Axiomatic of the Shapley value of a game with a priori unions

In this paper, we define a modification of the Shapley value for the model of TU games with a priori unions. We provide two characterizations of this value and a new characterization of the Banzhaf–Owen coalitional value.     

The Shapley value for the probability game

The main goal of this paper is to introduce the probability game. On one hand, we analyze the Shapley value by providing an axiomatic characterization. We propose the so-called independent fairness property, meaning that for any two players, the player with larger individual value gets a larger portion of the total benefit. On the other, we use the Shapley value for studying the profitability of merging two agents.     

The joint law of the maximum and terminal value of a martingale

Summary In this paper, we characterise the possible joint laws of the maximum and terminal value of a uniformly-integrable martingale. We also characterise the joint laws of the maximum and terminal value of a convergent continuous local martingale vanishing at zero. A number of earlier results on the possible laws of the maximum can be deduced quite easily.     

The problem of computing the value of a differential game for a positional functional

A dynamical system driven by controls and uncontrollable noise is considered in a game-theoretic setting [1–8]. The problem of feedback control in which the performance index is a positional functional of the motion of the system [8–11] is investigated. On the assumption that the structure of the functional satisfies reasonably general conditions, a procedure is proposed for computing the value of the corresponding differential game. Irrespective of the number of dimensions in the initial problem, as dictated by the structure of the performance index, the proposed procedure reduces to the problem of the successive construction of the upper convex hulls of certain auxiliary functions in domains whose dimension does not exceed that of the phase vector of the system.     

Exponential inequalities and the law of the iterated logarithm in the unbounded forecasting game

We study the law of the iterated logarithm in the framework of game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk. We investigate hedges under which a game-theoretic version of the upper bound of the law of the iterated logarithm holds without any condition on Reality’s moves in the unbounded forecasting game. We prove that in the unbounded forecasting game with an exponential hedge, Skeptic can force the upper bound of the law of the iterated logarithm without conditions on Reality’s moves. We give two examples such a hedge. For proving these results we derive exponential inequalities in the game-theoretic framework which may be of independent interest. Finally, we give related results for measure-theoretic probability which improve the results of Liu and Watbled (Stochastic Processes and their Applications 119:3101–3132, 2009).     

Construction of the value function in a pursuit-evasion game with three pursuers and one evader

A differential pursuit-evasion game is considered with three pursuers and one evader. It is assumed that all objects (players) have simple motions and that the game takes place in a plane. The control vectors satisfy geometrical constraints and the evader has a superiority in control resources. The game time is fixed. The value functional is the distance between the evader and the nearest pursuer at the end of the game. The problem of determining the value function of the game for any possible position is solved.

Three possible cases for the relative arrangement of the players at an arbitrary time are studied: “one-after-one”, “two-after-one”, “three-after-one-in-the-middle” and “three-after-one”. For each of the relative arrangements of the players a guaranteed result function is constructed. In the first three cases the function is expressed analytically. In the fourth case a piecewise-programmed construction is presented with one switchover, on the basis of which the value of the function is determined numerically. The guaranteed result function is shown to be identical with the game value function. When the initial pursuer positions are fixed in an arbitrary manner there are four game domains depending on their relative positions. The boundary between the “three-after-one-in-the-middle” domain and the “three-after-one” domain is found numerically, and the remaining boundaries are interior Nicomedean conchoids, lines and circles. Programs are written that construct singular manifolds and the value function level lines.     

On a simple strategy weakly forcing the strong law of large numbers in the bounded forecasting game

In the framework of the game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk it is of basic importance to construct an explicit strategy weakly forcing the strong law of large numbers in the bounded forecasting game. We present a simple finite-memory strategy based on the past average of Reality’s moves, which weakly forces the strong law of large numbers with the convergence rate of ${O(\sqrt{\log n/n})}In the framework of the game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk it is of basic importance to construct an explicit strategy weakly forcing the strong law of large numbers in the bounded forecasting game. We present a simple finite-memory strategy based on the past average of Reality’s moves, which weakly forces the strong law of large numbers with the convergence rate of . Our proof is very simple compared to a corresponding measure-theoretic result of Azuma (T?hoku Mathematical Journal, 19, 357–367, 1967) on bounded martingale differences and this illustrates effectiveness of game-theoretic approach. We also discuss one-sided protocols and extension of results to linear protocols in general dimension.     

