基于需求的实时网络定价策略

价格作为一种网络拥塞控制管理与资源分配的机制不断地表现出较高的效率。基于对网络使用实际流量的信息，本提出了一种实时的网络定价策略——基于需求的实时网络定价策略。该定价策略由三部分构成：固定连接费、资源使用费及网络拥塞费。与传统的定价策略相比，基于需求的实时网络定价策略更能反映实际的需求情况，在网络拥塞控制管理与网络资源分配等方面有更高的效率。     

基于网络顾客行为意向的物流服务供应链定价策略

就一个运营网络购物的供应链,分析物流服务需求方和服务提供方的定价和服务水平决策等问题。在成本共担优化模型中考虑基于顾客购买行为意向的产品需求函数,进而分别给出非合作、准合作和完全合作模式下供应链企业决策间的关系,以及网购顾客重购概率对最优定价策略的影响。结论有:证明三种合作模式下双方最优策略的存在性及存在条件;给出最优产品定价策略和服务定价策略间的数量关系,并证明其与网购顾客行为意向有关。数值分析表明,最优定价策略随服务水平和网购顾客重购概率的变化趋势受成本共担系数的影响;较小的成本分摊系数使最优产品定价随着服务水平和网购顾客重购概率的变化幅度增大。     

考虑流量局部变化与转移的移动App价格促销广告策略研究

随着移动App市场中消费者流量的不断增加，越来越多的广告主选择在移动App市场中投放价格促销广告。本文分析了当移动App市场中的流量分别发生局部变化或相互转移时，广告主应如何制定其最优促销广告定价与最优广告投放水平。我们首先假设市场不完全覆盖的情境，结果表明：(1)在广告主的局部市场与竞争市场中的流量发生局部变化下，广告主的产品定价与广告投放水平和竞争市场大小、竞争市场流量大小以及局部市场流量大小有关；(2)当流量在局部市场与竞争市场之间相互转移时，广告主还需考虑原市场中流量的大小来调整其价格促销广告策略；(3)当局部市场的流量大小不相等时，本文也为处于流量优势或劣势的广告主提供了相应的最优产品定价与广告投放水平策略的指导。本研究为移动App环境下网络营销企业广告策略的制定提供了理论参考。     

带缓冲器的巴黎地铁定价策略

本在巴黎地铁定价(PMP(Paris Metro Pricing))的基础上研究了一种带有缓冲器的巴黎地铁定价策略。同样将网络分成几个逻辑上独立的不同部分，每一个部分制定不同的价格，各部分仅在价格上有区别。但是额外增加一个适合“中性消费”需求的缓冲器，使得“中性消费”可以先向缓冲器提交服务请求，而后由ISP网络提供商根据各部分的实际负载状况将其分配到合适的服务节点。最后通过仿真说明与巴黎地铁相比，带有缓冲器的巴黎地铁定价策略在网络拥塞控制与网络资源分配等方面有更高的效率。     

基于顾客策略行为的两周期供应链动态定价,契约协调与利润分配机制

构建考虑顾客策略行为的两周期供应链博弈模型,分析分散式和集中式决策下,供应链成员的最优决策及顾客策略行为强度对各成员企业决策和利润的影响,研究两部定价契约和数量折扣契约的协调问题,提出一个基于成员议价能力的利润分配机制,并探讨顾客策略行为和成员议价能力对最优补偿金额的影响.主要结论为:1)顾客策略性越强,对供应链成员和总利润的负效应越大,且存在一个阈值,超过此阈值后,供应链各成员利润和总利润均降至最低限,但供应商利润总是高于零售商;2)两部定价契约和数量折扣契约能实现上述供应链的协调,但总有一参与方独占整个供应链的利润;3)基于成员议价能力的利润分配机制下,最优补偿金额与补偿提供方的议价能力负相关,顾客策略行为将导致补偿金额的降低.     

