Equilibrium structures of two supply chains with price and displayed-quantity competition

This paper studies the equilibrium structure of two competing supply chains, each of which consists of one manufacturer and one retailer who faces the demand influenced by price and displayed quantity. Each chain has two structure options: integration or decentralization. Under linear demand, we present the optimal pricing/displayed quantity of all members in the two chains under possible structures: two integrated chains (II), two decentralized chains (DD), and one integrated chain and one decentralized chain (ID or DI). We then analyse the impact of the intensities of price and displayed-quantity competition on the equilibrium structure of two supply chains. The results show that both price and displayed-quantity competition intensities influence significantly the equilibrium structure. Moreover, under certain specific conditions, both price and displayed-quantity competition can have the two chains fall into the prisoner’s dilemma and play a game of chicken as well.     

Mean–variance analysis of supply chains under wholesale pricing and profit sharing schemes

In this paper, we explore the use of a wholesale pricing and profit sharing scheme (WPPS) for coordinating supply chains under the mean–variance (MV) decision framework. We first analytically establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for coordinating the centralized supply chain by WPPS. We then show that there exists a unique equilibrium of the Stackelberg game with WPPS in the decentralized case. After that, we discuss the information asymmetric case in which the retailer can be benefited by pretending to be more risk averse. Finally, we propose a new measure for the manufacturer to prevent this cheating from happening. Insights are generated.     

Bargaining in competing supply chains with uncertainty

Substantial literature has been devoted to supply chain coordination. The majority of this literature ignores competition between supply chains. Moreover, a significant part of this literature focuses on coordination that induce the supply chain members to follow strategies that produce the equilibria chosen by a vertically integrated supply chain. This paper investigates the equilibrium behavior of two competing supply chains in the presence of demand uncertainty. We consider joint pricing and quantity decisions and competition under three possible supply chain strategies: Vertical Integration (VI), Manufacturer’s Stackelberg (MS), and Bargaining on the Wholesale price (BW(α), α is the bargaining parameter) over a single or infinitely many periods. We show that, in contrast to earlier literature, using VIVI (VI in both chains) is the unique Nash Equilibrium over one period decision, while using MSMS or BW(α)BW(α) may be Nash Equilibrium over infinitely many periods.     

供应链链际竞争的研究与发展

本文试图从供应链的结构、竞争的数学经济模型,以及工业应用的领域等三个方向, 概括和介绍国际和国内有关供应链链际竞争的研究工作。其中绝大多数的数学模型是建立 在竞争的各方都是具有相同性质和相同结构的供应链的前提假设下,因此是对称的链际竞 争模型,而且主要局限于二层或者三层的供应链网络。但是我们也特别介绍了一些非对称的模型可以用来研究不同性质和结构的供应链之间的竞争问题。另一个有意义的方向是研 究链内的合作契约在链际竞争中所起到的作用。     

Stability and monotonicity for interactive Markov chains

In a Markov chain model of a social process, interest often centers on the distribution of the population by state. One question, the stability question, is whether this distribution converges to an equilibrium value. For an ordinary Markov chain (a chain with constant transition probabilities), complete answers are available. For an interactive Markov chain (a chain which allows the transition probabilities governing each individual to depend on the locations by state of the rest of the population), few stability results are available. This paper presents new results. Roughly, the main result is that an interactive Markov chain with unique equilibrium will be stable if the chain satisfies a certain monotonicity property. The property is a generalization to interactive Markov chains of the standard definition of monotonicity for ordinary Markov chains.     

