通过博弈的室内行人疏散动力学研究

在室内行人疏散过程中,行人博弈对疏散效率有着重要的影响.本文把抵制博弈策略更新的强度定义为抵制强度. 为了研究抵制强度对疏散效率的影响, 通过在行人博弈策略更新的概率中引入抵制强度,基于元胞自动机模型数值计算在不同的行人密度, 出口宽度下疏散总时间随抵制强度变化的关系.结果表明: 室内行人疏散过程中, 抵制强度小会使得争抢行为极其容易蔓延. 当行人密度小且出口宽大时, 输入以急速疏散为主的规范信息,鼓励行人模仿优胜者更新博弈策略, 当行人密度大且出口狭小时, 输入以避让为主的规范信息抑制行人争抢,都能提高疏散效率. 最后找出不同条件下与最短疏散总时间相对应的优化抵制强度, 为提高室内行人疏散效率提供一个新的视角.     

基于脏脸博弈模型的人车路口穿越行为研究

行人与车辆在穿越无信号路口时的行为冲突尤其具有危险性, 行人和机动车不仅具有运动特征, 更具有行为特征, 因此需要从社会学层面对人车路口穿越问题进行建模. 通过对无信号路口处人车干扰机理的深入剖析, 提出基于脏脸博弈模型研究人车“理性人”的行为特征以及交互行为背后的微观机理, 分析了人车穿越路口时共同知识的形成过程、人车双方优势策略的产生机理和人车脏脸博弈的动力学过程. 理论推导了人、车收益的数学期望和发生人车冲突的概率. 分析结果表明: 行人穿越的理论时间和机动车穿越的理论时间越接近, 人车越容易发生冲突. 同时, 进一步分析了不同车型、不同行人等待时间和个体认知能力异质性对人车冲突概率的影响.     

Cellular Automaton Simulation of Evacuation Process in Story

Computer simulations on the evacuation process in a story are launched with cellular automaton in this article. The story is composed of five rooms and one corridor. Influence of various parameters on the evacuation process is investigated. It shows that the width of the door of rooms has little influence but the width of the corridor and the maximum velocity of the pedestrian have great influence on the time for evacuation. The relation between evacuation time and the width of corridor is found as tc ∝ W^-0.84. It is also found that appropriate shape of the room is helpful to evacuation.     

Exit selection strategy in pedestrian evacuation simulation with multi-exits

A mixed strategy of the exit selection in a pedestrian evacuation simulation with multi-exits is constructed by fusing the distance-based and time-based strategies through a cognitive coefficient, in order to reduce the evacuation imbalance caused by the asymmetry of exits or pedestrian layout, to find a critical density to distinguish whether the strategy of exit selection takes effect or not, and to analyze the exit selection results with different cognitive coefficients. The strategy of exit selection is embedded in the computation of the shortest estimated distance in a dynamic parameter model, in which the concept of a jam area layer and the procedure of step-by-step expending are introduced. Simulation results indicate the characteristics of evacuation time gradually varying against cognitive coefficient and the effectiveness of reducing evacuation imbalance caused by the asymmetry of pedestrian or exit layout. It is found that there is a critical density to distinguish whether a pedestrian jam occurs in the evacuation and whether an exit selection strategy is in effect. It is also shown that the strategy of exit selection has no effect on the evacuation process in the no-effect phase with a low density, and that evacuation time and exit selection are dependent on the cognitive coefficient and pedestrian initial density in the in-effect phase with a high density.     

双出口房间人群疏散的实验研究和数学建模

本文设计了一个双出口房间内人群疏散的实验方案,通过不同条件下疏散过程的实况录像及视频检测,得到不同人数疏散时间的许多定量结果.提出了双出口房间吸引区间的概念,证明了较小出口吸引区间的边界总是一段圆弧,可以解释行人流出口处的圆形成拱现象.通过类比地铁候车厅内人群疏散过程,建立了双出口房间内疏散时间的二次函数模型,成功拟合不同条件下的实测数据.疏散人数较少时,疏散时间随着人数增加而线性增长;人数较多,在出口附近出现待行区域时,疏散时间则呈二次函数增长.与一些已知疏散时间数学模型相比,本文模型对出口宽度变化的反应更敏感.     