考虑顾客策略行为和机器故障的加工排队系统最优定价

在加工系统中,顾客的决策行为不仅受价格影响,同时对交货时间敏感,而且不同的顾客对时间具有不同的敏感程度。本文采用排队理论,研究了垄断环境中策略顾客行为和机器故障干扰的加工系统最优定价问题,证明了最优定价的存在性,设计了最优定价的求解方法。通过数值算例,讨论了实际需求比例、最优定价和最大利润关于加工成本、单位时间维修成本、机器故障频率和平均维修时间的变化规律。数值结果说明机器故障修复时间增加比故障频率增加对企业利润造成影响更大。     

不同价格水平下排队策略研究

在M/M/1排队中引入了不同的服务价格,基于"收益-成本"结构,以顾客和企业均追求利益最大化为出发点,在两种不可见情形下,研究了顾客均衡策略行为和企业最优服务定价决策,通过数值模拟,描述了休假期服务价格对顾客均衡策略的影响,以及几乎不可见情况下休假期服务价格对企业收益的作用和完全不可见情况下休假期服务价格随潜在到达率的变化情况,以及当企业获得最大收益时,正常工作期和休假期服务价格的关系.     

异质性生鲜农产品供应链的差别定价与协调策略

在单一供应商生产的两种产品存在替代性,需求受自身价格、新鲜度以及替代品价格共同影响的条件下,研究了受数量损耗影响的生鲜农产品供应链的定价策略及协调问题.比较分析了集中式与分散式决策下的最优策略,讨论了竞争替代系数以及可控的新鲜度和数量损耗率对最优决策的影响,进而给出了继续提升系统总利润的决策空间和顾客共赢的决策范围.并设计了"利润共享契约"对供应链进行协调,当契约参数在一定范围内变化时,该契约能实现供应商、零售商和顾客三方的共赢,供应商也拥有继续提升系统总利润的动力.     

数字环境下产品定价与一种产品差异化机制模型分析

本文首先分析了在新的市空下市场结构特征和厂商定价策略,以及价格机制的演变和不同市场环境下具体价格机制的使用;依据逆向选择原理,设计了一种有中间商参与的基于顾客需求和品牌偏好的产品差别定价机制模型,利用logit模型得到厂商利润方程;然后对模型性质以及厂商间产品价格、产品特性的影响进行了分析,得出厂商定价策略必存在Nash均衡,并对两种情形下如何求均衡解进行了说明;最后对参数估计进行了分析。     

考虑跨渠道退货的双渠道零售商定价与退货策略研究

本文以零售商线上线下销售和消费者退货并存的销售模式为背景，以零售商利润最大化为目标，构建线上线下统一定价和自主定价的双渠道和跨渠道退货两种不同的定价决策模型，分析了顾客渠道偏好和退货麻烦成本对零售商定价和退货策略选择与利润的影响。研究发现：给定退货麻烦成本，当顾客渠道偏好明显时，零售商应采取自主定价策略，否则应采取统一定价策略。顾客偏好线上渠道时，应该采取跨渠道退货政策；顾客偏好线下渠道时，应采取双渠道退货政策。零售商应根据顾客渠道偏好和退货麻烦成本选择合理的定价策略和退货策略，保证其利润最大化。本文研究对于采用线上线下渠道销售并允许退货的零售商设置最合理的退货方式和最优定价策略有一定的实际应用价值。     

考虑路网可靠性和空间公平性的次优拥挤收费模型

根据随机路网环境下出行者规避风险的路径选择行为,提出了一种考虑路网可靠性和空间公平性的次优拥挤收费双层规划模型。其中,上层模型以具有空间公平性约束条件下最大化路网的社会福利为目标,下层模型是实施拥挤收费条件下考虑行程时间可靠性的弹性需求用户平衡模型。鉴于双层规划模型的复杂性,设计了基于遗传算法和FrankWolfe算法的组合式算法来求解提出的模型。算例结果表明:考虑行程时间可靠性的次优拥挤收费会产生不同于传统次优拥挤收费的平衡流量分布模式,表明出行者的路径选择行为对拥挤收费结果会产生直接影响;此外,算例结果还说明遗传算法对参数设置具有很强的鲁棒性。     

