The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problems

The purpose of this paper is to extend the rights egalitarian solution (Herrero et al. in Math Soc Sci 37:59–77, 1999) to the context of non-transferable utility sharing problems. Such an extension is not unique. Depending on the kind of properties we want to preserve we obtain two different generalizations. One is the “proportional solution”, that corresponds to the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution for surplus sharing problems and the solution in Herrero (Soc Choice Welf 15:113–119, 1998) for rationing problems. The other is the “Nash solution”, that corresponds to the standard Nash bargaining solution for surplus sharing problems and the Nash rationing solution (Mariotti and Villar in Int J Game Theory 33:367–377, 2005) for the case of rationing problems.     

Fixed point theorems for nonexpansive mappings and Suzuki-generalized nonexpansive mappings on a Banach lattice

We prove the existence of fixed points for multivalued nonexpansive nonself-mappings on a weakly orthogonal reflexive Banach lattice with uniformly monotone norm. Moreover, for single-valued mappings, we extend Betiuk-Pilarska and Prus’s result [A. Betiuk-Pilarska, S. Prus, Banach lattices which are order uniformly noncreasy, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 342 (2008) 1271–1279] on the weak fixed point property to continuous mappings satisfying condition (C) on a w-weakly orthogonal OUNC Banach lattice.     

NOTE The Johnson Graphs Satisfy a Distance Extension Property

G has property if whenever F and H are connected graphs with and |H|=|F|+1, and and are isometric embeddings, then there is an isometric embedding such that . It is easy to construct an infinite graph with for all k, and holds in almost all finite graphs. Prior to this work, it was not known whether there exist any finite graphs with . We show that the Johnson graphs J(n,3) satisfy whenever , and that J(6,3) is the smallest graph satisfying . We also construct finite graphs satisfying and local versions of the extension axioms studied in connection with the Rado universal graph. Received June 9, 1998     

Positive solutions for nonlinear periodic problems

We consider a nonlinear periodic problem driven by the scalar p-Laplacian and with a nonsmooth potential. Using the degree map for multivalued perturbations of (S)₊-operators and the spectrum of a weighted eigenvalue problem for the scalar periodic p-Laplacian, we prove the existence of a strictly positive solution. Michael E. Filippakis: Researcher supported by a grant of the National Scholarship Foundation of Greece (I.K.Y.)     

Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market

This paper studies Nash implementation in the job-matching market where each worker works for only one firm and a firm hires as many workers as it wishes. We show that the competitive equilibrium correspondence (CEC) is the smallest Nash implementable correspondence satisfying individual rationality and Pareto indifference. Furthermore, the CEC is the minimal monotonic extension of the worker-optimal and firm-optimal subcorrespondences. We offer two “good” mechanisms that implement this correspondence in Nash equilibrium.     

Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space

We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining solution as the length of a time period between offers goes to zero. Without the differentiability assumption, convergence need not hold.     

Complexity of Weighted Approximation over

We study approximation of univariate functions defined over the reals. We assume that the rth derivative of a function is bounded in a weighted L_p norm with a weight ψ. Approximation algorithms use the values of a function and its derivatives up to order r−1. The worst case error of an algorithm is defined in a weighted L_q norm with a weight ρ. We study the worst case (information) complexity of the weighted approximation problem, which is equal to the minimal number of function and derivative evaluations needed to obtain error . We provide necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of the weights ψ and ρ, as well as the parameters r, p, and q for the weighted approximation problem to have finite complexity. We also provide conditions which guarantee that the complexity of weighted approximation is of the same order as the complexity of the classical approximation problem over a finite interval. Such necessary and sufficient conditions are also provided for a weighted integration problem since its complexity is equivalent to the complexity of the weighted approximation problem for q=1.     

