On the asymptotic convergence to mixed equilibria in 2×2 asymmetric games

We analyse the stability properties of mixed equilibria in 2×2 asymmetric games under evolutionary dynamics. With the standard replicator dynamics these equilibria are stable but not asymptotically stable. We modified the replicator dynamics by introducing players of two types: myopies — like in the standard replicator dynamics — and best responders. The behaviour of the latter is described by a continuos time version of the best reply dynamics. Asymptotic convergence under theModified Replicator Dynamics is proved by identifying a strictly decreasing Ljapunov function. We argue that the finding has important implications to justify the use of economic models with mixed strategy equilibria.     

Linear stability of relative equilibria in the charged three-body problem

A relative equilibrium is a periodic orbit of the n-body problem that rotates uniformly maintaining the same central configuration for all time. In this paper we generalize some results of R. Moeckel and we apply it to study the linear stability of relative equilibria in the charged three-body problem. We find necessary conditions to have relative equilibria linearly stable for the collinear charged three-body problem, for planar relative equilibria we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for linear stability in terms of the parameters, masses and electrostatic charges. In the last case we obtain a stability inequality which generalizes the Routh condition of celestial mechanics. We also proof the existence of spatial relative equilibria and the existence of planar relative equilibria of any triangular shape.     

Stability of the planar equilibrium solutions of a restricted 1 + N body problem

We started our studies with a planar Eulerian restricted four-body problem (ERFBP) where three masses move in circular orbits such that their configuration is always collinear. The fourth mass is small and does not influence the motion of the three primaries. In our model we assume that one of the primaries has mass 1 and is located at the origin and two masses of size µ rotate around it uniformly. The problem was studied in [3], where it was shown that there exist noncollinear equilibria, which are Lyapunov stable for small values of µ. KAM theory is used to establish the stability of the equilibria. Our computations do not agree with those given in [3], although our conclusions are similar. The ERFBP is a special case of the 1 + N restricted body problem with N = 2. We are able to do the computations for any N and find that the stability results are very similar to those for N = 2. Since the 1 + N body configuration can be stable when N > 6, these results could be of more significance than for the case N = 2.     

Deregulation and welfare in airline markets: An analysis of frequency equilibria

This paper models airline competition as a two-stage game in frequency and prices, allowing for asymmetric frequency equilibria. The approach follows the spatial multiproduct oligopoly literature. The dynamic structure gives airlines an incentive to choose asymmetric frequency equilibria such that price competition is reduced. This feature is most pronounced in the case of inelastic demand, for which a maximum differentiation result is derived. We apply the model in a simulation study of airline deregulation of the Amsterdam—Maastricht market in The Netherlands, calculating welfare effects for various types of post-deregulation entry.     

A Shared-Constraint Approach to Multi-Leader Multi-Follower Games

Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints is complicated by nonconvex agent problems and therefore providing tractable conditions for existence of global or even local equilibria has proved challenging. Consequently, much of the extant research on this topic is either model specific or relies on weaker notions of equilibria. We consider a modified formulation in which every leader is cognizant of the equilibrium constraints of all leaders. Equilibria of this modified game contain the equilibria, if any, of the original game. The new formulation has a constraint structure called shared constraints, and our main result shows that if the leader objectives admit a potential function, the global minimizers of the potential function over this shared constraint are equilibria of the modified formulation. We provide another existence result using fixed point theory that does not require potentiality. Additionally, local minima, B-stationary, and strong-stationary points of this minimization problem are shown to be local Nash equilibria, Nash B-stationary, and Nash strong-stationary points of the corresponding multi-leader multi-follower game. We demonstrate the relationship between variational equilibria associated with this modified shared-constraint game and equilibria of the original game from the standpoint of the multiplier sets and show how equilibria of the original formulation may be recovered. We note through several examples that such potential multi-leader multi-follower games capture a breadth of application problems of interest and demonstrate our findings on a multi-leader multi-follower Cournot game.     

On the bifurcation analysis of a food web of four species

This paper is concerned with bifurcations of equilibria and the chaotic dynamics of a food web containing a bottom prey X, two competing predators Y and Z on X, and a super-predator W only on Y. Conditions for the existence of all equilibria and the stability properties of most equilibria are derived. A two-dimensional bifurcation diagram with the aid of a numerical method for identifying bifurcation curves is constructed to show the bifurcations of equilibria. We prove that the dynamical system possesses a line segment of degenerate steady states for the parameter values on a bifurcation line in the bifurcation diagram. Numerical simulations show that these degenerate steady states can help to switch the stabilities between two far away equilibria when the system crosses this bifurcation line. Some observations concerned with chaotic dynamics are also made via numerical simulations. Different routes to chaos are found in the system. Relevant calculations of Lyapunov exponents and power spectra are included to support the chaotic properties.     

