Some Analytical Properties of the Model for Stochastic Evolutionary Games in Finite Populations with Non-uniform Interaction Rate

Traditional evolutionary games assume uniform interaction rate, which means that the rate at which individuals meet and interact is independent of their strategies. But in some systems, especially biological systems, the players interact with each other discriminately. Taylor and Nowak (2006) were the first to establish the corresponding non-uniform interaction rate model by allowing the interaction rates to depend on strategies. Their model is based on replicator dynamics which assumes an infinite size population. But in reality, the number of individuals in the population is always finite, and there will be some random interference in the individuals' strategy selection process. Therefore, it is more practical to establish the corresponding stochastic evolutionary model in finite populations. In fact, the analysis of evolutionary games in a finite size population is more difficult. Just as Taylor and Nowak said in the outlook section of their paper, "The analysis of non-uniform interaction rates should be extended to stochastic game dynamics of finite populations." In this paper, we are exactly doing this work. We extend Taylor and Nowak's model from infinite to finite case, especially focusing on the influence of non-uniform connection characteristics on the evolutionary stable state of the system. We model the strategy evolutionary process of the population by a continuous ergodic Markov process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we can give the evolutionary stable state of the system. We make a complete classification of the symmetric 2×2 games. For each case game, the corresponding limit distribution of the Markov-based process is given when noise intensity is small enough. In contrast with most literatures in evolutionary games using the simulation method, all our results obtained are analytical. Especially, in the dominant-case game, coexistence of the two strategies may become evolutionary stable states in our model. This result can be used to explain the emergence of cooperation in the Prisoner is Dilemma Games to some extent. Some specific examples are given to illustrate our results.     

Duality, phase structures, and dilemmas in symmetric quantum games

Symmetric quantum games for 2-player, 2-qubit strategies are analyzed in detail by using a scheme in which all pure states in the 2-qubit Hilbert space are utilized for strategies. We consider two different types of symmetric games exemplified by the familiar games, the Battle of the Sexes (BoS) and the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD). These two types of symmetric games are shown to be related by a duality map, which ensures that they share common phase structures with respect to the equilibria of the strategies. We find eight distinct phase structures possible for the symmetric games, which are determined by the classical payoff matrices from which the quantum games are defined. We also discuss the possibility of resolving the dilemmas in the classical BoS, PD, and the Stag Hunt (SH) game based on the phase structures obtained in the quantum games. It is observed that quantization cannot resolve the dilemma fully for the BoS, while it generically can for the PD and SH if appropriate correlations for the strategies of the players are provided.     

Collective decision making and paradoxical games

We study an ensemble of individuals playing the two games of the so-called Parrondo paradox. In our study, players are allowed to choose the game to be played by the whole ensemble in each turn. The choice cannot conform to the preferences of all the players and, consequently, they face a simple frustration phenomenon that requires some strategy to make a collective decision. We consider several such strategies and analyze how fluctuations can be used to improve the performance of the system.     

Quantum games via search algorithms

We build new quantum games, similar to the spin flip game, where as a novelty the players perform measurements on a quantum system associated to a continuous time search algorithm. The measurements collapse the wave function into one of the two possible states. These games are characterized by a continuous space of strategies and the selection of a particular strategy is determined by the moments when the players measure.     

Two Party Non-Local Games

In this work we have introduced two party games with respective winning conditions. One cannot win these games deterministically in the classical world if they are not allowed to communicate at any stage of the game. Interestingly we find out that in quantum world, these winning conditions can be achieved if the players share an entangled state. We also introduced a game which is impossible to win if the players are not allowed to communicate in classical world (both probabilistically and deterministically), yet there exists a perfect quantum strategy by following which, one can attain the winning condition of the game.     

Motion of influential players can support cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma

We study a spatial Prisoner’s dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner’s Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor’s strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategies; therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.     

Stochastic Stability in Spatial Games

We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. Long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of spatial games with multiple Nash equilibria is analyzed. In particular, we construct an example of a spatial game with three strategies, where stochastic stability of Nash equilibria depends on the number of players and the kind of dynamics.     

