An epistemic model of an agent who does not reflect on reasoning processes

This paper introduces an epistemic model of a boundedly rational agent under the two assumptions that (i) the agent’s reasoning process is in accordance with the model but (ii) the agent does not reflect on these reasoning processes. For such a concept of bounded rationality a semantic interpretation by the possible world semantics of the Kripke (1963) type is no longer available because the definition of knowledge in these possible world semantics implies that the agent knows all valid statements of the model. The key to my alternative semantic approach is the extension of the method of truth tables, first introduced for the propositional logic by Wittgenstein (1922), to an epistemic logic so that I can determine the truth value of epistemic statements for all relevant truth conditions. In my syntactic approach I define an epistemic logic–consisting of the classical calculus of propositional logic plus two knowledge axioms–that does not include the inference rule of necessitation, which claims that an agent knows all theorems of the logic. As my main formal result I derive a determination theorem linking my semantic with my syntactic approach. The difference between my approach and existing knowledge models is illustrated in a game-theoretic application concerning the epistemic justification of iterative solution concepts.     

A simple logic for reasoning about incomplete knowledge

The semantics of modal logics for reasoning about belief or knowledge is often described in terms of accessibility relations, which is too expressive to account for mere epistemic states of an agent. This paper proposes a simple logic whose atoms express epistemic attitudes about formulae expressed in another basic propositional language, and that allows for conjunctions, disjunctions and negations of belief or knowledge statements. It allows an agent to reason about what is known about the beliefs held by another agent. This simple epistemic logic borrows its syntax and axioms from the modal logic KD. It uses only a fragment of the S5 language, which makes it a two-tiered propositional logic rather than as an extension thereof. Its semantics is given in terms of epistemic states understood as subsets of mutually exclusive propositional interpretations. Our approach offers a logical grounding to uncertainty theories like possibility theory and belief functions. In fact, we define the most basic logic for possibility theory as shown by a completeness proof that does not rely on accessibility relations.     

Can realists know that they know?

Realists typically suppose that nonepistemic truth is an independent condition on propositional knowledge. Few philosophers, however, have seriously questioned the meta-epistemic consequences of combining alethic and epistemic variants of realism. In this paper I aim to show that the truth condition in the customary definition of knowledge presents an important problem for the realist at higher epistemic levels. According to my argument, traditional epistemic-logical analyses of metaknowledge fail because of their extensionalism and certain presuppositions they have about the satisfaction of the truth condition. I further suggest that we need a different approach to metaknowledge if (1) we want to retain alethic realism, and (2) we want our epistemological accounts to adequately explicate the meta-epistemic states of actual, evidence-bound cognitive agents. This paper greatly benefited from the comments and criticisms of an anonymous referee for Acta Analytica.     

Probability,fuzziness and borderline cases

An integrated approach to truth-gaps and epistemic uncertainty is described, based on probability distributions defined over a set of three-valued truth models. This combines the explicit representation of borderline cases with both semantic and stochastic uncertainty, in order to define measures of subjective belief in vague propositions. Within this framework we investigate bridges between probability theory and fuzziness in a propositional logic setting. In particular, when the underlying truth model is from Kleene's three-valued logic then we provide a complete characterisation of compositional min–max fuzzy truth degrees. For classical and supervaluationist truth models we find partial bridges, with min and max combination rules only recoverable on a fragment of the language. Across all of these different types of truth valuations, min–max operators are resultant in those cases in which there is only uncertainty about the relative sharpness or vagueness of the interpretation of the language.     

Inquisitive logic as an epistemic logic of knowing how

In this paper, we present an alternative interpretation of propositional inquisitive logic as an epistemic logic of knowing how. In our setting, an inquisitive logic formula α being supported by a state is formalized as knowing how to resolve α (more colloquially, knowing how α is true) holds on the S5 epistemic model corresponding to the state. Based on this epistemic interpretation, we use a dynamic epistemic logic with both know-how and know-that operators to capture the epistemic information behind the innocent-looking connectives in inquisitive logic. We show that the set of valid know-how formulas corresponds precisely to the inquisitive logic. The main result is a complete axiomatization with intuitive axioms using the full dynamic epistemic language. Moreover, we show that the know-how operator and the dynamic operator can both be eliminated without changing the expressivity over models, which is consistent with the modal translation of inquisitive logic existing in the literature. We hope our framework can give an intuitive alternative interpretation to various concepts and technical results in inquisitive logic, and also provide a powerful and flexible tool to handle both the inquisitive reasoning and declarative reasoning in an epistemic context.     

