳定的持续刺激并不会让企业盲目投资,但政府环境规制的频繁变动却会使企业无所适从。     

突发事件冲击下基于或有支付机制的创投融资决策

探讨了突发事件冲击下基于或有支付机制的创业融资优化决策问题.假定创业企业利润流服从跳跃-扩散过程,运用实物期权方法推导出投资机会价值与最优投资时机,给出了最优的或有支付决策,使得创业企业家和风险投资家愿意共同支持给定的创业企业的增长策略.研究发现,突发事件时创业企业家和风险投资家的最优投资时机不受或有支付类型的影响.突发事件的平均发生率越大,双方共同投资的时机越早.利润流跳跃幅度越大,共同投资的时机也越早.目标实现时刻进行支付的或有支付具有更高的投资机会价值,可变数额或有支付具有更高的投资机会价值.     

乡村振兴战略下农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作行为演化博弈分析

农村人居环境整治是乡村振兴战略的重要内容,基于有限理性的演化博弈理论,构建了以地方政府、社会资本和农村居民为博弈主体的农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作行为演化博弈模型,运用Matlab软件分析了三方主体的初始意愿和政府规制对三方主体行为策略演化的影响。研究发现:(1)政府规制对农村人居环境整治PPP模式合作博弈系统演化的影响从大到小依次是:政府对社会资本的补贴资助、投机罚金、合作奖励和政府对农村居民的参与奖励。(2)与提高地方政府对社会资本的补贴资助力度和惩罚力度相比,提高地方政府的激励规制初始意愿更能促进农村人居环境整治PPP项目的顺利落地实施。(3)农村居民参与PPP项目的初始意愿的提升关键在于提高农村居民参与收益。最后,为促进PPP模式在农村环境治理领域的应用与发展和推动农村人居环境整治的可持续改善提出相应建议。     

中国式分权下地方政府环境规制执行研究——以排污收费为例

在中国式分权的制度背景下,以排污收费为例,对地方政府环境规制执行问题进行研究。通过建立地方政府与企业的动态博弈模型,刻画了环境规制的约束性本质特征。以此为基础,通过对政府规制利益集团理论Peltzman模型进行修正和拓展,构建了地方政府的环境规制执行均衡模型,阐述了环境规制执行均衡的形成机制。基于环境规制执行均衡模型,分析了制度因素、环境规制政策标准、治污成本和污染削减技术对地方政府环境规制执行的影响。研究结果表明,地方政府通过调节环境规制执行强度实现自身效用的最大化,从而达到环境规制执行的均衡状态。中央政府制定的更为严格的环境规制政策标准尽管在理论上能够提高企业的治污投入,但却有可能对地方政府的环境规制执行产生负面影响。降低企业治污成本能够促进地方政府严格执行环境规制,而污染削减技术创新则会在不同条件下对地方政府的环境规制执行产生不同的影响。     

Absolutely cooperative solution for a linear,multiplayer differential game

If the players of ann-player differential game agree to cooperate, then the solutions to the game should be confined to undominated ones. A property of an undominated or Pareto-optimal solution is that, when compared locally with any other solution, at least one player must do worse or all do the same if they use a solution other than the Pareto-optimal one.Closely related to the concept of a Pareto-optimal solution is the concept of an absolutely cooperative solution. The absolutely cooperative solution is given the property that, when compared locally with any other solution, every player will do no better if a solution other than the absolutely cooperative one is used.A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an absolutely cooperative solution is presented in this paper. The circumstance under which the control variables may take on interior values is also included.This research was supported in part by NASA Grant No. NGR-03-002-011.     

Two Person Zero-Sum Semi-Markov Games with Unknown Holding Times Distribution on One Side: A Discounted Payoff Criterion

This paper deals with two person zero-sum semi-Markov games with a possibly unbounded payoff function, under a discounted payoff criterion. Assuming that the distribution of the holding times H is unknown for one of the players, we combine suitable methods of statistical estimation of H with control procedures to construct an asymptotically discount optimal pair of strategies. Work supported partially by Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACyT) under Grant 46633-F.     

