个人所得税制度对收入分配效应的测度方法—基于收入分布函数的思路

针对微观数据缺乏的情况,借助位置-尺度分布族、截尾分布等统计概念与性质,提出了基于收入随机变量、分布函数的个人所得税制度对收入差距影响效应的测度方法.方法适用于微观调查数据,也适用于收入分组数据.作为应用,将该方法用于2008-2010年我国个人所得税制度对收入分配影响效应的定量分析.结果表明:个人所得税制度使收入差距的扩大趋势得到抑制,基本符合居民之间的税负公平原则.但随着城镇居民收入的增长,既定个人所得税制度优化收入分配结构的能力逐年减弱,免税额和应税区间的改革具有合理性.     

市场需求下产学研协同创新意愿的动态收益分配优化模型

产学研协同创新意愿高低关键在于合作收益的大小及分配,且这种大小和分配不是基于固定收益下不同贡献度的分配,而是将创新收益与产品市场表现挂钩,基于动态收益的分配.据此,构建了一个优化模型,分析市场需求(初始市场需求、未来市场需求)、收益分配、研发投入三种因素对协同创新意愿的影响.结果显示:一是企业收益分配比例受到未来市场需求的强烈影响,不同的取值范围导致协同创新意愿与初始市场需求之间存在线性、"U"型、和倒"U"型三种不同关系.二是协同创新意愿与研发投入呈负相关关系,表明通过提升企业分配比例可以抵消由研发投入增加带来的负面效应.这些结论不仅深化了关于协同创新意愿影响因素及其影响机制的研究,而且对协同创新可持续发展的利益分配机制提供了新的研究思路和对策启示.     

Measuring income inequalities beyond the Gini coefficient

Growing interest in the analysis of interrelationships between income distribution and economic growth has recently stimulated new theoretical and empirical research. Measures such as the head-count ratio for the poverty index or the widely used Gini coefficient are aggregated indicators describing the general extent of inequality without deeper insights into income distribution among households. To derive an indicator accounting for income distribution among income groups, we propose a new approach based on an output oriented DEA model where the input value is unitized to 1 for each country and weights restrictions imposed so as to favour a higher income share in the lower quantiles. We demonstrate the merits of this approach on the quintile income breakdown data of 29 European countries. Prioritizing lower income groups’ welfare, countries such as Slovenia and Slovakia can be equally favoured by the new proposed indicator while being assessed differently by the Gini index. An intertemporal analysis reveals a slight deterioration of income distribution in the majority of 29 European countries over the period of 2007–2016 in a Rawlsian sense.

     

Optimal income taxation with discrete skill distribution

This paper studies the pattern of the optimal marginal income tax rates in a discrete model allowing all forms of individual skill distribution. It derives an explicit solution to the optimal marginal income tax rates in terms of the parameters of the model, and then rigorously shows the optimal marginal tax rate can be U-shaped, inverse U-shaped, strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing in the interior of skill levels, depending crucially on skill distribution. The numerical examples indicate that the optimal marginal tax rates can be W-shaped and inverse W-shaped in the interior of skill levels. The explicit solution to the optimal marginal income tax rate derived in this discrete model can be used to find optimal marginal income tax rates for an economy with any empirical skill distribution, without the need to estimate the density function of skill.     

A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption

In this paper, we construct a theoretical game model with incomplete information to analyze the tax revenues of a multiethnic country, when fiscal corruption is widespread. Our proposal is that income inequality between ethnic groups causes differences leading to prejudice and discrimination among ethnic groups themselves and, as a consequence, this affects the control of corruption and evasion. Hence, the amount of tax revenues is proven to be dependent on the relevance of the income distribution between the ethnic groups.     

Tsallis statistics in the income distribution of Brazil

This paper discusses the empirical evidence of Tsallis statistical functions in the personal income distribution of Brazil. Yearly samples from 1978 to 2014 were linearized by the q-logarithm and straight lines were fitted to the entire range of the income data in all samples, producing a two-parameters-only single function representation of the whole distribution in every year. The results showed that the time evolution of the parameters is periodic and plotting one in terms of the other reveals a cycle mostly clockwise. It was also found that the empirical data oscillate periodically around the fitted straight lines with the amplitude growing as the income values increase. Since the entire income data range can be fitted by a single function, this raises questions on previous results claiming that the income distribution is constituted by a well defined two-classes-base income structure, since such a division in two very distinct income classes might not be an intrinsic property of societies, but a consequence of an a priori fitting-choice procedure that may leave aside possibly important income dynamics at the intermediate levels.     