Conditional strategies in iterated quantum games

Iterated bipartite quantum games are implemented in terms of the discrete-time quantum walk on the line. Our proposal allows for conditional strategies, as two rational agents make a choice from a restricted set of two-qubit unitary operations. We discuss how several classical strategies are related to families of quantum strategies. A quantum version of the well known Prisoner’s Dilemma bipartite game, in which both players use mixed strategies, is presented as a specific example.     

Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules

We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent. Coevolution thus here refers to an evolutionary process affecting the teaching activity of players that accompanies the evolution of their strategies. Particularly, we increase the teaching activity of a player after it has successfully reproduced, yet we do so depending on the disseminated strategy. We separately consider coevolution affecting either only the cooperators or only the defectors, and show that both options promote cooperation irrespective of the applied game. Opposite to intuitive reasoning, however, we reveal that the coevolutionary promotion of players spreading defection is, in the long run, more beneficial for cooperation than the likewise promotion of cooperators. We explain the contradictive impact of the two considered coevolutionary rules by examining the differences between resulting heterogeneities that segregate participating players, and furthermore, demonstrate that the influential individuals completely determine the final outcome of the games. Our findings are immune to changes defining the type of considered social dilemmas and highlight that the heterogeneity of players, resulting in a positive feedback mechanism, is a fundamental property promoting cooperation in groups of selfish individuals.     

Seasonality as a Parrondian game

Switching strategies can be related to the so-called Parrondian games, where the alternation of two losing games yields a winning game. We consider two dynamics that by themselves yield undesirable behaviors, but when alternated, yield a desirable oscillatory behavior. In the analysis of the alternate-logistic map, we prove that alternating parameter values yielding extinction with parameter values associated with chaotic dynamics results in periodic trajectories. Ultimately, we consider a four season logistic model with either migration or immigration.     

Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma game on hypergraph networks

We study the possible advantages of adopting quantum strategies in multi-player evolutionary games. We base our study on the three-player Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. In order to model the simultaneous interaction between three agents we use hypergraphs and hypergraph networks. In particular, we study two types of networks: a random network and a SF-like network. The obtained results show that in the case of a three-player game on a hypergraph network, quantum strategies are not necessarily stochastically stable strategies. In some cases, the defection strategy can be as good as a quantum one.     

Non-Classical Rules in Quantum Games

Over the last twenty years, quantum game theory has given us many ideas of how quantum games could be played. One of the most prominent ideas in the field is a model of quantum playing bimatrix games introduced by J. Eisert, M. Wilkens and M. Lewenstein. The scheme assumes that players’ strategies are unitary operations and the players act on the maximally entangled two-qubit state. The quantum nature of the scheme has been under discussion since the article by Eisert et al. came out. The aim of our paper was to identify some of non-classical features of the quantum scheme.     

Preferences in quantum games

A quantum game can be viewed as a state preparation in which the final output state results from the competing preferences of the players over the set of possible output states that can be produced. It is therefore possible to view state preparation in general as being the output of some appropriately chosen (notional) quantum game. This reverse engineering approach in which we seek to construct a suitable notional game that produces some desired output state as its equilibrium state may lead to different methodologies and insights. With this goal in mind we examine the notion of preference in quantum games since if we are interested in the production of a particular equilibrium output state, it is the competing preferences of the players that determine this equilibrium state. We show that preferences on output states can be viewed in certain cases as being induced by measurement with an appropriate set of numerical weightings, or payoffs, attached to the results of that measurement. In particular we show that a distance-based preference measure on the output states is equivalent to a having a strictly-competitive set of payoffs on the results of some measurement.     

Coevolving agent strategies and network topology for the public goods games

Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Coevolutionary public goods games in structured populations are studied where players can change from an unproductive public goods game to a productive one, by evaluating the productivity of the public goods games. In our model, each individual participates in games organized by its neighborhood plus by itself. Coevolution here refers to an evolutionary process entailing both deletion of existing links and addition of new links between agents that accompanies the evolution of their strategies. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of time scale separation of strategy and structure on cooperation level. This study presents the following: Foremost, we observe that high cooperation levels in public goods interactions are attained by the entangled coevolution of strategy and structure. Presented results also confirm that the resulting networks show many features of real systems, such as cooperative behavior and hierarchical clustering. The heterogeneity of the interaction network is held responsible for the observed promotion of cooperation. We hope our work may offer an explanation for the origin of large-scale cooperative behavior among unrelated individuals.     

