Competitive facility location models

Two classes of competitive facility location models are considered, in which several persons (players) sequentially or simultaneously open facilities for serving clients. The first class consists of discrete two-level programming models. The second class consists of game models with several independent players pursuing selfish goals. For the first class, its relationship with pseudo-Boolean functions is established and a novel method for constructing a family of upper and lower bounds on the optimum is proposed. For the second class, the tight PLS-completeness of the problem of finding Nash equilibriums is proved.     

Approximate algorithms for the competitive facility location problem

We consider the competitive facility location problem in which two competing sides (the Leader and the Follower) open in succession their facilities, and each consumer chooses one of the open facilities basing on its own preferences. The problem amounts to choosing the Leader’s facility locations so that to obtain maximal profit taking into account the subsequent facility location by the Follower who also aims to obtain maximal profit. We state the problem as a two-level integer programming problem. A method is proposed for calculating an upper bound for the maximal profit of the Leader. The corresponding algorithm amounts to constructing the classical maximum facility location problem and finding an optimal solution to it. Simultaneously with calculating an upper bound we construct an initial approximate solution to the competitive facility location problem. We propose some local search algorithms for improving the initial approximate solutions. We include the results of some simulations with the proposed algorithms, which enable us to estimate the precision of the resulting approximate solutions and give a comparative estimate for the quality of the algorithms under consideration for constructing the approximate solutions to the problem.     

An upper bound for the competitive location and capacity choice problem with multiple demand scenarios

A new mathematical model is considered related to competitive location problems where two competing parties, the Leader and the Follower, successively open their facilities and try to win customers. In the model, we consider a situation of several alternative demand scenarios which differ by the composition of customers and their preferences.We assume that the costs of opening a facility depend on its capacity; therefore, the Leader, making decisions on the placement of facilities, must determine their capacities taking into account all possible demand scenarios and the response of the Follower. For the bilevel model suggested, a problem of finding an optimistic optimal solution is formulated. We show that this problem can be represented as a problem of maximizing a pseudo- Boolean function with the number of variables equal to the number of possible locations of the Leader’s facilities.We propose a novel systemof estimating the subsets that allows us to supplement the estimating problems, used to calculate the upper bounds for the constructed pseudo-Boolean function, with additional constraints which improve the upper bounds.     

Competitive facility location problem with attractiveness adjustment of the follower: A bilevel programming model and its solution

We are concerned with a problem in which a firm or franchise enters a market by locating new facilities where there are existing facilities belonging to a competitor. The firm aims at finding the location and attractiveness of each facility to be opened so as to maximize its profit. The competitor, on the other hand, can react by adjusting the attractiveness of its existing facilities with the objective of maximizing its own profit. The demand is assumed to be aggregated at certain points in the plane and the facilities of the firm can be located at predetermined candidate sites. We employ Huff’s gravity-based rule in modeling the behavior of the customers where the fraction of customers at a demand point that visit a certain facility is proportional to the facility attractiveness and inversely proportional to the distance between the facility site and demand point. We formulate a bilevel mixed-integer nonlinear programming model where the firm entering the market is the leader and the competitor is the follower. In order to find the optimal solution of this model, we convert it into an equivalent one-level mixed-integer nonlinear program so that it can be solved by global optimization methods. Apart from reporting computational results obtained on a set of randomly generated instances, we also compute the benefit the leader firm derives from anticipating the competitor’s reaction of adjusting the attractiveness levels of its facilities. The results on the test instances indicate that the benefit is 58.33% on the average.     

A capacitated competitive facility location problem

We consider a mathematical model similar in a sense to competitive location problems. There are two competing parties that sequentially open their facilities aiming to “capture” customers and maximize profit. In our model, we assume that facilities’ capacities are bounded. The model is formulated as a bilevel integer mathematical program, and we study the problem of obtaining its optimal (cooperative) solution. It is shown that the problem can be reformulated as that of maximization of a pseudo-Boolean function with the number of arguments equal to the number of places available for facility opening. We propose an algorithm for calculating an upper bound for values that the function takes on subsets which are specified by partial (0, 1)-vectors.     