基于涨跌幅限制的双边截断正态分布期权定价模型

标准Black Scholes期权定价公式假设股票价格服从对数正态分布,没有考虑股票价格涨跌幅的限制带来的影响.放松该假设条件,假设股票价格服从双边截断对数正态分布,考虑中国股票市场的涨跌幅限制,得到一个新的B-S期权定价公式来表达股价行为.双边截断正态分布假设下收益率的波动率要要比正态分布下的波动率小,所以新B-S公式计算出的期权价格就会比标准B-S公式计算出的价格低.     

On a class of renewal risk model with random income

In this paper, we consider a renewal risk process with random premium income based on a Poisson process. Generating function for the discounted penalty function is obtained. We show that the discounted penalty function satisfies a defective renewal equation and the corresponding explicit expression can be obtained via a compound geometric tail. Finally, we consider the Laplace transform of the time to ruin, and derive the closed‐form expression for it when the claims have a discrete K_m distribution (i.e. the generating function of the distribution function is a ratio of two polynomials of order m∈?⁺). Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于CCAPM框架的财富不平等与房价关系研究

运用含有房屋的CCAPM模型,在同时考虑房屋的消费属性与投资属性基础上分析了财富(或收入)分配对房价的影响;并通过数值模拟解释了我国房价高企的根源.结论表明,我国房价高企是财富分配不均所致,财富不均等程度加剧致使房屋从消费属性向投资属性转变进而推高了房价.文章也分析了财富分配对居民消费结构的影响,财富分配不均等程度加剧使得贫穷阶层的房屋消费比重下降而富裕阶层的投资性购房比重增加,进而拉高房价.文章最后指出,要调控我国当前房地产市场价格,必须从财富(或收入)分配入手,明晰产权.     

Estimation of the number of failures in the Weibull model using the ordinary differential equation

In estimating the number of failures using right truncated grouped data, we often encounter cases that the estimate is smaller than the true one when we use the likelihood principle to conditional probability. In infectious disease spread predictions, the SIR model described by simultaneous ordinary differential equations is commonly used, and it can predict reasonably well the number of infected patients even when the size of observed data is small. We have investigated whether the ordinary differential equation model can estimate the number of failures more accurately than does the likelihood principle under the condition of right truncated grouped data. The positive results are obtained in the Weibull model, similarly to the cases of the SARS, A(H1N1), and FMD.     

The graph grabbing game on Km,n-trees

The graph grabbing game is a two-player game on weighted connected graphs where all weights are non-negative. Two players, Alice and Bob, alternately remove a non-cut vertex from the graph (i.e., the resulting graph is still connected) and get the weight assigned to the vertex, where the starting player is Alice. Each player’s aim is to maximize his/her outcome when all vertices have been taken, and Alice wins the game if she gathered at least half of the total weight. Seacrest and Seacrest (2017) proved that Alice has a winning strategy for every weighted tree with even order, and conjectured that the same statement holds for every weighted connected bipartite graph with even order. In this paper, we prove that Alice wins the game on a type of a connected bipartite graph with even order called a $K_{m,n}$-tree.     

Extremal and game-theoretic characterizations of the probabilistic approach to income redistribution

In this paper, we cast the problem of income redistribution in two different ways, one as a nonlinear goal programming model and the other as a game theoretic model. These two approaches give characterizations for the probabilistic approach suggested by Intriligator for this problem. All three approaches reinforce the linear income redistribution plan as a desirable mechanism of income redistribution.This research was partly supported by ONR Contract No. N00014-82-K-0295 with the Center for Cybernetic Studies, The University of Texas, Austin, Texas.     

On the spanning connectivity of the generalized Petersen graphs P(n,3)

In this paper, we employed lattice model to describe the three internally vertex-disjoint paths that span the vertex set of the generalized Petersen graph $P(n,3)$. We showed that the $P(n,3)$ is 3-spanning connected for odd $n$. Based on the lattice model, five amalgamated and one extension mechanisms are introduced to recursively establish the 3-spanning connectivity of the $P(n,3)$. In each amalgamated mechanism, a particular lattice trail was amalgamated with the lattice trails that was dismembered, transferred, or extended from parts of the lattice trails for $P(n?6,3)$, where a lattice tail is a trail in the lattice model that represents a path in $P(n,3)$.     

A ruin model with random income and dependence between claim sizes and claim intervals

In this paper,we consider a generalization of the classical ruin model,where the income is random and the distribution of the time between two claim occurrences depends on the previous claim size.This model is more appropriate than the classical ruin model.Explicit expression for the generating function of the Gerber-Shiu expected discounted penalty function are derived.A similar model is discussed.Finally,the result are showed by two examples.     

k-正态分布及其应用

近本文研究了截断随机变量和k-正态分布.利用对数凹函数理论,获得了涉及截断随机变量和截断随机变量的函数的方差的不等式链,推广了涉及正态分布和分层教学模型的一些经典结论.同时在附录部分给出了仿真结果.     