On the optimization of the initial boundary value problem for a conservation law

In the present note, the theory of shift differentiability for the Cauchy problem is extended to the case of an initial boundary value problem for a conservation law. This result allows to exhibit an Euler-Lagrange equation to be satisfied by the extrema of integral functionals defined on the solutions of initial boundary value problems of this kind.     

An NTU value under complement reduced game

The paper follows Kalai and Samet’s (Econometrica 53:307–327, 1985) construction to define a possible extension of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs (EANSC) to games without transferable utilities. We offer a characterization of the EANSC based on the axiom of independence of irrelevant monotonic transformation [Chang and Hwang (Int J Game Theory 32:253–271, 2003) introduced this axiom, and they named it independence of irrelevant expansions. The referee points out that the terminology is inappropriate. So, we change the name.] introduced by Chang and Hwang (Int J Game Theory 32:253–271, 2003) as well as on several familiar axioms. Specifically, we show that the EANSC is the only solution to satisfy Pareto optimality, translation covariance, anonymity, TU-bilateral consistency (or TU-converse consistency), aggregate monotonicity, and independence of irrelevant monotonic transformation.     

Explicit optimal value for Dynkin's stopping game

Under the One-step Look Ahead rule of Dynamic Programming, an explicit game value of Dynkin's stopping problem for a Markov chain is obtained by using a potential operator. The condition on the One-step rule could be extended to the k-step and infinity-step rule. We shall also decompose the game value as the sum of two explicit functions under these rules.     

The vertex picking game and a variation of the game of dots and boxes

A two-player game played on a graph is introduced and completely solved. As a consequence, a solution to a simplified variation of a well-known game called dots and boxes played on a grid [2] is given.     

A polynomial expression for the Owen value in the maintenance cost game

The class of maintenance cost games was introduced in 2000 to deal with a cost allocation problem arising in the reorganization of the railway system in Europe. The main application of maintenance cost games regards the allocation of the maintenance costs of a facility among the agents using it. To that aim it was first proposed to utilize the Shapley value, whose computation for maintenance cost games can be made in polynomial time. In this paper, we propose to model this cost allocation problem as a maintenance cost game with a priori unions and to use the Owen value as a cost allocation rule. Although the computation of the Owen value has exponential complexity in general, we provide an expression for the Owen value of a maintenance cost game with cubic polynomial complexity. We finish the paper with an illustrative example using data taken from the literature of railways management.     

Stability and Shapley value for an n-persons fuzzy game

The aim of the paper is to explain new concepts of solutions for n-persons fuzzy games. Precisely, it contains new definitions for ‘core’ and ‘Shapley value’ in the case of the n-persons fuzzy games. The basic mathematical results contained in the paper are these which assert the consistency of the ‘core’ and of the ‘Shapley value’. It is proved that the core (defined in the paper) is consistent for any n-persons fuzzy game and that the Shapley values exists and it is unique for any fuzzy game with proportional values.     

The sufficient conditions of stability for the value function of a differential game in terms of singular points

Differential games in which the payoff is the time required to reach a given terminal set (optimum-time games) are considered. The Bellman-Isaacs equation must have a classical solution in domains where the value function of the game is smooth. At singular points, where smooth branches of the solution interlock, more complicated conditions must hold, in terms of directional derivatives. A class of games is found and two types of singularities are described such that the aforementioned conditions follow automatically from the geometrical properties of the singularities: the class of games with autonomous separated dynamics in which one player's control set is a June segment. An appropriate theorem is proved. The result is used to construct the value function of a game in which there are three types of singular surfaces: dispersal, equivocal, and switching surfaces.     

On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game

This paper presents two characterizations of the core on the domain of all NTU games. One is based on consistency with respect to “complement-reduced game” and converse consistency with respect to “max-reduced game”. The other is based on consistency with respect to “max-reduced game” and weak converse consistency with respect to “complement-reduced game”. Besides, we introduce an alternative definition of individual rationality, we name conditional individual rationality, which is compatible with non-emptiness. We discuss axiomatic characterizations involving conditional individual rationality for the core.     

On the contribution of a player to a game

In ann-person game, corresponding toMilnor's upper bound,b (i), a quantitym (i) is defined, which is a lower bound ofX _i whenx belongs to the kernel. In the case of the bargaining set, it is shown for particular games thatb (i),m (i) are bounds ofx _i .