A two-level evolutionary algorithm for solving the facility location and design (1|1)-centroid problem on the plane with variable demand

In this work, the problem of a company or chain (the leader) that considers the reaction of a competitor chain (the follower) is studied. In particular, the leader wants to set up a single new facility in a planar market where similar facilities of the follower, and possibly of its own chain, are already present. The follower will react by locating another single facility after the leader locates its own facility. Both the location and the quality (representing design, quality of products, prices, etc.) of the new leader’s facility have to be found. The aim is to maximize the profit obtained by the leader considering the future follower’s entry. The demand is supposed to be concentrated at n demand points. Each demand point splits its buying power among the facilities proportionally to the attraction it feels for them. The attraction of a demand point for a facility depends on both the location and the quality of the facility. Usually, the demand is considered in the literature to be fixed or constant regardless the conditions of the market. In this paper, the demand varies depending on the attraction for the facilities. Taking variable demand into consideration makes the model more realistic. However, it increases the complexity of the problem and, therefore, the computational effort needed to solve it. Three heuristic methods are proposed to cope with this hard-to-solve global optimization problem, namely, a grid search procedure, a multistart algorithm and a two-level evolutionary algorithm. The computational studies show that the evolutionary algorithm is both the most robust algorithm and the one that provides the best results.     

A mathematical model of market competition

We consider a mathematical model of decision making by a company attempting to win a market share. We assume that the company releases its products to the market under the competitive conditions that another company is making similar products. Both companies can vary the kinds of their products on the market as well as the prices in accordance with consumer preferences. Each company aims to maximize its profit. A mathematical statement of the decision-making problem for the market players is a bilevel mathematical programming problem that reduces to a competitive facility location problem. As regards the latter, we propose a method for finding an upper bound for the optimal value of the objective function and an algorithm for constructing an approximate solution. The algorithm amounts to local ascent search in a neighborhood of a particular form, which starts with an initial approximate solution obtained simultaneously with an upper bound. We give a computational example of the problem under study which demonstrates the output of the algorithm.     

A decomposition approach to solve a bilevel capacitated facility location problem with equity constraints

In this paper, we study a capacitated facility location problem with two decision makers. One (say, the leader) decides on which subset of facilities to open and the capacity to be installed in each facility with the goal of minimizing the overall costs; the second decision maker (say, the follower), once the facilities have been designed, aims at maximizing the profit deriving from satisfying the demands of a given set of clients beyond a certain threshold imposed by the leader. The leader can foresee but cannot control the follower’s behavior. The resulting mathematical formulation is a discrete–continuous bilevel optimization problem. We propose a decomposition approach to cope with the bilevel structure of the problem and the integrality of a subset of variables under the control of the leader. Such a proposal has been tested on a set of benchmark instances available in the literature.     

Heuristics for the facility location and design (1|1)-centroid problem on the plane

A chain (the leader) wants to set up a single new facility in a planar market where similar facilities of a competitor (the follower), and possibly of its own chain, are already present. The follower will react by locating another single facility after the leader locates its own facility. Fixed demand points split their demand probabilistically over all facilities in the market in proportion to their attraction to each facility, determined by the different perceived qualities of the facilities and the distances to them, through a gravitational model. Both the location and the quality (design) of the new leader’s facility are to be found. The aim is to maximize the profit obtained by the leader following the follower’s entry. Four heuristics are proposed for this hard-to-solve global optimization problem, namely, a grid search procedure, an alternating method and two evolutionary algorithms. Computational experiments show that the evolutionary algorithm called UEGO_cent.SASS provides the best results.     