零行列式策略在雪堆博弈中的演化

零行列式策略不仅可以单方面设置对手收益,而且可以对双方的收益施加一个线性关系,从而达到敲诈对手的目的.本文针对零行列式策略博弈前期与稳态期的收益存在偏差,基于Markov链理论给出零行列式策略与全合作策略博弈的瞬态分布、瞬态收益及达到稳态所需时间.发现在小的敲诈因子下,敲诈者前期收益高于稳态期收益,敲诈因子较大时,情况截然相反,并且敲诈因子越大,越不利于双方合作,达到稳态也越慢.这为现实生活中频繁更新策略的博弈提供了一种计算实时收益的方法.此外针对敲诈策略与进化人的博弈,论证了双方均背叛状态下,进化人下次博弈时一定进化为全合作策略.通过对所有状态下策略更新过程仿真,发现进化人在四种情况下的进化速度有显著差异,并最终演化为全合作策略,表明零行列式策略是合作产生的催化剂.     

Zero-determinant strategy:An underway revolution in game theory

Repeated games describe situations where players interact with each other in a dynamic pattern and make decisions according to outcomes of previous stage games. Very recently, Press and Dyson have revealed a new class of zero-determinant(ZD) strategies for the repeated games, which can enforce a fixed linear relationship between expected payoffs of two players, indicating that a smart player can control her unwitting co-player’s payoff in a unilateral way [Proc. Acad. Natl. Sci.USA 109, 10409(2012)]. The theory of ZD strategies provides a novel viewpoint to depict interactions among players,and fundamentally changes the research paradigm of game theory. In this brief survey, we first introduce the mathematical framework of ZD strategies, and review the properties and constrains of two specifications of ZD strategies, called pinning strategies and extortion strategies. Then we review some representative research progresses, including robustness analysis,cooperative ZD strategy analysis, and evolutionary stability analysis. Finally, we discuss some significant extensions to ZD strategies, including the multi-player ZD strategies, and ZD strategies under noise. Challenges in related research fields are also listed.     

A 2-stage strategy updating rule promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

In this study,we propose a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game model with a 2-stage strategy updating rule,and focus on the cooperation behavior of the system.In the first stage,i.e.,the pre-learning stage,a focal player decides whether to update his strategy according to the pre-learning factor β and the payoff difference between himself and the average of his neighbors.If the player makes up his mind to update,he enters into the second stage,i.e.,the learning stage,and adopts a strategy of a randomly selected neighbor according to the standard Fermi updating rule.The simulation results show that the cooperation level has a non-trivial dependence on the pre-learning factor.Generally,the cooperation frequency decreases as the pre-learning factor increases;but a high cooperation level can be obtained in the intermediate region of 3 < β < 1.We then give some explanations via studying the co-action of pre-learning and learning.Our results may sharpen the understanding of the influence of the strategy updating rule on evolutionary games.     

基于教室人群疏散实验的行人流建模和模拟

基于教室人群疏散实验, 从中归纳出疏散过程中行人的基本运动特征. 将桌椅分别视为不可穿越和可穿越的静态障碍物, 而行人则被当成可移动的障碍物, 这将导致背景场随人群的运动而动态更新, 因此可以更好地反映前方拥挤程度对后面人群路径选择行为的影响. 采用基于动态背景场的元胞自动机模型研究了不同桌椅排列和出口宽度的教室人群疏散过程, 给出了疏散时间的空间分布以及平均和最大疏散时间, 再现了实验中人群疏散的基本特征. 数值模拟结果表明, 疏散时间取决于桌椅的排列方式和教室出口的宽度. 对于同一种排列, 出口越小则疏散时间越长; 对于给定的出口宽度, 通常随着过道数的增加, 疏散时间随之减少; 当过道数增加且过道宽度不足以两人并行, 从两侧进入过道的行人会发生冲突, 使疏散效率有所降低; 靠近出口一侧墙壁设置过道有利于人群的疏散. 文中进一步分析了模拟与实验结果存在差异的原因.     