闭环供应链竞争的博弈分析与链内协调合同设计

假定生产商委托零售商回收废旧产品以进行再制造活动,研究两条分别由单生产商和单零售商组成的闭环供应链的竞争和链内协调。对应两条闭环供应链均为分散式供应链、均为集中式供应链、一条为分散式供应链另一条为集中式供应链,运用博弈论和均衡分析方法分别建立了三种情况下刻画闭环供应链竞争的带均衡约束的均衡模型、纳什均衡模型和带均衡约束的优化模型,进行了模型求解。基于合同理论,提出供应链竞争下协调链内零售商的零售价和回收价格决策的批发价加回收补贴合同。最后的算例验证了模型的合理性和协调合同的有效性。研究表明:产品零售价、需求量与产品替代效应正相关,废旧产品供给量、供应链利润与回收价格敏感性正相关;供应链协调是供应链竞争下的占优策略,有利于提高供应链的运作效率,但两条协调供应链之间的竞争将更激烈,存在囚徒困境现象。     

Optimizing steady state Markov chains by state reduction

Many service systems have a parameter which can be changed continuously within a certain range. In queueing, for instance, one may be able to change the service rate by means of faster servers, or the arrival rate through advertising. The question to be addressed is how to choose the value of the parameter in order to maximize rewards. In this paper, service systems are formulated as Markov chains in equilibrium. The optimum is then found by Newton's method. This requires one to determine the first and second derivative of the rewards, and an effective method for doing this is proposed. The method is based on state reduction, which is a technique for finding equilibrium probabilities for finite and even for infinite state Markov chains. The optimization technique is then used to obtain a number of curves involving two simple service systems.     

Bifurcations in a family of Hamiltonian systems and associated nontwist cubic maps

The aim of the paper is to study systems with one-and-a-half degrees of freedom generated by a Hamiltonian with a quartic unperturbed part and broad perturbation spectrum. To this end, an approximate interpolating Hamiltonian system is firstly studied. Behaviour of the Poincaré–Birkhoff or dimerised chains in their routes to reconnection when the perturbation parameter varies is particularly presented. In the second step, a discrete system associated to the full Hamiltonian system is constructed and studied. We point out interesting properties of the dynamics of the Poincaré–Birkhoff or dimerised chains, such as pairs of homoclinic orbits to the same equilibrium point (sandglass) and triple reconnection. Then we use the scenario of reconnections to explain the destruction of transport barriers in the non-autonomous system.     

Equilibrium contract selection strategy in chain-to-chain competition with demand uncertainty

This paper investigates the equilibrium contract selection problem for the dominant suppliers in two competing supply chains with stochastic and price-sensitive demand. The two suppliers, acting as the Stackelberg leaders, produce substitutable products and distribute them through each exclusive retailer, and can provide either a consignment contract or a wholesale-price contract. The equilibrium behaviours of the suppliers and retailers are investigated in three different scenarios: (1) the consignment contract scenario; (2) the wholesale-price contract scenario; and (3) the hybrid contract scenario. We prove that the equilibrium contracting strategy is of the threshold type: when the cost-share rates of the two retailers are above certain thresholds, both suppliers select consignment contracts; when the cost-share rates of the two retailers are lower than certain thresholds, both suppliers select wholesale-price contracts; when one retailer’s cost-share rate is above a certain threshold and the other is lower than a certain threshold, the supplier with large retailer’s cost-share rate selects the consignment contract and the other supplier with small retailer’s cost-share rate selects the wholesale-price contract. Furthermore, these thresholds depend on price sensitivities.     

Precommitment and equilibrium investment strategies for defined contribution pension plans under a jump–diffusion model

In this paper, we study an optimal investment problem under the mean–variance criterion for defined contribution pension plans during the accumulation phase. To protect the rights of a plan member who dies before retirement, a clause on the return of premiums for the plan member is adopted. We assume that the manager of the pension plan is allowed to invest the premiums in a financial market, which consists of one risk-free asset and one risky asset whose price process is modeled by a jump–diffusion process. The precommitment strategy and the corresponding value function are obtained using the stochastic dynamic programming approach. Under the framework of game theory and the assumption that the manager’s risk aversion coefficient depends on the current wealth, the equilibrium strategy and the corresponding equilibrium value function are also derived. Our results show that with the same level of variance in the terminal wealth, the expected optimal terminal wealth under the precommitment strategy is greater than that under the equilibrium strategy with a constant risk aversion coefficient; the equilibrium strategy with a constant risk aversion coefficient is revealed to be different from that with a state-dependent risk aversion coefficient; and our results can also be degenerated to the results of He and Liang (2013b) and Björk et al. (2014). Finally, some numerical simulations are provided to illustrate our derived results.     

Closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium under legislation

This paper expands previous work dealing with oligopolistic supply chains to the field of closed-loop supply chains. The model presented has been formulated with the intent of examining issues surrounding the recent European Union directive regarding waste of electric and electronic equipment (WEEE). The network modelled consists of manufacturers and consumer markets engaged in a Cournot pricing game with perfect information. Closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium occurs when all players agree on volumes shipped and prices charged. Certain properties of the model are examined analytically. Numeric examples are included and have been solved using an extragradient method with constant step size. The equilibrium solution obtained provide interesting insights that lead into a number of areas for future research.     

需求和汇率风险下的全球供应链汇率风险对冲策略

在下游零售商同时面临市场需求风险和汇率风险的背景下,研究了汇率风险对冲(外汇期货对冲)策略在全球供应链运作及风险管理中的作用。在无/有对冲策略两种情形下分别构建了上游制造商和下游零售商的动态博弈模型,并求解了均衡结果。两种情形下的均衡结果显示,汇率风险对冲策略可以提高供应链系统订货量、增加零售商收益的期望值和确定性等价量、增加供应链系统的总收益。进一步讨论了有对冲策略的情形下,两类外生风险对供应链均衡决策变量和盈利性的影响方式。结果表明,汇率风险对冲策略对汇率风险起到了有效的隔离作用,避免了供应链下游的汇率风险向上游企业传递,并能实现供应链收益与风险的权衡。     

投保人异质性风险偏好下指数保险市场均衡的动态演化分析

兼具道德风险与逆向选择免疫性和即刻赔付双重优势的指数保险逐渐成为巨灾风险管理的重要工具,但目前多处于试点阶段,市场均衡演化规律仍不明确。本文构建了指数保险市场中保险公司、投保人和政府的三方演化博弈模型,同时,考虑投保人面对损失与收益的不同风险态度,引入异质性风险偏好设计了投保人决策函数,进而分析指数保险市场均衡演化路径及其影响因素。结果表明,指数保险市场均衡随其生命周期的演进而变化,政府在指数保险市场中的职能将从管理者走向退出;政府对保险公司进行补贴更有效,但补贴力度需在适度范围内。影响因素方面,投保人的异质性风险偏好对市场均衡演化有重要影响,其损失敏感性将加快市场向均衡状态的收敛速度;提前赔付优势能够促进市场向均衡状态收敛,但溢出效应会延缓均衡的达成。基于此提出了政府对指数保险市场引导与鼓励的建议。     

The effect of market power on risk-sharing

The paper studies an oligopolistic equilibrium model of financial agents who aim to share their random endowments. The risk-sharing securities and their prices are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game played among all the participating agents. In the complete-market setting, each agent’s set of strategic choices consists of the security payoffs and the pricing kernel that are consistent with the optimal-sharing rules; while in the incomplete setting, agents respond via demand functions on a vector of given tradeable securities. It is shown that at the (Nash) risk-sharing equilibrium, the sharing securities are suboptimal, since agents submit for sharing different risk exposures than their true endowments. On the other hand, the Nash equilibrium prices stay unaffected by the game only in the special case of agents with the same risk aversion. In addition, agents with sufficiently lower risk aversion act as predatory traders, since they absorb utility surplus from the high risk averse agents and reduce the efficiency of sharing. The main results of the paper also hold under the generalized models that allow the presence of noise traders and heterogeneity in agents’ beliefs.     

Nash equilibrium strategies for a defined contribution pension management

This paper studies the time-consistent investment strategy for a defined contribution (DC) pension plan under the mean–variance criterion. Since the time horizon of a pension fund management problem is relatively long, two background risks are taken into account: the inflation risk and the salary risk. Meanwhile, there are a risk-free asset, a stock and an inflation-indexed bond available in the financial market. The extended Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB for short) equation of the equilibrium value function and the verification theorem corresponding to our problem are presented. The closed-form time-consistent investment strategy and the equilibrium efficient frontier are obtained by stochastic control technique. The effects of the inflation and stochastic income on the equilibrium strategy and the equilibrium efficient frontier are illustrated by mathematical and numerical analysis. Finally, we compare in detail the time-consistent results in our paper with the pre-commitment one and find the distinct properties of these two results.     