A Linear Programming Approach to the Solution of Constrained Multi-Facility Minimax Location Problems where Distances are Rectangular

The problem of locating new facilities with respect to existing facilities is stated as a linear programming problem where inter-facility distances are assumed to be rectangular. The criterion of location is the minimization of the maximum weighted rectangular distance in the system. Linear constraints which (a) limit the new facility locations and (b) enforce upper bounds on the distances between new and existing facilities and between new facilities can be included. The dual programming problem is formulated in order to provide for an efficient solution procedure. It is shown that the duLal variables provide information abouLt the complete range of new facility locations which satisfy the minimax criterion.     

Local search with a generalized neighborhood in the optimization problem for pseudo-Boolean functions

In the optimization problem for pseudo-Boolean functions we consider a local search algorithm with a generalized neighborhood. This neighborhood is constructed for a locally optimal solution and includes nearby locally optimal solutions. We present some results of simulations for pseudo-Boolean functions whose optimization is equivalent to the problems of facility location, set covering, and competitive facility location. The goal of these experiments is to obtain a comparative estimate for the locally optimal solutions found by the standard local search algorithm and the local search algorithm using a generalized neighborhood.     

A two-player competitive discrete location model with simultaneous decisions

In this paper we will describe and study a competitive discrete location problem in which two decision-makers (players) will have to decide where to locate their own facilities, and customers will be assigned to the closest open facilities. We will consider the situation in which the players must decide simultaneously, unsure about the decisions of one another, and we will present the problem in a franchising environment. Most problems described in the literature consider sequential rather than simultaneous decisions. In a competitive environment, most problems consider that there is a set of known and already located facilities, and new facilities will have to be located, competing with the existing ones. In the presence of more than one decision-maker, most problems found in the literature belong to the class of Stackelberg location problems, where one decision-maker, the leader, locates first and then the other decision-maker, the follower, locates second, knowing the decisions made by the first. These types of problems are sequential and differ significantly from the problem tackled in this paper, where we explicitly consider simultaneous, non-cooperative discrete location decisions. We describe the problem and its context, propose some mathematical formulations and present an algorithmic approach that was developed to find Nash equilibria. Some computational tests were performed that allowed us to better understand some of the features of the problem and the associated Nash equilibria. Among other results, we conclude that worsening the situation of a player tends to benefit the other player, and that the inefficiency of Nash equilibria tends to increase with the level of competition.     

On the complexity of the (r|p)-centroid problem in the plane

In the (r∣p)-centroid problem, two players, called leader and follower, open facilities to service clients. We assume that clients are identified with their location on the Euclidean plane, and facilities can be opened anywhere in the plane. The leader opens p facilities. Later on, the follower opens r facilities. Each client patronizes the closest facility. In case of ties, the leader’s facility is preferred. The goal is to find p facilities for the leader to maximize his market share. We show that this Stackelberg game is \(\varSigma_{2}^{P}\) -hard. Moreover, we strengthen the previous results for the discrete case and networks. We show that the game is \(\varSigma_{2}^{P}\) -hard even for planar graphs for which the weights of the edges are Euclidean distances between vertices.     

An exact procedure and LP formulations for the leader—follower location problem

The leader—follower location problem consists of determining an optimal strategy for two competing firms which make decisions sequentially. The leader optimisation problem is to minimise the maximum market share of the follower. The objective of the follower problem is to maximise its market share. We describe linear programming formulations for both problems and analyse the use of these formulations to solve the problems. We also propose an exact procedure based on an elimination process in a candidate list.     

Improving solution of discrete competitive facility location problems

We consider discrete competitive facility location problems in this paper. Such problems could be viewed as a search of nodes in a network, composed of candidate and customer demand nodes, which connections correspond to attractiveness between customers and facilities located at the candidate nodes. The number of customers is usually very large. For some models of customer behavior exact solution approaches could be used. However, for other models and/or when the size of problem is too high to solve exactly, heuristic algorithms may be used. The solution of discrete competitive facility location problems using genetic algorithms is considered in this paper. The new strategies for dynamic adjustment of some parameters of genetic algorithm, such as probabilities for the crossover and mutation operations are proposed and applied to improve the canonical genetic algorithm. The algorithm is also specially adopted to solve discrete competitive facility location problems by proposing a strategy for selection of the most promising values of the variables in the mutation procedure. The developed genetic algorithm is demonstrated by solving instances of competitive facility location problems for an entering firm.     