固定经营期下基于运行绩效的PPP项目服务价格形成机制研究

本文研究PPP项目价格形成机制、补偿机制及其社会效率。首先,分析了招投标制度下固定经营期PPP项目服务价格形成机制及其不足。其次,基于成本与运行绩效的PPP项目定价规制及可行性缺口补贴思想,建立模型分析实施机构可观察PPP项目服务成本时的定价水平和可行性缺口补贴标准;当实施机构无法准确掌握项目公司的运行成本时,通过制度设计诱导社会投资者上报真实的运行成本和运行绩效以获得最大净现值。分析表明,当PPP项目服务需求弹性较大同时有可行性缺口补贴政策时,政府进行价格规制时项目净现值高于不规制时的净现值。文章通过实例验证了成本信息是否可观察两种情形下PPP项目的服务价格水平、运行绩效、项目投资净现值及消费者剩余。为了避免PPP项目运行绩效下降和社会福利损失,政府应建立科学的监督激励机制,依据PPP项目服务成本与运行绩效的信息确定固定特许经营期下项目服务价格和可行性缺口补贴额度。     

多方式弹性需求下公交定价双层规划模型

为描述多方式城市交通网络下公交定价与出行选择行为的相互作用与影响,将出行方式选择与路径选择涵盖于同一网络,建立了上层模型分别以企业利润最大化、乘客出行成本最小化和社会福利最大化为目标函数,下层模型为多方式弹性需求随机用户配流模型的公交定价双层规划模型。运用改进遗传算法对模型整体进行求解,下层模型采用综合对角化算法和MSA算法的组合求解算法。最后,设计了一个算例以说明模型应用。结果表明:运用双层规划模型所确定的公交票价较传统静态票价可使政府、企业及出行者三方都获得更高收益,且上层模型以社会福利最大化为目标函数能代表社会群体中多数人利益,优化效果最为理想。     

Hybrid pricing in a coupled European power market with more wind power

In the European electricity market, the promotion of wind power leads to more network congestion. Zonal pricing (market coupling), which does not take the physical characteristics of transmission into account, is the most commonly used method to relieve network congestion in Europe. However, zonal pricing fails to provide adequate locational price signals regarding scarcity of energy and thus creates a large amount of unscheduled cross-border flows originating from wind-generated power. In this paper, we investigate the effects of applying a hybrid congestion management model, i.e., a nodal pricing model for one country embedded in a zonal pricing system for the rest of the market. We find that, compared to full nodal pricing, hybrid pricing fails to fully utilize all the resources in the network and some wrong price signals might be given. However, hybrid pricing still outperforms zonal pricing. The results from the study cases show that, within the area applying nodal pricing, better price signals are given; the need for re-dispatching is reduced; more congestion rent is collected domestically and the unit cost of power is reduced.     

基于风险偏好的供应链企业社会责任投入与定价策略研究

本文研究制造商承担企业社会责任时,竞争市场下供应链的均衡价格策略。通过Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨供应链成员的风险规避程度、竞争市场的需求波动性和竞争市场的需求相关性以及制造商企业社会责任水平对供应链均衡策略的影响。研究表明,在制造商承担企业社会责任时,风险规避程度对价格策略的影响依赖于制造商企业社会责任水平的高低;竞争市场的需求波动性较大或竞争市场需求相关性较高时,制造商向下游风险规避型零售商提供较低的批发价格合约, 此时产品的市场价格降低,消费者福利增加;当制造商的生产成本较低时,承担越高的企业社会责任导致消费者福利增加;反之,当制造商的生产成本较高时,消费者福利总是减少。     

Uniform pricing and subsidy coordination mechanism in a two-tier healthcare system under a co-payment policy

Recently, the lengthy waiting time in public hospitals (called the public system) under the free healthcare policy has become a serious problem. To address this issue, motivated by the Japanese healthcare system, this paper investigates a two-tier co-payment healthcare system under a uniform pricing and subsidy coordination mechanism. In such a setting, the public system and the private system (i.e., the private hospitals) compete for market share with different objectives, whereas the government uniformly sets the service price and the subsidy rate to maximize social welfare under a total budget constraint. Compared with two free healthcare policy cases implemented in the Canadian and Australian healthcare systems respectively in terms of social welfare, the results show that when the market demand (or the patient service quality sensitivity) is sufficiently high (sufficiently low), the uniform pricing and subsidy coordination mechanism is better and worse otherwise; and when the patient's waiting sensitivity (or the total government budget) is in an appropriate middle range (sufficiently low or high), the mechanism can outperform than the free policy cases.     

