The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences

In a decentralized setting the game-theoretical predictions are that only strong blockings are allowed to rupture the structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these blockings come from the grand coalition. This solution concept requires stability plus Pareto optimality. A characterization of the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational matchings whose blocking pairs, if any, are formed with unmatched agents. These matchings always exist and give an economic intuition on how blocking can be done by non-trading agents, so that the transactions need not be undone as agents reach the set of stable matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and Roommate models are obtained.     

Analysis of stochastic matching markets

Suppose that the agents of a matching market contact each other randomly and form new pairs if is in their interest. Does such a process always converge to a stable matching if one exists? If so, how quickly? Are some stable matchings more likely to be obtained by this process than others? In this paper we are going to provide answers to these and similar questions, posed by economists and computer scientists. In the first part of the paper we give an alternative proof for the theorems by Diamantoudi et al. and Inarra et al., which imply that the corresponding stochastic processes are absorbing Markov chains. The second part of the paper proposes new techniques to analyse the behaviour of matching markets. We introduce the Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates Automaton and show how the probabilistic model checking tool PRISM may be used to predict the outcomes of stochastic interactions between myopic agents. In particular, we demonstrate how one can calculate the probabilities of reaching different matchings in a decentralised market and determine the expected convergence time of the stochastic process concerned. We illustrate the usage of this technique by studying some well-known marriage and roommates instances and randomly generated instances.     

Median Stable Matching for College Admissions

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.     

Canonical monotone decompositions of fractional stable matchings

This paper continues recent work that introduced algebraic methods for studying the stable marriage problem of Gale and Shapley [1962]. Vande Vate [1989] and Rothblum [1992] identified a set of linear inequalities which define a polytope whose extreme points correspond to the stable matchings. Points in this polytope are called fractional stable matchings. Here we identify a unique representation of fractional stable matchings as a convex combination of stable matchings that are arrangeable in a man-decreasing order. We refer to this representation and to a dual one, in terms of woman-decreasing order, as the canonical monotone representations. These representations can be interpreted as time-sharing stable matchings where particular stable matchings are used at each time-instance but the scheduled stable matchings are (occasionally) switched over time. The new representations allow us to extend, in a natural way, the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings to the set of all fractional stable matchings.     

Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems

We study competitive equilibria in generalized matching problems. We show that, if there is a competitive matching, then it is unique and the core is a singleton consisting of the competitive matching. That is, a singleton core is necessary for the existence of competitive equilibria. We also show that a competitive matching exists if and only if the matching produced by the top trading cycles algorithm is feasible, in which case it is the unique competitive matching. Hence, we can use the top trading cycles algorithm to test whether a competitive equilibrium exists and to construct a competitive equilibrium if one exists. Lastly, in the context of bilateral matching problems, we compare the condition for the existence of competitive matchings with existing sufficient conditions for the existence or uniqueness of stable matchings and show that it is weaker than most existing conditions for uniqueness.     

Saturating stable matchings

I relate bipartite graph matchings to stable matchings. I prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a saturating stable matching, where every agent on one side is matched, for all possible preferences. I extend my analysis to perfect stable matchings, where every agent on both sides is matched.     

The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules

A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave straightforwardly and the students’ strategies are given by their preferences over the colleges. We show that the college-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For any other stable matching rule the strategic behavior of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. We then introduce uncertainty about the matching selected and prove that the natural solution concept is that of NE in the strong sense. A general result shows that the random stable matching rule, as well as any stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via NE in the strong sense. Precise answers are given to the strategic questions raised.     

Covers,matching and odd cycles of a graph

We link some well-known theorems and prove some new ones, each on one or more of the items of the title, and together illustrating their close relationship. The main tools are well-known similar conditions on maximum stable sets and maximum matchings, by which we prove theorems on the existence of odd cycles, including a generalization of Konig's equality between the matching and covering numbers of a bipartite graph. We deal with the question “How nearly bipartite is a graph?” and conjecture an inequality involving the matching and covering numbers and the number of disjoint odd cycles.     

Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas

We consider the problem of allocating applicants to courses, where each applicant has a capacity, possibly greater than 1, and a subset of acceptable courses that she ranks in a strict order of preference. Each course has a lower and an upper quota, indicating that if it is assigned some applicants then their number has to be between these two bounds. We further suppose that applicants extend their preferences over courses to preferences over bundles of courses lexicographically.In this setting we present several algorithmic results concerned with the computation of Pareto optimal matchings (POMs). Firstly, we extend the Serial Dictatorship with Project Closures mechanism to the case when an applicant can be assigned more than one course. We show that unlike in the one-to-many case no mechanism is strategy-proof against dropping manipulations and that this mechanism is strategy-proof against reordering strategies only for some picking sequences. We further show the intractability of the following problems: deciding about the Pareto optimality of a given matching, computation of a POM with maximum cardinality and computation of a POM in case of indifferences.     

What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets

In two-sided matching markets, stability can be costly. We define social welfare functions for matching markets and use them to formulate a definition of the price of stability. We then show that it is common to find a price tag attached to stability, and that the price of stability can be substantial. Therefore, when choosing a matching mechanism, a social planner would be well advised to weigh the price of stability against the value of stability, which varies from market to market.     

Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games

Stability of matchings was proved to be a new cooperative equilibrium concept in Sotomayor (Dynamics and equilibrium: essays in honor to D. Gale, 1992). That paper introduces the innovation of treating as multi-dimensional the payoff of a player with a quota greater than one. This is done for the many-to-many matching model with additively separable utilities, for which the stability concept is defined. It is then proved, via linear programming, that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty and it may be strictly bigger than the set of dual solutions and strictly smaller than the core. The present paper defines a general concept of stability and shows that this concept is a natural solution concept, stronger than the core concept, for a much more general coalitional game than a matching game. Instead of mutual agreements inside partnerships, the players are allowed to make collective agreements inside coalitions of any size and to distribute his labor among them. A collective agreement determines the level of labor at which the coalition operates and the division, among its members, of the income generated by the coalition. An allocation specifies a set of collective agreements for each player.     

On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model ∗

For the many-to-one matching model with firms having substitutable and q-separable preferences we propose two very natural binary operations that together with the unanimous partial ordering of the workers endow the set of stable matchings with a lattice structure. We also exhibit examples in which, under this restricted domain of firms' preferences, the classical binary operations may not even be matching     

Some remarks on the stable matching problem

The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no two unmatched agents prefer each other to their mates. We establish three results on properties of these matchings and present two short proofs of a recent theorem of Dubins and Freedman.     

Matching preclusion and conditional matching preclusion for regular interconnection networks

The matching preclusion number of a graph is the minimum number of edges whose deletion results in a graph that has neither perfect matchings nor almost-perfect matchings. For many interconnection networks, the optimal sets are precisely those induced by a single vertex. Recently, the conditional matching preclusion number of a graph was introduced to look for obstruction sets beyond those induced by a single vertex. It is defined to be the minimum number of edges whose deletion results in a graph with no isolated vertices and neither perfect matchings nor almost-perfect matchings. In this paper, we prove general results regarding the matching preclusion number and the conditional matching preclusion number as well as the classification of their respective optimal sets for regular graphs. We then use these general results to study the problems for Cayley graphs generated by 2-trees and the hyper Petersen networks.     

Rank of maximum matchings in a graph

The matching polytope is the convex hull of the incidence vectors of all (not necessarily perfect) matchings of a graphG. We consider here the problem of computing the dimension of the face of this polytope which contains the maximum cardinality matchings ofG and give a good characterization of this quantity, in terms of the cyclomatic number of the graph and families of odd subsets of the nodes which are always nearly perfectly matched by every maximum matching.This is equivalent to finding a maximum number of linearly independent representative vectors of maximum matchings ofG; the size of such a set is called thematching rank ofG. We also give in the last section a way of computing that rank independently of those parameters.Note that this gives us a good lower bound on the number of those matchings.     

Monotonicity and Consistency in Matching Markets

Objective: To obtain axiomatic characterizations of the core of one-to-one and one-to-many matching markets. Methods: The axioms recently applied to characterize the core of assignment games were adapted to the models of this paper. Results: The core of one-to-one matching markets is characterized by two different lists of axioms. The first one consists of weak unanimity, population monotonicity, and Maskin monotonicity. The second consists of weak unanimity, population monotonicity, and consistency. If we allow for weak preferences, the core is characterized by weak unanimity, population monotonicity, Maskin monotonicity, and consistency. For one-to-many matchings, the same lists as for the case of strict preferences characterize the core. Conclusions: The cores of the discrete matching markets are characterized by axioms that almost overlap with the axioms characterizing the core of the continuous matching markets. This provides an axiomatic explanation for the observations in the literature that almost parallel properties are obtained for the core of the two models. We observe that Maskin monotonicity is closely related to consistency in matching marketsThis research is financially supported by Waseda University Grant for Special Research Projects #2000A−887, 21COE-GLOPE, and Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research #15530125, JSPS. This paper was presented at the 7th. International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare held in Osaka, Japan. The comments of the participants are gratefully acknowledged. The author thanks Professors William Thomson, Eiichi Miyagawa and anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are independent     

Two algorithms for the Student-Project Allocation problem

We study the Student-Project Allocation problem (SPA), a generalisation of the classical Hospitals/Residents problem (HR). An instance of SPA involves a set of students, projects and lecturers. Each project is offered by a unique lecturer, and both projects and lecturers have capacity constraints. Students have preferences over projects, whilst lecturers have preferences over students. We present two optimal linear-time algorithms for allocating students to projects, subject to the preference and capacity constraints. In particular, each algorithm finds a stable matching of students to projects. Here, the concept of stability generalises the stability definition in the HR context. The stable matching produced by the first algorithm is simultaneously best-possible for all students, whilst the one produced by the second algorithm is simultaneously best-possible for all lecturers. We also prove some structural results concerning the set of stable matchings in a given instance of SPA. The SPA problem model that we consider is very general and has applications to a range of different contexts besides student-project allocation.     

Two-sided coalitional matchings

In a two-sided coalitional matching problem agents on each side of the market simultaneously form coalitions which then are matched to coalitions from the other market side. We assume that each agent has preferences over groups on his own market side and over groups on the opposite market side. These preferences are combined lexicographically as to examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides, the restriction of agents’ preferences over groups to strict orderings, and the extent to which individual preferences respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings.     

On bipartite matchings of minimum density

We study the complexity of bipartite matchings between points on two horizontal lines when the density (i.e., the number of edges of the matching that cross any vertical cut) is to be minimized. We show that finding density-minimizing matchings is considerably harder than finding weight-minimizing matchings by proving that the problem is NP-hard for general bipartite graphs. For a number of variants we present a new combinatorial characterization of the optimal density that leads to efficient and elegant algorithms. The problem of finding a matching of minimum density has applications in the area of circuit layout.