A discrete competitive facility location model with variable attractiveness

We consider the discrete version of the competitive facility location problem in which new facilities have to be located by a new market entrant firm to compete against already existing facilities that may belong to one or more competitors. The demand is assumed to be aggregated at certain points in the plane and the new facilities can be located at predetermined candidate sites. We employ Huff's gravity-based rule in modelling the behaviour of the customers where the probability that customers at a demand point patronize a certain facility is proportional to the facility attractiveness and inversely proportional to the distance between the facility site and demand point. The objective of the firm is to determine the locations of the new facilities and their attractiveness levels so as to maximize the profit, which is calculated as the revenue from the customers less the fixed cost of opening the facilities and variable cost of setting their attractiveness levels. We formulate a mixed-integer nonlinear programming model for this problem and propose three methods for its solution: a Lagrangean heuristic, a branch-and-bound method with Lagrangean relaxation, and another branch-and-bound method with nonlinear programming relaxation. Computational results obtained on a set of randomly generated instances show that the last method outperforms the others in terms of accuracy and efficiency and can provide an optimal solution in a reasonable amount of time.     

Location of terror response facilities: A game between state and terrorist

We study a leader follower game with two players: a terrorist and a state where the later one installs facilities that provide support in case of a terrorist attack. While the Terrorist attacks one of the metropolitan areas to maximize his utility, the State, which acts as a leader, installs the facilities such that the metropolitan area attacked is the one that minimizes her disutility (i.e., minimizes ‘loss’). We solve the problem efficiently for one facility and we formulate it as a mathematical programming problem for a general number of facilities. We demonstrate the problem via a case study of the 20 largest metropolitan areas in the United States.     

A Stackelberg equilibrium for a missile procurement problem

This paper deals with a procurement problem of missiles involving the efficient assignment of the missiles to some targets. Within a fixed amount of budget, a leader purchases several types of missiles, by which he aims to damage as much value as possible a follower hides into some facilities later. The effectiveness of the missile depends on the type of missile and facility. A payoff of the game is the expected amount of destroyed value. The problem is generalized as a two-person zero-sum game of distributing discrete resources with a leader and a follower. Our problem is to derive a Stackelberg equilibrium for the game. This type of game has an abundance of applications. The problem is first formulated into an integer programming problem with a non-separable objective function of variables and it is further equivalently transformed into a maximin integer knapsack problem. We propose three exacts methods and an approximation method for an optimal solution.     

IP modeling of the survivable hop constrained connected facility location problem

We consider a generalized version of the rooted connected facility location problem which occurs in planning of telecommunication networks with both survivability and hop-length constraints. Given a set of client nodes, a set of potential facility nodes including one predetermined root facility, a set of optional Steiner nodes, and the set of the potential connections among these nodes, that task is to decide which facilities to open, how to assign the clients to the open facilities, and how to interconnect the open facilities in such a way, that the resulting network contains at least λ edge-disjoint paths, each containing at most H edges, between the root and each open facility and that the total cost for opening facilities and installing connections is minimal. We study two IP models for this problem and present a branch-and-cut algorithm based on Benders decomposition for finding its solution. Finally, we report computational results.     

A Lagrangean Heuristic for a Modular Capacitated Location Problem

This paper considers the Modular Capacitated Location Problem (MCLP) which consists of finding the location and capacity of the facilities, to serve a set of customers at a minimum total cost. Each customer has an associated demand and the capacity of each potential location must be chosen from a finite and discrete set of available capacities. Practical applications of this problem can be found in the location of warehouses, schools, health care services or other types of public services. For the MCLP different mixed integer linear programming models are proposed. The authors develop upper and lower bounds on the problem's optimal value and present computational results with randomly generated tests problems.