考虑低碳偏好及碳减排的闭环供应链回收及专利授权策略

研究考虑消费者低碳偏好的闭环供应链回收、碳减排与专利授权决策问题。分别构建制造商回收再制造、零售商回收再制造支付固定专利费、零售商回收再制造支付单位专利费的闭环供应链模型,分析低碳消费者比例、普通消费者对再制品的接受程度及碳权交易价格,对企业回收、碳减排及定价决策的影响,并比较了三种模式下企业及供应链的利润。研究表明：随着市场中低碳消费者比例及普通消费者对再制品接受程度的提高,总会使得回收率及碳减排率增加;碳权交易价格的提高,也会促使制造商提高碳减排率;对制造商来说,其利润在零售商回收再制造且支付固定专利费用下实现最优。从自身利润最优的角度出发,作为领导者的制造商将总是选择零售商回收再制造且支付固定专利费用模式。     

闭环供应链竞争的博弈分析与链内协调合同设计

假定生产商委托零售商回收废旧产品以进行再制造活动,研究两条分别由单生产商和单零售商组成的闭环供应链的竞争和链内协调。对应两条闭环供应链均为分散式供应链、均为集中式供应链、一条为分散式供应链另一条为集中式供应链,运用博弈论和均衡分析方法分别建立了三种情况下刻画闭环供应链竞争的带均衡约束的均衡模型、纳什均衡模型和带均衡约束的优化模型,进行了模型求解。基于合同理论,提出供应链竞争下协调链内零售商的零售价和回收价格决策的批发价加回收补贴合同。最后的算例验证了模型的合理性和协调合同的有效性。研究表明:产品零售价、需求量与产品替代效应正相关,废旧产品供给量、供应链利润与回收价格敏感性正相关;供应链协调是供应链竞争下的占优策略,有利于提高供应链的运作效率,但两条协调供应链之间的竞争将更激烈,存在囚徒困境现象。     

基于回收风险的闭环供应链差异定价决策研究

随着资源的匮乏和环境污染的加剧,越来越多的企业和消费者开始关注废旧产品的回收再制造。针对制造商唯一寡头垄断市场竞争结构,引入回收风险,分别对制造商(OEM)自行回收废旧产品的闭环供应链、第三方回收商回收废旧产品的闭环供应链建立数学模型,分析给出各企业的最优差异定价规则,并从经济学意义上得到相关管理启示;数值实验的结果则进一步验证回购价格、回收风险、价格竞争强度对最优解的影响。研究结果表明:(1)闭环供应链结构会影响再制品价格及废旧产品的回收价格,但对OEM新品定价无影响。(2)回收风险的变化对价格决策的影响取决于闭环供应链的结构特征。当回收风险较低时,在激发消费者对再制品需求、促使消费者返回废旧产品、提升闭环供应链整体效率等方面,OEM自行回收模式优于第三方回收商回收模式;而当回收风险较高时,则第三方回收商回收模式优于OEM自行回收模式。(3)回收风险的降低使得闭环供应链总利润呈现出增长的趋势,进而进一步体现到再制造的经济价值。(4)OEM自行回收废旧产品需考虑到新品与再制品间的价格竞争强度,当价格竞争强度较弱时,OEM自行回收废旧产品可为OEM带来更多的利润;新品与再制品间的价格竞争也有利于再制品需求的提升。     

链与链竞争下闭环供应链中制造商纵向整合策略选择

基于链与链竞争情形下,探讨了闭环供应链中制造商纵向整合策略选择。以制造商单位生产成本为基准,发现制造商不仅有动机整合正向物流或逆向物流,而且整合正向物流总是有利于增加其闭环供应链利润。若存在规模不经济,虽然制造商同样有动机整合正向物流或逆向物流,但是整合正向物流时闭环供应链利润是否高于其整合逆向物流取决于规模不经济系数。规模不经济系数较小时,制造商整合正向物流时闭环供应链利润高于其整合逆向物流;反之,制造商整合正向物流时闭环供应链利润低于其整合逆向物流。     

存在价格差异的闭环供应链定价策略及契约协调

以零售商回收模式为对象,采用博弈论方法,研究再制造产品与新产品存在销售价格差异以及废旧产品存在回收价格差异时闭环供应链的定价策略及契约协调问题。对闭环供应链系统在分散决策和集中决策下的定价模型进行了分析,得到了系统各成员的最优定价策略和利润,发现分散决策会造成系统效率的损失。为此提出一种改进的特许经营费用契约对闭环供应链进行协调,使得闭环供应链系统不仅消除了"双重边际化"的问题,而且实现了完美协调。算例分析验证了定价策略及契约协调机制的有效性。     