Independence of irrelevant expansions

Nash characterized the only bargaining solution to satisfy a well-known list of axioms. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives states invariance of the solution outcome under certain contractions of the bargaining problem. A dual of this axiom is proposed here, stating invariance under certainexpansions of the bargaining problem andNash's solution is characerized by substituting this axiom for IIA in Nash's original list. After a transposition from the domain of bargaining solutions to the domain of choice rules, and a weakening of Invariance with respect to Positive Affine Transformations toTranslation Invariance, this new list of axioms is shown to characterizeUtilitarian rules.     

Characterizing properties of approximate solutions for optimization problems

Approximate solutions for optimization problems become of interest if the ‘true’ optimum cannot be found: this may happen for the simple reason that an optimum does not exist or because of the ‘bounded rationality’ (or bounded accuracy) of the optimizer. This paper characterizes several approximate solutions by means of consistency and additional requirements. In particular we consider invariance properties. We prove that, where the domain contains optimization problems without maximum, there is no non-trivial consistent solution satisfying non-emptiness, translation and multiplication invariance. Moreover, we show that the class of ‘satisficing’ solutions is obtained, if the invariance axioms are replaced with Chernoff’s Choice Axiom.     

Weak Equality and Exact Sequences in H v -modules

The largest class of multivalued systems satisfying the module-like axioms is the H_v-module. H_v-modules first were introduced by Vougiouklis. In this paper we define weak equality between two subsets of an H_v-module and introduced the notion of exact sequences of H_v-modules. Also some results on the weak equality and exact sequences are given.     

Set-valued nonlinear analogues of the shapley value

One of Shapley's classic axioms deals with the addition of the games. We consider the family of axiom systems depending on various operations over the set of cooperative games. The existence and the uniqueness of the correspondinga priori set-valued solutions are studied. The family of solutions (satisfying the proposed system of axioms) contains, as particular cases, the Shapley value and the -core. The modification of the proposed system of axioms is studied, prekernel being the maximal solution satisfying this modification.We would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Second Order Nonlinear Evolution Inclusions Ⅱ： Structure of the Solution Set

We contimle the work initiated in [1] （Second order nonlinear evolution inclusions I： Existence and relaxation results. Acta Mathematics Science, English Series, 21（5）, 977-996 （2005）） and study the structural properties of the solution set of second order evolution inclusions which are defined in the analytic framework of the evolution triple. For the convex problem we show that the solution set is compact Rs, while for the nonconvex problem we show that it is path connected, Also we show that the solution set is closed only if the multivalued nonlinearity is convex valued. Finally we illustrate the results by considering a nonlinear hyperbolic problem with discontinuities.     

A Stochastic Petri Net Approach for Inventory Rationing in Multi-Echelon Supply Chains

Manufacturing supply chains are considered as discrete event dynamical systems (DEDS) where coordination of material and information flows is essential to satisfy customer orders and to improve the bottomline of the constituent organizations. A critical problem that is often faced by distribution centres that hold finished good inventory is that of inventory rationing. Inventory rationing is a useful strategy to tackle the problem of conflicting objectives i.e., minimizing inventory costs (holding and backorder) on the one hand and achieving the desired customer service levels (CSLs) on the other. The focus of this paper is to formulate Generalized Stochastic Petri net models to address the inventory rationing problem in the context of multi-echelon make-to-stock distribution chains, where the goods flow through multiple echelons, typically from product manufacturers all the way up-to the retail outlets. The statistical inventory control (SIC) policies modeled by the GSPN are (R, s, S) and a variant that we propose, (R^∗, s, S). We compare the performance of the model under two rationing settings. The first setting considers a case without cooperation, where the individual local stockpoints maximize their own performance. The second setting considers a case with cooperation, where the local stockpoints cooperate with each other to maximize the overall system performance. We provide a methodology to approximately determine the optimal rational fractions with different weights assigned to expected backorder and holding cost components (b/h). We present some interesting results obtained after rigorous numerical experimentation on the model.     