Impacts of memory on a regular lattice for different population sizes with asynchronous update in spatial snowdrift game

Memory is an important factor on the evolution of cooperation in spatial structure. For evolutionary biologists, the problem is often how cooperation acts can emerge in an evolving system. In the case of snowdrift game, it is found that memory can boost cooperation level for large cost-to-benefit ratio r, while inhibit cooperation for small r. Thus, how to enlarge the range of r for the purpose of enhancing cooperation becomes a hot issue recently. This paper addresses a new memory-based approach and its core lies in: Each agent applies the given rule to compare its own historical payoffs in a certain memory size, and take the obtained maximal one as virtual payoff. In order to get the optimal strategy, each agent randomly selects one of its neighbours to compare their virtual payoffs, which can lead to the optimal strategy. Both constant-size memory and size-varying memory are investigated by means of a scenario of asynchronous updating algorithm on regular lattices with different sizes. Simulation results show that this approach effectively enhances cooperation level in spatial structure and makes the high cooperation level simultaneously emerge for both small and large r. Moreover, it is discovered that population sizes have a significant influence on the effects of cooperation.     

量子博弈论及其应用

介绍了量子博弈理论及与经典博弈理论的关系，指出了量子博弈理论的优越性，及对现实物理世界的意义。     

Maximize personal gain in the minority game

In standard minority game, each agent at every time step chooses the highest-score strategy from his limited number of strategies given arbitrarily in the beginning of the game. Suppose one agent is free to choose any strategy at every time step, how can he manage to maximize his personal gain? Based on the behavior of the standard game, we found a strategy for the agent to score more than the others do for most of the cases.     

双出口房间内疏散行人流的仿真和实验研究

为研究行人疏散过程中的路径选择行为, 提出了一个基于元胞自动机的行人微观模型, 并组织了三组双出口教室内的学生疏散实验. 模型中, 行人路径选择行为受其到出口距离、前方路径通行能力和行人间排斥力影响. 通过观察实验结果, 得到一些相关现象. 利用实验结果对模型参数进行校正. 利用校正模型对该教室内疏散学生流进行仿真, 结果表明 模型能有效地刻画教室内学生流的疏散特征, 疏散时间随学生人数线性增加. 该研究有助于类似场景中行人疏散策略和方案的制定. 关键词： 元胞自动机 行人疏散 仿真 实验     

初始位置布局不平衡的疏散行人流仿真研究

行人初始位置布局不平衡的多安全出口疏散过程, 是行人疏散流仿真研究的热点. 利用行人流动态参数仿真模型, 在实际距离和假想距离"极大极小"路径选择机理的基础上, 改进假想距离的计算方法及其拥堵计算区域, 实现疏散过程的动态平衡; 提出行人位置布局的不平衡系数, 以描述疏散空间内行人初始位置布局的不平衡性. 从行人初始位置随机和固定布局的角度, 仿真研究正常疏散环境下行人布局的不平衡性对疏散时间的影响, 并将仿真结果与原始模型做对比分析. 研究表明, 模型能有效地实现行人流疏散过程的动态平衡, 行人疏散时间受行人位置或安全出口布局的影响较小, 而与安全出口总宽度、 行人的初始数量以及拥堵感知系数有关.     

基于演化博弈论的行人与机动车冲突演化机理研究

行人与机动车冲突时,各自都会在经过简单判断后以一定的概率选择通过.本文根据人车冲突的实际情景提出基础收益、冲突损失、等待损失以及互让损失的概念,据此构建行人与机动车的冲突博弈矩阵,并依据演化分析范式,建立人车冲突演化的动力学模型.对不同交通情形下均衡点的位置、稳定性以及系统演化机理进行深入分析,发现不同的行人与机动车的冲突损失和等待损失相对大小,对应系统的演化方向不同,可能的演化方向包括"人让车","车让人","人让车,同时车让人"以及"人不让车,车不让人".此外,定义机会损失的交通概念,据此分析系统关于行人与机动车的互让损失以及机会损失的灵敏度,发现行人或机动车互让损失的增加对于各自通过概率有着上升促进和下降抑制作用,而机会损失的作用恰好与互让损失相反.本文建立的动力学模型可以为人车冲突演化方向的宏观调控提供理论依据.     