Complexity analysis of dynamic noncooperative game models for closed-loop supply chain with product recovery

In this paper, we consider a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with product recovery, which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. The retailer is in charge of recollecting and the manufacturer is responsible for product recovery. The system can be regarded as a coupling dynamics of the forward and reverse supply chain. Under different decision criteria, two noncooperative game models: Stackelberg game model and peer-to-peer game model are developed. The dynamic phenomena, such as the bifurcation, chaos and sensitivity to initial values are analyzed through bifurcation diagrams and the largest Lyapunov exponent (LLE). The influences of decision parameters on the complex nonlinear dynamics behaviors of the two models are further analyzed by comparing parameter basin plots, and the results show that with the improvement of retailer’s competitive position, the CLSC system will be more easier to enter into chaos.     

基于经销商再制造的闭环供应链政府补贴策略及效果分析

针对制造商负责再制造设计,经销商负责再制造的闭环供应链系统,建立政府无补贴、补贴经销商再制造和补贴制造商再制造设计3种策略下的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析不同补贴策略对供应链成员企业决策的影响。同时,应用数值仿真方法研究相同补贴支出下两种补贴策略的优劣。结果表明:相对于无补贴策略,两种补贴策略均会降低再制品和新产品的销售价格,提高再制品销售量,提升再制造设计水平,并且在再制品需求量小于新产品需求量时均会降低新产品销售量,在再制品和新产品的需求量相等时均会提高新产品销售量;另外,在相同的补贴支出下,当新产品需求量大于再制品需求量时,补贴经销商更能降低两种产品的销售价格和新产品的销售量,提高再制品销售量和制造商与经销商的利润,补贴制造商则更能提升再制造设计水平。     

Flexible long-term capacity planning in closed-loop supply chains with remanufacturing

We deal with long-term demand-driven capacity planning policies in the reverse channel of closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) with remanufacturing, under high capacity acquisition cost coupled with uncertainty in actual demand, sales patterns, quality and timing of end-of-use product returns. The objective is to facilitate the decision-making when the management faces the dilemma of implementing either a strategy of early large-scale investments to benefit from economies of scale and capacity readiness, or a flexible strategy of low volume but more frequent capacity expansions. We consider a CLSC with two sequential product-types. We study the system’s response in terms of transient flows, actual/desired capacity level, capacity expansions/contractions and total supply chain profit, employing a simulation-based system dynamics optimization approach. Extensive numerical investigation covers a broad range of real-world remanufacturable products under alternative scenarios in relation to the market preference over product-types. The key findings propose flexible policies as improved alternatives to large-scale capacity expansions/contractions in terms of adaptability to the actual pattern of end-of-use product returns and involved risk in the investments’ turnover. Flexible policies are also proposed as practices to avoid overcapacity phenomena in collection and remanufacturing capacity and as robust policies to product demand. Their implementation is revealed to be even more important for the case of remanufacturing, when a high capacity acquisition unit-cost ratio (remanufacturing/collection) is coupled with strong economies of scale. Finally, results under different information sharing structures show changes in remanufacturing policies, thus justifying the importance of coordination between the decision-maker and the distributor.     

Modeling reverse logistic tasks within closed-loop supply chains: An example from the automotive industry

In this contribution, the peculiarities of establishing a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) are presented, based on an example considering the end-of-life vehicle (ELV) treatment in Germany. Different design options for a CLSC are put up, concentrating on how reverse material flows can be handled with regard to reintegrate them into their genuine supply chains. Reverse logistics aspects are modeled with vehicle routing planning. Introducing a problem-tailored algorithm, results of several CLSC scenarios are discussed which are based on real case data, depicting measures from German ELV stakeholders.     