格值命题逻辑系统中基于滤子的MP归结演绎

给出了格值命题逻辑系统中子句的极简规则型范式,定义了MP归结.结合格蕴涵代数中滤子的性质,对格值命题逻辑系统中基于滤予的MP归结演绎及其语义与语法性质进行了研究,证明了归结演绎的可靠性与完备性定理.为进一步研究格值逻辑的自动归结推理奠定了理论基础.     

Bilattice logic of epistemic actions and knowledge

Baltag, Moss, and Solecki proposed an expansion of classical modal logic, called logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (EAK), in which one can reason about knowledge and change of knowledge. Kurz and Palmigiano showed how duality theory provides a flexible framework for modeling such epistemic changes, allowing one to develop dynamic epistemic logics on a weaker propositional basis than classical logic (for example an intuitionistic basis). In this paper we show how the techniques of Kurz and Palmigiano can be further extended to define and axiomatize a bilattice logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (BEAK). Our propositional basis is a modal expansion of the well-known four-valued logic of Belnap and Dunn, which is a system designed for handling inconsistent as well as potentially conflicting information. These features, we believe, make our framework particularly promising from a computer science perspective.     

二值命题逻辑中基于前提信息的近似推理理论

以真度为基础,给出二值命题逻辑系统中基于前提信息的相似度和伪距离的概念以及伪距离的真度表示式,对二值命题逻辑中具有前提信息的近似推理问题进行讨论.     

Logic of agreement: Foundations,semantic system and proof theory

In this paper a multi-valued propositional logic — logic of agreement — in terms of its model theory and inference system is presented. This formal system is the natural consequence of a new way to approach concepts as commonsense knowledge, uncertainty and approximate reasoning — the point of view of agreement. Particularly, it is discussed a possible extension of the Classical Theory of Sets based on the idea that, instead of trying to conceptualize sets as “fuzzy” or “vague” entities, it is more adequate to define membership as the result of a partial agreement among a group of individual agents. Furthermore, it is shown that the concept of agreement provides a framework for the development of a formal and sound explanation for concepts (e.g. fuzzy sets) which lack formal semantics. According to the definition of agreement, an individual agent agrees or not with the fact that an object possesses a certain property. A clear distinction is then established, between an individual agent — to whom deciding whether an element belongs to a set is just a yes or no matter — and a commonsensical agent — the one who interprets the knowledge shared by a certain group of people. Finally, the logic of agreement is presented and discussed. As it is assumed the existence of several individual agents, the semantic system is based on the perspective that each individual agent defines her/his own conceptualization of reality. So the semantics of the logic of agreement can be seen as being similar to a semantics of possible worlds, one for each individual agent. The proof theory is an extension of a natural deduction system, using supported formulas and incorporating only inference rules. Moreover, the soundness and completeness of the logic of agreement are also presented.     

在一种扩展多层感知器模型中实现命题知识的语义推演

§ 1.　Introduction　　Artificialintelligentisbasedonknowledgeexpression ,atthesametimeitisdependedonusingknowledge .Wecangetanalysisanddecisionandforecastbyusingknowledge .Inlogicsystem ,usingknowledgemeanslogicinferenceordeduction .Now ,manylogicsystemshavebeenproposedasformalmodelsforknowledgeexpressionandreasoning [1 ] ,[2 ] ,[6]— [9] .Althoughpropositionalcalculus(P(X) )isthesimplestlogicsystem ,itprovideswithuniversalmethodforotherlogicsystems.Asweknow ,reasoninginpropositionalcalculu…     

Actualism and Modal Semantics

According to actualism, modal reality is constructed out of valuations (combinations of truth values for all propositions). According to possibilism, modal reality consists in a set of possible worlds, conceived as independent objects that assign truth values to propositions. According to possibilism, accounts of modal reality can intelligibly disagree with each other even if they agree on which valuations are contained in modal reality. According to actualism, these disagreements (possibilist disagreements) are completely unintelligible. An essentially actualist semantics for modal propositional logic specifies which sets of valuations are compatible with the meanings of the truth-functional connectives and modal operators without drawing on formal resources that would enable us to represent possibilist disagreements. The paper discusses the availability of an essentially actualist semantics for modal propositional logic. I argue that the standard Kripkean semantics is not essentially actualist and that other extant approaches also fail to provide a satisfactory essentially actualist semantics. I end by describing an essentialist actualist semantics for modal propositional logic.     