拥堵疏散的行人拥挤力仿真研究

基于元胞自动机仿真研究拥堵疏散条件下行人拥挤力的产生、传递、吸收、抵消、累积等过程, 以安全出口前拱形的拥挤疏散行人流为研究对象, 研究拥挤致伤的生成机理. 基于行人位置距安全出口的距离, 生成趋于安全出口方向的拥挤力; 引入拥挤力效果与合力参数, 分别描述外界拥挤力对个体行人的作用效果与作用合力; 引入吸收系数与抗死伤系数, 分别描述拥挤力传递过程中行人对外界拥挤力的吸收与抵抗能力. 研究表明, 随吸收系数或抗死伤系数的增加, 能有效预防疏散行人流的拥挤致伤; 存在临界吸收系数与抗死伤系数, 将系统区分为弱保护相位、强保护相位和完全保护相位; 拥挤的死伤数量随疏散行人数量的增加而增加; 而且, 拥挤致伤的危险区域在安全出口前以安全出口中心线为对称轴呈“倒钟”形分布.     

Cautious strategy update promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

In the realistic world, individual cautiousness can be often involved or observed when a rational individual makes a decision. However, it remains unclear how such individual cautiousness influences the evolution of cooperative behavior. To this end, we consider a Fermi strategy updating rule, where each individual is assigned a cautiousness index that controls its learning activity, and then study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Interestingly, it is found that cooperation can be significantly promoted when individuals’ cautiousness is considered. In particular, there exists an optimal range of the degree of cautiousness resulting in the highest cooperation level. The remarkable promotion of cooperation, as well as the emerging phase transition is explained by configurational analysis. The sensitivity of cooperation to initial states with different fractions of cooperators is also discussed. The result illustrates that high densities of cooperators can be established at small initial fractions of cooperators. The detailed mechanism for such phenomenon is explained by analyzing the typical initial configurations.     

Simulation of pedestrian evacuation based on an improved dynamic parameter model

An improved dynamic parameter model is presented based on cellular automata. The dynamic parameters, including direction parameter, empty parameter, and cognition parameter, are formulated to simplify tactically the process of making decisions for pedestrians. The improved model reflects the judgement of pedestrians on surrounding conditions and the action of choosing or decision. According to the two-dimensional cellular automaton Moore neighborhood we establish the pedestrian moving rule, and carry out corresponding simulations of pedestrian evacuation. The improved model considers the impact of pedestrian density near exits on the evacuation process. Simulated and experimental results demonstrate that the improvement makes sense due to the fact that except for the spatial distance to exits, people also choose an exit according to the pedestrian density around exits. The impact factors α, β, and γ are introduced to describe transition payoff, and their optimal values are determined through simulation. Moreover, the effects of pedestrian distribution, pedestrian density, and the width of exits on the evacuation time are discussed. The optimal exit layout, i.e., the optimal position and width, is offered. The comparison between the simulated results obtained with the improved model and that from a previous model and experiments indicates that the improved model can reproduce experimental results well. Thus, it has great significance for further study, and important instructional meaning for pedestrian evacuation so as to reduce the number of casualties.     

Cooperation and charity in spatial public goods game under different strategy update rules

Human cooperation can be influenced by other human behaviors and recent years have witnessed the flourishing of studying the coevolution of cooperation and punishment, yet the common behavior of charity is seldom considered in game-theoretical models. In this article, we investigate the coevolution of altruistic cooperation and egalitarian charity in spatial public goods game, by considering charity as the behavior of reducing inter-individual payoff differences. Our model is that, in each generation of the evolution, individuals play games first and accumulate payoff benefits, and then each egalitarian makes a charity donation by payoff transfer in its neighborhood. To study the individual-level evolutionary dynamics, we adopt different strategy update rules and investigate their effects on charity and cooperation. These rules can be classified into two global rules: random selection rule in which individuals randomly update strategies, and threshold selection rule where only those with payoffs below a threshold update strategies. Simulation results show that random selection enhances the cooperation level, while threshold selection lowers the threshold of the multiplication factor to maintain cooperation. When charity is considered, it is incapable in promoting cooperation under random selection, whereas it promotes cooperation under threshold selection. Interestingly, the evolution of charity strongly depends on the dispersion of payoff acquisitions of the population, which agrees with previous results. Our work may shed light on understanding human egalitarianism.