专利保护下再制造闭环供应链差别定价与协调研究

本文目的是研究当再制造闭环供应链系统中原制造商具专利保护以及新产品与再制造品之间存在差异情况下,闭环供应链系统成员的最优决策及系统协调机制设计问题。根据现实情形构建了再制造闭环供应链差别定价模型,利用博弈理论讨论了集中决策与分散决策情形下节点企业的最优定价策略及最优利润。研究结果表明,废旧产品的再造率和专利许可费用均对废旧产品的回收价格和回收量具有一定的影响;消费者对再制造品的接受程度会影响到供应链系统各方的最优定价策略及利润;提出的一种收益-费用分担契约协调机制,可以实现分散决策下闭环供应链系统的协调和效率优化。     

考虑政府约束的再制造闭环供应链差别定价博弈模型

本文考虑政府对废弃产品回收的奖惩约束措施,针对一类由制造商、零售商构成的再制造闭环供应链系统,基于博弈论方法研究了新产品和再制造品存在定价差别时集中决策和分散决策模式下的定价策略,得出了闭环供应链成员的最优定价策略和利润,并分析了政府约束措施对闭环供应链运作的影响。研究表明:集中决策下供应链效率高于Stackelberg博弈分散决策,为此设计了一个收益共享协调定价契约实现了闭环供应链的协调,进而分析了政府回收约束情况下再制造过程利润超过制造过程的再制造优先条件。算例分析验证了定价策略及协调机制的有效性。     

奖惩机制下零售商信息分享对闭环供应链的影响研究

研究奖惩机制下零售商的信息分享策略以及对闭环供应链的影响,建立了由制造商和零售商以及消费者组成的闭环供应链,其中制造商负责回收废旧产品并进行再制造。分别研究了集中式决策的情形和分散式决策下零售商信息分享和不分享的情形。研究发现,若政府在社会总福利目标中不考虑奖惩成本且回收难度较小时,零售商信息分享使社会总福利提高,反之,导致社会总福利降低;零售商信息分享总会使消费者剩余的期望值降低,但能够提高废旧产品的回收率。最后,针对零售商信息分享引起社会福利提高的情况设计了回收责任分担契约激励零售商分享信息。关键词:信息分享;奖惩机制;闭环供应链;社会福利;消费者剩余     

差异化竞争下考虑再制造专利许可的闭环供应链生产决策

针对高端产品和低端产品的差异化竞争,构建高端制造商将再制造专利许可作为外部竞争要素情形的闭环供应链竞合决策模型,研究消费者异质需求下再制造专利许可对闭环供应链生产决策、利润和环境效益的影响。研究结果表明:再制造专利许可是高端制造商的有效产品差异化竞争策略,可提高高端制造商利润,降低低端制造商利润;再制造专利许可策略对环境并不总是有利的,但消费者对再制造品的支付意愿越强,其环境效益越高。     

The impact of two-product joint lifecycles on capacity planning of remanufacturing networks

Capacity planning in the reverse channel of closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) involves complex issues due to the different lifecycles of product offerings in combination with the variability regarding product usage time, quality level of used products and return patterns. (Georgiadis, P., Vlachos, D., Tagaras, G., 2006. The impact of product lifecycle on capacity planning of closed-loop supply chains with remanufacturing. Production and Operations Management 15; 514–527) developed a system dynamics (SD) model to study a CLSC with remanufacturing for a single product which incorporates a dynamic capacity modeling approach. We extend this SD model for two sequential product-types under two alternative scenarios regarding the market preferences over the product-types; in the first scenario, the market is considered showing no preferences, while in the second scenario, the demand over a product-type can be satisfied only by providing units of the specific type. We study how the joint lifecycles of two product-types, entry time of the second product-type to the market and used product return patterns affect the optimal policies regarding expansion and contraction of collection and remanufacturing capacities. The results of extensive numerical investigation are tested for their statistical significance using analysis of variance (ANOVA). In the first scenario, the results show that the system performs best when the two lifecycles form a trapezoid pattern for total demand while in the second scenario, when the two lifecycles form a triangular pattern.     