Default swap games driven by spectrally negative Lévy processes

This paper studies game-type credit default swaps that allow the protection buyer and seller to raise or reduce their respective positions once prior to default. This leads to the study of an optimal stopping game subject to early default termination. Under a structural credit risk model based on spectrally negative Lévy processes, we apply the principles of smooth and continuous fit to identify the equilibrium exercise strategies for the buyer and the seller. We then rigorously prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium and compute the contract value at equilibrium. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the impacts of default risk and other contractual features on the players’ exercise timing at equilibrium.     

Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents

We employ the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (Int J Game Theory 1:111–130, 1972) to study the endogenous matching patterns in a market that consists of heterogenous principals and agents. We show that, in general, the equilibrium matching is non-assortative. We then characterize the equilibrium relationship between risk and performance pay and risk and fixed compensation. This is the first paper that characterizes the equilibrium matching, to its fullest possible extent, building on the Holmstrom and Milgrom (Econometrica 55:303–328, 1987) principal-agent model. This model has been used extensively in the empirical literature and therefore we hope that our results will be of value to empirical researchers who wish to study a principal-agent market.     

Optimal portfolio choice and stochastic volatility

In this paper we examine the effect of stochastic volatility on optimal portfolio choice in both partial and general equilibrium settings. In a partial equilibrium setting we derive an analog of the classic Samuelson–Merton optimal portfolio result and define volatility‐adjusted risk aversion as the effective risk aversion of an individual investing in an asset with stochastic volatility. We extend prior research which shows that effective risk aversion is greater with stochastic volatility than without for investors without wealth effects by providing further comparative static results on changes in effective risk aversion due to changes in the distribution of volatility. We demonstrate that effective risk aversion is increasing in the constant absolute risk aversion and the variance of the volatility distribution for investors without wealth effects. We further show that for these investors a first‐order stochastic dominant shift in the volatility distribution does not necessarily increase effective risk aversion, whereas a second‐order stochastic dominant shift in the volatility does increase effective risk aversion. Finally, we examine the effect of stochastic volatility on equilibrium asset prices. We derive an explicit capital asset pricing relationship that illustrates how stochastic volatility alters equilibrium asset prices in a setting with multiple risky assets, where returns have a market factor and asset‐specific random components and multiple investor types. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mean–variance analysis of a single supplier and retailer supply chain under a returns policy

In the literature, most of the supply chain coordinating policies target at improving the supply chain’s efficiency in terms of expected cost reduction or expected profit improvement. However, optimizing the expected performance alone cannot guarantee that the realized performance measure will fall within a small neighborhood of its expected value when the corresponding variance is high. Moreover, it ignores the risk aversion of supply chain members which may affect the achievability of channel coordination. As a result, we carry out in this paper a mean–variance (MV) analysis of supply chains under a returns policy. We first propose an MV formulation for a single supplier single retailer supply chain with a newsvendor type of product. The objective of each supply chain decision maker is to maximize the expected profit such that the standard deviation of profit is under the decision maker’s control. We study both the cases with centralized and decentralized supply chains. We illustrate how a returns policy can be applied for managing the supply chains to address the issues such as channel coordination and risk control. Extensive numerical studies are conducted and managerial findings are proposed.     

Equilibrium states with incomplete supports and periodic trajectories

The relationship between analytic properties of the Artin-Mazur-Ruelle zeta function and the structure of the state of equilibrium states for a topological Markov chain is studied for a class of functions constant on a system of cylinder sets. The convergence of discrete invariant measures to equilibrium states is studied. Special attention is paid to the case in which the uniqueness condition is violated. Dynamic Ruelle-Smale zeta functions are considered, as well as the distribution laws for the number of periodic trajectories of special flows corresponding to topological Markov chains and to positive functions of this class.Translated fromMatematicheskie Zametki, Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 230–253, February, 1996.The author is grateful to B. M. Gurevich for discussing the paper.This work was partially supported by the International Science Foundation under grant No. M8X000.