标准序列逻辑系统S_3中公式的概率真度理论

利用势为3的非均匀概率空间的无穷乘积在三值标准序列逻辑系统中引入了公式的概率真度概念,证明了全体公式的概率真度值之集在[0,1]中没有孤立点;利用概率真度定义了概率相似度和伪距离,进而建立了概率逻辑度量空间,证明了该空间中没有孤立点,为三值命题的近似推理理论提供了一种可能的框架.     

Separability of normalizable superintuitionistic propositional logics

The problem of separability of superintuitionistic propositional logics that are extensions of the intuitionistic propositional logic is studied. A criterion of separability of normal superintuitionistic propositional logics, as well as results concerning the completeness of their subcalculi is obtained. This criterion makes it possible to determine whether a normalizable superintuitionistic propositional logic is separable. By means of these results, the mistakes discovered by the author in the proofs of certain statements by McKay and Hosoi are corrected.Translated fromMatematicheskie Zametki, Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 606–615, October, 1998.This research was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research under grant No. 94-01-00944.     

Piaget's Logic of Meanings: Still Relevant Today

In his last book, Toward a Logic of Meanings ( Piaget & Garcia, 1991 ), Jean Piaget describes how thought can be categorized into a form of propositional logic, a logic of meanings. The intent of this article is to offer this analysis by Piaget as a means to understand the language and teaching of science. Using binary propositions, conjunctions, and disjunctions, a table of binary operations is used to analyze the structure of statements about conclusions drawn from observations of science phenomena. Two examples from science content illustrate how the logic of binary propositions is used to symbolize typical reasoning of secondary‐school science students. The content areas are the period of a pendulum and the Archimedes' Principle, which were chosen based on observations in secondary science classrooms. The analyses of the student responses in these two observations demonstrate the commonalities of arguments used by students of science as they try to make sense of observations. The analysis of students' reasoning, demonstrates that Piaget's logic of meanings is a useful and relevant tool for science educators' understanding of the syntactical aspects of pedagogical content knowledge.     

关于随机真度的若干注记

以随机真度为基础,在三值R_0命题逻辑系统中给出了三种不同的近似推理模式并讨论了它们之间的关系,其次利用根的性质得出误差定义的若干推理结果.     

Fuzzy inequational logic

We present a logic for reasoning about graded inequalities which generalizes the ordinary inequational logic used in universal algebra. The logic deals with atomic predicate formulas of the form of inequalities between terms and formalizes their semantic entailment and provability in graded setting which allows to draw partially true conclusions from partially true assumptions. We follow the Pavelka approach and define general degrees of semantic entailment and provability using complete residuated lattices as structures of truth degrees. We prove the logic is Pavelka-style complete. Furthermore, we present a logic for reasoning about graded if–then rules which is obtained as particular case of the general result.     

系统L_n中公式相对于有限理论的Г-绝对真度理论

将多值逻辑中的∑-α重言式理论与计量逻辑学中的真度理论相结合,在n值Lukasiewicz命题逻辑系统中引入了公式相对于有限理论Γ的Γ-绝对真度概念,讨论了它的若干性质.利用Γ-绝对真度定义了公式间的Γ-绝对相似度与伪距离,为进一步建立n值Lukasiewicz命题逻辑系统相对于有限理论Γ的近似推理奠定了基础.     

Hypersequent calculi for intuitionistic logic with classical atoms

We discuss a propositional logic which combines classical reasoning with constructive reasoning, i.e., intuitionistic logic augmented with a class of propositional variables for which we postulate the decidability property. We call it intuitionistic logic with classical atoms. We introduce two hypersequent calculi for this logic. Our main results presented here are cut-elimination with the subformula property for the calculi. As corollaries, we show decidability, an extended form of the disjunction property, the existence of embedding into an intuitionistic modal logic and a partial form of interpolation.