Probabilistic analysis of three-player symmetric quantum games played using the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm setting

This Letter extends our probabilistic framework for two-player quantum games to the multiplayer case, while giving a unified perspective for both classical and quantum games. Considering joint probabilities in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm (EPR-Bohm) setting for three observers, we use this setting in order to play general three-player noncooperative symmetric games. We analyze how the peculiar non-factorizable joint probabilities provided by the EPR-Bohm setting can change the outcome of a game, while requiring that the quantum game attains a classical interpretation for factorizable joint probabilities. In this framework, our analysis of the three-player generalized Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) shows that the players can indeed escape from the classical outcome of the game, because of non-factorizable joint probabilities that the EPR setting can provide. This surprising result for three-player PD contrasts strikingly with our earlier result for two-player PD, played in the same framework, in which even non-factorizable joint probabilities do not result in escaping from the classical consequence of the game.     

Heritability promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games

Heritability is ubiquitous within most real biological or social systems. A heritable trait is most simply an offspring’s trait that resembles the parent’s corresponding trait, which can be fitness, strategy, or the way of strategy adoption for evolutionary games. Here we study the effects of heritability on the evolution of spatial public goods games. In our model, the fitness of players is determined by the payoffs from the current interactions and their history. Based on extensive simulations, we find that the density of cooperators is enhanced by increasing the heritability of players over a wide range of the multiplication factor. We attribute the enhancement of cooperation to the inherited fitness that stabilizes the fitness of players, and thus prevents the expansion of defectors effectively.     

Asymptotically stable equilibrium and limit cycles in the Rock–Paper–Scissors game in a population of players with complex personalities

We investigate a population of individuals who play the Rock–Paper–Scissors (RPS) game. The players choose strategies not only by optimizing their payoffs, but also taking into account the popularity of the strategies. For the standard RPS game, we find an asymptotically stable polymorphism with coexistence of all strategies. For the general RPS game we find the limit cycles. Their stability depends exclusively on two model parameters: the sum of the entries of the RPS payoff matrix, and a sensitivity parameter which characterizes the personality of the players. Apart from the supercritical Hopf bifurcation, we found the subcritical bifurcation numerically for some intervals of the parameters of the model.     

Reversals of chance in paradoxical games

We present two collective games with new paradoxical features when they are combined. Besides reproducing the so-called Parrondo effect, where a winning game is obtained from the alternation of two fair games, there also exists a current inversion when varying the mixing probability between the games. We show that this is a new effect insofar one of the games is an unbiased random walk without internal structure. We present a detailed study by means of a discrete-time Markov chain analysis, obtaining analytical expressions for the stationary probabilities for a finite number of players. We also provide qualitative insight into this current inversion effect.     

Effects of average degree on cooperation in networked evolutionary game

We study effects of average degree on cooperation in the networked prisoner's dilemma game. Typical structures are considered, including random networks, small-world networks and scale-free networks. Simulation results show that the average degree plays a universal role in cooperation occurring on all these networks, that is the density of cooperators peaks at some specific values of the average degree. Moreover, we investigated the average payoff of players through numerical simulations together with theoretical predictions and found that simulation results agree with the predictions. Our work may be helpful in understanding network effects on the evolutionary games.     

Tripartite Dynamic Zero-Sum Quantum Games

The Nash equilibrium plays a crucial role in game theory. Most of results are based on classical resources. Our goal in this paper is to explore multipartite zero-sum game with quantum settings. We find that in two different settings there is no strategy for a tripartite classical game being fair. Interestingly, this is resolved by providing dynamic zero-sum quantum games using single quantum state. Moreover, the gains of some players may be changed dynamically in terms of the committed state. Both quantum games are robust against the preparation noise and measurement errors.