Inclusion problems via subsolution–supersolution method with applications to hemivariational inequalities

Abstract

Existence and location of solutions to a Dirichlet problem driven by (p, q)-Laplacian and containing a (convection) multivalued term fully depending on the solution and its gradient are established through the method of subsolution–supersolution. This result extends preceding works, in particular improving the growth condition for the lower order terms and allowing multivalued nonlinearities. A criterion for the existence of positive solutions with a priori estimates is obtained. Finally, an application to hemivariational inequalities is given.     

Browder’s Theorems through Localized SVEP

A bounded linear operator T ∈ L(X) on aBanach space X is said to satisfy “Browder’s theorem” if the Browder spectrum coincides with the Weyl spectrum. T ∈ L(X) is said to satisfy “a-Browder’s theorem” if the upper semi-Browder spectrum coincides with the approximate point Weyl spectrum. In this note we give several characterizations of operators satisfying these theorems. Most of these characterizations are obtained by using a localized version of the single-valued extension property of T. In the last part we shall give some characterizations of operators for which “Weyl’s theorem” holds.     

Generalized Hodges-Lehmann estimators for the analysis of variance

For X_i, …, X_n a random sample and K(·, ·) a symmetric kernel this paper considers large sample properties of location estimator satisfying , . Asymptotic normality of is obtained and two forms of interval estimators for parameter θ satisfying EK(X₁ − θ, X₂ − θ) = 0, are discussed. Consistent estimation of the variance parameters is obtained which permits the construction of asymptotically distribution free procedures. The p-variate and multigroup extension is accomplished to provide generalized one-way MANOVA. Monte Carlo results are included.     

Consistency and monotonicity in sequencing problems

We explore the implications of consistency and monotonicity in sequencing problems. We first identify all rules satisfying Pareto indifference, individual rationality from random arrival, and consistency. Next, we ask whether there is a rule satisfying the three axioms together with either one of two monotonicity requirements, time monotonicity and cost monotonicity. As it turns out, the minimal transfer rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto indifference, individual rationality from random arrival, consistency together with either time monotonicity or cost monotonicity. We also investigate how the maximal transfer rule responds to changes in the service time and waiting cost.     

Comparison results for nonlinear elliptic equations with lower–order terms

We consider a solution u of the homogeneous Dirichlet problem for a class of nonlinear elliptic equations in the form A(u) + g(x, u) = f, where the principal term is a Leray–Lions operator defined on and g(x, u) is a term having the same sign as u and satisfying suitable growth assumptions. We prove that the rearrangement of u can be estimated by the solution of a problem whose data are radially symmetric.     

Disagreement point axioms and the egalitarian bargaining solution

We provide new characterizations of the egalitarian bargaining solution on the class of strictly comprehensive n-person bargaining problems. The main axioms used in all of our results are Nash’s IIA and disagreement point monotonicity—an axiom which requires a player’s payoff to strictly increase in his disagreement payoff. For n = 2 these axioms, together with other standard requirements, uniquely characterize the egalitarian solution. For n > 2 we provide two extensions of our 2-person result, each of which is obtained by imposing an additional axiom on the solution. Dropping the axiom of anonymity, strengthening disagreement point monotonicity by requiring player i’s payoff to be a strictly decreasing function of the disagreement payoff of every other player j ≠ i, and adding a “weak convexity” axiom regarding changes of the disagreement point, we obtain a characterization of the class of weighted egalitarian solutions. This “weak convexity” axiom requires that a movement of the disagreement point in the direction of the solution point should not change the solution point. We also discuss the so-called “transfer paradox” and relate it to this axiom.     

An axiomatization of the weighted NTU value

Non-symmetric generalizations of the non-transferable utility (NTU) are defined and characterized axiomatically. The first of these is a weighted NTU value that is identical to the (symmetric) NTU value when players have the same weights. On the class of transferable utility games, this weighted NTU value coincides with the weighted Shapley value and on the pure bargaining games it coincides with the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution. A further extension, the random order NTU value, is also defined and axiomatized and its relationship to the core is discussed.