Coordination games on graphs

We introduce natural strategic games on graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in a local setting. We study the existence of equilibria that are resilient to coalitional deviations of unbounded and bounded size (i.e., strong equilibria and k-equilibria respectively). We show that pure Nash equilibria and 2-equilibria exist, and give an example in which no 3-equilibrium exists. Moreover, we prove that strong equilibria exist for various special cases. We also study the price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS) for these solution concepts. We show that the PoS for strong equilibria is 1 in almost all of the special cases for which we have proven strong equilibria to exist. The PoA for pure Nash equilbria turns out to be unbounded, even when we fix the graph on which the coordination game is to be played. For the PoA for k-equilibria, we show that the price of anarchy is between \(2(n-1)/(k-1) - 1\) and \(2(n-1)/(k-1)\). The latter upper bound is tight for \(k=n\) (i.e., strong equilibria). Finally, we consider the problems of computing strong equilibria and of determining whether a joint strategy is a k-equilibrium or strong equilibrium. We prove that, given a coordination game, a joint strategy s, and a number k as input, it is co-NP complete to determine whether s is a k-equilibrium. On the positive side, we give polynomial time algorithms to compute strong equilibria for various special cases.     

正则对策的N-M稳定集及其唯一存在定理

研究了有非对称性和负传递性偏好的无限策略对策,提出了N-M稳定集和正则对策的概念,其中N-M稳定集是将合作对策中由Von Neumann 和Morgenstern给出的相应概念引入到策略对策中的.所谓正则对策是指其Nash均衡集中每条链关于一致偏好总有上界的无限策略对策.证明了每个正则对策都有唯一N-M稳定集. 此结果及其应用例子说明正则对策N-M稳定集的概念对于策略对策的纯Nash均衡的精炼起着重要作用.     

R(O)SSLER系统平衡点集的镇定

研究了R\"ossler系统的镇定问题. 当参数变化时, R\"ossler系统具有两条平衡点曲线, 因此是一个多平衡点系统. 在这些平衡点中, 有的是不稳定, 有的平衡点上会出现Hopf分岐.提出了一种多项式反馈控制律, 保证R\"ossler系统的两平衡点曲线上的平衡点都渐近稳定. 现有的方法只能保证某个参数点附近平衡点渐近稳定.     

Dynamics of SIR epidemic models with horizontal and vertical transmissions and constant treatment rates

We investigate the dynamics and bifurcations of SIR epidemic model with horizontal and vertical transmissions and constant treatment rates. It is proved that such SIR epidemic model have up to two positive epidemic equilibria and has no positive disease-free equilibria. We find all the ranges of the parameters involved in the model under which the equilibria of the model are positive. By using the qualitative theory of planar systems and the normal form theory, the phase portraits of each equilibria are obtained. We show that the equilibria of the epidemic system can be saddles, stable nodes, stable or unstable focuses, weak centers or cusps. We prove that the system has the Bogdanov-Takens bifurcations, which exhibit saddle-node bifurcations, Hopf bifurcations and homoclinic bifurcations.     

Symmetric versus asymmetric equilibria in symmetric supermodular games

This paper investigates the general properties of symmetric n-player supermodular games with complete-lattice action spaces. In particular, we examine the extent to which all pure strategy Nash equilibria tend to be symmetric for the general case of multi-dimensional strategy spaces. As asymmetric equilibria are possible even for strictly supermodular games, we investigate whether some symmetric equilibrium would always Pareto dominate all asymmetric equilibria. While this need not hold in general, we identify different sufficient conditions, each of which guarantees that such dominance holds: 2-player games with scalar action sets, uni-signed externalities, identical interests, and superjoin payoffs. Various illustrative examples are provided. Finally, some economic applications are discussed. The first version of this paper was completed while M. Jakubczyk and M. Knauff were visiting junior scholars at CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, financed through the Marie-Curie Early Stage Training program of the European Union (under contract no HPMT-CT-2001-00327), which is hereby gratefully acknowledged. The presentation of the revised version of this paper has benefitted from detailed and careful suggestions by two anonymous referees and William Thomson (as editor) of this Journal.     

Cholera dynamics with Bacteriophage infection: A mathematical study

Mathematical modeling of waterborne diseases, such as cholera, including a biological control using Bacteriophage viruses in the aquatic reservoirs is of great relevance in epidemiology. In this paper, our aim is twofold: at first, to understand the cholera dynamics in the region around a water body; secondly, to understand how the spread of Bacteriophage infection in the cholera bacterium V. cholerae controls the disease in the human population. For this purpose, we modify the model proposed by Codeço, for the spread of cholera infection in human population and the one proposed by Beretta and Kuang, for the spread of Bacteriophage infection in the bacteria population [1, 2]. We first discuss the feasibility and local asymptotic stability of all the possible equilibria of the proposed model. Further, in the numerical investigation, we have found that the parameter ϕ, called the phage adsorption rate, plays an important role. There is a critical value, ϕ_c, at which the model possess Hopf-bifurcation. For lower values than ϕ_c, the equilibrium E^* is unstable and periodic solutions are observed, while above ϕ_c, the equilibrium E^* is locally asymptotically stable, and further shown to be also globally asymptotically stable. We investigate the effect of the various parameters on the dynamics of the infected humans by means of numerical simulations.     