考虑码头内外堆场竞争的集装箱堆存定价模型

针对由于集装箱吞吐量增加造成翻箱成本增加与码头堆场拥堵,考虑内外堆场竞争,构建集装箱堆存定价模型,研究内外堆场竞争下的堆存定价决策和货主移箱决策,分析码头堆场操作成本、场外堆场运输成本、货主需求参数和码头堆场收益的内在关系。算例结果表明:一旦过了免费期立即移箱到场外堆场,货主成本最小。随着场外堆场运输成本的增加,码头堆场的堆存定价和箱量增加,提高码头堆场收益。随着码头堆场操作成本降低,码头堆场堆存价格随之下降,但码头堆存箱量增加,提高码头堆场收益。此外降低堆场定价对货主需求的影响参数以及提高运输成本对货主需求的影响系数,有利于提高码头堆场收益。     

Controlled predatory pricing in a multiperiod Stackelberg game: an MPEC approach

We analyze a multiperiod oligopolistic market where each period is a Stackelberg game between a leader firm and multiple follower firms. The leader chooses his production level first, taking into account the reaction of the followers. Then, the follower firms decide their production levels after observing the leader’s decision. The difference between the proposed model and other models discussed in literature is that the leader firm has the power to force the follower firms out of business by preventing them from achieving a target sales level in a given time period. The leader firm has an incentive to lower the market prices possibly lower than the Stackelberg equilibrium in order to push the followers to sell less and eventually go out of business. Intentionally lowering the market prices to force competitors to fail is known as predatory pricing, and is illegal under antitrust laws since it negatively affects consumer welfare. In this work, we show that there exists a predatory pricing strategy where the market price is above the average cost and consumer welfare is preserved. We develop a mixed integer nonlinear problem (MINLP) that models the multiperiod Stackelberg game. The MINLP problem is transformed to a mixed integer linear problem (MILP) by using binary variables and piecewise linearization. A cutting plane algorithm is used to solve the resulting MILP. The results show that firms can engage in predatory pricing even if the average market price is forced to remain higher than the average cost. Furthermore, we show that in order to protect the consumers, antitrust laws can control predatory pricing by setting rules on consumer welfare.     

Competition among providers in loss networks

Communication networks are becoming ubiquitous and more and more competitive among revenue-maximizing providers, operating on potentially different technologies. In this paper, we propose to analyze thanks to game theory the competition of providers playing with access prices and fighting for customers. Considering a slotted-time model, the part of demand exceeding capacity is lost and has to be resent. We consider an access price for submitted packets, thus inducing a congestion pricing through losses. Customers therefore choose the provider with the cheapest average price per correctly transmitted unit of traffic. The model is a two-level game, the lower level for the distribution of customers among providers, and the upper level for the competition on prices among providers, taking into account what the subsequent repartition at the lower level will be. We prove that the upper level has a unique Nash equilibrium, for which the user repartition among different available providers is also unique, and, remarkably, efficient in the sense of social welfare (with a so-called price of anarchy equal to one). Moreover, even when adding a higher level game on capacity disclosure with a possibility of lying for providers, providers are better off being truthful, and the unique Nash equilibrium is thus unchanged.     

A new pricing scheme for a multi-period pool-based electricity auction

A new pricing scheme is proposed for determining the social welfare distribution in a centralized pool-based auction in the context of solving the unit commitment problems under competition. A significant contribution of this paper over previous publications on this subject is the inclusion of the price-responsive demand side for the multi-period auctions with dynamic commitment characteristics. The model allows every thermal unit and every consumer to obtain individual maximum profits, and at the same time it gives the market coordinator an adequate tool for solving the ensuing technologically constrained unit commitment problem with fair market clearing. The pricing model is in the form of a mixed linear programming model that minimizes the sum of the compensation costs. The accompanying case study illustrates the approach proposed.