基于演化博弈的大运河文化带城市间合作发展策略研究

目前我国正向纵深推进大运河文化带建设,合作发展是推进其建设的重要手段。文章引入经济环境、城市间资源互补性、收益分配比例、机会主义收益、惩罚成本等影响因子,运用演化博弈研究大运河文化带沿线城市间合作的形成机制。结果表明良好的宏观经济环境或城市间资源互补性强时,带来高合作超额收益,从而提高城市间向合作演化的可能性;机会收益与惩罚成本之间的差额越小,越能提高合作可能性;相反,合作成本限制了双方的合作;此外,超额收益在城市间的配比影响合作,且影响方向取决于双方投入成本与收益分配比例。因此,当前亟需政府采取各种政策鼓励城市间,特别是资源互补性强的城市间利用良好的经济建设环境加强合作,同时提高监查力度。合作城市在合作中要重视诸如利益分配、违约惩罚机制等管理机制的设计。     

基于微分博弈的数据开放策略及合作收益分配机制研究

数据作为数字经济时代一种重要的生产要素,在国民经济运行中的作用越来越重要。然而,现阶段我国社会数据开放仍处于起步阶段,急需加快推进数据开放共享。为准确分析数据开放主体政府和企业的数据开放策略,运用微分博弈分别构建Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈和协同合作博弈模型,得到三种情形下政府和企业最优开放数据努力程度、社会数据开放水平最优轨迹以及最优收益函数;其次,在协同合作博弈情景下,将时间因素引入Nash谈判模型,进一步分析政府和企业合作时具有时间一致性的动态收益分配机制;最后,结合数值仿真对影响社会数据开放水平的相关参数进行灵敏性分析。研究结果发现,当政府获得收益分配比例大于1/3时,Stackelberg主从博弈下的政府和企业双方收益以及社会数据开放水平均高于Nash非合作情形;协同合作情形下,双方总收益和社会数据开放水平均能达到帕累托最优状态。     

Longevity risk and retirement income tax efficiency: A location spending rate puzzle

In this paper we model and solve a retirement consumption problem with differentially taxed accounts, parameterized by longevity risk aversion. The work is motivated by some observations on how Canadians de-accumulate financial wealth during retirement — which seem rather puzzling. While the Modigliani lifecycle model can justify a variety of (pre-tax) de-accumulation or draw down rates depending on risk preferences, the existence of asymmetric taxes implies that certain financial accounts should be depleted faster than others. Our analysis of data from the Survey of Financial Security indicates that Canadian retirees maintain approximately two-thirds of their financial wealth in tax-sheltered accounts and a third in taxable accounts regardless of age. The ratio of taxable to tax-sheltered wealth increases slightly or remains relatively constant depending on household income which is not what one would expect from the lifecycle model. Indeed, using our model we cannot locate a plausible tax function that justifies a constant “account ratio” regardless of age. For example under flat rates taxable accounts should be depleted well before tax-sheltered accounts are ever touched. The account ratio should go to zero quite rapidly in the absence of government mandated withdrawals. We also demonstrate that under progressive income taxes withdrawals are made from both accounts but at different rates depending on account size, pension income and longevity risk preferences. Again, the “account ratio” should eventually decline. We postulate that this sort of behavior is likely due to irrational considerations linked to mental accounting, etc. It remains to be seen whether this will persist over time and under a more careful analysis of Canadian cohorts or if retirees in other countries exhibit the same behavior.     

Meritocratic and monopoly inequality: A computer simulation of income distribution

This paper explores the properties of a model of the distribution of income in which individual income is proportional to a multiplicative function of previous income, ability, chance, a ceiling factor determined by competition among members of an income class for resources held by members of other classes, and an additive factor summarizing effects of altruism and minimal subsistence. The behavior of the model is investigated by computer simulation for combinations of values of three model parameters representing the tendency of income to grow exponentially (the Monopoly effect), the weight of the ability factor (the meritocracy effect), and the weight of the ceiling factor resulting from competitive interactions. Steady state income distributions generated by the model are characterized by measures of income inequality, exchange mobility, elite stability, and meritocracy. Results suggest that for constant Monopoly effect, the effect of the meritocracy parameter on various aggregate outcomes is nonlinear, with a range over which greater returns to ability produce lower inequality, lower exchange mobility, greater elite stability and meritocracy, for constant returns to ability, a greater Monopoly effect generally produces greater inequality, more exchange mobility, less stability of the elite, and lower meritocracy. Results also reveal a nonlinear relationship between exchange mobility and inequality, with mobility decreasing to a minimum and then increasing again as inequality increases; a nonlinear but monotonic negative relationship between elite stability and inequality, with greater inequality, associated with less stability, and a nonlinear relationship between meritocracy and inequality, with meritocracy increasing at first with inequality at low inequality levels, reaching a maximum and then decreasing as inequality increases further. These findings are interpreted in relation to major stratification trends in the course of sociocultural evolution.