Nonlinear Stability of Riemann Ellipsoids with Symmetric Configurations

Using modern differential geometric methods, we study the relative equilibria for Dirichlet’s model of a self-gravitating fluid mass having at least two equal axes. We show that the only relative equilibria of this type correspond to Riemann ellipsoids for which the angular velocity and vorticity are parallel to the same principal axis of the body configuration. The two solutions found are MacLaurin and transversal spheroids. The singular reduced energy-momentum method developed in Rodríguez-Olmos (Nonlinearity 19(4):853–877, 2006) is applied to study their nonlinear stability and instability. We found that the transversal spheroids are nonlinearly stable for all eccentricities while for the MacLaurin spheroids, we recover the classical results. Comparisons with other existing results and methods in the literature are also made.      

Analysis of a delayed HIV/AIDS epidemic model with saturation incidence

In this paper, a delayed HIV/AIDS epidemic model with saturation incidence is proposed and analyzed. The equilibria and their stability are investigated. The model exhibits two equilibria, namely, the disease-free equilibrium and the endemic equilibrium. It is found that if the threshold R ₀<1, then the disease-free equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable, and if the threshold R ₀>1, the system is permanent and the endemic equilibrium is asymptotically stable under certain conditions.     

Entire solutions of reaction-advection-diffusion equations with bistable nonlinearity in cylinders

This paper deals with entire solutions and the interaction of traveling wave fronts of bistable reaction-advection-diffusion equation with infinite cylinders. Assume that the equation admits three equilibria: two stable equilibria 0 and 1, and an unstable equilibrium θ. It is well known that there are different wave fronts connecting any two of those three equilibria. By considering a combination of any two of those different traveling wave fronts and constructing appropriate subsolutions and supersolutions, we establish three different types of entire solutions. Finally, we analyze a model for shear flows in cylinders to illustrate our main results.     

Non-cooperative stochastic dominance games

A non-cooperative stochastic dominance game is a non-cooperative game in which the only knowledge about the players' preferences and risk attitudes is presumed to be their preference orders on the set ofn-tuples of pure strategies. Stochastic dominance equilibria are defined in terms of mixed strategies for the players that are efficient in the stochastic dominance sense against the strategies of the other players. It is shown that the set of SD equilibria equals all Nash equilibria that can be obtained from combinations of utility functions that are consistent with the players' known preference orders. The latter part of the paper looks at antagonistic stochastic dominance games in which some combination of consistent utility functions is zero-sum over then-tuples of pure strategies.     

How to share the cost of a public good?

The paper deals with a simple model with only one private and one public good. The core of such an economy is shown to have strong properties, in particular, it is stable in thevon Neumann-Morgenstern sense and complete. A natural candidate for a selection within the core is the concept ofLindahl equilibrium which constitutes a generalization of the concept of competitive equilibrium in an economy with private goods only. Although theLindahl equilibria belong in general to the core, they do not have the same symmetry properties. It is shown that it is possible to select in the core allocations having stronger symmetry properties than theLindahl equilibria.     

A bifurcation analysis of stage-structured density dependent integrodifference equations

There is evidence for density dependent dispersal in many stage-structured species, including flour beetles of the genus Tribolium. We develop a bifurcation theory approach to the existence and stability of (non-extinction) equilibria for a general class of structured integrodifference equation models on finite spatial domains with density dependent kernels, allowing for non-dispersing stages as well as partial dispersal. We show that a continuum of such equilibria bifurcates from the extinction equilibrium when it loses stability as the net reproductive number n increases through 1. Furthermore, the stability of the non-extinction equilibria is determined by the direction of the bifurcation. We provide an example to illustrate the theory.     

Two-tier equilibria for supply chains with a single manufacturer and multiple asymmetric retailers

We derive sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot equilibria for a supply chain problem with a single manufacturer and multiple asymmetric retailers and characterize the first and second order derivatives of the total equilibrium quantities. The Stackelberg manufacturer is assumed to supply a homogeneous product to all retailers with the retail price determined by a general nonlinear inverse demand function. We provide several extensions of our previous results [G.J. Kyparisis, C. Koulamas, A note on equilibria for two-tier supply chains with a single manufacturer and multiple retailers, Operations Research Letters 39 (2011) 471–474] obtained for a similar supply chain with symmetric retailers.