政府奖惩机制下零售商主导的闭环供应链微分博弈策略

本文在考虑政府奖惩机制下,研究零售商主导的闭环供应链中成员的动态均衡策略,其中制造商负责回收再制造,回收率随时间动态变化。分别构建了三种模式下的Stackelberg微分博弈模型:政府不对制造商和零售商实施奖惩机制、政府只对制造商实施奖惩机制以及政府同时对制造商和零售商实施奖惩机制。运用贝尔曼连续型动态规划理论,求解了三种模式下制造商和零售商的决策均衡结果并进行了对比分析,从消费者剩余价值和成员利润的视角证明了政府实施奖惩机制的有效性。最后通过算例对成员均衡策略进行了稳态分析和非稳态分析。研究结果表明:政府的奖惩机制能够正确引导闭环供应链成员做出最优决策,有利于减缓分散决策所带来的双重边际效应,提高消费者剩余价值。零售商分担回收责任会削减政府对制造商回收的激励作用,降低闭环供应链整体利润。相比之下,政府只对制造商实施奖惩机制是最优模式选择,可以同时提高经济和环保双重效益。     

两零售商竞争下第三方回收闭环供应链的决策及协调

为研究同时考虑零售商竞争与第三方回收闭环供应链的定价决策及协调问题, 分别建立了集中与分散决策模式下的闭环供应链优化模型, 并提出了基于改进K-S法的协调机制。研究表明:在分散式闭环供应链决策下, 较之两零售商与第三方, 制造商总是可以获得最大的利润。两零售商在产品价格上竞争程度的增强不仅可以有效提高产品销量, 同时对废旧产品的回收也起到了很好地促进作用。闭环供应链成员企业间的合作策略能有效消除系统的“双重边际”效应, 且较之零售商及第三方回收商, 制造商的合作动力更强。     

Supply planning models for a remanufacturer under just-in-time manufacturing environment with reverse logistics

We study a supply planning problem in a manufacturing system with two stages. The first stage is a remanufacturer that supplies two closely-related components to the second (manufacturing) stage, which uses each component as the basis for its respective product. The used products are recovered from the market by a third-party logistic provider through an established reverse logistics network. The remanufacturer may satisfy the manufacturer’s demand either by purchasing new components or by remanufacturing components recovered from the returned used products. The remanufacturer’s costs arise from product recovery, remanufacturing components, purchasing original components, holding inventories of recovered products and remanufactured components, production setups (at the first stage and at each component changeover), disposal of recovered products that are not remanufactured, and coordinating the supply modes. The objective is to develop optimal production plans for different production strategies. These strategies are differentiated by whether inventories of recovered products or remanufactured components are carried, and by whether the order in which retailers are served during the planning horizon may be resequenced. We devise production policies that minimize the total cost at the remanufacturer by specifying the quantity of components to be remanufactured, the quantity of new components to be purchased from suppliers, and the quantity of recovered used products that must be disposed. The effects of production capacity are also explored. A comprehensive computational study provides insights into this closed-loop supply chain for those strategies that are shown to be NP-hard.     

Don’t forget your supplier when remanufacturing

A popular assumption in the current literature on remanufacturing is that the whole new product is produced by an integrated manufacturer, which is inconsistent with most industries. In this paper, we model a decentralised closed-loop supply chain consisting of a key component supplier and a non-integrated manufacturer, and demonstrate that the interaction between these players significantly impacts the economic and environmental implications of remanufacturing. In our model, the non-integrated manufacturer can purchase new components from the supplier to produce new products, and remanufacture used components to produce remanufactured products. Thus, the non-integrated manufacturer is not only a buyer but also a rival to the supplier. In a steady state period, we analyse the performances of an integrated manufacturer and the decentralised supply chain. We find that, although the integrated manufacturer always benefits from remanufacturing, the remanufacturing opportunity may constitute a lose–lose situation to the supplier and the non-integrated manufacturer, making their profits be lower than in an identical supply chain without remanufacturing. In addition, the non-integrated manufacturer may be worse off with a lower remanufacturing cost or a larger return rate of used products due to the interaction with the supplier. We further demonstrate that the government-subsidised remanufacturing in the non-integrated (integrated) manufacturer is detrimental (beneficial) to the environment.     

考虑差别定价的闭环供应链协调应对突发事件研究

本文以一个新产品和再造品存在差别定价的零售商负责回收闭环供应链为研究对象,研究突发事件干扰下如何采用收益共享契约协调分散式决策闭环供应链的问题。首先,给出了一个可协调稳定环境下分散式决策闭环供应链的收益共享契约;其次,在突发事件同时干扰闭环供应链中新产品和再造品最大市场需求规模的情况下,分析了集中式决策闭环供应链的最优应对策略,并证实了原收益共享契约在突发事件干扰下会失效;最后,通过对原收益共享契约进行改进,解决了突发事件干扰下的分散式决策闭环供应链协调问题,且改进后的收益共享契约也能够协调稳定环境下的分散式决策闭环供应链。