Randomized stopping games and Markov market games

We study nonzero-sum stopping games with randomized stopping strategies. The existence of Nash equilibrium and ɛ-equilibrium strategies are discussed under various assumptions on players random payoffs and utility functions dependent on the observed discrete time Markov process. Then we will present a model of a market game in which randomized stopping times are involved. The model is a mixture of a stochastic game and stopping game. Research supported by grant PBZ-KBN-016/P03/99.     

Performance versus informativeness in linear-quadratic Gaussian noncooperative games

In this paper, we study the impact of informativeness on the performance of linear quadratic Gaussian Nash and Stackelberg games. We first show that, in two-person static Nash games, if one of the players acquires more information, then this extra information is beneficial to him, provided that it is orthogonal to both players' information. A special case is that when one of the players is informationally stronger than the other, then any new information is beneficial to him. We then show that a similar result holds for dynamic Nash games. In the dynamic games, the players use strategies that are linear functions of the current estimates of the state, generated by two Kalman filters. The same properties are proved to hold in static and feedback Stackelberg games as well.This work was partially supported by the US Air Force Office of Scientific Research under Grant No. AFOSR-82-0174.     

Inner solvers for interior point methods for large scale nonlinear programming

This paper deals with the solution of nonlinear programming problems arising from elliptic control problems by an interior point scheme. At each step of the scheme, we have to solve a large scale symmetric and indefinite system; inner iterative solvers, with an adaptive stopping rule, can be used in order to avoid unnecessary inner iterations, especially when the current outer iterate is far from the solution. In this work, we analyse the method of multipliers and the preconditioned conjugate gradient method as inner solvers for interior point schemes. We discuss the convergence of the whole approach, the implementation details and report the results of numerical experimentation on a set of large scale test problems arising from the discretization of elliptic control problems. A comparison with other interior point codes is also reported. This research was supported by the Italian Ministry for Education, University and Research (MIUR) projects: FIRB Project: “Parallel Nonlinear Numerical Optimization PN ² O” (grant n. RBAU01JYPN, ) and COFIN/PRIN04 Project “Numerical Methods and Mathematical Software for Applications” (grant n. 2004012559, ).     

Markov stopping games with random priority

In the paper a construction of Nash equilibria for a random priority finite horizon two-person non-zero sum game with stopping of Markov process is given. The method is used to solve the two-person non-zero-sum game version of the secretary problem. Each player can choose only one applicant. If both players would like to select the same one, then the lottery chooses the player. The aim of the players is to choose the best candidate. An analysis of the solutions for different lotteries is given. Some lotteries admit equilibria with equal Nash values for the players.The research was supported in part by Committee of Scientific Research under Grant KBN 211639101.     

Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains

This paper focuses on the impact of competition and consumers’ environmental awareness on key supply chain players. We consider both the production competition between partially substitutable products made by different manufacturers, and the competition between retail stores. We use two-stage Stackelberg game models to investigate the dynamics between the supply chain players given three supply chain network structures. We find that as consumers’ environmental awareness increases, retailers and manufacturers with superior eco-friendly operations will benefit; while the profitability of the inferior eco-friendly firm will tend to increase if the production competition level is low, and will tend to decrease if the production competition level is high. In addition, higher levels of retail competition may make manufacturers with inferior eco-friendly operations more likely to benefit from the increase of consumers’ environmental awareness. Moreover, as production competition intensifies, the profits of the retailers will always increase, while the profits of the manufacturers with inferior eco-friendly operations will always decrease. The profitability of the manufacturers with superior eco-friendly operations will also tend to decrease, unless consumers’ environmental awareness is high and the superior manufacturer has a significant cost advantage related to product environmental improvement.