A Five Color Zero-Sum Generalization

Let g_zs(m, 2k) (g_zs(m, 2k+1)) be the minimal integer such that for any coloring Δ of the integers from 1, . . . , g_zs(m, 2k) by (the integers from 1 to g_zs(m, 2k+1) by ) there exist integers such that 1. there exists j_x such that Δ(x_i) ∈ for each i and ∑_i=1^m Δ(x_i) = 0 mod m (or Δ(x_i)=∞ for each i); 2. there exists j_y such that Δ(y_i) ∈ for each i and ∑_i=1^m Δ(y_i) = 0 mod m (or Δ(y_i)=∞ for each i); and 1. 2(x_m−x₁)≤y_m−x₁. In this note we show g_zs(m, 2)=5m−4 for m≥2, g_zs(m, 3)=7m+−6 for m≥4, g_zs(m, 4)=10m−9 for m≥3, and g_zs(m, 5)=13m−2 for m≥2. Supported by NSF grant DMS 0097317     

Zero-Sum Flows in Regular Graphs

For an undirected graph G, a zero-sum flow is an assignment of non-zero real numbers to the edges, such that the sum of the values of all edges incident with each vertex is zero. It has been conjectured that if a graph G has a zero-sum flow, then it has a zero-sum 6-flow. We prove this conjecture and Bouchet’s Conjecture for bidirected graphs are equivalent. Among other results it is shown that if G is an r-regular graph (r ≥ 3), then G has a zero-sum 7-flow. Furthermore, if r is divisible by 3, then G has a zero-sum 5-flow. We also show a graph of order n with a zero-sum flow has a zero-sum (n + 3)²-flow. Finally, the existence of k-flows for small graphs is investigated.     

关于零和子列个数的一个猜想

本文证明了下述结论: 设p>10000为一素数且合于p≡3(mod 4),取S=((?)2,3)为Z_p上p项序列,则不存在 Z_p上 p 项序列 T,使得f_p(S)=f_p(T)且T的非零项最多有两项互异,其中,f_p(S)表示S的零和子列的个数,这一结论否定了一个有关零和问题的猜想,     

Zero-Sum Differential Games Involving Hybrid Controls

We study a zero-sum differential game with hybrid controls in which both players are allowed to use continuous as well as discrete controls. Discrete controls act on the system at a given set interface. The state of the system is changed discontinuously when the trajectory hits predefined sets, an autonomous jump set A or a controlled jump set C, where one controller can choose to jump or not. At each jump, the trajectory can move to a different Euclidean space. One player uses all the three types of controls, namely, continuous controls, autonomous jumps, and controlled jumps; the other player uses continuous controls and autonomous jumps. We prove the continuity of the associated lower and upper value functions V⁻ and V⁺. Using the dynamic programming principle satisfied by V⁻ and V⁺, we derive lower and upper quasivariational inequalities satisfied in the viscosity sense. We characterize the lower and upper value functions as the unique viscosity solutions of the corresponding quasivariational inequalities. Lastly, we state an Isaacs like condition for the game to have a value This work was partially supported by Grants DRDO 508 and ISRO 050 to the Non-linear Studies Group, Indian Institute of Science. The first author is a University Grant Commission Research Fellow and the financial support is gratefully acknowledged. The authors thank Prof. M.K. Ghosh, Department of Mathematics, Indian Institute of Science, for introducing the problem and thank the referee for useful suggestions.     

Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Partial Information

We study a zero-sum stochastic game on a Borel state space where the state of the game is not known to the players. Both players take their decisions based on an observation process. We transform this into an equivalent problem with complete information. Then, we establish the existence of a value and optimal strategies for both players.     

Binomial Coefficients and Zero-Sum Ramsey Numbers

A counting argument is developed and divisibility properties of the binomial coefficients are combined to prove, among other results, that[formula]whereK_n, resp.K^k_n, is the complete, resp. completek-uniform, hypergaph andR(K_n, Z_p),R(K^k_n, Z₂) are the corresponding zero-sum Ramsey numbers.     

A Coding Theory Bound and Zero-Sum Square Matrices

For a code C=C(n,M) the level k code of C, denoted C _k , is the set of all vectors resulting from a linear combination of precisely k distinct codewords of C. We prove that if k is any positive integer divisible by 8, and n=k, M=k2k then there is a codeword in C _k whose weight is either 0 or at most . In particular, if <(4–2)²/48 then there is a codeword in C _k whose weight is n/2–(n). The method used to prove this result enables us to prove the following: Let k be an integer divisible by p, and let f(k,p) denote the minimum integer guaranteeing that in any square matrix over Z _p , of order f(k,p), there is a square submatrix of order k such that the sum of all the elements in each row and column is 0. We prove that lim inf f(k,2)/k<3.836. For general p we obtain, using a different approach, that f(k,p)p( ^{k / ln k )(1+ o} _k ⁽¹⁾⁾.     

Zero-Sum Ergodic Semi-Markov Games with Weakly Continuous Transition Probabilities

Zero-sum ergodic semi-Markov games with weakly continuous transition probabilities and lower semicontinuous, possibly unbounded, payoff functions are studied. Two payoff criteria are considered: the ratio average and the time average. The main result concerns the existence of a lower semicontinuous solution to the optimality equation and its proof is based on a fixed-point argument. Moreover, it is shown that the ratio average as well as the time average payoff stochastic games have the same value. In addition, one player possesses an ε-optimal stationary strategy (ε>0), whereas the other has an optimal stationary strategy. A. Jaśkiewicz is on leave from Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology. This work is supported by MNiSW Grant 1 P03A 01030.     

Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Partial Information and Average Payoff

We consider a discrete time partially observable zero-sum stochastic game with average payoff criterion. We study the game using an equivalent completely observable game. We show that the game has a value and also we present a pair of optimal strategies for both the players.     

Bias and Overtaking Equilibria for Zero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games

This paper deals with zero-sum stochastic differential games with long-run average payoffs. Our main objective is to give conditions for existence and characterization of bias and overtaking optimal equilibria. To this end, first we characterize the family of optimal average payoff strategies. Then, within this family, we impose suitable conditions to determine the subfamilies of bias and overtaking equilibria. A key step to obtain these facts is to show the existence of solutions to the average payoff optimality equations. This is done by the usual “vanishing discount” approach. Finally, a zero-sum game associated to a certain manufacturing process illustrates our results.     

First Time Solutions of 3 x 3 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games

This paper examines the relative success rates of simple techniques for the solution of 3 x 3 games. It is suggested that examination of a 2 x 2 subgame which does not possess a saddle point is the most likely means of obtaining a first time solution to the original 3 x 3 game.     

The Value of Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games the extensive case

The purpose of this article is to extend the results of J. F.Mertens and S.Zamir, The Value of Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Lack of Information on Both Sides (Intern. Journal of Game Theory,1, 39–64, 1971) to the case where both players are not necessarily informed of each other's pure strategy choices at each stage.     

On A Property Of Minimal Zero-Sum Sequences And Restricted Sumsets

Let G be an additively written abelian group, and let S be asequence in G \ {0} with length |S| 4. Suppose that S is aproduct of two subsequences, say S = BC, such that the elementg + h occurs in the sequence S whenever g.h is a subsequenceof B or of C. Then S contains a proper zero-sum subsequence,apart from some well-characterized exceptional cases. This resultis closely connected with restricted set addition in abeliangroups. Moreover, it solves a problem on the structure of minimalzero-sum sequences, which recently occurred in the theory ofnon-unique factorizations. 2000 Mathematics Subject Classification11B50, 11B75, 11P99.     

模糊二人零和对策的纳什均衡求解

用三角模糊数刻画二人零和对策支付值的不确定性,提出了计算模糊二人零和对策纳什均衡解的多目标规划方法.给出了一种基于区间数比较的三角形模糊数排序方法,根据该方法将模糊二人零和对策转化为多目标线性规划.通过一个数值实例说明了该方法的有效性和实用性.     

A New Condition and Approach for Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Average Payoffs

Abstract

This article deals with discrete-time two-person zero-sum stochastic games with Borel state and action spaces. The optimality criterion to be studied is the long-run expected average payoff criterion, and the (immediate) payoff function may have neither upper nor lower bounds. We first replace the optimality equation widely used in the previous literature with two so-called optimality inequalities, and give a new set of conditions for the existence of solutions to the optimality inequalities. Then, from the optimality inequalities we ensure the existence of a pair of average optimal stationary strategies. Our new condition is slightly weaker than those in the previous literature, and as a byproduct some interesting results such as the convergence of a value iteration scheme to the value of the discounted payoff game is obtained. Finally, we first apply the main results in this article to generalized inventory systems, and then further provide an example of controlled population processes for which all of our conditions are satisfied, while some of conditions in some of previous literature fail to hold.     

Note on “The Value of Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games the extensive case”

The purpose of this note is to extend the results of J. F.Mertens and S.Zamir, The Value of Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Lack of Information on Both Sides (Intern. Journal of Game Theory,1, 39–64, 1971) to the case where both players are not necessarily informed of each other's pure strategy choices at each stage.     

On Zero-Sum {\mathbb{Z}_k} -Magic Labelings of 3-Regular Graphs

Let G =  (V, E) be a finite loopless graph and let (A, +) be an abelian group with identity 0. Then an A-magic labeling of G is a function ${\phi}$ from E into A ? {0} such that for some ${a \in A, \sum_{e \in E(v)} \phi(e) = a}$ for every ${v \in V}$ , where E(v) is the set of edges incident to v. If ${\phi}$ exists such that a =  0, then G is zero-sum A-magic. Let zim(G) denote the subset of ${\mathbb{N}}$ (the positive integers) such that ${1 \in zim(G)}$ if and only if G is zero-sum ${\mathbb{Z}}$ -magic and ${k \geq 2 \in zim(G)}$ if and only if G is zero-sum ${\mathbb{Z}_k}$ -magic. We establish that if G is 3-regular, then ${zim(G) = \mathbb{N} - \{2\}}$ or ${\mathbb{N} - \{2,4\}.}$      

General Theorem on a Finite Support of Mixed Strategy in the Theory of Zero-Sum Games

A theorem related to the theory of zero-sum games is proved. Rather general assumptions on the payoff function are found that are sufficient for an optimal strategy of one of the players to be chosen in the class of mixed strategies concentrated in at most m + 1 points if the opponent chooses a pure strategy in a finite-dimensional convex compact set and m is its dimension. This theorem generalizes results of several authors, starting from Bohnenblust, Karlin, and Shapley (1950).     

Existence of the Limit Value of Two Person Zero-Sum Discounted Repeated Games via Comparison Theorems

We give new proofs of existence of the limit of the discounted values for two person zero-sum games in the three following frameworks: absorbing, recursive, incomplete information. The idea of these new proofs is to use some comparison criteria.